JUDGMENT Bartley, J. - The Appellant F. Karim has been convicted on two counts on charges framed under sec. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced on each count to rigorous imprisonment for one day and a fine of Rs. 500, in default two months' rigorous imprisonment. The present case had its origin in proceedings which arose under sec. 7 of the Indian Tea Control Act (Act VIII of 1938). Under the provisions of that Act, the Indian Tea Licensing Committee estimated the quota rights of the Jhemain Tea Estate which belonged to this Appellant on the basis of a crop of 147 lbs. of tea. The Appellant filed an appeal against that assessment under the provisions of sec. 7 (2) of the Indian Tea Control Act whereby the Legislature confers a right of appeal against any order made by the committee to either the Central Government or the High Court of the Province within which the tea estate is situated. The appeal was heard by a Judge, of this Court, and the present Appellant himself gave evidence. This evidence was recorded in the manner adopted in suits and proceedings on the Original Side, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and the witness in the course of his evidence answered nearly five thousand such questions. With regard to three sets of these questions, charges under sec. 193 of the Indian Penal Code were framed against him. He was acquitted of one of the charges and convicted on the other two. The first charge upon which conviction was recorded was with regard to- Question No. 1933. When did you get this receipt? Answer: The date is over there. Question No. 1934: Tell me when it was In the year 1929. Answer: 1929. Question No. 1936: You have had it over since? Answer: Yes. Question No. 1936: Kept with you in your file? Answer: Yes, in my box it was. Then subsequently- Question No. 2074: Are you sure that you did not get that receipt on 12th December, 1933? Answer: I will tell you that way. I had the receipt when the landlord was staying in Park Lane in 1933. That receipt was ante-dated. That was required for the lease because the lease said that the rent is payable on 31st December every year. I paid the money and took that receipt in 1933. Answer: I will tell you that way. I had the receipt when the landlord was staying in Park Lane in 1933. That receipt was ante-dated. That was required for the lease because the lease said that the rent is payable on 31st December every year. I paid the money and took that receipt in 1933. The connected charge was with regard to the rent evidenced by that receipt. The questions were- Question No. 1459: The first payment of rent was in December, 1929 of Rs. 1,250 Answer: Yes. Question No. 2071: And in fact yon paid on the 12th December, 1929? Answer: This I paid in cash, Rs. 1,250. Question Ni. 2072: On the 12th December, 1929 Answer: Yes. Then subsequently- Question No. 2094: You in fact paid the money in 1933? Answer: Yes, I paid their previous dues all along. Question No. 2095: You paid Rs. 1,250 in 1933? Answer: Previous dues I paid. Question No. 2096: Including the Es. 1,250 mentioned in this receipt? Answer: Yes, plus Rs. 2,000. 2. Now, the convictions are based upon the obvious fact that in one set of answers this Appellant indicated that the receipts in question and the payment of rents made thereunder represented a transaction which took place in the year 1929, while in the other set of answers the Appellant stated that the receipt of payment of rent represented a transaction which took place in 1933. The Appellant has been convicted upon the finding that some of the answers represented false statements intentionally made in the course of judicial proceedings. 2. For the Appellant Mr. N.K. Basu advanced three main contentions. He argued that in the first place, the proceedings purporting to be held in this Court under sec. 7 of the Indian Tea Control Act were not judicial proceedings; secondly, he contended that as the statements on which charges were based were not read over to the accused, no conviction for giving false evidence can be maintained; and thirdly, he contended that in any event the statements did not constitute false evidence intentionally given in the course of a judicial proceeding. We do not propose for the purpose of this appeal to enter into any consideration of the first two arguments advanced on behalf of the Appellant except in so far as to say that, on the whole, we are not satisfied that they are really valid. We do not propose for the purpose of this appeal to enter into any consideration of the first two arguments advanced on behalf of the Appellant except in so far as to say that, on the whole, we are not satisfied that they are really valid. It is, however, sufficient for the decision of this case to deal with the last contention which is that upon the evidence in the circumstances of the particular case the conviction under sec. 193 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be maintained. We are satisfied on a consideration of the entire evidence that this contention must be upheld. In the present case, the prosecution arose from a proceeding by way of an appeal against the decision of the Indian Tea Licensing Committee with respect to the quota applicable to the Appellant's tea estate. The main question before the Tribunal was whether the decision of the Committee assessing the crop basis of the tea estate in question was correct or not. It is difficult to see and the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer appearing for the Crown has been unable to indicate to us what was the exact bearing of the evidence with regard to the receipt granted either in 1929 or 1933 for the payment of rent of the tea estate on the question what the correct quota of that estate should be in the year 1938. It further appears, although the learned Magistrate in his judgment makes no reference to the fact, that the receipt in question was not used by the present Appellant but was put to him in cross-examination by the other side and proved in that manner. Here, therefore, the facts are that a certain document, admittedly a receipt for rent of a tea estate to which the Appellant's title was never in question, was put to the Appellant in cross-examination, whereupon he said that he obtained the receipt and paid the rent specified therein on the date mentioned in the receipt itself. At a subsequent stage of the same cross-examination, however, he altered that statement and then alleged that although the receipt bore the date 1929 and purported to represent payment of rent in that year, it was actually given to him in 1933, and represented a payment made in the year 1933 and not in the year 1929 as the receipt purported to show. Granting that these statements are themselves contradictory and cannot both be true, it does not seem beyond all reasonable doubt that the evidence contained therein can properly be held to have been intentionally false. The case might well have been different, if the statements complained of related to a substantial question in issue at the time of the original proceedings by way of appeal under the Indian Tea Control Act, or even if the receipt and the payments referred to had any obvious relevancy to the questions which were in issue before the Tribunal where the evidence was given. As we have already said, we have been unable to see what the relevancy of this particular cross-examination was, or what bearing, if any, the existence of the receipt or the date of the receipt could have upon the question of the proper quota for the particular tea estate. It seems difficult, therefore, to hold that a false or erroneous, statement in connection with evidence of this kind can rightly be held to have been intentionally made. It may equally have been the result of a mistake when the witness was confronted with the receipt bearing the date 1929 and which at a subsequent stage in his cross-examination he corrected by giving the true explanation. We are, therefore, not satisfied that in the present case the evidence is of such a character as would justify us in holding that an offence under sec. 193 of he Indian Penal Code has been committed, and in this view, we must allow the present appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed upon the Appellant. The fine, if paid, will be refunded. Lodge, J. I agree.