JUDGMENT Braund, J. - This is an unfortunate matter. It' is a suit by a lady against her husband for judicial separation brougth under S. 22 of the Indian Divorce Act. 2. The Petitioner's husband is, I understand an employee of the Jivaji Rao Cotton Mills, which are known as the Birla Mills and are situated in Gwalior State. It was there that the Petitioner and her husband last resided together prior to the presentation of this petition. Accordingly, in paragraph 22 of the petition it is stated: That your Petitioner and the Respondent last resided together at Gwalior within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and this suit is, therefore, cognizable by this Hon'ble Court. 3. That paragraph provokes the question which I have now to decide. It occurred to me when the petition first came before me to ask whether this Court really has jurisdiction under the Indian Divorce Act in respect of residents of Gwalior State. It is provided by S. 23 of the Indian Divorce Act that: Application for judicial separation...may be made by either husband or wife by petition to the District Court or the High Court....... 4. The definition of the words "the High Court" is to be found in Saction 3 of the Act: ........and in any place in the dominion of the princes and States of India in alliance with Her Majesty--the High Court or Chief Court to whose original criminal jurisdiction the Petitioner is for the time being subject, or would be subject, if he or she were an European British subject of Her Majesty.......... 5. We arrive, therefore, at the point at which we have to consider whether the Petitioner, at the time she last resided with her husband at the Birla Mills in Gwalior, was then subject to the original Criminal Jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. 6. By a notification of the Governor General, made in pursuance of S. 109 Sub-section (1) of the Government of India Act, 1915, the Governor General directed that the appellate criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects of His Majesty for the time being within the territories of the State of India which were named below--these included Gwalior--should be exercised by the respective Courts to which they were allocated by the notification. And, t:he notification proceeded to allot certain portions of Gwalior State to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. It is the language of that particular passage of the notification which defines what is allocated to this High Court that is material for the present purpose. It runs: ........the portions of the Gwalior and Khaniadhana States occupied by the Great Indian Peninsula Railway midland section (including the Scindia State Railway), north of Lalitpur......... 7. Residents of that portion of Gwalior State described in the words I have set out above, were, therefore, for the purpose of jurisdiction under the Indian Divorce Act, allocated to this High Court. All the rest of Gwalior State was consigned to the Bombay High Court by a converse notification in almost identical language: .........Gwalior and Khaniadhana States other than the portions of those States occupied by the Great Peninsula Railway midland section (including the Scindia State Railway) north of Lalitpur.......... 8. It came to this, that everything that was not given to Allahabad was bestowed on Bombay 9. It is impossible to pretend that the expression " the portions of the Gwalior...State occupied by the Great Indian Peninsula........is a particularly happy one. It is not easy to see what territory a railway can be said to " occupy ". On the narrowest possible construction of the word, a railway could be said to "occupy " no more than the actual soil on which its railway lines run. 10. Returning now to the facts, it is common ground that the house in which the Petitioner and her husband lived belonged to the Mill owners and was within the compound of the Birla Mills. It is also admitted that the Great Indian Peninsula Railway line ran close to the Birla Mills and that a siding actually ran into and through the Mills themselves and, no doubt, served the purpose of bringing materials to, and taking goods away from the mills. There is no doubt, therefore, that the Petitioner lived within the mill compound and that the mill was " served " in a commercial sense by the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. 11. The question I have to decide is whether, in those circumstances, the Petitioner can be said to have resided in a portion of the Gwalior State which was " occupied " by the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. In my view, she cannot. 12. 11. The question I have to decide is whether, in those circumstances, the Petitioner can be said to have resided in a portion of the Gwalior State which was " occupied " by the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. In my view, she cannot. 12. Looking at the words as they stand and putting on them a reasonable construction, I think they refer to those portions of the soil of the Gwalior State and of any buildings attached thereto which are in the possession or occupation of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway for whatever purpose and upon whatever form of tenure. That would include all land and buildings which were strictly railway property. It would include all land and buildings of which the railway were lessees or licensees or in or once which they had any other right or possession or occupancy. It would include any buildings of the railway in which it housed its employees. Members of the railway staff who lived on premises belonging to the Railway, whether as owners or as lessees, would be residents in a part of Gwalior State "occuoopied" by the Railway. But I cannot in any reasonable use of the English language, extend the words so as to include all land and buildings, which were 'served" by the Great Indian Peninsula Railway in the sense that it catered for the needs of those who lived or worked there. The mere circumstance that the railway serves a particular place, a particular factory or a particular town or village, does not, in the common parlance of language, make the railway the "occupant" of that place, factory, town or village. It may "serve" it certainly; but it does not "occupy' it. If one were to hold that the mere fact that a particular place or a particular group of buildings was "served" by the railway was sufficient to constitute the railway the "occupant" of that place or of those buildings, it would, to my mind, be impossible, in relation to a question of jurisdiction under the Indian Divorce Act, to know where to draw the line. For instance, the railway line passes through and "serves" the countryside at large. If it is to be held that for that reason it "occupied" the countryside, then it may fairly be asked what distance on either side of the Railway line does it "'serve" and so '"occupy". For instance, the railway line passes through and "serves" the countryside at large. If it is to be held that for that reason it "occupied" the countryside, then it may fairly be asked what distance on either side of the Railway line does it "'serve" and so '"occupy". Is a house within one mile, or five miles, or twenty miles, to be said in that case, to be "served" and "occupied" by the railway? Where is the one to be drawn? I think that we should arrive at an altogether impossible position. 13. For these reasons, in my opinion, there is no alternative but to give to the word "occupy" its ordinary, and, as it seems to me, grammatical meaning. That, to my mind, certainly does not include a building in the compound of a mill which is merely "served" by the Great Indian Peninsula Railway in the sense that it has a siding running into and through the mill premises. 14. I regret, therefore, that I am bound to come to the conclusion that this petition does not lie in this Court and I must, therefore, direct that it be returned to the Petitioner to be filed in the proper Court. 15. The Respondent has asked for his costs. But I, feel in all the circumstances, that the proper order in this case is to make no order for costs.