JUDGMENT Braund, J. - This is an appeal from an order of the Civil Judge of Etawah which raises a not uninteresting point. I should perhaps have said that there are two appeals before me, both by the same appellant against the same respondents, and that the judgment I am about to deliver covers both. The point is a short one and is really one of practice, It is however very important in this, as in most other practice points, to follow exactly the course that events have taken. The appellant was the plaintiff in the suit and, to all intents and purposes, respondent 1, Shrimati Rani Maha Laxmi Bai, was the only defendant. It will perhaps be best, in view of the question at issue to relate what it is that the suit claims by setting out verbatim the reliefs it asks for. The prayer for relief is in this language: (a) On establishment of the fact that the plots of rent-free holding granted by the zamindar and specified below did not stand mortgaged to defendant 1 by the plaintiff or his ancestor, and that the entry relating thereto in the public papers as a rent-free grant held in consideration of the rendering of services is altogether wrong, and that it may be declared that the plaintiff is the owner in possession of the said rent-free holding. (b) If for any reason the plaintiff may not be found entitled to relief (a), then, in the alternative, he prays for the following reliefs: (1) If, in the opinion of the Court, the plaintiff is found to be the proprietor of the land by a rent-free grant from the zamindar and is found not to be in possession thereof then defendant 1 may be ejected and the plaintiff put into possession. (2) If it is proved that any mortgage deed was executed in respect of the said rent-free holding in favour of defendant 1 and is binding on the plaintiff then an order for redemption may be granted. 2. It is important to grasp what that relief is. I have analyzed it with great care and it appears to me to amount, in reality, to four distinct things. 2. It is important to grasp what that relief is. I have analyzed it with great care and it appears to me to amount, in reality, to four distinct things. First, under heading (a), it appears to ask for a declaration that the land referred to in the plaint is held by the plaintiff from the zamindar, who, by the way, is defendant 1 herself, by a rent-free grant technically known as a "muafi Dada Zamindar" grant (that is to say a rent-free grant from the zamindar) and not by a "muafi chakrana" grant (that is to say a grant free of any money rent but in consideration of services). That seems to be the first relief asked for. Next-also included in heading (a) - there seems to be a declaration prayed that the land is free from any encumbrances, so far as any mortgage to defendant 1 is concerned. Then, thirdly, in the first part of para, (b) comes a claim for possession by the plaintiff; and, fourthly, as an alternative to the declaration of the land as being free from encumbrances, there is a prayer for redemption in case it should be found that there is a subsisting mortgage on the land in favour of defendant 1. Thus, the plaint, speaking generally, asks for two things, first the establishment of the nature of the plaintiff's interest in the land, and secondly, either a declaration that there is no mortgage in favour of defendant 1, or that, if there is, there may be redemption. 3. I do not think I need say very much about the defence except that the defendant denied that the land was held by a rent-free grant from the zamindar and alleged that, at the most, it was held on some terms of services to be rendered. He further alleged various grounds upon which even that form of grant had come to an end, while, in the alternative, he set up a claim to a usufructuary mortgage over the property in consideration of a loan made in about 1896 for Rs. 300 in favour of defendant 1. Finally, there is the usual siring of "make-weight" defences, involving questions of adverse possession, estoppel, limitation and so forth. In that condition of things the suit came before the Munsif of Etawah. 300 in favour of defendant 1. Finally, there is the usual siring of "make-weight" defences, involving questions of adverse possession, estoppel, limitation and so forth. In that condition of things the suit came before the Munsif of Etawah. I have forgotten to mention that there was another defence raised which was that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That issue-the issue as to jurisdiction-was made issue 1 in the suit by the Munsif and there followed after that a number of other issues dealing with the other questions raised and among them an issue (No. 2) whether the land was "muafi Dada Zaimindar" or "muafi chakrana" land. There was also another issue (No. 3) whether there was any mortgage in favour of defendant 1's mother and if so, how much was teemed by it. 4. It will be sufficient for the present purpose if I say that the Munsif, having been into the issue of jurisdiction, came to the conclusion that, because the plaint raised an alternative claim of redemption, the jurisdiction of the civil Court remained intact and covered every issue in the suit. He therefore went on and tried the suit and in the course of his judgment came to the conclusion, and held, that the land was "Muafi Dada Zamindar" land i.e., rent-free land, and not "Muafi Chakrana" or service land. He also came to the conclusion on issue 3 that there was a subsisting mortgage for Rs. 300 originally created in favour of defendant 1's mother, but now vested in defendant 1 and, finally, he ordered redemption on the footing of that mortgage. The Munsif, however, seems, when he came to his actual order at the end of his judgment to have forgotten that he had held that he had in effect decided in the plaintiff's favour as regards the quality of his title to the land and, so far as the actual order he dictated went, it only referred to redemption. All that the Munsif says is: "Claim for redemption of the mortgage in suit is decreed....." Then followed certain directions as regards redemption. All that the Munsif says is: "Claim for redemption of the mortgage in suit is decreed....." Then followed certain directions as regards redemption. The inevitable result of this was that, in the usual careless way in which decrees are drawn up, the only actual decree which the plaintiff got was a decree for redemption and he never got at all any decree declaring his title, which, after all, had been one of the, main purposes-if not the main purpose-of his suit. 5. The next step was that there were two cross-appeals from the decree of the Munsif to the Civil Judge of Etawah. The plaintiff appealed against the decree for redemption that had been passed against him, while the defendant appealed against the declaration which had in effect been made, but had not found its way into decree, and also upon the ground that the Munsif had been wrong in entertaining the suit at all, because he had had no jurisdiction to do so. Now, on these two cross-appeals, the learned Civil Judge seems to have taken just as firm a view that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to try any part of the suit, as the Munsif himself had taken the view that he was entitled to try the whole of it. The learned Civil Judge pointed out a fallacy in the Munsif's reasoning that, because there was a plea of redemption, therefore the civil Court was clothed with jurisdiction, by referring to the Ss. 12 and 25, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, and showing that redemption proceedings in this case were not within the jurisdiction of the civil Court. In the result, as I have said, the learned Civil Judge came to the conclusion that the civil Court had no jurisdiction and he took the course-which is the course now complained of-of ordering the whole plaint to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation in the right Court, that is to say, in the revenue Court. He did that, presumably, under O. 7, R. 10 of Sch. He did that, presumably, under O. 7, R. 10 of Sch. 1, Civil P.C. He actually says: Having come to this conclusion (that was the conclusion that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to order redemption)-I have no jurisdiction myself to dismiss the suit, and all that I can do is to allow the appeal with costs and direct that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff and Appeal No. 46 of 1939 be dismissed with costs with the same order of returning of the plaint. 6. From that the plaintiff has launched two appeals to me inasmuch as the order which I have just indicated in the Court below was made in each of the two cross-appeals, and therefore it has been necessary that there should be two appeals to me. They raise, however, precisely the same point. Now, as I see it, there are really only two questions for me to consider-first, whether the the civil Court or the revenue Court or partly one and partly the other had jurisdiction over the matters in issue in this suit, and, secondly,-and this is far the more difficult question-what as a matter of practice ought to be done having regard to the answer to the first question. Now, I have come to the conclusion that, quite obviously there were some issues raised by the pleadings in respect of which the civil Court had jurisdiction and that there were other issues in respect of which the civil Court had no jurisdiction, but in respect of which an exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the revenue Court. I shall take the various issues by reference to the headings of the relief which I have already set out earlier in this judgment. As regards the declaration that the nature of the plaintiff's interest in the land was that of a "Muafi Dada Zamindar" grantee and not that of "Muafi Chakrana" grantee, I feel no doubt that the giving of a declaration in that respect was within the jurisdiction of the civil Court. That issue, as such, has nothing whatever to do with the mortgage. As I pointed out earlier in this judgment, it is a distinct issue affecting the nature and quality of the plaintiff's title. By S. 3(6), Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, it is made quite clear that the word "tenant" does not include a rent-free grantee. That issue, as such, has nothing whatever to do with the mortgage. As I pointed out earlier in this judgment, it is a distinct issue affecting the nature and quality of the plaintiff's title. By S. 3(6), Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, it is made quite clear that the word "tenant" does not include a rent-free grantee. By S. 230, Agra Tenancy Act, certain suits and applications of the kind specified in Sch. 4 are consigned to revenue Courts and altogether withdrawn from the jurisdiction of other Courts. 7. I have looked carefully through Sch. 4 but, having regard to the definition of a tenant in the Act and to the circumstance that it does not include a rent-free grantee, I cannot find that there is anything in it to cover a suit which claims a declaration by a person that he is a rent-free grantee. On the other hand, S. 99, Agra Tenancy Act, expressly refers to a rent-free grantee as something quite distinct from a tenant and indicates the manner in which ho may enforce his rights. I think, therefore, that so far as the declaration of the nature and quality of the plaintiff's title is concerned, it was within the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The same thing in my opinion, applies to the declaration in the abstract whether or not it was free from any encumbrances. It is true that in Chapter 3, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, certain express provisions are to be found relating to mortgages and their redemption and the manner in which such mortgages can be enforced. I shall deal with that chapter in a moment but it seems to me that it deals with these mortgages as such and does not affect a case in which a person is endeavouring to establish, or to escape from, a character as mortgagee or mortgagor. In asking for a declaration that the land is free from an encumbrance, a man is not instituting a suit for redemption of a mortgage within S. 12 of the Act. 8. In asking for a declaration that the land is free from an encumbrance, a man is not instituting a suit for redemption of a mortgage within S. 12 of the Act. 8. On the other hand, it appears to me to be equally clear that in so far as the plaint in this case asked for redemption of the mortgage, should it be found to exist, that was clearly a matter which was within S. 12, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, and accordingly, under S. 25 of the same Act, was a matter over which the revenue Court alone had jurisdiction. I think also that so far as the claim made by the plaintiff was one simply for possession of the property, that too was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue Court. I have said enough to indicate that, in my opinion, neither the relief for redemption nor the relief by way of possession was within the jurisdiction of the civil Court, whereas the relief by way of a declaration as to the nature and quality of the plaintiff's rent-free interest and its freedom from the encumbrance was within the jurisdiction of the civil Court. It follows, therefore, that this was a suit instituted in the civil Court in which part of the relief was within its jurisdiction and part was not. There, therefore, emerges the second question which I have to deal with namely what, as a matter of practice is the proper course to take. Now, the learned Civil Judge of Etawah, who, I hope, would not greatly disagree with my conclusions up to this point, has come to the conclusion that the proper thing to do is to apply O. 7, R. 10 and to return the plaint lock, stock and barrel, to the plaintiff for presentation to the revenue Court. I venture to think that that is not the right course. Order 7, Rule 10 reads in this way: (1) The plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. 9. I venture to think that that is not the right course. Order 7, Rule 10 reads in this way: (1) The plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. 9. Now, in a case in which the whole plaint is outside the jurisdiction of a particular Court and no part of the plaint is within the jurisdiction of that Court, no difficulty presents itself, because what the Court has to do is to return the plaint to be taken to the proper Court. It must not dismiss the plaint. It is bound to return it for presentation to the proper Court: see (22) 9 AIR 1922 All. 424 : 70 I.C. 98 : 44 All. 686, Ramjas Singh v. Babu Nandan Singh. A greater difficulty, however, presents itself m a case in which part of the plaint is in order to use a simple expression "bad" and part is "good". In that case it is not so easy to say what the proper course to take is. There are, I think, two alternatives I exclude the possibility of merely giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend by removing the part that is bad and so leaving the remainder entirely within the jurisdiction of that Court I exclude that because it goes without saying that it is always possible for the Court to allow the plaintiff to do that in a proper case I am not, therefore, treating that as a distinct alternative. Not do I think that it is possible, notwithstanding what was said by two learned Judges of this Court in a case to which I shall refer in a moment, to apply O. 7, R. 10 literally, because, when O. 7, R. 10 speaks of a "plaint," I think it means the entire plaint and not merely put of the plaint and still less a certified copy of a plaint or part of it. The two alternatives which have been suggested to me are, first that the Court (i.e., the civil Court in which the irregular plaint is presented) should keep the suit pending before it for the purpose of trying, and granting relief in respect of, so much of the subject matter of the suit as is within its jurisdiction, while to the extent to which such subject-matter is not within its jurisdiction, it should allow a certified copy of the plaint to be taken and filed in the revenue Court, or whatever the proper Court may be which can grant relief in respect of that part. That is one alternative. The other alternative is that the civil Court in which the plaint is first presented should simply dismiss the suit in respect of that put which is "bad" and proceed to try the remaining part of the issue in the suit which is within its jurisdiction I venture to suggest that there may be a possible thud alternative, which however, is, perhaps hardly more than a variation of the second, namely that instead of dismissing the suit, the Court might exercise its powers under O. 6, R. 16 and strike out the bad part of the plaint as tending to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of that part which is good. 10. In a case of this Court, ('21) 8 AIR 1921 All. 193 : 64 I.C. 688 : 19 A.L.J. 822, Kishori Lal v. Ram Sundar, Walsh and Wallach JJ appear to me to favour the former alternative That was a case in which there was a suit in which the plaint consisted of one claim which was within the jurisdiction of the civil Court and one which was not within its jurisdiction. The learned judges had before them, therefore, precisely the same point as I have now before me. They said in reference to O. 7, R. 10: The rule does not specifically state what is to be done when a plaint consists of a claim within the jurisdiction and also a claim outside the jurisdiction, but it obviously means that that portion of such a plaint which is outside the jurisdiction shall be treated as though it was a distinct plaint by itself. The rule would be unworkable at it were not to be construed in this way... 11. The rule would be unworkable at it were not to be construed in this way... 11. By that the learned Judges presumably meant that the proper thing to do was to treat so much of the plaint as related to matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Court as being a plaint on its own and presumably that that part should be returned to the plaintiff to be presented elsewhere. It would be unbecoming of me to discuss this at length, as with great respect I have some difficulty in agreeing either that that view of the matter is obvious or that, having regard to ordinarily good practice, it is even possible I do not see how, having regard, for instance, to O. 4, R. 1 any proceedings in a different Court could he begun merely by the presentation to it an off shoot of a suit already on existence in another Court and a copy of that. 12. In a later case, (Acharya Guru Mahant) Ramrup Goshain and Others Vs. Mahant Ramdhari Bhagat and Others Ramrup Goshain v. Ramdhari Bhagat, Sir Shah Sulaiman and Boys J., in this Court took quite a different view and one with which, if I may say so with great respect, I entirely agree. These learned Judges held that in a case in which some reliefs were within the jurisdiction of the Court to which the plaint was presented, it was not correct to return the plaint "for presentation to the proper Court"-indeed, as I have already pointed out, it is extremely difficult to see how that could be done-but that the Court should either call upon the plaintiff to amend his plaint by striking out what was beyond jurisdiction and so leaving the remainder unobjectionable, or, that failing, should wait till it delivers its judgment upon those parts that are within its jurisdiction and then at the same time dismiss what is beyond it. This recognises what, with great respect to the learned Judges who decided the earlier case, seems to me to be the impossibility of applying O. 7, R. 10 to such a case and also, the impossibility, except where under some statutory provision it is allowed, of sending part of a plaint from one Court to another so as to split it up into several suits. I would, however, myself suggest that there is possibly a third course which, though amounting to very much the same thing, might obviate the necessity of waiting until the judgment is delivered to dismiss the suit as regards that part which is beyond jurisdiction. That course would be to apply O. 6, R. 16 of Sch. 1, Civil P.C., and to dismiss that part at once as tending to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit. Ex-hypothesi that part will have become merely "dead wood" and it seems to me that obviously it must embarrass, prejudice or delay the fair trial of the suit to leave it there. I only venture to throw it out as a suggestion. I regret that, upon this view of the matter, supported as it is by the view of two other learned Judges of this Court in the case I have just referred to, I find myself unable to agree with the view taken by two learned Judges of the Patna High Court in Secretary of State Vs. Natabar Mangraj, AIR 1927 Patna 254 and I think that the case in the Lahore High Court, ('32) 19 A.L.R. 1932 Lah. 595 : 138 I.C. 755 : 33 P.L.R. 766, Ruknuddaulah v. Mohd. Umardaraz Ali Khan, hardly covers the point, as it leaves it merely to the option of the plaintiff whether he will amend his plaint or not. As I said, it is always possible for the Court to give the plaintiff that option, but the real question arises only if and when he has declined to make the amendment. The view which therefore, in my opinion, is the right view is the one expressed by Sir Shah Sulaiman and Boys J., in the case in ('25) 12 AIR 1925 All. 683 : 89 I.C. 40 : 47 All. 770 : 23 A.L.J. 601, Ramrup Goshain v. Ramdhari Bhagat which I have referred to above. 13. Now, applying that to the present case, what must be done; the suit plainly raises issues, some of which were within the jurisdiction of the civil Court and others of which were within the jurisdiction only of the revenue Court. 770 : 23 A.L.J. 601, Ramrup Goshain v. Ramdhari Bhagat which I have referred to above. 13. Now, applying that to the present case, what must be done; the suit plainly raises issues, some of which were within the jurisdiction of the civil Court and others of which were within the jurisdiction only of the revenue Court. I think that the learned Civil Judge of Etawah was wrong, for the reasons which I have explained, in applying O. 7, R. 10 in its entirety to a case like that, because it is quite impossible to do so. What should have been done was that, following the rule laid down by Sir Shah Sulaiman and Boys J., the plaint should have been dismissed by the Munsif so far as it contained matters exceeding the jurisdiction of his Court. As I have already pointed out, I am inclined myself to think that the Munsif need not have waited until the stage of delivering judgment to do that but might, instead of dismissing them, have struck them out at a far earlier stage under O. 6, R. 16. That, however, is an academic matter as that stage has long passed. The proper order for the Munsif to have made in the circumstances was, therefore, to have dismissed the suit so far as it related to an order for possession and to redemption of the mortgage and to have decreed the suit, accepting for this purpose as right the findings he has actually arrived at, in respect to the declaration that the land was "Maufi Dada Zamindar" land and not "Muafi Chakrana" land and also in respect of the declaration that it was subject to an encumbrance in favour of defendant 1. 14. What I must do now, therefore, is first to set aside the decree of the Civil Judge of Etawah. That I do. I have already pointed out that the decree which was originally passed by the Munsif was defective in so far as it never contained the declaration of title which the plaintiff was entitled to have. It should have done so. That I do. I have already pointed out that the decree which was originally passed by the Munsif was defective in so far as it never contained the declaration of title which the plaintiff was entitled to have. It should have done so. The only actual order that I can now make, except an order as to costs, is to set aside the decree of the Court below and to direct that the two cross-appeals in the Court below now be restored to be heard upon the issues other than the issue as to jurisdiction which I have now decided. As regards the costs, the plaintiff was bound to come here because the order of the Civil Judge was wrong. On the other hand, this trouble is primarily due to the state in which he launched his own plaint. I think the proper order as to the costs of this appeal is that both parties should bear their own costs. As regards the costs of the two hearings in the Courts below I think the proper order is that those costs shall abide the event in the now pending appeals. They will, accordingly, be dealt with by the Civil Judge of Etawah when he hears those appeals.