JUDGMENT Collister and Bajpai, JJ. - This is a Plaintiff's appeal. The Plaintiff was Raghu-bir Sarau Das, but he is now dead and his heirs and legal representatives have been brought on the record. 2. The suit was for recovery of a sum of Rs. 6,480 principal and interest ; and the Defendant to the suit was the Official receiver of the property of two persons, Sri Ram and Tirlok Prasad, who have been adjudged insolvent It appears that a man named Gur Baksh Singh died leaving considerable property, including two pakka shops and a pakka stair case in the town of Meerut. He died without issue, but he lett a widow, by name Mst. Nehal Kunwar, who under the Hindu Law acquired a life estate in the property of her deceased husband. 3. On the 4th August, 1915, Mst. Nehal Kunwar executed a sale-deed of the pakka shops and stair case in favour of Sri Ram and Tirlok Prasad for a consideration of Rs. 1,420. The sale-deed is at page 37 of our paper book and it will be seen that she claimed to be the "permanent owner in possession " and stated that the property belonged exclusively to herself. 4. Twelve years later, on the 28th January, 1927, Sri Ram and Tirlok Prasad who we may mention are brothers--were adjudged insolvent and their property vested in the Official receiver u/s 28 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The Official receiver took possession inter alia of the two buildings and the stair case. On the 17th May, 1931, Mst. Nehal Kunwar died and therefore her life estate was extinguished under the Hindu Law. The Official receiver, however, put up this property as well as other property for sale at auction on the 25th August, 1931. The Plaintiff made the highest bid, namely Rs. 5,500 for the two buildings and the stair case and these properties were knocked down to him for the aforesaid amount. 5. On the 8th April, 1932, Mst. Hardei who is a sister of Gur Buksh Singh, instituted a suit (Suit No. 39 of 1932) under the provisions of Act III of 1929, in which she impleaded no less than 47 Defendants including Raghubir Saran Das. the Plaintiff of the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. 5. On the 8th April, 1932, Mst. Hardei who is a sister of Gur Buksh Singh, instituted a suit (Suit No. 39 of 1932) under the provisions of Act III of 1929, in which she impleaded no less than 47 Defendants including Raghubir Saran Das. the Plaintiff of the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. In that suit Mst, Hardei challenged the validity of an award which was said to have been made on the 27th February, 1915, and which purported to confer an absolute title upon Mst. Nehal Kunwar. She further assailed the sale deed of 4th August, 1915, on the ground that the title of the vendees to that sale deed did not enure beyond the death of Mst. Nehal Kunwar--which as we have already seen, took place on the 17th May, 1931, and on the same grounds she attacked the auction purchase of 25th August, 1931, alleging that no title had passed thereunder to the Plaintiff Appellant. 6. We may mention at this stage that after the auction sale of 25th August, 1931, the Plaintiff Appellant had paid the sum of Rs. 5,500 which was the amount of his bid --to the Official receiver. 7. Mst. Hardei's suit was decided on the 19th April, 1933, and it was he'd that the award in question is not a family arrangement and is not bona fide or genuine and the Plaintiff (that is to say Mst. Hardei) was not bound by it; and so far as the two buildings and the stair case are concerned it was held that the vendees under the sale deed of 4th August, 1931, had no title beyond the death of Mst. Nehal Kunwar and that the auction sale of 25th August, 1931, conferred no title on Raghubir Saran Das. Mst. Hardei's claim for possession in respect to these properties was accordingly decreed and on the 11th June, 1933, she obtained delivery of possession. 8. We may mention that the Plaintiff to the present suit did not contest that suit and it was decreed against him ex-parte. Nor did the Official receiver ask to be impleaded in it, although he was aware of its institution. We know this because in a report dated 21st May, 1932, he made a mention of suit No. 39 of 1932. 9. We must new go back again to the year 1932. Nor did the Official receiver ask to be impleaded in it, although he was aware of its institution. We know this because in a report dated 21st May, 1932, he made a mention of suit No. 39 of 1932. 9. We must new go back again to the year 1932. On the 2nd May, 1932, the Plaintiff to the present suit preferred an application in which he referred to Mst. Hardei's suit and went on to say: Under these circumstances when the rights of ownership of the insolvent in respect of the shop sold are not clear and the Petitioner purchaser has to face unnecessary litigation, as regards the result of which nothing can be said with certainty, the Petitioner is by no means ready to purchase the shop aforesaid. Hence it is respectfully prayed that the sale may not be confirmed in favour of the Petitioner and an order may be passed for the refund of Rs. 5,500 which the Petitioner has deposited and the interest thereon. 10. The only result of this application was that on the 24th June, 1932, the Court passed the following order:-- Let the objections be dismissed as prayed for and the sale confirmed. 11. On the 25th August, 1934, the suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted by Raghubir Saran Das. It is unnecessary to set out the allegations in the plaint in any detail: it will suffice to say that the main plea in the suit was that the insolvents had no title in the property after the death of Mst. Nehal Kunwar on the 17th May, 1931, and that therefore no title passed to the Plaintiff under the auction sale of 25th August, 1931. The suit was contested by the Defendant on various grounds and it has been dismissed by the Court below. The learned Judge after referring to the Proviso to Section 55 (2) of the Transfer of Property Act and an authority of this Court, which it is unnecessary for us to mention, says: Therefore, in view of the aforesaid states of law and also of the fact that the property was purchased from a trustee with full knowledge that the owner prior to Sri Ram and Tilikchand was a Hindu widow, the Plaintiff cannot be allowed to get back his purchase money. The Plaintiff bid at the auction with his eyes open. The Plaintiff bid at the auction with his eyes open. He took all the risk which the sale by a trustee entails. He did not move his little finger to ward off the attack made on his title by Mst Hardei I therefore fail to discover any equity in his favour to entitle him to claim a refund of his purchase mony. This mention of a trustee and of the Proviso to Section 55 (2) of the Transfer of Property Act predicates the title of the insolvents to the property in question, and the fact of this title is vehemently assailed. This is a matter which we shall shortly have to deal with. 12. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the questions were all in favour of the Defendant. He says: It is an admitted fact that no sale deed has so far been executed in favour of the Plaintiff, who has also failed to get possession over the disputed shops because Mst. Hardei has obtained a decree against and also possession over them. But it cannot also be denied that the sale deed was not executed because the Plaintiff himself committed a default in supplying the requisite stamp (vide Defendant's statement on oath) and also because the Plaintiff himself wanted to introduce certain amendments in the draft of the sale deed which are not acceptable to the Defendant in his capacity as Official receiver. 13. The learned Judge then goes on to say that the Plaintiff alternately approbated and reprobated the sale and that even after confirmation of the sale by the Court on the 24th June, 1932, the Plaintiff did nothing to have a formal conveyance executed in his favour or to obtain possession of the property. It certainly does appear that the Plaintiff was vacillating as to whether to accept or repudiate the sale, and the reason for this vacillation was that he did not know what the result of Mst. Hardei's suit would be and was apprehensive as regards the validity of his title. The Defendant says that within a year or six months of the sale he asked the Plaintiff to supply him with the stamp for sale-deed he made this request three or four times ; but the Plaintiff replied that there was no hurry about the matter. Hardei's suit would be and was apprehensive as regards the validity of his title. The Defendant says that within a year or six months of the sale he asked the Plaintiff to supply him with the stamp for sale-deed he made this request three or four times ; but the Plaintiff replied that there was no hurry about the matter. The Defendant's own clerk, however, a man named Ram Saran Das, has stated in cross examination that so far as he remembers the draft of the sale deed was first handed over to the Plaintiff in 1934 and that previous to that there had been no talk of any sale deed at all. As we know, Mst Hardei's suit was decided on the 19th April 1933 and therefore if the evidence of this witness is correct, the sale deed was no: drafted by the Defendant until long after the decision of the Court to the effect that the insolvents had no title to this property. As regards the stamp, moreover, it is an admitted fact that the Defendant has all along been in possession of the property and has been realising rents from it and he was therefore in a position to pay for the stamp out of these rents and to execute the sale deed. 14. So much for the equities. We now come to the pleas which have been specifically taken before us by Learned Counsel for the Appellants. He pleads that although in the sale proclamation vide page 45 the property was stated to belong to the insolvents it did not in fact belong to them and therefore it could not and did not vest in the Defendant as Official receiver u/s 28 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Learned Counsel further pleads that if it be found that the insolvents had a title to this property there could be no conveyance without a registered sale deed as required by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 17 of the Registration Act. 15. In our opinion these contentions are wellfounded. It is perfectly clear that after the death of Mst. Nehal Kunwar on the 17th May 1931 no title remained in her transferees in as much as she had no higher interest in the property than a life estate as a Hindu widow. 15. In our opinion these contentions are wellfounded. It is perfectly clear that after the death of Mst. Nehal Kunwar on the 17th May 1931 no title remained in her transferees in as much as she had no higher interest in the property than a life estate as a Hindu widow. Of course it might have been otherwise if the transfer had been for legal necessity, but there is no suggestion of any such thing. If the property did not belong to the insolvents it is clear that it could not vest in the receiver; and there was therefore no question of his holding it in a fiduciary capacity This being so the proviso to Section 55 (2) of the Transfer of property Act has no application. It is the sub-section itself which is applicable and that sub-section provides :-- The seller shall be deemed to contract with the buyer that the interest which the seller professes to transfer to the buyer subsists and that he had power to transfer the same. 16. Section 2 of the Transfer of Property Act provides inter alia that nothing in the Act shall be deemed to affect. any transfer by operation of law or by, or in execution of, a decree or order of a Court of competent jurisdiction 17. The preamble shows that the Act contains the law relating to the transfer of property by Act of parties and from Section AIR 1935 Mad, 55 it is clear that a transfer which is other than a transfer by operation of law or in execution of a decree or order of a Court is governed by the provisions of this Act and therefore a deed of conveyance in respect to immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards can only be made by means of a registered instrument. The Provincial Insolvensy Act does not provide for sales by the Court such as ate provided for in the Civil Procedure Code,. There can, we think, be no doubt that a sale in insolvency proceedings, whether it be a direct sale by the Official receiver to a particuler person or whether it be a sale at auction, is nothing more than a transfer by act of parties. There can, we think, be no doubt that a sale in insolvency proceedings, whether it be a direct sale by the Official receiver to a particuler person or whether it be a sale at auction, is nothing more than a transfer by act of parties. This view was held by four out of five learned Judges composing a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Pinnamameni Basava Sankaram v. Garapati Narasin-hulu A1 R 1927 Mad. 1 Kumaraswami Sastri, A.C. J. observes :-- I do no think that a sale by the Official receiver acting under the provisions of the provincial Insolvency Act is a transfer by operation of law or by, or in execution of, a decree or order of a Court of competent jurisdiction........ 18. On the next page he says: Though property vests in the receiver by operation of law, the transfer by him is a transfer by one party to another and cannot be said to be transfer by operation of law in favour of his vendee. 19. The same view has been expressed by three of the other learned Judges composing the Bench, but we will content ourselves with citing the observations of Ourgenven J. He says: No difficulty seems to be presented by the words transfer by operation of law which, however, widely they may be construed, cannot cover a sale by a receiver of an insolvent's property. Such a sale is frequently a matter of discretion and so a voluntary act on the part of the receiver, as the purchase is on the part of the buyer, and although the receiver may be a public officer, the transaction is not the less an act of parties on that account. The ordinary rules relating to stamps and registration apply to such sales. 20. Similarly in Kamsala Narasappa v. Hussain Sab2, a Bench of that Court held that transfer deed executed by an officia receiver in pursuance of an auction sale held by him is not exempt from registration u/s 17 (2) (XII) of the Registration Act. In Abdul Hashim Vs. Amar Krishna Saha, AIR 1919 Cal 193 it was held by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court that there is nothing to exempt a conveyance by an official receiver in insolvency from the operation of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. 21. In Abdul Hashim Vs. Amar Krishna Saha, AIR 1919 Cal 193 it was held by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court that there is nothing to exempt a conveyance by an official receiver in insolvency from the operation of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. 21. In Golam Hossein Cassim Arif v. Fatitna Begum (1910) 16 C. W, N. 394 : 6 I.C. 300' it was held that a sale by a receiver under the directions of the Court is not a sale by the Court, and as such the Court does not grant sale certificate nor does it confirm the sale. 22. Since the official receiver is an agent of the Court, it may be said that a sale effected by him is a sale under the Court, but it is certainly not a sale by the Court. This being so, even if the insolvents had any title to the property, no such title has passed to the Plaintiff for the reason that such title could only pass by means of a registered instrument. 23. In view of what we have already said and having regard to the fact that the property has now passed into the possession of Mst. Hardei and the Appellants can receive no consideration for their money, we are of opinion that the Appellants are entitled to the refund which they claim. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the decree of the Court below and we decree the suit with costs in both Courts.