JUDGMENT Derbyshire, C. J. 1. The facts which give rise to this application are set out in the judgment of Mr. Justice McNair, dated June 27th, 1940. The learned Judge after a consideration of the circumstances of Manmohanmal and the state, ordered the payment of a sum of Rs. 46,000 in respect of his marriage. There was an appeal from that order to this Bench and this Bench, again taking into consideration the circumstances both of Manmohanmal and the estate, upheld that order. The Petitioner now seeks to appeal to His Majesty in Council against the decision of this Court affirming that of Mr. Justice McNair. 2. It seems clear to me that for the Petitioner to succeed in obtaining a certificate from us under secs. 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, she must show that the order which is appealed from is in respect of property which is rupees ten thousand or upwards in value. It is clear that that is satisfied. Then there comes the provisions of sec. 110 that where the decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing such decree or final order, the appeal must involve some substantial question of law. 3. Mr. Carden Noad has argued that the High Court is one Court and, therefore, there is no such thing as the Court immediately below the Appellate Bench of this Court. That is a new argument to me and it seems to me that it is contrary to the usage that has prevailed with regard to the word "Court" in this particular respect. For instance, in the case of Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim and Sons (1), Sir George Lowndes referring to the Rangoon High Court said: It does not appear, however, to have been objected before the Appellate Court that the question was not open to the first Respondent, or that they had ceased to be parties to the suit before the decree of the trial Judge was made, and their Lord-ships are not prepared now to take any account of the very apparent irregularities in the trial Court. 4. The "trial Court" is clearly the Court below the Appellate Court and I see no reason why Mr. Justice McNair, sitting as he was, was not the Court immediately below this Bench which has heard the appeal from him. 5. 4. The "trial Court" is clearly the Court below the Appellate Court and I see no reason why Mr. Justice McNair, sitting as he was, was not the Court immediately below this Bench which has heard the appeal from him. 5. That being so and the order appealed from being one of affirmance, and no question of law arising (because in each case the Court exercised its discretion upon the facts which were before it in determining the amount in respect of the marriage), I am of the opinion that no certificate of fitness for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council can be granted in this case. The application is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Panckridge, J. 6. I agree. As learned Counsel for the Respondent Man-mohanrnal points out, the notice taken out by the Appellant, dated April 23rd, 1941, proceeds on the basis that the appeal which the Appellant desires to prefer to His Majesty in Council is one from a final order passed on appeal, and the certificate which is sought is one to the effect that the subject-matter of suit in the Court of first instance was Rs. 10,000 and that the case fulfils the requirements of sec. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Learned Counsel for the Appellant admits that the appeal cannot be said to involve a substantial question of law. Therefore, prima facie, the condition imposed by the concluding paragraph of sec. 110 is not satisfied. Mr. Carden Noad however argues that the decision of Mr. Justice McNair is not the decision of a Court immediately below the Court passing the final order within the meaning of sec. 110, and he maintains that a Court can only be said to be immediately below another Court, when it is a different Court altogether, and that the language of sec. 110 is not applicable where the appeal has been under the Letters Patent of a High Court from the decision of a Judge sitting singly to a Bench of two or more Judges. 8. 110 is not applicable where the appeal has been under the Letters Patent of a High Court from the decision of a Judge sitting singly to a Bench of two or more Judges. 8. It is not unusual for persons to take steps to appeal to His Majesty in Council in cases where a Bench of two or more Judges has affirmed the decision of a Judge of the High Court sitting singly on the Original Side, but I have rever before known it suggested that the would-be Appellant in such a case is absolved from establishing that the appeal involves a substantial question of law. So to hold would have this peculiar result, that an Appellant would have to show the existence of some substantial question of law in a case where the High Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of the District Judge, but would be under no such obligation where a Bench of two or more Judges of the High Court had affirmed the decision of another Judge of the High Court, sitting singly. 9. In my opinion having regard to the language of secs. 109 and 110, where a Bench of two or more Judges has affirmed on a Letters Patent Appeal the judgment of a Judge of the High Court, sitting singly on the Original Side, the decision of the single Judge is the decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing the decree or final order within the meaning of sec. 110. 10. Therefore on the assumption that the order from which an appeal is sought is a final order, the application for a certificate must fail by reason of the concluding paragraph of sec. 110. For myself, I incline to the view that the order is not a final order, inasmuch as it does not finally dispose of the matters of the suit between the parties, since, if the Appellant should succeed, and the adoption be set aside, undoubtedly Manmohanmal will be liable to restore the sum which Mr. Justice McNair and this Bench have permitted him to withdraw. On the assumption that it is an interlocutory order, I am of the opinion that there are no special circumstances which would justify us in granting a certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council.