JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmad, C.J. - The present reference to a Full Bench has been occasioned by conflict of judicial opinion between this Court and the Oudh Chief Court as to the true interpretation of Section 7(1)(a) and (b) of the Encumbered Estates Act (XXV of 1934) and the question referred for decisions is as follows: Is Section 7(1)(b) of the Encumbered Estates Act limited in its operation to suits, proceedings etc., to be instituted against the landlord in respect of any debts incurred by him before the passing of the order u/s 6 of the Act or it applies to suits or proceedings etc., to be instituted by the landlord also? 2. In Sheo Baran Singh v. Ranbir Prasad 1938 A.W.R. (H.C.) 324, a Bench of this Court consisting of Collister and Bajpai JJ. held that proceedings, attachments, processes and suits mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 7 of the Encumbered Estates Act are proceedings, attachments, processes and suits against the landlord in respect of debts, but the landlord himself is not necessarily under any disability for taking proceedings which he may be entitled to take under the law for the protection of his interest. In short, the learned Judges held that Section 7(1)(a) and (b) was limited in its operation to suits and proceedings instituted against the landlord in respect of the debts incurred by him and that it was no bar to suits and proceedings instituted by the landlord in respect of his debts. On an application for review being filed in the said case the same learned Judges in Ranbir Prasad v. Sheobaran Singh 939 A.W.R. (H.C.) 581 affirmed the view previously expressed by them as to the interpretation of the said section. 3. A Bench of the Oudh Chief Court, on the other hand, in Dildar Husain v. Baboo Lal 1940 AWR (CC) 455 : O.A. 1052 held that Section 7(1)(a) U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, applies to all proceedings in any Civil Court whether instituted by the landlord (debtor) or by the claimant (creditor) and accordingly where the debtor has applied u/s 4, U.P. Encumbered Estates Act and the debt is proved under the provisions of that Act a suit by him u/s 33 U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, which is pending at the time must be stayed u/s 7(1)(a), U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. To the same effect is the decision of that Court in Mohammad Husain v. Baba Din 1941 A.W.R. (Rev.) 8 : 1940 O.A. 1231. 4. Section 7 runs as follows: 7. (1) When the Collector has passed an order u/s 6 the following consequences shall ensue: (a) all proceedings pending at the date of the said order in any Civil or Revenue Court in the United Provinces in respect of any public or private debt to which the landlord is subject, or with which his immovable property is encumbered, except an appeal, review or revision against a decree or order, shall be stayed, all attachments and other execution processes issued by any such Court and then in force in respect of any such debt shall become null and void and no fresh process in execution shall, except as hereinafter provided be issued; (b) no fresh suit or other proceedings other than an appeal, review or revision against a decree or order, or a process for ejectment for arrears of rent shall, except as hereinafter provided, be instituted in any civil or Revenue Court in the United Provinces in respect of any debts incurred before the passing of the said order but if for any reason whatsoever such a suit or proceedings has been instituted, it shall be deemed to be a proceeding pending at the date of the said order within the meaning of Clause (a). 5. It would be noted that Section 7 is general in its terms and the language used is precise and unambiguous. Sub-clause (a) speaks of "all proceedings pending at the date of" and order u/s 6 and Sub-clause (b) similarly deals with "fresh suit or other proceedings." The only words of limitation used in the said Sub-clauses are "except an appeal, review of revision against: a decree or order...or a process for ejectment for arrears of rent." There are no further words of limitation that may in any way cut down or modify the generality of the words quoted above, The language used is plain and admits of but one meaning, i.e. all suits or proceedings, other than those expressly excepted, relating to the debts due from the landlord Applicant. The Legislature must, therefore, be deemed to have intended to mean what it has plainly expressed and prima facie, there appears to be no warrant for the introduction of the words "against the landlord" in either of the said sub-clauses--words which are not there. It fallows, therefore, that Sub-clauses (a) and (b) embrace all suits and proceedings (except an appeal, review or revision or a process for ejectment for arrears of rent) irrespective of the fact whether those suits or proceedings are by or against the landlord. This was recognized by the learned Judge who decided the case of Ranbir Prasad v. Sheobaran Singh, 939 A.W.R. (H.C.) 581 and they observed that it may be conceded that Section 7 does not in terms say that the suits or proceedings mentioned there should be against landlords. 6. They however, went on to observe that it is obvious that attachments and execution processes in Clause (a) and processes for ejectment for arrears of rent needs must be against the landlord, and this was one of the reasons that possibly led the learned Judges to hold that the sub-clauses in question are confined in their operation to suits and proceedings against the landlord. The short answer to the observation last quoted, however, is that the sub-clauses in question embrace not only attachments, execution processes and processes for ejectment, but also suits and "other proceedings" and it is manifest that suits and proceedings may be initiated either by or against the landlord. 7. The learned Judges then referred to the rule of interpretation that enjoins that the dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, to be collected from the clause and necessity of the Act being made, from a comparison of its reveral parts and from foreign (meaning extraneous) circumstances so far as they can justly be considered to throw light upon the subject. 8. They then observed that Bearing the above canon in view, we find that the intention of the Legislature was not to put the landlord under a disability but to provide for the relief of his encumbered estate and when on an application by him the Collector has passed an order u/s 6 of the Act the consequences that should flow from such order should be consequences to the benefit of the landlord and not to his detriment. 9. 9. The rule of interpretation quoted by the learned Judges is subject to the cardinal rule of interpretation that "the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expressions used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the Court as to what is just or expedient. If the words go beyond what was probably the intention, effect must nevertheless be given to them. They cannot be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should be excluded or embraced. However unjust, arbitrary or inconvenient the meaning conveyed may be, it must receive its full effect. When once the meaning is plain, "it is not the province of the Court to scan its wisdom or its policy. It duty is not to make the law reasonable, but to expound it as it stands according to the real sense of the words,"--vide, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, seventh edition, p. 4. 10. Both the Encumbered Estates Act and the Agriculturists' Relief Act came into force on the same date, namely April 30, 1935 and it may be conceded, as observed by the learned Judges that these Acts were passed with a view to provide relief to debtors and for the relief of the encumbered estates of landlords, but it does not necessarily follow from this that provisions to safeguard the interest of the creditors in certain respects were not enacted by the Legislature in either of the two Acts. Nor does it necessarily follow that the remedies under the two Acts could not be in the alternative. The Encumbered Estates Act is a self-contained Act and an examination of its scheme unmistakably shows that exclusive jurisdiction is given by it to the Special Judge 10 ascertain the debts of the landlord Applicant and to pass a decree for the amount of such debts. It is easy to imagine the practical inconvenience that would result if simultaneous proceedings for the ascertainment of such debts were allowed to continue both before the Special Judge under the Encumbered Estates Act and before another Judge under the Agriculturists, Relief Act and it seems to me, that Section 7 was enacted with a view to bar the door to such an inconvenience. 11. 11. The last reason assigned by the learned Judges in Ranbir Prasad's case in support of the view expressed by them was based on Section 4(3) of the Encumbered Estates Act which provides; If within three months after the date on which Chapter III of this Act comes into force a landlord has applied for amendment of a decree under the provisions of the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1934, the period from the date of his application to the date of the final disposal therefore shall be excluded from the period within which he may make an application under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of this Section. 12. After referring to this provision the learned Judges observed as follows: It is clear fro m the above that an agriculturist landlord may apply under the Agriculturists' Relief Act first for the amendment of a decree u/s 30 of the Act and he may then apply for relief under the Encumbered Estates Act. If it was thought that he should be precluded from applying u/s 30 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act after he had applied under the Encumbered Estates Act, one would have expected the Legislature to say so in unambiguous language somewhere. 13. Section 4 inter alia prescribes the period of limitation within which an application under the Act may be presented to the Collector. Sub-Section (1) of that section prescribes a period of one year for the making of such an application. Sub-Section (2) empowers the Local Government to extend the period fixed by the section for making applications by a further period of six months. Then follows Sub-section (3) which has been quoted above. It allows the exclusion of the period referred to in it in the computation of the period of limitation for the filing of an application u/s 4. Lastly Sub-section (4) of Section 4 gives discretion to the Court in specified circumstances to extend the periods prescribed by Sub-sections (1) and (2) by a further period of six months. In short, Section 4 is a section that prescribes the period of limitation for an application under the Act and it nowhere lays down that remedies under the Encumbered Estates Act and the Agriculturists' Relief Act could be availed of simultaneously. In short, Section 4 is a section that prescribes the period of limitation for an application under the Act and it nowhere lays down that remedies under the Encumbered Estates Act and the Agriculturists' Relief Act could be availed of simultaneously. Indeed the fact, that by virtue of Sub-section (3) the time taken by a landlord in the prosecution of an application for the amendment of a decree under the provisions of the Agriculturists' Relief Act is to be excluded in the computation of the period of limitation, strongly suggests that the Legislature intended to prohibit the simultaneous prosecution of proceedings under the two Acts. This is further demonstrated by the fact that the benefit of the provisions of Sub-section (3) could be availed of only if the application referred to in that sub-section was filed within three months from the date on which Chapter III of the Act came into force. Again if it was the intention of the Legislature that notwithstanding Section 7(1)(a) and (b) of the Act a landlord could, during the pendency of proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act, file an application for amendment of a decree u/s 30(2) or a suit u/s 33 of the Agriculturist's Relief Act, it was wholly unnecessary to give him an extended period of limitation for an application u/s 4 as has been done by Sub-section (3) of that Section. Further there is nothing in Sub-section (3) of Section 4 which is inconsistent with, or in any way restricts the scope of Section 7(1)(a) and (b). In other words both Section 4 and Section 7 of the Act are independent of each other and neither section controls the other. It follows that Section 7 must be interpreted according to its plain language and Sub-section (3) of Section 4 does not justify the introduction of the words "against the landlord" in Section 7(1)(a) and (b). 14. There is yet another reason which leads me to the conclusion that the Oudh view is correct. The Legislature in Section 7 took good care to specify in detail the proceedings which were to be exempt from the operation of that section, e.g. in Sub-clause (a) it provided "except an appeal, review or revision" and in Sub-clause (b) it provided other than an appeal, review or revision against a decree or order, or a process for ejectment for arrears of rent. 15. 15. If the Legislature had intended that suits and proceedings by landlord were to be exempt from the operation of tint section, it would have, after the exceptions noted above, said so by adding such words as "or suits or proceedings by a landlord." There are, however, no such words in the section. 16. For the reasons given above my answer to the question referred is that Section 7(1)(b) of the Act is not limited in its operation to suits, proceedings etc., to be instituted against the landlord, bit applies to suits or proceedings etc., to be instituted by the landlord also. Braund J. 17. I agree and find nothing that I can usefully add. Dar J. 18. I agree. Iqbal Ahmad C.J. Braund and Dar JJ. 19. Our answer to the question referred is that Section 7(1)(b) of the Encumbered Estates Act (XXV of 1934) is not limited in its operation to suits, proceedings etc. to be instituted against the landlord, but applies to suits, proceedings etc. to be instituted by the landlord also.