JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmad, C.J., Ismail and Dar, JJ. - This is a vendee's appeal arising out of a pre-emption suit. The vendee contested the suit inter alia on the ground that the transaction sought to be pre-empted by the Plaintiff-Respondents was not a sale within the meaning of Section 11 of the Agra Preemption Act and as such, the suit for pre-emption was not maintainable. We are not concerned in the present appeal with the other contentions raised by the vendee. 2. Both the Courts below overruled the contention noted above and decreed the Plaintiff's suit. 3. The facts that gave rise to the plea noted above are undisputed and are as follows: The property in dispute in the present litigation belonged to one Ram Jan Rai. He died leaving five daughters, two of whom were named Mantorna and Kabutra. The daughters entered into possession of the property of Ram Jan after his death and by two sale deeds, transferred the whole of the property to certain persons. One of the sale deeds executed by the daughters was in favour of the Plaintiffs of the present suit and certain other persons. 4. Of the five daughters of Ram Jan, Mantorna died last of all and on her death, the reversion opened in favour of Mahabir, the son of Kabutra. Mahabir, however, could not secure possession of the properties of Ram Jan which were in the possession of the vendees from his five daughters. 5. On the 14th of July 1936, Mahabir executed a sale deed in favour of Jagat Prasad, the Appellant before us. By the sale deed, he transferred the entire properties of Ram Jan in favour of Jagat Prasad, for a consideration of Rs. 400. It was recited in the sale deed that Mahabir was the heir of Ram Jan and entitled to his properties, but the properties were in possession of the transferees who had no title to the same. It was also recited in the sale deed that as Mahabir was not in a position to bring a suit for possession of the properties against the transferees, he was selling the properties to Jagat Prasad in consideration of Rs. 400 and the expenses which Jagat Prasad may have to incur in bringing a suit for getting possession of the properties from the transferees. The properties sold were specified at the foot of the sale deed. 6. 400 and the expenses which Jagat Prasad may have to incur in bringing a suit for getting possession of the properties from the transferees. The properties sold were specified at the foot of the sale deed. 6. The Plaintiff-Respondents then brought the suit giving rise to the present appeal. The vendee Appellant, as stated above, resisted the suit on the ground that as the consideration for the transaction sought to be preempted, was not only Rs. 400 but also the expenses of the suit to be brought by the vendee for recovering possession of the properties, the suit for preemption was not maintainable. The Courts below, relying on the decision of this Court in Badri Prasad Misir Vs. Bijai Nand Tewari and Another , overruled this contention and decreed the suit. 7. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that the view taken by the Courts below is erroneous and in support of this contention tie has placed reliance on the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Abdul Wahid Khan v. Shaluka Bibi (1893) 21 Cal. 496 (P.C.) and a decision of this Court in Kalyan Vs. Mt. Desrani, AIR 1927 All 361 . 8. In our judgment the cases relied upon by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant are distinguishable and the case before us is governed by the decision in Badri Prasad Misir Vs. Bijai Nand Tewari and Another . 9. In Abdul Wahid Khan's case (1893) 21 Cal. 496 (P.C.) the consideration of the sale that was the subject of the suit for pre-emption was not only the cash price that was paid by the vendee to the vendor, the vendee had further agreed to incur all the expenses of a litigation that was in contemplation and was to be brought for the common benefit of the vendor and the vendee. The consideration for the sale in Abdul Wahid's case was, apart from cash consideration, an undertaking by the vendee to provide the money necessary for carrying on a suit, the amount of which could not be estimated. Their Lordships pointed out that the transaction in that case was "a sale of a share in a law suit." Similarly, in Kalyan Vs. Mt. Their Lordships pointed out that the transaction in that case was "a sale of a share in a law suit." Similarly, in Kalyan Vs. Mt. Desrani, AIR 1927 All 361 the consideration of the sale deed was, apart from the cash consideration, an undertaking by the vendee to pay the costs of a joint suit to be brought in the name of the vendee and the vendor to recover certain properties from the hands of certain transferees. In that case a Hindu widow had sold the properties of her husband to certain persons. On the death of the widow the nearest reversioner, not having enough money to sue for the recovery of the property, sold his interest in a portion of the property and the vendee undertook to pay the cost of a suit for recovery of the entire property from the hands of the widow's transferees. The learned Judges constituting the Bench delivered separate but concurrent judgments. Lindsay, J. held that the transfer in that case was merely a transfer of "a share" of the chance of success in a suit which was subsequently to be brought. The learned Judge, accordingly, held that "there was no transfer of proprietary interest" and therefore, no suit for pre-emption could lie under the Agra Pre-emption Act. Sulaiman, J. based his decision on the ground that a sale which is not in lieu exclusively of a cash price, or such price as can he definitely ascertained, is not capable of pre-emption. 10. Reliance was placed by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant on the observation of Sulaiman. J. Just quoted and it was contended that, as in the present case the consideration for the sale, over and above the sum of Rs. 400 was the stipulation by the vendee to bear all the expenses of a suit for recovery of possession of the properties from the transferees, the sale was not pre-emptible. But the observations of Sulaiman, J., must be read in connection with the facts of the case decided by him. In that case, the vendee had undertaken to meet the expenses of a suit that was to be brought not only for the recovery of possession of the properties sold but also for recovery of possession of the properties that had not been sold. In that case, the vendee had undertaken to meet the expenses of a suit that was to be brought not only for the recovery of possession of the properties sold but also for recovery of possession of the properties that had not been sold. In other words the vendee was to bear the expenses of a suit that was to be filed for the joint benefit of the vendor and the vendee. In the case before us, there was no such stipulation between the vendee and the vendor. The vendor sold the entire properties left by Ram Jan in lieu of a cash consideration of Rs. 400. It is true that according to the recitals in the sale deed Jagat Prasad, the vendee, had to bear the expenses of a suit for recovery of possession of the properties sold, but the suit to be brought by him could not be for the benefit of the vendor for the simple reason that the vendor had sold his rights and interests in the entire properties of Ram Jan Rai. In other words, the only consideration that Jagat Prasad paid to the vendor for the sale was a sum of Rs. 400 and the vendor was not entitled to any other consideration over and above that amount. The sale was for a definite and ascertained amount that was paid to the vendor. Accordingly the transaction sought to be pre-empted was a sale as defined by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such, the suit for pre emption was maintainable. 11. For the reasons given above, we dismiss this appeal, but, having regard to the circumstances of the present case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this litigation in all the courts.