JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmad, C.J. - The present reference to a Full Bench was occasioned by conflict of judicial opinion between this Court and the Oudh Chief Court as regards the interpretation of the word "loan" in Section 30(1) of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1934) and the question referred for decision is: Where an earlier transaction of loan is renewed, is the new transaction itself a 'loan' for the purposes of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1934)? 2. The question is of great general importance as it is bound frequently to arise in suits brought by debtors for account u/s 33 of the Act. It is, therefore, unfortunate to be faced with bewildering divergence of judicial opinion on the question. It is still more unfortunate that this Bench has not been able lo arrive at an unanimous decision. Three of the Judges constituting this Bench (Bajpai, Dar and Hamilton JJ.) have put one interpretation on the word "loan", whereas the fourth Judge (Braund J.) has interpreted that word otherwise. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of all my brother Judges and much as I would have liked to adopt the view expressed either by the majority of the Judges or by Braund J., I find it wholly impossible to do so. The only solution of the difficulty that at present confronts the Courts in these provinces appears to be intervention by the Legislative by the addition of an explanation to Section 30 clearly indicating the import of the word "lean" used in that section and such intervention, in my judgment, is imperatively called for to set at rest all doubts on the point. 3. As, apart from the principle of stare decisis, I am, if I may say so with respect, in complete agreement with a Full Bench and two Division Bench decisions of this Court to be presently referred to, I do not propose to encumber my judgment by an elaborate discussion of the question under consideration. It is, however, necessary to briefly indicate the varying interpretations put on the word "loan" in various decisions of this Court and of the Oudh Chief Court. In Kailash Kuar v. Amar Nath AIR 1936 Oudh 334 : 12 Luck. It is, however, necessary to briefly indicate the varying interpretations put on the word "loan" in various decisions of this Court and of the Oudh Chief Court. In Kailash Kuar v. Amar Nath AIR 1936 Oudh 334 : 12 Luck. 175 and in AIR 1937 469 (Oudh) , the Oudh Chief Court held that the word "loan" used in Section 30(1) of the Act refers not only to principal amount, but to the whole amount due under the terms of a contract upto the 31st of December, 1929 and accordingly interest from January 1, 1930, should be calculated not only on the principal amount, but on the whole amount due for the principal and interest on the 1st of January, 1930. This view has been adopted by the majority of the Judges constituting the present Full Bench. It is, however, diametrically opposed to the decision of Full Bench of this Court consisting of Sir Shah Sulaiman C.J., Thorn and Bennet JJ. in Raghubir Singh v. Mul Chand 1937 AWR 710 : A.L.J. 671 : I.L.R 1937 All. 805. It was held in that case that having regard to the definition of the wards "loan" and "interest" as given in Section 2 of the Act it is clear that the word "loan" cannot include any interest on the principal sum that may accrue as a result of the contractual 1 ability of the debtor after the advance had been made. To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Bennet and Verma JJ. in Ramanand Misir v. Ram Baran Chaube 1939 A.W.R. (HC) 209 : A.L.J 189. In accordance with these decisions the word "loan" in Section 30 means only the principal amount advanced to the debtor and does not include interest that may have accrued due on the amount advanced in between the data of the loan and January 1, 1930. 4. The question under consideration directly arose for decision in the case of Dharam Singh v. Bishan Sarup 1937 A.W.R 892 : ILR 1938 All. 29. In that case a usufructuary mortgage was executed in lieu of amounts due under previous hypothecation bonds and the mortgagor instituted a suit u/s 33. 4. The question under consideration directly arose for decision in the case of Dharam Singh v. Bishan Sarup 1937 A.W.R 892 : ILR 1938 All. 29. In that case a usufructuary mortgage was executed in lieu of amounts due under previous hypothecation bonds and the mortgagor instituted a suit u/s 33. The mortgagor maintained that the interest from the 1st of January, 1930, should be calculated only on the principal amounts advanced under the previous hypothecation bonds and not on the amounts that were due on those bonds on account of principal and interest on the 31st of December, 1929 It was, on the other hand, urged on behalf of the mortgagee that when the previous hypothecation bonds were renewed and a usufructuary mortgage-deed was executed in lieu of the amount due on the previous bonds, then although there was no fresh advance of money, it was a new transaction of loan and the previous transaction must be deemed to have been completely wiped out. In short, the contention of the mortgagee was that interest from January 1, 1930, should be calculated on the amount that was due on the previous hypothecation bonds both on account of the original advances made and on account of interest on those advances. In this connection it was pointed out on behalf of the mortgagee that the renewal of the mortgage-deed was itself a new loan or advance in kind. The contention of the mortgagee was overruled by Sulaimin C.J. and Harries J. who decided the case. They observed: Now both the words 'loan' and interest' which occur in Section 30(1) are denned in Section 2, and we must, therefore, understand from those words in the Sub-section the meaning which have been given to them by their definitions.... In the present case the new transaction was one of a possessory mortgage under which possession was taken by the mortgagee and the income was to be set off against interest, but admittedly there was no fresh advance of any money to the mortgagor. We find it difficult to hold that this transaction can be regarded as a fresh advance in kind by the mortgagee to the mortgagor. We find it difficult to hold that this transaction can be regarded as a fresh advance in kind by the mortgagee to the mortgagor. The use of the words 'actually lent' in the definition of the word 'interest' suggests that any such fiction of law should not be imported into the definition and what the Court has to see is the actual amount advanced or lent and not what by some fiction might be imagined to have been indirectly advanced. 5. I am not unaware of the decisions in which it has been held that where the debtor and the creditor settle accounts in respect of a previous debt and the debtor executes a fresh bond with respect to the amount found due in favour of the creditor the fresh bond is in law to be regarded as a loan by itself, though cash actually did not pass between the parties by way of lending and repayment. But, in my opinion, those cases have no bearing on the decision of the question before us. Here we have to deal with a provision in a statute which the Legislature in its discretion considered advisable to pass with a view to relieve agriculturists from indebtedness. It is clear that in its anxiety to relieve agriculturists from indebtedness the Legislature gave a go-by to the sanctity that ordinarily attaches to contracts and made drastic provisions to regulate interest on advances made by creditors. It defined the words "interest" and "loan" as follows: 2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.... (8) 'Interest' includes the return to be made over and above what was actually lent, whether the same is charged or sought to be recovered specially by way of interest or in the form of service or otherwise. (10)(a) 'Loan' means an advance to an agriculturist, whether of money or in kind and shall include any transaction which is in substance a loan.... 6. (10)(a) 'Loan' means an advance to an agriculturist, whether of money or in kind and shall include any transaction which is in substance a loan.... 6. Both the words "interest" and "loan" have been used in Section 30(1) which runs as follows: Notwithstanding anything in any contract to the contrary no debtor shall be liable to pay interest on a loan taken before this Act comes into force at a rate higher than that specified in Schedule III for the period from January 1, 1930, till such date as may be fixed by the Local Government in the Gazette in this behalf. 7. In view of the definitions of "interest" and "loan" quoted above there is no escape from the conclusion that for the purposes of the Act "loan" is exclusive of interest and "interest" is that amount which constitutes the return on the amount "actually lent". The word "loan" in Section 30 must, therefore, refer to the amount that was actually advanced by the creditor and it cannot include the interest that accrued due on the sum "actually lent". I cannot assent to the proposition that the words "loan" and "interest" in Section 30 have been used in a sense other than that defined by the Act. Where the Legislature defines particular words used in a particular statute those words must be given the meaning given to them by the Legislature unless, by doing (sic) any repugnancy is created in the subject or context. The interpretation of the words "loan" end, "interest" in Section 30 in accordance with the definition contained in the Act does not, to my mind, lead to any repugnancy in the subject dealt with by Section 30 or in the context in which those words occur and as such, the word "loan" must mean the sum originally advanced. 8. Some of my brother Judges have, in the course of their judgments, made reference to Schedule III of the Act and have pointed out that if "loan" is interpreted in the light of the definition of that word contained in the Act, Schedule III cannot be applied. I am, however, unable to share their view. If the view that commended itself to the Full Bench and to the two Division Benches of this Court is adopted, there is, to my mind, no difficulty in the calculation of interest in accordance with Schedule III. I am, however, unable to share their view. If the view that commended itself to the Full Bench and to the two Division Benches of this Court is adopted, there is, to my mind, no difficulty in the calculation of interest in accordance with Schedule III. That this is so can be illustrated by reference to the facts that have given rise to the question that has been referred to the present Bench for decision. 9. In the case before us Dharam Singh in the year 1904 executed a mortgage-deed in favour of Gulzari Lal, Murari Lal and Banwari Lal for a sum of Rs. 36,000. By the year 1916 the amount due to the mortgagees on the basis of the mortgage of 1904 on account of principal and interest amounted to Rs. 60,000. Dharam Singh then in the year 1916 executed a mortgage-deed for Rs. 60,000 in favour of the same mortgagees and lastly in the year 1928 Dharam Singh renewed the mortgage of 1916 and executed a fresh mortgage-deed for Rs. 82,000. The interest on Rs. 82,000 must run at the contractual rate up to December 31, 1929 and the amount due to the mortgagees on that date must be ascertained but in view of Section 30 interest from the 1st January, 1930, must be calculated on a sum "actually lent" by the mortgagees, viz. on Rs. 36,000. As we know that there was stipulation for payment of compound interest to the mortgagees and the amount lent by them was secured, the interest on Rs. 36,000 is to be calculated in accordance with the first column under the heading "Secured loans" in Schedule III. The interest so calculated should be added to the amount due to the mortgagees on the 31st of December, 1929 and the total of the two amounts will represent the amount due to the mortgagees. 10. To be brief I adopt the view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Raghubir Singh's case 1339 A. W. R. (H C) 209: ALJ 189. and my answer to the question referred is in the negative. Bajpai, J. 11. The facts which have given rise to this Civil Revision and which have necessitated a reference to the Full Bench may be shortly stated. 12. and my answer to the question referred is in the negative. Bajpai, J. 11. The facts which have given rise to this Civil Revision and which have necessitated a reference to the Full Bench may be shortly stated. 12. One Dnaram Singh executed a simple mortgage on August 31, 1904, in favour of Gulzari Lal, Murari Lal and Banwari Lal for Rs. 36,000 with interest at seven annas per cent per mensem compoundable every six months. On the 3rd of May 1916, Dharam Singh executed another mortgage in favour of the same mortgages for Rs. 60,000 on the same rate of interest and it appears that the second mortgage was a renewal of the first mortgage inasmuch as the sum of Rs. 36,000 and its interest after making allowance for some payments made from time to time swelled to Rs. 60,000. On the 16th of April, 1928, a third mortgage was executed by Dharam Singh in favour of the same creditors for Rs. 82,000 and this sum was made up of the former sum of Rs. 60,000 with interest thereon and a fresh advance of Rs. 450 taken by Dharam Singh for stamp and registration expenses. The rate of interest in this mortgage was increased from seven annas to nine annas per cent, but the stipulation of compound interest with six monthly rests continued. In the mortgage deeds of 1916 and 1928 it was specifically mentioned that the rights arising under the earlier mortgages would remain with the mortgagees. 13. The mortgagees on the 30th of May, 1933, brought a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge of Aligarh for recovery of Rs. 1,14,498-12-6 on the basis of the mortgage of the 16th April, 1928 and the Defendants to the suit were Dharam Singh and his sons and grandsons. A preliminary decree was passed in favour of the Plaintiffs mortgagee for Rs. 1, 29,330-2-3 with interest at 6 per cent, per annum simple till realisation. The decree-holders applied for the preparation of a final decree and as the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, (Local Act XXVII of 1934), was passed in the meantime in 1935, the judgment-debtors applied for the reduction of interest and for grant of instalments. 1, 29,330-2-3 with interest at 6 per cent, per annum simple till realisation. The decree-holders applied for the preparation of a final decree and as the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, (Local Act XXVII of 1934), was passed in the meantime in 1935, the judgment-debtors applied for the reduction of interest and for grant of instalments. u/s 30 of the Act it is provided that the rate of interest for the period from January 1, 1930, will be calculated according to Schedule III of the Act till such date as may be fixed by the Local Government in the Gazette in this behalf. It was agreed between the patties that on the 31st of December, 1929, the sum due to the decree-holders was Rs. 91,689/12/6, regard being had to the contractual rate of interest The learned Civil Judge on the two application, one for the preparation of the final decree and the other for the reduction of interest and for grant of instalments passed the following order on the 13th of February, 1936: The sum due to the decree-holders on the 31st of December, 1929, is Rs. 91,698-12-6. Interest on it shall run at the rate of 5-8-0 per cent per annum with yearly rests up to 26th January, 1935 and from the 27th of January, 1935, the rate of interest shall be Rs. 5 1/2 per cent up to 7th of May, 1935, on the aggregate amount including costs, thereafter at Rs. 3 1/2 "per cent per annum up to 14th of January, 1936 and thereafter at 3 1/4 per cent per annum simple. The judgment-debtors shall pay Rs. 65,000 within six months from this day. They shall pay the remaining amount by half-yearly instalments of Rs. 6,000 from February, 1937 and on default of paying any three instalments the whole amount shall fall due. A final decree shall be prepared accordingly. 14. The judgment-debtors in revision contend that the Court below erred in interpreting the provisions of Section 30 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act and the rate of interest fixed by the Court ought to be calculated not on the accumulated amount due under the loan, but upon the principal sum advanced and in argument it was submitted that the principal sum advanced was a sum of Rs. 36,000 and interest after the 1st of January, 1930, ought to be under the Schedule rate fixed in the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act on this sum of Rs. 36,000 and not on the sum of Rs. 91,689-12-6. 15. When the matter came before a Division Bench in this Court the following question of law was referred to the Full Bench: Where an earlier transaction of loan is renewed, is the new transaction itself a loan for the purposes of U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1934)?. 16. It would be clear from what I have said above that the earlier transaction of loan by the document of 1904 was of Rs. 36,000 and it was renewed in 1916 and the next transaction was for Rs. 60,000 and it was renewed again in 1928 when the fresh and final transaction was for Rs. 82,000. To my mind, every renewed transaction was a loan for the purposes of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act and I am further prepared to say that the amount on which interest ought to run according to Schedule III for the period from January 1, 1930, is Rs. 91,689-1-0 and not either Rs. 36.000 or Rs. 60,000 or Rs. 82,000. The question was referred to us because of some conflict of judicial authority. 17. Now Section 30 occurs in Chapter IV which is headed as "Rates of interest" and consists of four sections. Section 28 provides for rate of interest on loans taken after the passing of the Act; Section 29 confers a benefit in the shape of reduced interest for prompt payment of loans taken after the passing of the Act; Section 30 provides for rate of interest on undecreed loans taken before the Act came into force for the period after January 1, 1930 and there is also a provision for the decree being amended if a decree has already been passed; Section 31 provides for rate of interest on loans taken after the Act came into force when the aggregate of interest has reached 100 per cent, of the sum borrowed. It is, therefore, obvious that this legislation, which was intended to make provision for the relief of agriculturists from indebtedness, in Chapter IV provided for relief by reducing the contractual rate of interest and Schedule II was enacted in connection with Section 28 and Schedule III was enacted in connection with Section 30. It is, therefore, obvious that this legislation, which was intended to make provision for the relief of agriculturists from indebtedness, in Chapter IV provided for relief by reducing the contractual rate of interest and Schedule II was enacted in connection with Section 28 and Schedule III was enacted in connection with Section 30. Unless the intention is clearly expressed it will not be proper to give greater relief to debtors at the expenses of the creditors than what is stated in the various provisions. 18. In Kailash Kuar v. Amar Nath (supra) it was held that "loan" in Section 30 refers not only to principal amount but also to principal with interest and there is nothing in the terms of Section 30 to suggest any intention on the part of the Legislature to interfere with amount found due under the terms on the contract or decree up to 31st December, 1929. It was also held that the words 'Interest on a loan' referred to in Section 30 means 'interest in respect of a loan.' 19. I am in agreement with this view, although I feel that in holding like this I am dissenting, which I most respectfully do, from the decision of a three Judge Full Bench of this Court in Raghubir Singh v. Mulchand (supra) where it was held that the 'rate of interest' to be fixed by the Court in an application u/s 30 U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act is to be calculated not on the accumulated amount due under the loan as at December 31, 1929, but upon the principal amount advanced as loan. 20. There was no question of a renewal of transaction in the case before the Full Bench and it is possible to say as Braund J., one of the Judges constituting the present Full Bench, says that when interest has accumulated on any sum and the debtor in a fresh transaction capitalizes the interest and promises to pay the entire sum (principal plus accumulated interest due till then) he has for all practical purposes taken as it were a fresh advance of the accumulated interest and the transaction must be construed as if by one hand the debtor paid the interest due till then and by the other hand took the same back from the creditor. In this view of the matter for which there is abundant authority there is really no conflict between my opinion and the opinion expressed by Sir Shah Sulaiman in Raghubir Singh's case. In Paton v. Inland Revenue Commissioners 1938 App. Cases 341 the House of Lords took this view and the same view was taken in B.S. Lyle Ltd. v. Chappel (1932) 1 K.B. 691. In Jai Gobini Singh v. Lachhmi Narain AIR 1940 FC. 20, a similar view was adopted and I think there can be no difficulty in holding that the judgment-debtors have after the 31st of December, 1929, to pay interest according to the rate provided in the Third Schedule of the Agriculturists' Relief Act on a sum of Rs. 82,000 at least. It of course, is to be understood that this implies that the sum of Rs. 91,689-12-6 stands intact and the only thing that has got to be done is that thereafter interest is to be calculated not on Rs. 91,689-12-6 but on Rs. 82,003 according to the Schedule rate and the interest thus calculated will have to be added to Rs. 91,689-12-6 in order to find out what is actually due to the decree-holders. 21. But, as indicated earlier in my judgment, I am of the opinion that the Schedule rate of interest from and after the 1st of January, 1930, should be calculated not on Rs. 82,000 but on Rs. 91,689-12-6 as directed by the trial Court. I am in general agreement with the views expressed by Hamilton and Dar JJ. on this aspect of the case when they come to a similar conclusion. My answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. Braund, J. 22. I think that there is some danger in this case, owing to the subtlety of the argument to which we have listened, of losing sight of the real question involved. What we have to do is to construe Section 30, Sub-section (1) of the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1934, with reference to the facts before us. 23. As I understand it, the first loan, amounting to Rs. 36 000, was taken in 1904. It was "renewed" in 1916 when a fresh instrument of mortgage was executed in which the principal sum secured was seated to be Rs. 60,000 odd, consisting in fact of the original Rs. 23. As I understand it, the first loan, amounting to Rs. 36 000, was taken in 1904. It was "renewed" in 1916 when a fresh instrument of mortgage was executed in which the principal sum secured was seated to be Rs. 60,000 odd, consisting in fact of the original Rs. 36,000 together with the then outstanding balance of interest. The rate of interest was As. 7 per cent per mensem, which was the same as in the original mortgage and there was a fresh covenant for payment. 24. The second "renewal" took place in 1928. There was again a fresh mortgage instrument in which the principal sum secured was entered as Rs. 82,000, consisting in fact of (1) of a fresh advance of Rs. 450 for the purpose of paying the necessary stamp duties incurred and (2) a sum of Rs. 81,550 which comprised the then outstanding principal from the 1916 mortgage together with the then unpaid accumulated interest. The rate of interest on this occasion was filtered from As. 7 to As. 9 per cent per mensem. 25. Those appear to be the relevant facts. A suit was in due course brought by the mortgagees on the 1-28 mortgage and on 26th of July, 1934, a preliminary decree was passed. In pursuance of that preliminary decree, a final decree was ultimately pronounced on the 13th of February, 1936, by which it was held, in effect, that interest at the statutory rate should be calculated from the 31st of December, 1929, on the sum of Rs. 91,689/12/6, being the amount then outstanding in respect of the principal secured by the 1928 mortgage (Rs. 82,000) together, I assume, with interest on that sum accrued and unpaid on the 31st of December, 1929. 26. The question which has been propounded to the Full Bench is in the form of an Abstract question: Where an earlier transaction of loan is renewed, is the transaction itself a 'loan' for the purpose of the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1984)?. 27. I venture to think that some of the difficulty of this case has arisen from putting the question in this abstract form. As I read the body of the reference to us, the only alternative offered, by it to the view that the principal sum expressed to be secured by the "renewed" mortgage of 1928 (in this case the sum of Rs. As I read the body of the reference to us, the only alternative offered, by it to the view that the principal sum expressed to be secured by the "renewed" mortgage of 1928 (in this case the sum of Rs. 82,000) is itself to be treated as the "loan taken before" the Act came into force, is that the original sum "actually taken" in 1904 (that is, the sum of Rs. 36,000) ought alone to be so treated and hence that "interest" from the 1st January, 1930, ought to be allowed to the creditor against the debtor on the latter sum only. In my view, that is not the only alternative. If the question which has engaged our attention in this Full Bench is considered by reference to the actual facts and not merely in the abstract, it will be found, I think, to be susceptible of a solution which is not in any way inconsistent either with the principles of the judgment of the late Sir Shah Sulaiman in the Full Bench case Raghubir Singh v. Moot Chand of this Court or to the later Bench case Dharam Singh v. Bishan Sarup to both of which I shall refer presently. But I regard it as of importance for its proper solution to consider the question, not in the abstract only, but by reference to the actual facts before us and in the light of the exact language of Section 30, Sub-section (1) of the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1934. 28. The section of the Act which we have to construe is in these terms: Notwithstanding anything in any contract to the contrary no debtor shall be liable to pay interest on a loan taken before this Act comes into force at a rate higher than that specified in Schedule III for the period from January 1, 1933 till such date as may be fixed by the Local Government.... 29. I desire at this stage TO draw attention to only two things about the section itself. The first is that all it does is to affect the rate of interest as form a particular date. 29. I desire at this stage TO draw attention to only two things about the section itself. The first is that all it does is to affect the rate of interest as form a particular date. It does net deal in any way with interest prior to the prescribed date and still less does it, on its face, purport to regulate any transaction which occurred prior to that date and secondly,--and I regard this as of the utmost importance--it speaks of "a loan taken before this Act comes into force," by which it can only, in my opinion and on any ordinary use of the English language, mean any loan so taken. It is I think, a mistake to regard it as confined to one loan, or to any particular loan. 30. Now, as it seems to me, there are, exhypothesi, only two ways of looking at this problem. Either the construction to be adopted must be one which treats the only "loan taken before" the Act came into force as being, for the purposes of Section 30 Sub-section (1), the consolidated sum of Rs. 82,000 referred to in the 1928 mortgage, or it must be one which treats some other "loan" or "loans" as fulfilling that definition. If the former construction is the right one, then "caedit quaestio" and interest, as from the 1st January, 1930, will be calculated, at any rate, on Rs. 82,000. The problem may, therefore, be stated by asking, on the assumption that that construction is not the right one, what else the words "a loan taken" in this section can mean and where any other solution leads us to. I am for this purpose assuming (but not deciding) that the word "loan" in Section 30(1) of the Act does not refer to the sum of Rs. 82,000 only, because, as I hope to show, precisely the same result is arrived at by adopting the only possible alternative view The question, therefore, will in the result, become merely academic. 31. The only alternative suggested in the reference to us is that the words "loan taken" mean the Rs. 36,000 originally and actually taken. That is where, in my respectful opinion, the mistake has been made, because it assumes that there is no other alternative. 31. The only alternative suggested in the reference to us is that the words "loan taken" mean the Rs. 36,000 originally and actually taken. That is where, in my respectful opinion, the mistake has been made, because it assumes that there is no other alternative. In my view, for the reasons I propose to try to explain, that alternative is neither the correct, nor the only alternative and that, in so concluding, no violence will be done to the Full Bench case of the Court referred to later, nor, in my view, necessarily to the Bench case which immediately followed it. 32. I am assuming, therefore,--but not deciding--for this purpose that the construction which speaks of the full renewed sum of Rs. 82,000 as the "loan" upon which the calculation of interest from the 1st of January, 1930, is to be made is, wrong. If that is so, then according to the plain language of Section 30, Sub-section (1), it remains to be ascertained what, with reference to the particular facts of our case, the "loan taken before the Act came in to force" was. 33. It is necessary, therefore, to direct one's mind first to the very simple question whether any and if so what, loans were taken by this debtor before the Act came into force, for, as I have pointed out, Section 30, Sub-section (1) does not confine us to a single loan, nor to any particular loan. Viewed in that way, it cannot be denied that the sum of Rs. 36,000 "taken" in 1904 was a "loan taken before" the Act came into force. It undeniably was. It was "taken"; and it was "taken" before the Act came into force, Therefore on this line of reasoning it is necessary, in accordance with Section 30, Sub-section (1), to allow the debtor interest on that sum of Rs. 36,000 at the statutory rate only. So be it. 34. But that does not by any means conclude the matter. I have already pointed out that, on the plain construction of Section 30, Sub-section (1) we are not confined to a single loan nor to a particular loan, provided the loan was taken before the Act came into force. The next question, therefore, is whether there was any other loan "taken" before the Act came into force. I have already pointed out that, on the plain construction of Section 30, Sub-section (1) we are not confined to a single loan nor to a particular loan, provided the loan was taken before the Act came into force. The next question, therefore, is whether there was any other loan "taken" before the Act came into force. The next transaction took place in 1916 and on that occasion we find that the principal sum expressed to be secured by the "renewed" mortgage was Rs. 60,000. I desire, with respect, to accept in its entirety the reasoning adopted by the late Sir Shah Sulaiman in the Full Bench case of Raghubir Singh v. Mulchand (supra), that, for the reasons he has fully explained, it is necessary to regard the increment of Rs. 34,000 over and above the original Rs. 36,000 as "interest" within the definition of that term contained in Section 2(8) of the Act. I do not desire to repeat the argument he has used except to say that, with great respect, I entirely agree with it. The position therefore in 1916, as we must view it for the purpose of construing Section 30, Sub-section (1) of the Act, is that that sum of Rs. 34,000 was "capitalized" by the "renewed" mortgage of that year. As I pointed out earlier, a fresh covenant for payment was taken. And on the principles of the English cases to which our attention has been drawn. The Credit Company v. Pott I.R. 6 Q.B.D. 295; B.S. Lyle Limited v. Chappell (1932) 1 K.B.D. 691 and Paton v. J.R. Commissioner (supra) and upon the ordinary principles of contract and of novation, there can be no possible doubt to my mind but that this constituted in law a "loan" of that sum of Rs. 34,000 by the mortgagee to the mortgagor. It is quite true that that money was not actually handed by the mortgagor to the mortgagee in cash in satisfaction of the outstanding interest and again "taken" back as money "lent". But it is the substance of the transaction to which we have to look. It is the commonest form of commercial operation that outstanding sums are "capitalized" and in fact relent, in that way. I am unable to take any other view than that in the case before us the sum of Rs. But it is the substance of the transaction to which we have to look. It is the commonest form of commercial operation that outstanding sums are "capitalized" and in fact relent, in that way. I am unable to take any other view than that in the case before us the sum of Rs. 34,000 was "lent" by the mortgagee to the mortgagor in 1916 and was, in that sense, also a "loan taken before this Act came into force" within the meaning of Section 30, Sub-section (1). It has to be observed that this is quite irrespective of any question of whether a fresh consolidated loan of an aggregate sum of Rs. 60,000 was constituted by the mortgage of 1916. That, therefore, was the second "loan taken" within the meaning of the section of the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act with which we are dealing. In precisely the same way as in the case of the loan of Rs. 36,000 "taken" in 1904, the debtor, upon the plain language of the Act, cm be given, as from the 1st of January, 1930, interest on that sum also only at the statutory rate. 35. Finally, we come to the transaction of 1928. There was a further increment of Rs. 21,550, representing the accumulated interest. The only additional factor to be observed is that, on this occasion there was not only a fresh covenant to pay it as capital, but the rate of interest it was to carry was not even the same as on the former occasion. By parity of reasoning, I entertain no doubt but that this sum also was a loan and that it also was a "loan taken before" the Act came into force. 36. The Full Bench case of Raghubir Singh v. Mulchand (supra), to which I have already referred and in which the late Sir Shah Sulaiman delivered the leading judgment, was not a case in any way on all fours with the present one. The question in that case arose with reference to a simple case in which money had been lent in 1923 and was outstanding with the accumulated interest in 1934. It was not therefore, complicated by any question of "renewal". It has no relation to the case we are considering in the abstract form in which the question is put to us. It was not therefore, complicated by any question of "renewal". It has no relation to the case we are considering in the abstract form in which the question is put to us. But, as I have already pointed out, the reasoning of it, based on the definitions of "loan and interest" contained in Section 2 of the Act, point to the sum "actually" taken as fulfilling the definition of the words "loan taken" in Section 30, Sub-section (1). It is, on that reasoning, sums "actually" taken that one has to look for. In the conclusion which I have reached above that the Rs. 82,000 which found its way into the mortgage of 1928 was, for the purpose of the construction of Section 30, Sub-section (1), nothing less than three separate loans "taken" in 1904, 1916 and 1928 respectively. I have followed to the fullest extent the reasoning of that Full Bench judgment with which, with the greatest respect, I entirely agree. 37. Now, to revert to the facts before us, the position becomes, as I think, very clear started by discarding, for the purpose of argument only, the construction that the "renewed" sum of Rs. 82,000 expressed to be secured by the 1928 mortgage was itself the only sum which fulfilled the definition of a "loan taken" in Section 30, Sub-section (1) of the Act. I am not prepared to decide that that was so, but I assume it for the purposes of the argument, because, if it was not so, then I am satisfied that the only possible alternative, once it has been appreciated that we are not confined to a single loan, is to look (as the Act tells us to do) for the various sums which were actually "taken" before it came into force and doing that, we find that the three sums mentioned above were "actually taken". Now, if we add up those three sums, we arrive at precisely the same result as before, namely that the aggregate sum at which interest at the statutory rate has to be allowed as from the 1st of January, 1930, is Rs. 81,550. It is obvious that the additional sum of Rs. 450 advanced in 1928 was a "loan taken". 38. 81,550. It is obvious that the additional sum of Rs. 450 advanced in 1928 was a "loan taken". 38. I have put it in that way because, as I think, we have been somewhat misled by ignoring the practical result of the conclusions at which we have been asked to arrive and by considering only the abstract meaning of the word "loan". And I confess to thinking that that difficulty has arisen from the abstract form in which the question has been put to this Full Bench I think that a good deal of confusion arises from attempting to answer abstract questions with reference to particular facts and that, when given, such answers tend to confuse, rather than to assist, posterity. If I may venture, with respect, to re-frame the question in the form in which, in my view, it arises on the facts before us, it would be this: Whether in the events which have happened and on the true construction of Section 30, Sub-section (1) of the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act, interest as from the 1st of January, 1930, at the rate therein provided ought to be calculated on the sum of Rs. 86,000 only or on the sum of Rs. 82,000 or on any other and what sum? 39. If the question is put in that way, then I think there can be only one possible answer, namely that, whichever way you look at it,--whether you treat the "renewal" of 1928 as the only outstanding loan or whether you treat the other sums also which were taken earlier as still outstanding--you arrive at precisely the same result. But, upon neither view, can I reconcile myself to thinking that the only alternative presented to us by the actual order of reference in this case, that the only sum upon which interest can be allowed as from the 1st of January, 1930, is the sum of Rs. 36,000, is the right one, because it was not the only "loan taken" before the Act came into force-There is only one other matter with which I desire to deal. It is the Bench case to which I have referred earlier Dharam Singh v. Bishan Sarup (supra) which followed immediately upon the Full Bench case. 36,000, is the right one, because it was not the only "loan taken" before the Act came into force-There is only one other matter with which I desire to deal. It is the Bench case to which I have referred earlier Dharam Singh v. Bishan Sarup (supra) which followed immediately upon the Full Bench case. If that case decided that, when you find interest "capitalized" in the sense of being included in the principal sum secured when a "renewal" of a mortgage is entered into, then, with great respect, I should feel bound to disagree with it for reasons which I have already shortly stated and which are more fully stated in the judgment of my learned brother Mr. Justice Dar. But I am not satisfied that in reality there is any conflict at all. The Bench case was one u/s 33 of the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act and arose out of an application by an agriculturist debtor for a declaration as to bow much he owed on a mortgage as at some date after 1933. That, of course, involved a calculation as to how much interest was due to him and that, in turn, involved ascertaining what was owing to him by way of interest from the 1st of January, 1930. By Section 33, Sub-section (2) of the Act the provisions of Section 30, Sub-section (1) are made applicable to that calculation and the question that arose was, accordingly, whether a "loan" was outstanding at all on the 31st of December, 1929, upon which interest could be given after the 1st of January, or whether the effect of the "renewal" which took place in 1933 was to extinguish the old "can" not merely as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, but for all purposes. As I understand it, that was the real bone of contention and I think it becomes clear from the following passage of the judgment: The contention urged on behalf of the Respondent is that when the mortgage deed was renewed and a usufructuary mortgage deed was executed, then although there was no fresh advance of money, it was a new transaction of loan and the previous transaction must be deemed to have been completely wiped out with the result that no reduction can be ordered prior Ito August 1933. 40. That, in my view, is the clue to the who e judgment. 40. That, in my view, is the clue to the who e judgment. It did not decide that a "capitalized" sum of interest could not it self be a "loan" for the purpose of Section 30 Sub-section (1). It decided that the effect of a "renewal" transaction was not completely to extinguish the old loan for the purpose of the calculation of interest u/s 30 and when viewed in that way, it is, in fact an authority for and not against, the view I have expressed above, because it recognises that, notwithstanding the "renewal", the old loan can exist as a "loan taken" within the meaning of Section 30. Perhaps I may be permitted to say with respect that the words subsequently used in the judgment: We find it difficult to hold that this transaction can be regarded as a fresh advance in kind by the mortgagee to the mortgagor. are a trifle misleading. But I am satisfied that they were not intended to lay down a broad proposition that no transaction such as those in question could constitute a loan. In fact, the question never arose in that case, at least as it has been reported. 41. So far as current interest, whether simple or compounded, accruing between 1928 and the 31st of January 1929 is concerned, it was affected by no "renewal" or "capitalization" transaction and in my judgment it never lost its character as 'interest' and assumed the character of "capital". In short, it never became a "loan taken before the Act came into force". That, as between mortgagee and mortgagor, it carried by contract compounded and not simple, interest, does not appear to me to constitute any sufficient reason for saying that it had lost its character as 'interest'. 42. I would answer the question before the Bench by saying that the words "loan taken" in Section 30, Sub-section (1) of the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1934, in my opinion, include in the case before us, the sum of Rs. 42. I would answer the question before the Bench by saying that the words "loan taken" in Section 30, Sub-section (1) of the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1934, in my opinion, include in the case before us, the sum of Rs. 82,000 which was the principal sum ex-pressed to be secured by the mortgage of I 1928, whether such sum is regarded as one single capitalized "loan taken" in the year 1928 or as compounded of three separate "loans taken" in the years 1904, 1916 and 1928 respectively, but that such words do not include interest, whether simple or compound, accrued between the date of the 1928 mortgage and the 31st of December, 1929, which at such last mentioned date remained 'uncapitalized' by any 'renewal' transaction. Hamilton J. 43. The following question has been referred by a Divisional Bench for decision: Where an earlier transaction of loan is renewed, is the new transaction itself a 'loan' for the purposes of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1934)?. 44. Certain decisions on the interpretation of Section 30 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act have been referred to in the reference order of the Divisional Bench and they have also been cited and discussed by counsel before us and I understand that I am to express an opinion on this point too. 45. The facts of the case in which this reference order has been made, as given in the reference, are as follows: On August 31, 1904, Dharam Singh borrowed Rs. 36,000 from Gulzari, Banwari and Muriri Lal and executed a mortgage of certain property. On May 3, 1916, he executed a new mortgage for Rs. 60,000 to pay off what was due on the previous mortgage. On April 16, 1928, he executed a mortgage, again in favour of the same persons, for Rs. 82,000 of which Rs. 81,550 was to pay off what was still due on the mortgage of 1916. The trial Court decided that interest u/s 30 of Schedule III would run on Rs. 91,699-12-6, the amount due on December 31, 1929, owing to the mortgage transaction of 1928. Learned Counsel for the judgment debtors argued that the rate of interest fixed by the Schedule which is to be read with Section 30 was to be on Rs. 36,000, the principal of the first mortgage deed of 1904 and not as decided by the learned Judge. 46. Learned Counsel for the judgment debtors argued that the rate of interest fixed by the Schedule which is to be read with Section 30 was to be on Rs. 36,000, the principal of the first mortgage deed of 1904 and not as decided by the learned Judge. 46. I will first consider the second point, namely the interpretation of Section 30. 47. In Kailash Kuer v. Amur Nath (supra), it was held that interest would be calculated on the total amount found due on December 31, 1929, at the rate of 5 1/2 per cent compoundable with yearly rests from January 1, 1930 to May 7, 1935 and at 4 1/2 per cent from May 8, 1935 till realisation On the other hand, a Full Bench of this Court in Raghubir Singh v. Mul Chand (supra), decided that the rate of interest under the Schedule which has to be read with Section 30 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act was to be calculated not on the accumulated amount due under the loan as at December 31, 1929, but upon the principal amount advanced as loan. The decision of the Oudh Chief Court in Kailash Kuer v. Amar Nath (supra) was referred to and dissented from. I agree with the result arrived at by the Oudh Chief Court though my reasoning is different. 48. The Full Bench of this Court referred to the definitions of 'loan' and 'interest' and held that 'loan' was the principal amount advanced and not the amount due as on December 31, 1929, in view of the definition of 'loan' in the Act. Section 30(1) reads as follows: (1) Notwithstanding anything in any contract to the contrary no debtor shall be liable to pay interest on a loan taken before this Act comes into force at a rate higher than that specified in Schedule III for the period from January 1, 1930, till such date as may be fixed by the Local Government in the Gazette in this behalf. Schedule III which has to be read with this section divides loans into secured and unsecured, into loans of Rs. 500 and under, loans of Rs. 501 to Rs. 5,000. (sic) of Rs. 5,001 to Rs. 20,000 and loans over Rs. 20,000. It divides interest into compound per cent per annum with yearly rests and simple per cent per annum. Schedule III which has to be read with this section divides loans into secured and unsecured, into loans of Rs. 500 and under, loans of Rs. 501 to Rs. 5,000. (sic) of Rs. 5,001 to Rs. 20,000 and loans over Rs. 20,000. It divides interest into compound per cent per annum with yearly rests and simple per cent per annum. It is obvious that the rates of compound interest in the Schedule are to be applied to loans bearing compound interest and simple interest to loans bearing simple interest and I can find nothing in the section which justifies in any year fixing a simple interest rate in the case of a loan bearing compound interest. The object of the section, therefore, appears to be merely to reduce the rate of compound interest and the heading of Chapter IV in which Section 30 occurs namely "Rates of Interest" bears out this view. Section 30(1) read with Schedule III, in my opinion, bears the same meaning as if the words were "Notwithstanding anything in any contract to the contrary no debtor shall be liable to pay interest, simple or compound as the case may be, on a loan...." The question for decision then would be: What is the compound interest on the principal in the first, second, third or whatever the year of the loan might be in which falls the date, 31st December, 1929 and in the next year? For the next year the rate of compound interest would be reduced u/s 30. 49. Let us consider a loan of Rs. 100 taken on the 1st of January, 1928, at 10 per cent with yearly rests when no part of the principal has at any time been repaid. At the expiry of the year 1928 the compound interest would be Rs. 10. This figure is arrived at by multiplying the principal by 10 and dividing by 100, the same operation as in the case of simple interest in my opinion, however, this sum would be compound interest because the loan bears compound interest and not simple interest. As the loan does not bear simple interest, in the following year the (compound) interest would be Rs. 11. As the loan does not bear simple interest, in the following year the (compound) interest would be Rs. 11. It is true that this sum is arrived at by a calculation which consists of multiplying the principal by 10 and dividing by 100 and multiplying the interest of the previous year by 10 ad dividing by 100. In the third year of the loan the compound interest would be Rs. 12 and 1/10th. This sum can be arrived at either by multiplying 121 by 10 and dividing by 100 or by multiplying 100 by 10 and dividing by 100, by multiplying 10 by 10 and dividing by 100 and by multiplying 11 by 10 and dividing by 100 and adding the three results together. It can thus be said that the compound interest is arrived at by taking 10 per cent of the capital plus 10 per cent of the simple interest of preceding years. Yet in my opinion the compound interest at 10 per cent in the third year of a loan of Rs. 100 is Rs. 12 and 1/10, whatever may be the calculations involved in order to ascertain the amount. On the loan of Rs. 100 taken on the 1st of January, 1928, the compound interest for the year 1930 will be the compound interest of the third year and whatever be the calculations which are required to ascertain the amount on the application of the Schedule rate the interest at the Schedule rate must be the compound interest which is due on the loan in the third year of the loan. The simplest way to reach this result is to take the aggregate amount due on the 31st December, 1929 and to apply to it the rate fixed by the Schedule. This arithmetical operation does involve multiplying past simple interest by a certain figure and dividing it by 100 but, in my opinion, the result will be the correct compound interest for the third year of the loan. 50. Let us suppose that the compound interest according to the rate fixed by Schedule III would be 5 per cent. According to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court the interest for the year 1930 on a loan of Rs. 100, bearing compound interest, taken on the 1st of January, 1928, would be Rs. 5. 50. Let us suppose that the compound interest according to the rate fixed by Schedule III would be 5 per cent. According to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court the interest for the year 1930 on a loan of Rs. 100, bearing compound interest, taken on the 1st of January, 1928, would be Rs. 5. With all respect to the decision of the learned Judges composing the Full Bench 1 do not see how in 1930 Rs. 5 can be compound interest at 5 per cent on the principal of Rs. 100 when this sum was lent at 5 or more per cent compound interest on the 1st of January, 1928. A sum of Rs. 5 would be compound interest at 5 per cent on a loan of Rs. 100 dated January t, 1930, or simple interest at 5 per cent on a loan of Rs. 100. That decision of the Full Bench does not specifically state how the interest is to be calculated in the year 1931. It must be remembered that the definitions of 'loan' and of 'interest' and Section 30 with Schedule III apply in 1931 and subsequent years just as in 1930 and in 1930 just as in 1931 and subsequent years. If again in the year 1931 and in subsequent years the interest is Rs. 5, then there is no compound interest on the loan. If in 1931 the compound interest is to be calculated on the principal of Rs. 100 plus the interest of Rs. 5 then I do not see why in the year 1930 the interest should not be similarly calculated on the principal plus the interest of preceding years. On my reasoning there is no necessity to say as the Oudh Chief Court have done that the words in Section 30 "on a loan" mean no more than "in respect of a loan" or to hold that the word 'loan' means the principal plus interest up to December 31, 1929. I thus agree with the Full Bench of this Court that interest on the loan mean interest on the sum that was advanced on the date that the loan was taken, but when the loan bears compound interest multiplying that principal by 5 or whatever the rate may be under the Schedule and dividing by 100 does not produce the correct result alter the first year. The simplest way to obtain this result is to take all the amount due, to multiply it by 5 or whatever the figure may be according to the Schedule and to divide by 100. 51. I will now consider the question which has been directly referred to the Full Bench. The first decision to which I must refer is one of a Divisional Bench of this Court reported in Dharam Singh v. Bishan Sarup, where the section to be interpreted was 33(2) of the Agriculturists Relief Act but Section 30 had also to be considered. This was a case where in lieu of the amounts due under two hypothecation bonds a fresh mortgage deed was executed in August 1933. It was then held that there was no fresh advance of money to the mortgagor and that it was difficult to hold that this transaction of renewal could be regarded as a fresh advance in kind by the mortgagee to the mortgagor. The following words appear in that decision-- The use of the words 'actually lent' in the definition of the word 'interest' suggests that any such fiction of law should not be imported into the definition and what the Court has to see is the actual amount advanced or lent and not what by some fiction might be imagined to have been indirectly advanced. 52. I think that the meaning of the words 'actually lent' becomes clear if one refers to Section 35 of the Act. u/s 32 a creditor has regularly to record and maintain a correct account for each agriculturist debtor of all transactions relating to each loan advanced to that debtor in such a manner as the Local Government may prescribe and to supply that debtor every year with a full and correct statement of account. This section applies after the date on which this Act comes into force. I have quoted only that part of the section which I consider relevant. u/s 35 a creditor who does not comply with the requirements of Section 32 is punished with fine. This section applies after the date on which this Act comes into force. I have quoted only that part of the section which I consider relevant. u/s 35 a creditor who does not comply with the requirements of Section 32 is punished with fine. Section 35(1) reads as follows: (1) Any creditor who, after the commencement of this Act, records in his book of accounts or in the statement of account submitted to the debtor as lent to an agriculturist a sum larger than that actually lent, whether by way of charges for expenses, inquiries, fines, bonuses, premia, renewals, or otherwise, shall be punished for the first offence with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees and for a second or subsequent offence with regard to the same or any other agriculturist, with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. 53. A distinction is drawn between the sum 'actually lent' and a larger sum, the difference being charges for expenses, inquiries, fines, bonuses, premia, renewals, or otherwise. If, therefore, at the time of the renewal the sum due was Rs. 200 and the renewal was for, say, Rs. 250, the Rs. 50 representing a sum for the privilege of having a renewal, something in fact in the nature of a Nazrana, that amount will not be considered to have been 'actually lent'. It is, however, only this charge for renewal and not the renewal itself which is considered to be a sum not actually lent, In my opinion, therefore, the use of the words 'actually lent' is not, as has been suggested in Dharam Singh v. Bishan Sarup to distinguish between a loan in which there is an actual advance in money or in kind and a transaction such as a renewal. 54. Rarnanand Misir v. Ram Baran Chaube is a case where on 29th June, 1926, a simple mortgage of Rs. 2,200 was executed and on 25th March, 1933, a (sic) was executed for Rs. 500, a sum still due under the simple mortgage. It was held that the only loan was that of 1926. No reasons for the decision were given save that otherwise in the opinion of the learned Judges the provisions of Section 30 would be easily circumvented and the intention of the Legislature would be frustrated in a large number of cases. 55. It was held that the only loan was that of 1926. No reasons for the decision were given save that otherwise in the opinion of the learned Judges the provisions of Section 30 would be easily circumvented and the intention of the Legislature would be frustrated in a large number of cases. 55. Contrary to these decisions is the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Bhim Sen v. Raghubir Saran 1939 A.W.R. (H.C.) 486 : A.L.J. 798 In this case the learned Judge quoted Section 2, Clause (10)(a) which is as follows: Loan means an advance to an agriculturist, whether of money or in kind and shall include any transaction which is in substance a loan.... 56. The learned Judge was of opinion that the words "in substance" were important and meant "in effect". In that case a promissory note had been executed before the Agriculturists' Relief Act came into force and on May 16, 1935 a fresh promissory note in satisfaction of the debt due from the first promissory note was executed. I agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge of this Court. The words "in substance" imply the words 'but not in form', that is to say, something which is not exactly an advance to an agriculturist, whether of money or in kind. 57. In AIR 1940 10 (Federal Court) the following words occur in the judgment of Sulaiman, J.-- The third category of 'any transaction which, substance, is a loan' may for instance possibly include a promise to pay unpaid purchase money or promise I pay a sum of money for some other good consideration, but not a mere acknowledgment c interest due, unless it also amounts to a renew, of a bond. 58. It is true that the Act which was to be construed was the Bihar Money lenders Act, but the words 'any transaction which, in substance, is a loan' are the same words as are to be found in the definition of 'loan' in the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. 59. In Jaigobind Singh v. Lachmi Narain Ram Anr. 58. It is true that the Act which was to be construed was the Bihar Money lenders Act, but the words 'any transaction which, in substance, is a loan' are the same words as are to be found in the definition of 'loan' in the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. 59. In Jaigobind Singh v. Lachmi Narain Ram Anr. case in which the Bihar Money-lenders' Act had to be interpreted, the following words appear in the judgment of Varadachariar, J,-- Where however as in the present case, tin parties settle accounts in respect of a pre-existing liability and agree that money borrowed under a later transaction, even from the same creditor, should be applied in discharge of that pre-existing liability, it seems to me that the later transaction should in law be regarded as a loan by itself, though cash did not actually pass between the parties by way of lending and repayment: See observations of Greer L. J. as he then was, in (1932) 1 KB 691, referred to with approval by the Judicial Committee in (1940) 1 MLJ 68 at p. 72. 60. I base no argument, either as regards the question of interpretation of Section 30 or the question whether a renewal is a loan, on what the intention of the U.P. Legislature may have been when this Act was passed in so far as that intention is not made clear by the Act itself. It is stated in the Preamble that the Act was "to make provision for the relief of agriculturists from indebtedness", but to what extent provision was being made has to be seen from the various sections of the Act. If any section is obscure I cannot presume that an interpretation which gives greater relief than one which gives a lesser relief is the correct one. 61. I answer in the affirmative the question "Where an earlier transaction of loan is renewed, is the new transaction itself a loan for the purposes of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1934)". Dar J. 62. This is a Reference to a Full Bench of this Court of a question of law which has arisen upon interpretation of certain sections of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1934.) 63. Dar J. 62. This is a Reference to a Full Bench of this Court of a question of law which has arisen upon interpretation of certain sections of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1934.) 63. On August 31, 1904, Dharam Singh a Hindu resident of village Kuarsi in Aligarh district, executed a simple mortgage in favour of Gulzari Lal, Murari Lal and Binwari Lal, three Hindu brothers, for a sum of Rs. 36 000, carrying interest at seven annas per cent per mensem compoundable with six-monthly rest. Under this mortgage the property mortgaged was village Kuarsi and two groves and an indigo factory in the said village. Only a small sum of money due under this mortgage was paid by Dharam Singh and almost on the expiration of twelve years, on May 3, 1916, Dharam Singh executed a fresh mortgage in favour of the same creditors for a sum of Rs. 60,000 bearing the same rate of interest and mortgaging the same property. In this mortgage it is stated that after making allowance for the payments received, a sum of Rs. 60,000 was due on the previous mortgage of 1904 for which the mortgage of 1916 was being executed. Again, by far the bulk of the debt due under the mortgage of 1916 remained unsatisfied and almost at the expiration of a second period of twelve years on April 16, 1928, Dharam Singh executed a fresh simple mortgage in favour of the same creditors for Rs. 82,000. In this mortgage the interest payable was raised from seven annas per cent per mensem to nine annas per cent per mensem compoundable six-monthly and in addition to the property mortgaged in the previous mortgages, one more grove and a share in one more village Hasanpur Qaem was mortgaged. In the mortgage deed it is further stated that out of the consideration of Rs. 82,000, Rs. 81,550, was due on the previous mortgage of 1916 and a sum of Rs. 450 was a fresh advance taken by the debtor from the creditors for purchasing stamp and for registration expenses of the document. It may also be stated here that even prior to 1904 Dharam Singh had borrowed money by making a mortgage of village Kuarsi and the successive mortgages of 1904, 1916 and 1928 set out that the rights arising under the earlier mortgages shall subsist in favour of the creditors. It may also be stated here that even prior to 1904 Dharam Singh had borrowed money by making a mortgage of village Kuarsi and the successive mortgages of 1904, 1916 and 1928 set out that the rights arising under the earlier mortgages shall subsist in favour of the creditors. 64. On May 30, 1933, the creditors Gulzari Lal and his brothers raised an action in the Court of the Civil Judge of Aligarh for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,14,498-12-6 due on the mortgage of April 16, 1928, against Dharam Singh and his four sons and four grandsons. On July 26, 1934, the Civil Judge of Aligarh passed a preliminary decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 4, CPC in favour of the creditors for a sum of Rs. 1,29,330-2-3 which sum was to carry interest at 6 per cent, per annum, simple, until realization. On April 30, 1935, the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1934) came into force and after this Act had come into force, one application was made by the creditors for the preparation of a final decree and another application was made by the debtors Dharam Singh and others for converting the mortgage decree into an instalment decree and for varying and reducing the interest granted by the decree. In this proceedings before the Civil Judge, it was a matter of agreement that a sum of Rs. 91,689-12-6 was due to the creditors on December 31, 1929, for principal and interest on the mortgage bond dated April 16, 1928, mentioned above and the main controversy in the case was whether the interest, which admittedly was to be varied and reduced from January 1, 1930, was to be varied and reduced on the sum of Rs. 91,639, odd which was the amount due on December 31, 1929, or it was to be varied and reduced on the sum of Rs. 82,000 odd which was the principal amount due on the mortgage of 1928, or it was to be varied and reduced on Rs. 36,000 which was the original amount borrowed by the debtors on the mortgage of 1904. One other matter of contention was whether instalments should or should not be granted to the judgment-debtors. 82,000 odd which was the principal amount due on the mortgage of 1928, or it was to be varied and reduced on Rs. 36,000 which was the original amount borrowed by the debtors on the mortgage of 1904. One other matter of contention was whether instalments should or should not be granted to the judgment-debtors. By an order dated February 13, 1936, the Civil Judge of Aligarh decided that the debtors were entitled to variation and reduction of interest from January 1, 1930, upon the aggregate sum of Rs. 91,689-12-6. With regard to instalments claimed by the debtors the learned Judge directed them to pay Rs. 65,000 within six months and the remaining amount by half-yearly instalments of Rs. 6,000 from February 1937 and in default of payment of any three instalments the whole amount shall fall due. 65. He also directed a final decree to be drawn up in terms of the above order. Some mistake crept in the final decree which was prepared under Order XXXIV Rule 5 CPC on February 13, 1936 and an amendment was allowed by the Civil Judge of the said decree on October 9, 1937, but which is not necessary to particularise for the purposes of this judgment. 66. Against the two orders of the Civil Judge of Aligarh, dated February 13, 1936 and October 9, 1937, two Revisions were filed by the debtors in this Court which came up for hearing before a Bench of this Court when the following question of law which arose in the case was referred to a larger Bench and in due course it has now come before us for our consideration and answer. Where an earlier transaction of loan is renewed, is the new transaction itself a lone for the purposes of U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1934)?. Chapter IV of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act which is headed as 'Rates of Interest' and which consists of four Sections 28 to 31 provides a statutory rate of interest in Leu of contractual rate of interest on loans taken by Agriculturists both before and after the Act came into force. Sections 28, 29 and 31 deal with loan taken after the Act and Section 30, Clause (1) deals with loans taken prior to Act and in the same section Clause (2) deals with loan taken prior to Act which have merged in decrees. Sections 28, 29 and 31 deal with loan taken after the Act and Section 30, Clause (1) deals with loans taken prior to Act and in the same section Clause (2) deals with loan taken prior to Act which have merged in decrees. We are dealing here in this case with a loan taken before the Act to which Section 30 alone applies and that main questions which arise in the case are whether the loan referred to in Section 30 refers to 'original' loan taken by Agriculturists or it also refers to 'renewed' loan and further whether the phrase 'interest on loan' as used in that Section means interest on principal sum or on sum actually lent, or it means interest on the loan which is actually due. The question which has been referred to us is wider than the mere interpretation of Section 30 and it embraces an interpretation of other sections of the Act, particularly of Sections 28, 29 and 31 in so far as a renewed loan is concerned and it is narrower in the sense that it does not specifically include an enquiry whether loan in Section 30 refers to sum actually lent or to sum actually due. But both these matters whether loan includes a renewed loan and whether loan also includes sum actually due were debated before us and they are so intimately connected that it is necessary to consider both of them and to express an opinion about them. 67. On the question whether 'loan' in Section 30 man the sum actually lent or it means the sum actually due, there is a conflict of judicial authority. In Kailash Knar v. Amar Nath Srivastava and Nanavutty JJ. held that loan in Section 30 refers not only to principal amount but also to principal with interest and there is nothing in the terms of Section 30 to suggest any intention on the part of the legislature to interfere with amount found due under the terms of the contract or decree upto 31st December, 1929 and the words 'interest on a loan' referred to in Section 30 means interest in respect of a loan. 68. This view was followed by the Oudh Chief Court in Kushal Chand v. Raja Prithipal Singh. 69. 68. This view was followed by the Oudh Chief Court in Kushal Chand v. Raja Prithipal Singh. 69. In Raghnnr Singh v. Mid Chand, a Full Bench of this Court dissenting from Kailash Knar v. Amar Nalh held that the 'rate of interest' to be fixed by the Court in an application u/s 30 U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, is to be calculated not on the accumulated amount due under the loan as at December 31, 1929, but upon the principal amount advanced as loan. It was further held that loan in Section 30 must mean the principal sum advanced which remains outstanding at the time when the application was made. 70. This view was followed in Mukat Lal v. Raghuraj Singh 1939 A.W.R. (H.C.) 837 : A.L.J. 1018 (1050) and in several other cases in this Court. 71. In Section 2 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act there are interpretation clauses in which at Nos. 8 and 10 interest and loan are denned and their definitions in so far as they are material for the purpose are as follows: (8) 'Interest' includes the return to be made over and above what was actually lent, whether the same is charged or sought to be recovered specifically by way of interest or in the form of service or otherwise. (10)(a) 'Loan' means an advance to an agriculturist whether of money or in kind and shall include any transaction which is in substance a loan. 72. I have no doubt that the interpretation clause which defines the loan is prima facie restrictive and the one which defines the interest is prima facie extensive and on the face of it if these two definitions are read together, loan as defined in the above interpretation clause must mean the principal sum lent and it should not include any interest which might fall due upon it subsequent to loan under the terms of the above loan. But I do not understand it to be the law that interpretation clause must necessarily apply wherever the word 'interpreted' is used in the statute and inspite of the fact that there are indications in the statute and in the section where it occurs to control and modify and explain the meaning of the word in a different sense than what is borne out by the interpretation clause. In Meux v. Jacobs (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 493 Lord Selborne said: It appears to me that the interpretation clause does no more than say that, where you find those words in the Act, they shall, unless there be something repugnant in the context or in the sense, include fixtures. And Craies on Statute Law, Fourth Edition, (1936) at page 195 has stated the law with regard to the application of interpretation clauses in these words: Another important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation clause is, that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another or as strictly defining what the meaning of a term must be under all circumstances, but rather as declaring what may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that it should be so comprehended. 73. I take it that the interpretation clause in the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act serves the purpose of a definition and it was not intended under the guise of definition to enact. The practice of defining terms used in varying sense in a Statute by an interpretation clause has been the subject of severe judicial criticism in England and only the other day in Knightsbridge Estates Trust Limited v. Byrne (1949) A.C. 613 at 624, in House of Lords Viscount Maugham added his protest in these words: We are dealing with an Act in which the word "debenture" is used in numerous sections and it must be admitted in more than one sense. The practice of inserting a definition in such a case has often been criticized. It was described by Blackburn, J. in Lindsay v. Gundy (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 348, 358 as a modern innovation which frequently does a great deal of harm and by Lord St. Leonards L.C. in Ely Dean and Chapter v. Bliss (1852) 2 De G.M. and G. 459, as an attempt to put a general construction on words which in the different sense in which they are introduced in the various clauses of an Act do not admit of such. It is probably too late to add to these and other complaints. 74. It is probably too late to add to these and other complaints. 74. In an earlier portion of the judgment in the same case at page 621 Viscount Maugham also observed: It is perhaps worth pointing out that the words "unless the context otherwise requires," which we find in the Consolidating Act of 1929, are not to be found in the amending Act of 1928. I attribute little weight to this fact, for in my opinion some such words are to be implied in all statutes where the expressions which are interpreted by a definition clause are used in a number of sections with meanings sometimes of a wide and sometimes of an obviously limited character. 75. Now, the controversy on this part of the case does not centre upon the interpretation clause because, so far as I am aware, it has not been seriously disputed that loan as defined in the interpretation clause means only a principal sum and it does not include the interest which falls due subsequent to the loan. The controversy centres round the question whether having regard to the language of Section 30 and the context the phrase 'interest on a loan' occurring in Section 30 means interest on the principal sum of the loan or it means interest in respect of a loan or in other words interest on the loan which is due and not interest on the amount which was actually lent. I have already stated that the heading of Chapter IV is 'rate of interest'. The marginal note of Section 30(1) is: Rate of interest on undecreed loans taken before this Act came into force for the period after January 1, 1935. And the section itself is worded as follows: Notwithstanding anything in any contract to the contrary no debtor shall be liable to pay interest on a loan taken before this Act conies into force at a rate higher than that specified in Schedule III for the period from January 1, 1930, till such date as may be fixed by the Local Government in the Gazette in this behalf. 76. In Schedule III which is part of Section 30, four rates of interest are specified and these relate separately to secured and unsecured loans and to simple and compound interest. But rate of compound interest set out in the Schedule is with yearly rest. 76. In Schedule III which is part of Section 30, four rates of interest are specified and these relate separately to secured and unsecured loans and to simple and compound interest. But rate of compound interest set out in the Schedule is with yearly rest. Schedule III is a part of Section 30 and the section and schedule read together clearly indicate that after January 1, 1930, when the statutory rate is to come in operation in place of the contractual rate of interest, the statutory rate can be both simple and compound and it will be imposed simple or compound according as under the agreement interest agreed to was simple or compound and it will not be open to the debtor or to the creditor to change the liability of payment of simple or compound interest at his option from what was settled at the time of the loan--See, Bisesar Ram Marwari v. Parasnath 1937 A.W.R. 76 : A.L.J. 125 Kunj Behari Lal v. Kethi Kuar 1937 A.W.R. 166 : A.L.J. 177 and Muhat Lal v. Raghuraj Singh. It follows that u/s 30(1) read with Schedule III, though statutory rate of interest is to be imposed in lieu of the contractual rate of interest from January 1, 1930, onward, this statutory rate in cases where the agreed interest was compound interest would also be compound interest with this difference that it would be a lower rate of interest and the rest would be yearly. If, therefore, covenant to pay compound interest on a loan remained in operation upto 31st December, 1929, as it is common ground that it must so remain in operation and if it is also agreed by all judicial authority that a covenant with regard to the payment of compound interest is to remain in operation even after January 1, 1930, subject to this modification that compound interest will run on schedule rates with yearly rest, is there any reason to hold that compound interest should not run on the loan for 12 months only between January 30 and December 1930? and we must start with the principal sum alone on January 1930 and go on charging compound interest over it and leave the accumulated interest which had fallen due upto 31st December, 1929 at a standstill? In every loan taken on a promise to pay compound interest two covenants are implicit. and we must start with the principal sum alone on January 1930 and go on charging compound interest over it and leave the accumulated interest which had fallen due upto 31st December, 1929 at a standstill? In every loan taken on a promise to pay compound interest two covenants are implicit. One gives a right to the creditor to capitalize the interest with the principal after an agreed period if interest is not paid and to charge interest upon the capitalized sum. And the other covenant is to pay interest at a particular rate and at certain periods. It seems to me that what was intended by Section 30 was not to interfere with the first covenant at all and in lieu of the second covenant to substitute a statutory rate and statutory period of payment. It is true that Section 30 opens with the clause 'notwithstanding anything in any contract to the contrary' which in a way negatives covenants between the debtor and a creditor. It is also true that if the expression loan and interest as used in the section is interpreted according to definition in the interpretation clause, Joan must mean the principal sum and not the interest which had fallen due upon it since the loan. But the section also says that the statutory rate shall be charged according to Schedule III and Schedule III enacts that if compound interest was agreed at the time of the loan then the debtor shall be liable to pay compound interest though at a lower rate and with yearly rest. Does it not reasonably follow from this that the covenant by which the creditor was given the right to capitalize the interest if not paid on due date, with the principal and charge interest upon the whole was preserved to the creditor and if so, does it not follow that the creditor had a right to capitalize the interest which had accrued due on December 31, 1929 and charge interest on the capitalized sum on January 1, 1930, according to schedule rate? In my opinion, the reasonable interpretation of Section 30 read with Schedule III is that in the clause 'no debtor shall be liable to pay interest on a loan taken before this Act', the expression 'on a loan' means 'in respect of a loan' or it means 'amount due on a loan' and it does not mean merely the principal sum of the loan. And I put this interpretation mainly upon the ground that the right of the creditor to capitalize interest and charge interest on the capitalized sum is preserved by Schedule III and there seems to be no reason to hold that the legislature intended that this right to capitalize on a loan shall exist in favour of the creditor, on a loan taken on compound interest throughout except for one date, namely on 1st January, 1930. 77. It is true this Court is not concerned with the reason or policy of the Act and it has to give effect to the plain meaning of the section or to its expressed intention and it has no means of finding out its implied intention But Section 30 read with Schedule III if paraphrased might run as follows: Notwithstanding anything in any contract to the contrary no debtor shall be liable to pay interest on a loan taken before this Act comes into force at a rate higher than that specified in Schedule III for the period from January 1, 1930, till such date as may be fixed by the Local Government in the Gazette in this behalf, but which rate in case of a loan bearing compound interest shall be compound interest and in case of ban bearing simple interest shall be simple interest. 78. It may be noted that the proviso which I have added in paraphrasing is only the judicial interpretation of the section and the schedule. It is thus clear that loan on January 1930 and afterwards will carry interest on interest. 78. It may be noted that the proviso which I have added in paraphrasing is only the judicial interpretation of the section and the schedule. It is thus clear that loan on January 1930 and afterwards will carry interest on interest. It is also clear that the loan upto December 31, 1929, will carry interest on interest and in both these cases the expression 'loan' is used in a sense so as to include interest and not to confine it to principal sum alone, why should not then the expression 'loan' be used in the same sense for the date January 1, 1930 also as including both principal and interest and why should it be used in the restrictive sense of principal sum only? It seems to me that the same meaning should be given to the word loan for all these periods, upto 31st December, 1929, for the period after 1st January, 1931 and for the date January 1, 1930 and the context and wording of Section 30 modifies the meaning of the word 'loan' as given in the interpretation clause Section 2(10) of the Act and loan in Section 30(1) means not the principal sum lent but the amount which is due on January 29 1929, for principal and interest and it is on this amount that the statutory rate of interest is to be charged from January 1, 1930. 79. I now pass on to the question whether loan includes a 'renewed' loan within the meaning of the Act. In Dharam Singh v. Bishan Singh which was an action by an agriculturist u/s 33 of U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act for account against a usufructuary mortgagee who held the property under a usufructuary mortgage of 1933 executed in satisfaction of two simple mortgages of 1926 and 1927 in favour of the same creditor, it was held that as there was no fresh advance of any money under the usufructuary mortgage, the transaction could not be regarded as a fresh advance and the agriculturist was entitled u/s 30 of Agriculturists' Relief Act to have the interest reduced for the period January 1, 1930 to August 1933 when the new mortgage was executed. In the course of their judgment Sir Shah Sulaiman C.J. and Harries J. observed: In the present case the new transaction was one of a possessory mortgage under which possession was taken by the mortgagee and the income was to be set off against interest, but admittedly there was no fresh advance of any money to the mortgagor. We find it difficult to hold that this transaction can be regarded as a fresh advance in kind by the mortgagee to the mortgagor. The use of the words "actually lent" in the definition of the word 'interest' suggests that any such fiction of law should not be imported into the definition and what the Court has to see is the actual amount advanced or lent and not what by some fiction might be imagined to have been indirectly advanced. It is urged before us that the parties having entered into a fresh contract, they must be deemed to have closed the previous transaction and therefore the new contract should not be reopened. It cannot, however, be doubted that a loan was in existence between January 1, 1930 and August 1933 and it was carrying some interest. The Applicant wants an account of the principal and interest which was due and a reduction of interest during that period. It is impossible to say that there was no loan at all we further find that in Section 30(2) the Court is bound to reopen even a decree which has been passed inter partes settling the account between them and creating a new judgment debt. Under that sub section if a decree has already been passed on the basis of a loan and remains unsatisfied in whole or in part, the Court which passed the decree shall on the application of the judgment-debtor amend it by reducing in accordance with the provision of Sub-section (1). The amount decreed on account of interest. If this is to be done in the case of a decree, it would follow that there should be no bar to such a reopening in the case of a renewal of a previous mortgage deed. Such reopening was expressly allowed in the Usuries Loans Act, but a decree could not be re-opened under that Act. The additional feature of this new Act is that even the amount adjudged by a Court under a decree has to be reopened. Such reopening was expressly allowed in the Usuries Loans Act, but a decree could not be re-opened under that Act. The additional feature of this new Act is that even the amount adjudged by a Court under a decree has to be reopened. The Applicant is entitled u/s 30(1) to have the interest reduced for the period from January 1, 1930 till August 1933 when the new mortgage was executed. 80. In Ramanand Misir v. Ram Baran Chaube the debtor who had made a simple mortgage in 1926 for Rs. 2,000 discharged the liability under the mortgage of 1926 in 1933 by executing a sale for Rs. 5,000 and a promissory note for Rs. 500. In an action brought to recover money on the promissory note the debtor pleaded that in taking account u/s 33, the settlement of 1933 should be opened up and interest should be calculated on the original advance of 1926 and Bennet and Verma JJ. held that under the circumstances Defendant was entitled to take benefit u/s 83 of the Act because the Court was justified in looking behind the promissory note and taking into consideration the real transaction of the loan which was the one in lieu of which the deed of mortgage was executed. 81. In Dr. B.N. Byas v. Raja Barkhandi Mahesh Pratap Narain Singh 1938 A.W.R. (C.C.) 81 : AIR 1988 Oudh 208, Thomas C.J. and Ziaul Hasan J., held in the Oudh Chief Court: Where a creditor has not been actually paid but he takes a renewed bill or promissory note for his debt in order to give time to the debtor and receives some consideration by way of increased interest or otherwise for his forbearance, it could hardly be said that the old debt had been paid of by the acceptance of the renewed bill. Section (sic) is wide enough to cover the case of old debt renewed subsequently. Sub-section (1) of Section 30 authorises to reopen an old debt which comes under that section. 82. Section (sic) is wide enough to cover the case of old debt renewed subsequently. Sub-section (1) of Section 30 authorises to reopen an old debt which comes under that section. 82. On the other hand in Bhim Singh v. Raghubar Sarcm, where a promissory note was executed prior to the coming into force of the Agriculturists' Relief Act and thereafter after the Act had come into force, a promissory note was executed in satisfaction of the debt due on the earlier note, Rachhpal Singh J., held that the transaction evidenced by the second promissory note was in substance a loan within the meaning of Section 2(10)(a) of the Act and the definition of 'loan in Section 2(10)(a) of the Agriculturists' Relief Act is not confined only to those transactions in which 'an advance in cash or in kind' is made, but also includes' a transaction which is in substance a loan. The words 'in substance' mean 'in effect'. 83. The true nature of a 'renewed loan' has often been subject of judicial consideration both in England and in India and it has recently been stated by Lord Fairfield in AIR 1940 60 (Privy Council) , in these words: Their Lordships are of opinion, where a loan has been incurred for interest and this interest is added to the amount agreed to be due when a new transaction is agreed between the parties, which includes the payment of interest as an acknowledged debt tills is not in principle open to any sound objection. As one member of this Board, when sitting in the Court of appeal, pointed out in (1932) 1 K.B. 691 at page 706 Lyle v. Chappel it ought not to make any difference to the validity of a transaction by way of a renewal of a loan, whether parties go through the form of payment by the borrower of the whole amount due and a relenting of the same amount by the money-lender, or the transaction is carried out, without any such payment by treating the amount of principal and interest still due as a debt acknowledged by the borrower together with an undertaking by the borrower to pay the amount of agreed debt. That this view is right in principle is confirmed by the following passage in the speech of Lord Atkin in (1938) A.C. 341 at page 348 Paton v. Inland Revenue Commissioner where his Lordship used these words in relation to a case involving six monthly settlements: If you settle that is agree the balance at the end of six months there is nothing to prevent your making a fresh start with the total debt which no doubt includes interest and agreeing to forbear from suing for the whole debt at a rate of interest meantime. 84. In Jai Gobind Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Ram, at p. 24, Sir Srinavas Varadachariar reiterated the same statement of law in these words: Where however as in the present case, the parties settle accounts in respect of a pre-existing liability and agree that money borrowed under a later transaction, even from the same creditor, should be applied in discharge of that pre-existing liability, it seems to me that the later transaction should in law be regarded as a loan by itself, though cash did not actually pass between the parties by way of lending and repayment. Sec-observations of Greer L.J. as he then was, in (1932) 1 K.B. 691 referred to with approval by the Judicial Committee (1940) 1 M.L.J. 68 at p. 72. 85. It was contended at the bar that where a creditor has not been actually paid up but he takes a renewed bill or promissory note or bond for his debt in order to give time to the debtor and receive some consideration by way of increased interest or otherwise for his forbearance, it cannot be said that the old debt has been paid off by the acceptance of the renewed bill, promissory note or bond and reliance was placed for this contention on certain observations made by Ghose and Panton, JJ. in Kshetra Nath Sikdar and Others Vs. Harasukdas Balkissen Das and Others, AIR 1927 Cal 538 . in Kshetra Nath Sikdar and Others Vs. Harasukdas Balkissen Das and Others, AIR 1927 Cal 538 . It was further contended that when a bond is renewed, at best only a notional payment takes place and notional payment is a fiction of English law which is limited to certain banking transactions and should not be extended to transactions in this country between the agriculturists and a money-lender and for this contention reliance was placed upon the following passages in the speech of Lord Macmillan in the House of Lords in Paton v. Inland Revenue Commissioners at page 357: My Lords, the origin of this agreeable fiction whereby debts are to be deemed to be paid without payment may be traced historically to the ingenuity of leaders in devising a method of obtaining compound interest without contravening the usury law. It was illegal by an antecedent contract to stipulate for the payment of compound interest, but if you agree to settle accounts at the end of six months that not being part of the prior contract and then stipulate that you will forbear for six months upon those terms (i.e., that the interest shall carry interest for the subsequent six months) that is legal: per Lord Chancellor Eldon in Ex-parte Bevan (9 Ves. 223, 224). On this principle it was held in Eaton v. Bell 5 B. and Aid. 34 that bankers who with the knowledge of and without objection by their customers, debited them with interest with half yearly rests in accordance with their general practice, did not offend against the usury laws. This method of dealing with loan accounts, which became common form among bankers, survived the abolition of the usury laws and is well established as the ordinary usage prevailing between bankers and customers who borrow from them and do not pay the interest as it accrues. Now, it may well be that as between a bank and its customer this method of dealing may have the result that the accrued interest which the bank has with the customer's assent added to the principal loan thereby ceases to be due or recoverable as interest, but becomes merged in the principal loan. But has it been 'paid'? 86. Now, it may well be that as between a bank and its customer this method of dealing may have the result that the accrued interest which the bank has with the customer's assent added to the principal loan thereby ceases to be due or recoverable as interest, but becomes merged in the principal loan. But has it been 'paid'? 86. It is further contended that U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act contemplates an actual payment of loan and not a notional payment and for this reliance is placed upon the observation of Sir Shah Sulaiman C.J. in Dharam Singh v. Bishan Singh: The use of the words 'actually lent' in the definition of the word 'interest' suggests that any such fiction of law should not be imported into the definition and what the Court has to see is the actual amount advanced or lent and not what by some fiction might be imagined to have been indirectly advanced. 87. In the Calcutta case referred to above where the claim was by a creditor for recovery of money due on Hundis which were secured by a mortgage of title deeds against subsequent purchasers of the property, the original Hundis having been renewed from time to time even after the purchase, it was contended by purchasers that the prior debt and mortgage must been deemed to have been satisfied by renewal of Hundis, but it was held in applying Section 62 of Indian Contract Act to the facts of that case that prior Hundis. were not discharged by renewal. 88. In the case before the House of Lords the question was whether an accrued interest on a loan, which bankers in their accounts, according to banking practice, treated as realized when in fact it was not paid, could be regarded as paid up for purposes of the income tax Act and the question before the House of Lords was whether that particular statute contemplated a payment in fact or a notional payment, not between the banker and the customer, but between the customer and the income tax authorities. So far as the validity of a renewed bond is concerned and in so far as the doctrine of notional payment applies to it, no question was raised about it and no doubt was thrown by Their Lordships on its validity or applicability. So far as the validity of a renewed bond is concerned and in so far as the doctrine of notional payment applies to it, no question was raised about it and no doubt was thrown by Their Lordships on its validity or applicability. Indeed, there are passages in the speeches of Lord Atkin and even of Lord Macmillan which go to support the doctrine. There is also an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in B.S. Lyle Ltd. v. Chappel in which the validity of renewed transaction and the doctrine of the so called notional payment ii fully recognised. 89. The observations of Sir Shah Sulaiman do not imply that notional payment is not recognised in law or that renewed loan is not a loan generally speaking or cannot be regarded as such under general law. He merely implied that on the particular statute which he was considering an actual payment was contemplated and not a payment by a fiction of law. It is true that the statute about which he was speaking is also the statute which I am considering in this case. But these observations and the decision in which these observations were made as also decisions which followed it are the subject matter of discussion in this Full Bench and though entitled to the greatest respect they are not binding upon me. It seems to me that it may be a particular statute insists or recognizes an actual payment and it may not recognize what may be conveniently described as notional payment or payment by fiction of law it may be that having regard to course of dealings between parties notional payment can be disregarded and parties can fall back upon original transaction, but apart from such and like cases the doctrine of notional payment is too firmly established to be successfully challenged and in the eye of law renewed loan is as good a loan as the original loan and loan is an expression which might suitably and appropriately be applied to both original and renewed transactions. 90. This leads me to the question whether there is anything in the wording of interpretation clause or in the wording of Section 30 or even in the wording of Sections 28 and 31 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act to exclude a renewed loan or notionally paid up loan from the operation of these sections. 91. 90. This leads me to the question whether there is anything in the wording of interpretation clause or in the wording of Section 30 or even in the wording of Sections 28 and 31 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act to exclude a renewed loan or notionally paid up loan from the operation of these sections. 91. It is not disputed that the word 'loan' in its primary and dictionary meaning is wide enough to include both the original loan as well as a renewed loan. It is also not disputed that the renewal of a loan was a perfectly valid transaction recognized by law and was a matter of daily occurrence amongst the agriculturists in these provinces before the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act of 1934 came into force. It is also not disputed that relying upon the validity of these transactions innumerable transactions took place as a result of which very valuable rights have come into existence, but it is contended that the legislature deliberately has used the word 'loan' in the Agriculturists' Relief Act in the sense so as to exclude renewed loans and so as to confine it to original loans alone and this has been done both retrospectively and prospectively for renewed loans taken after the Act came into force as also for renewed loans taken prior to Act came into force It is true that this contention has found favour with high authorities in this Court and in Oudh, but, with greatest respect, I cannot agree. 92. For the moment I am going to deal with renewed loan taken before the Act and I recognize that U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act had taken a great deal of liberty with contracts of parties and Section 30 which deals with loans taken prior to Act, deals retrospectively and it takes away vested rights. But there are certain well recognized canons of construction of even a retrospective statute which deals with vested legal rights or of a statute for which it is claimed that it does not recognize a transaction which before the statute and after the statute is justified by a clearly established principle of law. 93. But there are certain well recognized canons of construction of even a retrospective statute which deals with vested legal rights or of a statute for which it is claimed that it does not recognize a transaction which before the statute and after the statute is justified by a clearly established principle of law. 93. In Craies on Statute Law, Fourth Edition, at page 107 it is stated that Express and unambiguous language appears to be absolutely indispensible in statute passed for the following purposes: ...(2) conferring or taking away legal rights, whether public or private; (3) Excepting from the operation of or altering clearly established principles of law.... On page 114 of the same book it is further stated: to alter any clearly established principle of law a distinct and positive legislative enactment is necessary. And on page 335 of the same bock it is further stated: It is a well recognized rule that Statute should be so interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested rights and such a construction should never be adopted if the words are open to another construction. 94. In Reid v. Reid (1886) 31 Ch. D. 408 Bowen L.J. said: The particular rule of construction which has been referred to, but which is valuable only when the words of an Act of Parliament are not plain, is embodied in the well known trite maxim, Omnis Nova constitutio futuris forman imponere debet non proetaritis (2 Inst. 292)--That is that, except in special cases, the new law ought to be construed so as to interfere as little as possible with vested rights. It seems to me that even in construing an Act which is to a certain extent retrospective and in construing a section which is to a certain extent retrospective, we ought, nevertheless to bear in mind that maxim as applicable whenever we reach the line at which the words of the section cease to be plain. That is a necessary and logical corollary of the general proposition, that you ought not to give a larger retrospective power to a section, even in an Act which is to some extent intended to be retrospective, than you can plainly see the Legislature meant. 95. In Lauri v. Renad (1892) 3 Ch. That is a necessary and logical corollary of the general proposition, that you ought not to give a larger retrospective power to a section, even in an Act which is to some extent intended to be retrospective, than you can plainly see the Legislature meant. 95. In Lauri v. Renad (1892) 3 Ch. 402 (321) Lindley L.J. said: It is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall be construed so as to have a retrospective operation, unless the language is such as to plainly require such a construction. And the same rule involves another and subordinate rule to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. 96. Is there anything in the express language of the Agriculturists' Relief Act which confines the term 'loan' to the original loan and excludes renewed loan from its operation? Is there anything the express language of the statute (sic) declares a perfectly legitimate transaction on the basis of which one loan was closed and another loan started as inoperative? Is there anything in the express language of the Act which says at a well recognised doctrine of law in one lending transactions, viz., renewal bonds on the basis of notional payment and as a result of which transactions were closed and settled years ago in this case before us, the first more than twenty years and the second more than eight years ago, will all be reopened and declared as not binding on the parties? I cannot find any express language in the statute which will compel me to adopt such an interpretation. 97. For the moment I turn again to the Interpretation Clauses in Section 2(10) of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. It is said that the definition of the words 'loan' and 'interest' as given in Section 2 justified the interpretation, that loan in Section 2(10) means money actually lent and not what is notionally lent. I can only take Section 2(10) as an interpretation clause which defines and not one which under the guise of definition enacts. 98. Now, Section 2(10) defines 'loan' as an advance to agriculturist whether money or in kind and it includes any transaction which is substance a loan. 99. I can only take Section 2(10) as an interpretation clause which defines and not one which under the guise of definition enacts. 98. Now, Section 2(10) defines 'loan' as an advance to agriculturist whether money or in kind and it includes any transaction which is substance a loan. 99. I should say that an original loan, when accounts have been settled and on the basis of settlement of accounts it is renewed by a fresh mortgage bond, is in substance a loan within the meaning of the definition and there is no reason to interpret the words 'which is in substance a loan' in any since so as to destroy the validity of past transactions and in my opinion, where an earlier transaction of loan is renewed, the new transaction itself is a 'loan' for purposes of the Section 2(10) of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of 1934). 100. But it does not follow from this that the expression 'loan' as including renewed loan is always to be implied wherever the expression 'loan' is used throughout the statute. I have already stated that 'the interpretation clause does not necessarily apply on every occasion when the word interpreted is used in the Act' and the context in which the expression is used may modify or vary its meaning. 101. Now, the word 'loan' occurs in all the four sections of Chapter IV of U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act and it is possible that in each of these sections it may have a somewhat different meaning and the reason for this difference may arise on account of the language of the section and the context in which it occurs. It may well be that in Section 31 for purposes of applying the rule of Damdupat the expression 'loan' may have to be restricted by the words 'originally borrowed' in the section. It may be that the payment referred to in Section 29 may mean an actual payment and not a notional payment. It may further be that for purposes of Sections 28 and 31 that is for loans taken after the Act, renewal may be permissible or it may be subject to limitation that interest realised or accrued cannot exceed the principal sum of original loan. These questions though discussed, were not fully debated before us and they do not arise for decision and I express no opinion about them. These questions though discussed, were not fully debated before us and they do not arise for decision and I express no opinion about them. But so far as Section 30 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act is concerned, I am clear in my mind that there is nothing in Section 30 to control the meaning of 'loan' as given in the interpretation clause as I have expressed above., viz. that it should be in substance a loan and further there is nothing in the section to indicate that the expression 'loan' there is used in a sense so as to take away the pre-existing vested rights in favour of creditors on the basis of transactions which had been closed and settled and which were not subsisting when the Act came into force. 102. In my opinion, the expression loan as used in U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act includes a renewed loan and that the same expression as used in Section 30 is confined to subsisting loan which was operative when the Act came into force and it does not apply to a can which was incurred originally or which was incurred previously to subsisting loan but which original or previous loan was satisfied by mutual agreement by renewal of loan by means of transactions which by mutual consent were substituted in place of original or previous loan which was treated as closed. I am further of opinion in case of a loan taken before the Act bearing compound interest, statutory rate of interest is to be charged from January, 1930, not only on the principal sum due on the renewed loan but the statutory interest is to be charged on the total amount due on the subsisting loan on January 29, 1931. 103. Subject to above I answer the question referred to this Full Bench in the affirmative. 104. The answer to the question referred is in the affirmative.