JUDGMENT Braund, J. - This is an appeal from an order made by the Judge of the Small Cause Court of Meerut which raises a point which to my mind is one of some difficulty. 2. The facts are very simple. It seems that a certain person called Mutsaddi Lal and some others had a decree against one Nem Chand, as the judgment-debtor. There was a minor named Amar Chand--who is the present Appellant--whose mother was called Mst. Koli On the 1st of August, 1939, Mutsaddi Lal and the other decree-holders transferred the decree in writing to the minor, Amar Chand, in consideration of Rs. 410. No doubt this was purchase arranged by the mother in her capacity as the natural guardian. 3. On the 22nd of August, 1939, application was made to the Court in which the decree was being executed purporting to be under Order 21, Rule 16 of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. It was, I think, in form an application by Mst. Koli on behalf of the minor and it seems to have asked, in effect, to have the minor's name substituted for the names of the decree-holders in the execution proceedings so as to be able to carry them on. I point out in passing, because it may be of some materiality later, that Order 21, Rule 16 does not in strictness contemplate any actual substitution at all. All that it provides for is that the transferee may make an application for execution of the decree and that the decree may be executed "in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application"--i.e., the application for execution--"were made by such decree-holder" Technically speaking it does not amount to a "substitution" at all. 4. On the 14th of September, 1939, au event took place which has given rise to the present question. The mother, Mst. Koli, compromised the judgment debt with the judgment-debtor and accepted a sum of Rs. 200 in full satisfaction of it. In what capacity she did that is really the question which is now in dispute. 4. On the 14th of September, 1939, au event took place which has given rise to the present question. The mother, Mst. Koli, compromised the judgment debt with the judgment-debtor and accepted a sum of Rs. 200 in full satisfaction of it. In what capacity she did that is really the question which is now in dispute. It has to be noticed that it happened between the 22nd of August, 1939, on which date she had made the "substitution" application--I use that expression for want of a better one--and the 23rd of September; which was the date on which the "substitution" application came on for hearing and on which an order was made which, in effect, allowed the substitution. On that date the Munsif of Ghaziabad on the "substitution" application said: The judgment-debtor does not oppose the Applicant's name being substituted in place of the original decree-holder. The Applicant prays (sic) against the opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5. ORDER Let the Applicant's name be substituted in place of the original decree-holders. 5. On the same date an application appears to have been made by the judgment-debtor, Nem Chand, under Order 21, Rule 2, bringing into Court the compromise which he claimed to have effected with the minor and asking to have such payment or adjustment certified to the Court. That was opposed by Amar Chand, presumably acting through his mo her, upon the ground that the bargain had been made, if it was made at all, by the judgment-debtor with a person purporting to act as the Mukhtar-e-am of Mst. Koli but who in fact had ceased to be her agent and actually had no authority to enter into any such compromise. 6. The question which is now in dispute between the parties is, apart altogether from the facts of the case, whether, even assuming that the compromise was effected by Mst. Koli on the minor's behalf, it can bind the miner. The Munsif took the view, as I understand it, that it was beyond the powers, in any case, of Mst. Koli to have entered into an effective compromise at that stage and he accordingly declined to certify the payment as being a satisfaction of the decree. 7. Koli on the minor's behalf, it can bind the miner. The Munsif took the view, as I understand it, that it was beyond the powers, in any case, of Mst. Koli to have entered into an effective compromise at that stage and he accordingly declined to certify the payment as being a satisfaction of the decree. 7. In due course that came before the Judge of the Small Cause Court of Meerut and he took an opposite view, holding that there was nothing in law to have prevented Mst. Koli on the 14th of September, 1939, from effective y binding the minor's interest by a compromise and he accordingly held that the only question to be decided was whether, in the events which had happened, she had, in fact, done so. In that view of the matter, he sent the case back to the Munsif with directions to him to hear the case on the facts and to decide under Order 21, Rule 2 whether the compromise, assuming there was one, should be certified as a satisfaction or net. From that the case has come on appeal to me. 8. It turns, as I see it on Order 32, Rule 7 of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. That rule says: (1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as a next friend or guardian. (2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor. 9. I accept it for the present purpose, though I do not so decide, that, but for complication of her having become a "next friend", it was within the competence of Mst. Koli in her capacity as the natural guardian to enter into a valid compromise of the execution proceedings on the minor's behalf. That, of course, is without reference to the particular facts of this case. The whole question, therefore, is whether in the circumstances Mst. Koli in her capacity as the natural guardian to enter into a valid compromise of the execution proceedings on the minor's behalf. That, of course, is without reference to the particular facts of this case. The whole question, therefore, is whether in the circumstances Mst. Koli, by virtue of the application for substitution dated the 22nd of August, 1939, had become the "next friend" of the minor so as to bring herself within Order 32, Rule 7 and thereby to have put it out of her power without the leave of the Court to enter into an agreement or compromise on the minor's behalf, which apart from that capacity she would have a right to do. That raises a point which is, I think, by no means easy. At far as I am aware, the point has not before arisen--certainly in this Court I find a case of Kastori Singh v. Pati Ram 1939 A.W.R. (H.C.) 797 : A.L.J. 1019, decided by a Bench of this Court in which a question arose as to the power of a guardian to compromise in a case where, a minor being an original party to the suit, an arrangement was come to after the decree had been obtained but before the execution proceedings had been started. The learned Judge held--and if I may say so with respect I can see no other answer--that Order 32, Rule 7 applied just as much to a case before the execution proceeding was begun as afterwards. They say: If the proposition be sound then clearly it would be a matter of a difficulty to defeat the provisions of Order 32, Rule 7 and deprive the minor of the protection thereby provided; all that would be necessary would be to delay formally concluding the compromise till the decree in suit had been passed. We are satisfied that where a decree is adjusted before execution by means of a compromise and one of the parties to the litigation is a minor the consent of the Court is necessary, if the minor is to be bound thereby. 10. That really does not apply to this case, because the minor was there a party to the suit ab initio and ex-hypothesi had a next friend. 10. That really does not apply to this case, because the minor was there a party to the suit ab initio and ex-hypothesi had a next friend. The whole difficulty arises in the present case from the circumstance that the minor was not an original party to the suit and did not become associated with it--I use a neutral word--until the application of the 22nd of August, 1939, was made by Mst. Koli. I only refer to this decision for the purpose of showing that the Court does not readily surrender its inherent jurisdiction to safeguard the interests of minors. 11. The expression "a next friend" originally denoted the person through whom an infant acts without any necessary reference to litigation but in modern times it has come to assume a technical meaning of the person by whom a minor or an infant, as the case may be, is represented as a Plaintiff in litigation. The real object of having a next friend is that there may be somebody to whom the Defendant or the opposite-party may be able to look for costs. The next friend himself does not actually become a party to the litigation. It is the minor who is the party and the next friend is a person--so to speak in the back ground--who can act on the minor's behalf and to whom the opposite-party can look for costs. 12. Now there is one other peculiarity to notice in the position of a next friend. As every one knows a minor who is a Defendant to a suit is represented by a guardian ad litem. There is this difference between a guardian ad litem and a next friend that, whereas a guardian ad litem is constituted by an order of the Court, a next friend automatically constitutes himself by taking steps in the suit. That will be found to be so from comparing Order 32, Rules 1 and 2 with Order 32, Rule 3. There is, therefore, no difficulty at all in telling whether or not a person is a guardian ad litem, because it depends upon the question whether there has been an order of the Court putting him into that position. But in the case of a next friend there is no such convenient why of ascertaining when he has assumed that position. But in the case of a next friend there is no such convenient why of ascertaining when he has assumed that position. That, again, is I think the origin of the distinction which is drawn throughout Order 32 between a "next friend" and "the guardian for the suit". It has to be noticed that the words "for the suit" qualify guardian and not next friend. 13. Now, Order 32, Rule 1 provides for the manner in which a suit is to be instituted by a minor. It says that every suit by a minor shall be instituted in his name by a person who in that suit shall be called his next friend. From that it is quite clear that a person who does, in fact, institute a suit in the name of a minor becomes his next friend and according to the Code, that would apparently happen at the instant a plaint is presented on a minor's behalf. I draw attention to this that, though Order 32, Rule 1 provides how a suit is to be instituted on a minor's behalf, it does not say that that is the only way in which a person can become a next friend. It says that the result of presenting a plaint in a minor's name is to make the person presenting it a next friend. But it does cot say that nobody can become a next friend unless he institutes a suit on the minor's behalf. 14. Mr. Mukerji has conceded that immediately after the substitution order of the 23rd of September was made Mst. Koli became the minor's next friend. That, of course, in itself amounts to an admission that, in order to qualify as a next friend, it is not necessary for the minor to occupy the technical position of a Plaintiff, because, as I have already pointed out, the minor in this case never became the Plaintiff and indeed, on the actual wording of Order 21, Rule 16 it is difficult to see that he actually became a party to the execution proceedings at all. All that Order 21, Rule 16 says is that the execution proceedings shall be carried on as if he were a party. 15. It is necessary, however, to go a step further and to enquire whether, assuming that Mst. All that Order 21, Rule 16 says is that the execution proceedings shall be carried on as if he were a party. 15. It is necessary, however, to go a step further and to enquire whether, assuming that Mst. Koli would, in any case, have become a next friend when the "substitution" order was made, she did not actually become a next friend by virtue of her mere application for the minor to be substituted. In my judgment she did. I do not think that there is to be found any hard and fast definition in the CPC of a next friend as being a person--and no one less than a person--who presents a plaint on behalf of a minor under Order 32, Rule 1. Undoubtedly such a person does become a next friend, but as I see it, the actual character of a next friend rest upon a far wider principle than that. 16. The Court as I have said, has a special inherent jurisdiction, derived from the Crown as parens patriae to protect the interests of minors. And it will exercise that jurisdiction wherever it finds it necessary in the interests of a minor. That, of course, is a very wide proposition but coupled with the most ordinary equitable principles, I think it is sufficient to meet a case such as this, in which the Court finds a person making an application on behalf of the minor, which, if granted, will result in his becoming a next friend and to prevent that person from repudiating the position of a next friend at any time after he has taken upon himself to make the application. If it were otherwise, it would amount to a form of approbation and reprobation. The person acting on behalf of the minor would have accepted that capacity by making the application and in that sense would have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court--but at the same time would be claiming for all other purposes to be free from the restrictions attaching to a next friend. In other words, he would be denying the right of the Court to exercise any jurisdiction over him in relation to the minor's affairs. That can be put in many ways. One of them is to consider what would be the position as to costs in case the application was refused. In other words, he would be denying the right of the Court to exercise any jurisdiction over him in relation to the minor's affairs. That can be put in many ways. One of them is to consider what would be the position as to costs in case the application was refused. I do not doubt that the person making it on the minor's behalf would be liable for costs and in that sense, would be occupying the position of a next friend. 17. Rule 5 of Order 32 is in much more general terms. It says that "every application to the Court on behalf of a minor" with one exception shall be made by his next friend or his guardian ad litem. It does not limit that to an application in which he has already become the Plaintiff or the Defendant, as the case may be. It appears to me to imply that wherever you find an application to the Court by a person on a minor's behalf and in relation to a suit, that application must ex-hypothesi be made by the person making it as a next friend. Looking at the matter as a whole and applying principles of equity which I think I am entitled to apply, I cannot take so narrow a view of the expression "next friend" in Order 32, Rule 7 as to confine it to a person who is acting on behalf of a minor who has already assumed the position of a Plaintiff. I think that it applies to any person who makes an application to the Court on a minor's behalf in relation to a suit. And in particular, it applies to a person who makes such an application with a view to the minor assuming the position either of a Plaintiff or a person in the position of a Plaintiff. It seems to me to be opposed to fundamental principles that such a person should be allowed to assume what in fact is the position of a next friend and to repudiate that position in form. To put that in other words, I can see no justification for allowing a person in that position to do something which is inconsistent with the very position which he applies to be allowed to assume. To put that in other words, I can see no justification for allowing a person in that position to do something which is inconsistent with the very position which he applies to be allowed to assume. It seems to me that it would defeat the whole object of the provision of Order 32, Rule 7 if a guardian, having once applied on the minor's behalf for the minor to be put into a position which would constitute the Applicant a next friend in the fullest sense, were to be permitted to exercise powers which no next friend could exercise. The only solution to the difficulty that I can see is that such an Applicant must be treated as having surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the Court and to have assumed the responsibilities of an actual next friend. 18. If that is the true view, then I do not think that it was open to Mst. Koli to enter into this compromise on the minor's behalf, even assuming that, apart from Order 32, Rule 7, it was validly entered into. I think that the view taken by the Munsif of Ghaziabad in his judgment of the 4th of November, 1939, was the right view and that under Order 32, Rule 7 the compromise so entered into--if it was entered into at all--was voidable at the instance of the minor. He avoided it and that, I think is the end of the matter Nevertheless it does not preclude a fresh compromise being entered into and sanctioned by the Court in a proper way if the parties so desire. 19. The result is that I allow this appeal and set aside the order of the Judge of the Small Cause Court and restore the Munsif's order dated the 4th of November, 19:59. The Appellant is entitled to his costs of this appeal and of the appeal in the Small Causes Court.