Judgement 1940- 1941- IA - 68- 83 Appeal (No. 62 of 1939) from a decree of the High Court (July 16, 1936), which had reversed a majority decree of the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal constituted under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act (Punjab Act VIII. of 1925) (November 18, 1935). The following statement of facts is taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee The dispute in this case related to an area of 28 kanals and 1 marla (nearly three acres) situated in the village of Kot Fateh Khan, in the Attock district of the Punjab. Within that area lay the tomb (samadh) of a Hindu ascetic, Baba Than Singh, who was said to have died in or about 1793. That tomb had long been held in veneration, and had become a Udasi shrine (dehri or deri) before the Punjab came under British rule. The tomb of his disciple, Chet Ram, lay near to that of Than Singh, but the religious institution was known as the Deri Baba Than Singh. It would appear to have been in enjoyment of one, if not two, jagirs or assignments of revenue dating from Sikh times. At its head there had been a long succession of mahants, and in the area now in question had lived the sadhus connected with the institution, as well as the mahant. A langar, or free kitchen, with certain buildings attached thereto, had also been maintained there. The various compounds or closes comprised in the area were referred to in the judgments and decrees of the courts in India as ihatas Nos. 179 to 230, those being the numbers given to them in the khasra abadi register of 1862 at the first regular settlement. The village was said to have been founded in the 16th century by an ancestor of the first respondent, Lieutenant Sardar Mohammad Nawaz Khan (herein called the respondent). Its inhabitants, apart from those connected with the shrine, were Muslim cultivators and one or two kamins, e.g., the blacksmith, the carpenter. At the first regular settlement in 1862 the proprietors consisted of a number of members of the respondents family, but in or about 1882 a partition was made between three branches of the family. By that, the village was divided into three portions, called Abadi Kot Khas, Abadi Kot Bala and Abadi Deri Baba Than Singh. At the first regular settlement in 1862 the proprietors consisted of a number of members of the respondents family, but in or about 1882 a partition was made between three branches of the family. By that, the village was divided into three portions, called Abadi Kot Khas, Abadi Kot Bala and Abadi Deri Baba Than Singh. The last portion was included in the share which fell to the respondents predecessor. It included the land in suit, which was separated from that part of the village Kot Khas, in which the cultivators and kamins lived, by some thirty yards or more of cultivated land. The respondent was a minor when, in 1903, he succeeded to the property on the death of his father, and from 1903 to 1924 the Court of Wards was in charge of his estate. Since 1924 the respondent had had the management of his own property, and had asserted rights, as proprietor of the village, over the area in question which were now contested by those interested in the shrine. It was not now disputed by the respondent that the sites of the two samadhs must be treated as having been dedicated to the religious institution, and that the langar buildings belonged to it permanently. But he contested the appellants claim on behalf of the shrine that the whole area of twenty-eight kanals and one marla, together with the various houses thereon, was in the same position as the samadhs, and that he had no rights in it ; as also their claim that in any event the right of occupation was vested in the shrine and continued so long as the shrine existed. He claimed, moreover, certain rights by village custom in the malba, or materials, of which the houses were built, which rights were denied by the appellants. Those matters came originally before a Tribunal constituted under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act (Punjab Act VIII. of 1925). An application having been made to have the shrine declared to be a Sikh gurdwara, the mahant objected that it was a Udasi institution and not within the Act. The respondent, by petition dated April 25, 1931, objected that the area claimed as belonging to the institution was his Law. Rep. 68 Ind. App. of 1925). An application having been made to have the shrine declared to be a Sikh gurdwara, the mahant objected that it was a Udasi institution and not within the Act. The respondent, by petition dated April 25, 1931, objected that the area claimed as belonging to the institution was his Law. Rep. 68 Ind. App. 83 ( 1940- 1941) Committee of Management v. Lieutenant Sardar Mohammad 8 sole property ; that he was the owner of the malba of the houses and buildings, and that their sites reverted to him if a non-proprietor occupant died childless, or abandoned the building, or alienated it without his permission. In effect, his claim was to treat the mahant and the sadhus as non-proprietors occupying separate houses with permission of the proprietor, and subject to the rights which the custom of the village gave to the proprietor. The mahants objection at first succeeded, but in March, 1935, it was compromised on appeal to the High Court, and the institution was declared to be a Sikh gurdwara. It thus became necessary to decide the various matters raised by the respondents petition, and the Tribunal received oral and documentary evidence thereon in considerable quantity. On November 18, 1935, the Tribunal, by a majority, determined that "the petitioner is owner of the sites of ihatas Nos. 179 "to 230, but as long as the shrine exists there is no right of "reversion in favour of the petitioner; it has a right of "occupation of the whole area of 28 kanals 1 marla and there "is no right of reversion, in favour of the petitioner, of the "site or malba of any house over this area in the event of the "occupant thereof dying issueless or abandoning or alienating "the building without the permission of the proprietor." Apart from the two samadhs and the langar, Hilton J., the President of the Tribunal, dissented save as regards the declaration of the respondents ownership. On appeal to the High Court, Coldstream and Blacker JJ. On appeal to the High Court, Coldstream and Blacker JJ. agreed with Hilton J. The High Courts decree of July 16, 1936, declared the petitioner (the present respondent) to be the owner of the sites of ihatas 179 to 230 "except the sites of "the two gurdwaras Dehri Bhai Than Singh and Dehri Bhai " Chet Ram u ; and also to be entitled to the malba of the superstructures situated on the disputed areas in the event of the occupant thereof dying issueless or abandoning or alienating the building without the proprietors permission. From that last declaration, however, they excepted the superstructures of the "gurdwaras" and of the langar and the buildings appertaining thereto. 1941. March 13, 17. Wallach for the appellants. In the absence of any evidence that the respondent or his predecessors in title had exercised any rights of ownership over the area in dispute for at least one hundred and thirty years until 1924, the respondents claim should have been rejected ; and in the absence of evidence to the contrary the possession by the shrine and the sadhus of the area negatives the claim. The houses and sites round the shrine were dedicated to the shrine. [Sir George Rankin. There is not a single document in the record which suggests that. You have to show positive dedication as against the proprietor—some evidence of dedication which takes the property away from him.] If the Board finds that no such right as is now claimed has existed for one hundred and thirty years, then there is a strong presumption that such a right does not exist. On the finding that the area in dispute surrounds the shrine, and has been occupied by the religious fraternity spiritually connected with the saint whose remains lie buried in the shrine, and dependent upon it, the court below should have held that the land is attahed to the shrine and is a part of it. [LORD ATKIN. You want positive evidence to get rid of the wajib-ul-arz of 1862 which reserved rights to the respondent.] The wajib-ul-arz deals with the village abadi, and not with the institution or area in dispute, which contains a cluster of buildings, and is completely separate from the respondents village. [LORD ATKIN. You want positive evidence to get rid of the wajib-ul-arz of 1862 which reserved rights to the respondent.] The wajib-ul-arz deals with the village abadi, and not with the institution or area in dispute, which contains a cluster of buildings, and is completely separate from the respondents village. The long possession of the plots in question by the shrine and sadhus attached to it without any interference by anyone, and without payment of rent to anyone, raises a strong presumption against the respondents case. Law. Rep. 68 Ind. App. 83 ( 1940- 1941) Committee of Management v. Lieutenant Sardar Mohammad 9 [Reference was made to the Punjab Land-Revenue Act, XXXIII. of 1871, s. 16 ; Douies Punjab Settlement Manual, 3rd ed., para. 296 ; and to Sardar Mohammad Nawaz Khan v. Bhagata Nand (( 1938) L. R. 65 I. A. 301, 313.).] The appellants would be content to hold what the Gurdwara Tribunal gave them—that the ownership is in the respondent, but that the appellants have the particular right of occupancy specified by the Tribunal. Cover K.C. and J. E. Godfrey for the respondent were not called upon to argue. May 5. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir George Rankin. [The judgment, after stating the facts, continued ] Neither of the courts in India has taken the view, for which the appellants contend, that the area in dispute has as a whole become dedicated to the shrine so as to make an end of the respondents ownership therein. But the two members of the Tribunal who were in the majority considered that the right of occupation, whether or not given at different times to individual sadhus, was given to the institution, which occupied the various houses through them as its members. Rai Bahadur Lala Dwarka Parshad said in his judgment that "it was a case of dedication "by user " ; also " It is the shrine that has the right of occupation over this whole area of 28 kanals, and so long as it "exists there is no case of reversion to the Sardar." The other member, Sardar Man Singh, added that as the sadhus were all ascetics whatever they acquired was for and on behalf of the dehri, and not for themselves. For this he vouched as authority para, 89 of Rattigans "Digest of Civil Law for the "Punjab" "89. For this he vouched as authority para, 89 of Rattigans "Digest of Civil Law for the "Punjab" "89. All property acquired by individual members [of a religious fraternity] belongs, as a general rule, to "the religious institution to which they are attached." The papers prepared in 1862 at the first regular settlement were prepared before the village had been partitioned, and at a time when there were a considerable number of proprietors. The khasra abadi register (a list of inhabited sites) and the map of 1862 disclose some sixty " ihatas " as being houses, or areas of land held therewith, in the occupation of individuals who are for the most part without women or children. The great majority of them, if not, indeed, all, are clearly sadhus, but in two cases it is noticed that one house is a school and the other a police station. The sadhu in every case is entered in the register as " owner " of the house, but too much need not be made of this expression. In another of these settlement papers—a statement of owners’ and tenants holdings, called the muntakib assamiwar khasra—the owner as distinct from the tenant is entered as " shamilat deh " (village common land). In the wajib-ul-arz prepared at this time it is stated in para. 8, relating to " income from cesses " —" A person who "wishes to take up residence, does so with our (proprietors) "permission. If a person demands any help for the "construction of a Kotha, he is helped with wood. He is "entitled to reside as long as he likes. When he deserts the "place, he is not entitled to sell the house. After he has left, "the proprietor of the place shall be entitled to Malba. The "proprietor may make Abad in the Kotha any person he likes, "subject to the condition that if the former returns to the "village after 2-4 years and his house is in a sound condition, " then he is given on his request the same Kotha for residence.” The only point material to the present case in which this differs from the ordinary custom (set forth in para. 236 of Rattigans " Digest ") concerns the right to the malba—the latter giving to the non-proprietary resident a right to sell the materials of the house on his occupation ceasing. 236 of Rattigans " Digest ") concerns the right to the malba—the latter giving to the non-proprietary resident a right to sell the materials of the house on his occupation ceasing. In 1882, the mahant having died, a question arose as to the continuation by Government of the jagir of the village of Jassian, and the Revenue Court required the tahsildar of Fateh Jang to report on the condition of the dehri now in question, and its langar. This official requested Sardar Fateh Khan, a Law. Rep. 68 Ind. App. 83 ( 1940- 1941) Committee of Management v. Lieutenant Sardar Mohammad 10 predecessor of the respondent, to inquire, and his report of June 10, 1882 (exhibit O/31), is in evidence. It describes this abadi as a separate and important colony, and it gives the dehri a good character, saying that its kitchen not only feeds its sadhus and faqirs, but also wayfarers, and that it gives each faqir one rupee per month for clothes, etc. The appellants also seek to rely on exhibit O/32, a " list of "houses attached to Dehri Baba Than Singh,” made out— it does not appear by whom—for the Revenue Court on this occasion. This list has been treated as inadmissible by the High Court, but, if it be admitted, it shows the bulk of the houses as having a sadhu for " owner," though a number are entered as musafirkhana, making them appear as intended for use by wayfarers rather than residents—an appearance which would make a better impression upon any revenue official dealing with the continuation of the jagir otherwise it does not substantially alter the picture presented by the settlement papers of 1862, save that it shows the pakka buildings to be sixteen and the kacha to be forty-two. At the second regular settlement of 1882 in the khasra paimaish papers (statement of measurements) under the heading " owner " in respect of these twenty-eight kanals one marla is the entry " village abadi." The area itself is described as unculturable inhabited land (abadi ghair mumkin). At the second regular settlement of 1882 in the khasra paimaish papers (statement of measurements) under the heading " owner " in respect of these twenty-eight kanals one marla is the entry " village abadi." The area itself is described as unculturable inhabited land (abadi ghair mumkin). In the record of rights at the third settlement, 1905, and at the fourth, 1925, the entry " village abadi " is put in the column headed " tenant " as well as in the column headed " owner,” and to the description ghair mumkin abadi is added " of "Dehri Baba Man Singh"—which the respondent claims to be in recognition of the partition of 1882. In none of the settlements after the first is there any entry in a settlement paper corresponding to the entry which has been cited with reference to persons wishing to reside in the village. This the High Court has noted, but the learned judges, following a previous decision of their own court in Dhuman Khan v. Gurmukh Singh (( 1935) I. L. R. 17 Lah. 403.), have held that it does not detract from the force of the entry, as after the first settlement the revenue authorities did not concern themselves with recording rights in the village abadi. This is a matter of the revenue history of the Province, and their Lordships see no reason to think that the High Court is not correctly informed. Two matters which their Lordships do not find it necessary to discuss may here be mentioned and put aside. The first is an arbitration held in 1904 by an Assistant Commissioner, Mr. C. F. Usborne, in a dispute about the right to receive the rents paid for shops opened or erected in the area in suit at the time of the Baisakhi fair. The award of March 27, 1904, was that half the rent should be taken by the respondent and the other half by the sadhu in whose house the shop was put up. Both sides crave this in aid, the respondent pointing to the fact that the houses were held to belong to the individual sadhus, the appellants to the fact that the proceedings were brought by the mahant. The second matter is the claim made by the respondent in 1925 to receive haq buha, or door tax, from the mahant, Parkasha Nand, under the wajib-ul-arz of 1862. The second matter is the claim made by the respondent in 1925 to receive haq buha, or door tax, from the mahant, Parkasha Nand, under the wajib-ul-arz of 1862. This claim succeeded before the Revenue Courts, which were ultimately held by the Board to have exclusive jurisdiction over the claim, but doubts had been thrown upon the right by opinions of the Civil Courts, and the Board did not pronounce upon the matter. (Sardar Mohammad Nawaz Khan v. Bhagata Nand (( 1938) L. R. 65 I. A. 301.). Their Lordships are not to be understood as thinking that the results of these two disputes are irrelevant in the present case. On the contrary, their view is that on balance they are not without weight in favour of the respondent, but that in view of more direct and cogent evidence a discussion of them would encumber the present case unnecessarily. The respondents fifty-nine witnesses may be taken to estab lish that since he came of age in 1924 he has exercised the rights claimed by him, and the appellants evidence is that of late years he has done so somewhat harshly, having had a number of the kacha houses demolished. On the other hand—and Mr. Wallach, for the appellants, has most forcefully laid stress upon this as his main point—the respondents evidence does not include anything to show that his father, before his death in 1903, or Law. Rep. 68 Ind. App. 83 ( 1940- 1941) Committee of Management v. Lieutenant Sardar Mohammad 11 any previous proprietor, had taken possession of sadhus houses on their death or departure from the village, or had otherwise exercised the customary rights now claimed. For the time ( 1903 to 1924) of the management of the Court of Wards while the respondent was a minor, there is some such evidence. The responsible official who was manager from 1918 to 1923 speaks to the supply of timber to a sadhu called Budh Prakash, and says that the house of another sadhu called Narain Das was, on his death, about 1922, taken by the Court of Wards. The evidence of this witness as also of the assistant managers from 1914-7, 1917-23, and of several other witnesses, shows that there was no musafirkhana in this part of the village, though witnesses for the appellants say that the people of Qutbal, about 1917, built one which has been demolished. The evidence of this witness as also of the assistant managers from 1914-7, 1917-23, and of several other witnesses, shows that there was no musafirkhana in this part of the village, though witnesses for the appellants say that the people of Qutbal, about 1917, built one which has been demolished. One sadhu, Bawa Mohan Das, fully supports the respondent on all points, but is much exposed to suspicion of partisanship. Some, at least, of the sadhus appear to have had chelas who lived with them, and in some cases, at least, the chela succeeded in fact to the possession of the gurus house at his death. The witnesses called for the appellants include some who say, in general terms, that the sadhus houses were given to them by, or belonged to, the dehri, or that the sadhus were living through the mahant, or that when a sadhu went away the mahant got the key of his house and managed it, or that the mahant got the sadhus houses repaired, or that pilgrims were put up in te houses as the mahant directed. But this evidence is poor in quality, and is wholly lacking in particulars. The Mahant Bhaqta Nand, who succeeded Parkasha Nand in 1928, and who compromised with the appellants in 1935 over their claim that the shrine was not a Udasi institution but a Sikh gurdwara, was called on their behalf, and said that all the kacha houses except three or four were in his possession and were the property of the dehri, that he used some of them for his servants and some as storehouses. On the other hand, he says " I took the right of residence from "Garib Das and also from Sarup Das. If a sadhu lives in a "certain house he cannot be ousted by the mahant unless he "does something against the principles of the dehri sahib, but "no sadhu could alienate his right of residence to anybody "except the dehri sahib." The general effect of the evidence for the appellants is that in 1889, and down to 1933, the houses in this abadi were some forty or fifty in number, of which a dozen or so were pakka, i.e., built of masonry, while the rest were kacha, i.e., of mud and stones ; and that all, or all save three or four, had been demolished recently, that is, about 1934. The Court of Wards manager says that in his period of office ( 1918 to 1923) the pakka buildings were the langar, the mahants bungalow, the main dehri, the second dehri, and two houses, one on each side of the latter. Also that there were about twelve kacha houses inhabited by sadhus, most of whom lived there permanently, but some of whom came and went though they had houses there. The papers of 1862 show some sixty-eight compounds, but apparently the number of sadhu tenants holding houses is in the neighbourhood of thirty. The list, exhibit O/32, given to the Revenue Court in 1882, mentions sixteen pakka and forty-two kacha buildings. The general effect of this evidence is to show that between 1862 or 1882 and 1920, or thereabouts, there was a considerable diminution in the number of the kacha houses, but their Lordships are not prepared to go all the way with Hilton J. in saying that " this "fact can only be attributed to the proprietor having gained "possession of them according to the custom." If the number of sadhus for any reason became less, such houses, unoccupied, would tend to fall down, and might not be repaired or rebuilt by the mahant or by anyone else, whether they belonged to the dehri or to the individual sadhus. It appears unreasonable, on the evidence, to doubt that the original right in the land in suit was with the proprietary body. Hence the first question is whether the appellants have proved a dedication by user of the whole of the area to the purposes of the shrine. This burden lies heavy on the appellants, and it is beside the point to show that the respondents evidence does not exclude the theory of dedication. For practical purposes the shrine would hardly be treated as other than a permanent institution, and it is not easy to envisage conduct which would show an intention to dedicate the right of occupation until such time as the shrine should cease to exist and which would yet fall short of a simple out-and-out Law. Rep. 68 Ind. App. 83 ( 1940- 1941) Committee of Management v. Lieutenant Sardar Mohammad 12 dedication of the whole interest as in the case of the samadhs themselves. Rep. 68 Ind. App. 83 ( 1940- 1941) Committee of Management v. Lieutenant Sardar Mohammad 12 dedication of the whole interest as in the case of the samadhs themselves. But, in their Lordships opinion, the evidence falls far short of establishing that the individual houses of the sadhus were dedicated to the shrine in either sense, or at all. The settlement papers of 1862 and of the later settlements make it almost hopeless to challenge, as regards this abadi of some three acres, the proprietorship of the respondent. They exclude any suggestion that in " 1862, or later, the mahant had become entitled to the abadi by any form of dedication, and, indeed, there is no trace of any such claim having been brought to notice at any of the settlements, or haying been taken account of at the time of the partition between the members of the proprietors family. Yet the case now made by the appellants, and pleaded in their written statement of July 20, 1935, is that the respondent " has no "right, title or interest in the said area.” That the right of occupation but not the proprietorship has been dedicated is not an impossible position as a matter of law, and it might be affirmed without contradicting the entries in the settlement papers as to the proprietorship. But it is equally inconsistent with the settlement papers to suppose that the mahant, or the dehri sahib itself, was the sole and quasi-permanent tenant of this area. No trace of such a claim can be discerned in the map or khasras of 1862. The individual occupiers of the different houses are set forth in detail as the persons having the right of occupation. For the purposes of the question whether the proprietors rights in those three acres of abadi have been parted with wholly or partially by way of dedication to the shrine, the particular custom as to malba laid down in the wajib-ul-arz of 1862 is only of subsidiary importance. If it be postulated for the sake of argument that the case falls under the general custom referred to by Hilton J., and stated in Rattigans Digest in para. 236, the case as to dedication is not substantially altered, though the claim to malba would be inconsistent with the assumption made. If it be postulated for the sake of argument that the case falls under the general custom referred to by Hilton J., and stated in Rattigans Digest in para. 236, the case as to dedication is not substantially altered, though the claim to malba would be inconsistent with the assumption made. But their Lordships agree with the High Court in thinking that the special custom is proved, and, in any case, they think it reasonably clear that individual sadhus minded to attach themselves to the shrine were from time to time permitted by the proprietors to set up for their own habitation kacha houses in its neighbourhood, thus making it an abadi fairly enough described as a separate colony—a colony which not only enjoyed considerable reputation, but also had the good will of the respondents predecessors, such as Sardar Fateh Khan. The absence of evidence that the respondents predecessors refused to allow one sadhu to succeed another in the occupation of the houses, or took away the materials, or installed a different class of tenant, is sufficiently explained by the circumstances and by the lapse of time, and in no way warrants an inference of dedication whether of the right of occupation or of the whole interest in the land. Such a conclusion requires to be supported by clear and specific evidence of individual transactions which require the hypothesis of dedication to account for them—all the more so that it is contrary to the custom recorded in 1862 and to the position recorded at four settlements. The case of dedication is not made out merely by evidence of neighbourly or considerate conduct towards a religious institution, or by showing that small profits have not been churlishly exacted by the proprietor from persons held in general esteem. Nor is it to be made out by showing that the sadhus dependent on the mahant got his help for repairs, or allowed him to assign pilgrims to them at the time of mela, or sought his help in other ways. Nor is it to be made out by showing that the sadhus dependent on the mahant got his help for repairs, or allowed him to assign pilgrims to them at the time of mela, or sought his help in other ways. As Hilton J. has observed, “there is no evidence that the manager "of the institution obtained the proprietors’ permission to "build houses for sadhus.” There is, moreover, no foundation for the contention that the mahant was in management and control of the houses occupied by sadhus in such sense that the sadhus enjoyed a sort of service occupation of the property of the institution. Save as regards the samadhs themselves and the langar buildings the case of dedication by user fails. The appeal made to para. 89 of Rattigans " Digest" is in these circumstances of no avail to the appellants. If it were intended as the statement of a legal presumption based upon a general custom of the Punjab, their Lordships, in view of the wide sweep of the proposition and of the importance of presumptions in India, would have desired and, indeed, expected, ampler authority for it than they have been able to discover. Of the two cases cited as authority by the learned author their Lordships have been able to examine the first, Tota Puri v. Padam Puri (( 1874) 21 P. R.), and cannot find that it Law. Rep. 68 Ind. App. 83 ( 1940- 1941) Committee of Management v. Lieutenant Sardar Mohammad 13 affirms any such proposition. Ascetics and religious institutions exhibit great diversity of character, and Udasis, in particular, conform to no single type. In any case, to presume that a particular Udasi shrine followed a certain practice because on a count of all religious institutions throughout the Province the practice was found to obtain in a majority of the cases is a course of reasoning unwarranted by principle or authority. Their Lordships would be very slow to apply to such an institution as this dehri a rule not collected from its own constitution or practice as proved in evidence. Of the rule now in question it may be further said that unless it be written large in the conduct and history of the "fraternity " the greatest doubt is thrown upon it. However, from the introduction to chap. VI. of the "Digest M and from para. Of the rule now in question it may be further said that unless it be written large in the conduct and history of the "fraternity " the greatest doubt is thrown upon it. However, from the introduction to chap. VI. of the "Digest M and from para. 84, it appears that the force of such considerations did not escape the learned author, who insists that there is no general law applicable to religious institutions in the Punjab, and appears to recognize, in the light of long-standing decisions of the Board, that they are to be governed only by customs and usages which they can be shown to accept. Thus in Greedharee Doss v. Nundokissore Doss (( 1867) 11 Moo. I. A. 405, 428.), a case about a Hindu math in Bengal, it was said by the Board "the only law as to these mahants and their offices, "functions, and duties, is to be found in custom and practice, "which is to be proved by testimony,” Para. 89 of the "Digest " is not really put forward as a statement of any legal presumption though it uses the words "general rule," it is not the statement of a rule, but of something which has been found by inquiry to be true of most fraternities. Their Lordships are not satisfied that the sadhus living in this abadi were members of such a "fraternity" as is contemplated by the paragraph ; but, whether they were or were not, it is, in their Lordships view, established by the evidence that the houses in which the sadhus lived were treated by them and by the mahant as their own, and not as belonging to the dehri. It cannot, in these circumstances, be held that the rights which the sadhus obtained as a result of their being allowed to live in this abadi became enlarged as against the respondent by virtue of any such rule as is put forward. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the first respondent. The Registrar in taxing such costs will take note of, and deal with, any complaint made by the appellants as to the inclusion in the record of unnecessary documents, such as those specified in para. 9 of the appellants’ case.