JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This Rule is directed against a decree of the Subordinate Judge in the Small Cause Court, Mymensingh, dismissing the Plaintiff's suit on the preliminary ground that it was barred by limitation. I may say at once that this is not an ordinary dispute about limitation. The suit was admittedly filed in time. The only question is whether the Railway Administration can evade their liabilities by a highly technical argument with regard to nomenclature. I cannot help feeling surprised that such a defence should ever have been taken. The dispute between the parties is concerned with 28 out of a consignment of 141 bags of flour which were despatched to Mymensingh. The Plaintiff refused to take delivery of them. It is apparently admitted that at any rate some slight damage was caused to them. As the Plaintiff refused to take delivery, they were eventually sold by auction and the Opposite Party has always admitted his liability to pay over that amount. Why he has not done so or why the learned Subordinate Judge did not pass a decree, at any rate for the admitted claim, I do not know. 2. The difficulty in the way of the Plaintiff is due to the fact that his pleader forgot that sec. 79 of the CPC had been amended and drew up the plaint as though the old section was still in force. Eventually, the plaint was amended after the period of limitation had elapsed and the present objection was then taken. The question for decision is whether this is a case of mis-description or whether Defendant No. 1, as described in the original plaint, and Defendant No. 1, as described in the amended plaint, are separate persons, The contention of the Opposite Party is that they are separate persons. 3. Now, if the learned Subordinate Judge was right in his view that there are two persons, he should have made the matter clear in the order which he finally passed. Nobody could even pretend that the suit was barred by limitation against the first person and there could be no reason for dismissing the suit against him on the preliminary ground; but from his final order, it looks as though the learned Judge really thought that there was only one person. 4. The first written statement was signed by the Collector. 4. The first written statement was signed by the Collector. It was as usual type-written and contains 16 paragraphs and, as far as I can see, raises every conceivable defence both on the facts and on the law. Its original character, however, was altered by a subsequent substitution in ink in paragraph 2, which stated that Defendant No. 1 had not been correctly described and then raised a further objection that the Collector of Mymensingh could not represent Defendant No. 1. In spite of not being able to do so, however, he brought a host of witnesses and put up a full defence. Mr. Mookerjee suggested that this was done out of precaution in case it might be held that Defendant No. 1 was properly represented. But what I want to emphasise from this is that at that time there was no suggestion that there was any dual personality. It was merely said that the gentleman signing the written statement was not really in a position to bind Defendant No. 1. I should, however, find it difficult to believe that this written statement was drafted upon instructions from any adviser of the Province of Bengal. The case then proceeded as a case merely of mis-description. Defendant No. 1 was given very substantial costs. The only possible reason for giving such costs would be that the case is one of mis-description, as the Plaintiff contends. Now, there has been a complete volte-face in the second written statement and a dual personality has emerged. If I were to discharge the Rule, I should certainly order Defendant No. 1 to refund the costs which he pocketed upon a case of mis-description. 5. In support of his case, Mr. Mookerjee relied upon the changes that have been introduced by the Government of India Act. For example, it cannot now be disputed that the Central Government is distinct from the Province of Bengal. This distinction would clearly be of importance if in the present suit there were a quarrel between these two Governments, and the Central Government were trying to push its liability on to the Provincial Government. But I cannot see what relevancy it has to the present question. The question merely is what did the Plaintiff mean when he described the Government as the Secretary of State for India and then altered the description to the Governor-General in Council. But I cannot see what relevancy it has to the present question. The question merely is what did the Plaintiff mean when he described the Government as the Secretary of State for India and then altered the description to the Governor-General in Council. He was clearly not first asking for a personal decree against the former and then, changing his mind, asking for a joint decree against the latter. Both these terms were merely labels imposed upon him by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. For this defence point to be of any real substance, it would have to be shown that in the original plaint the Plaintiff asked for relief against the Province of Bengal, whereas in the amended plaint he was asking for relief against the Central Government. It appears to me to be quite ridiculous to suggest that in the plaint he was asking for any relief against the Province of Bengal. His case is and always has been that he is entitled to relief from the Government responsible for the administration of the railways. Under the new section, the Government has to be differently described. As long as the claim has always been against the same Government, it cannot be anything more than a matter of mis-description. 6. Mr. Mookerjee realied upon decisions of which the case of Agent, Bengal Nagpur Railway v. Behari Lal Dutt I.L.R 52 Cal. 783 (1925) is an example; that is to say, in which the plaint as originally framed disclosed no cause of action against the Defendant. Those decisions have no application to a case such as the present. Here the claim has always been against the Government. The Rule is accordingly made absolute. The order of the lower Court dismissing the suit is set aside and I direct that the case be remanded to be heard on the merits. Defendant No. 1 Opposite Party will pay costs of the Petitioner in this Court. Hearing-fee is assessed at five gold mohurs.