Jagdambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Tir Singh Bahadur Singh
1941-02-14
body1941
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Agarwal, J. - This is a second appeal by the plaintiff, whose claim has been dismissed by both the lower Courts. Chaudhri Mumtaz Hasain respondent No. 2 was employed by the plaintiff. The other respondent Tir Singh Bahadur Singh stood surety for Chaudhri Mumtaz Husain and executed a deed dated the 6th October, 1931, in favour of the plaintiff. Rs. 3,836 were embezzled by Chaudhri Mumtaz Husain and the plaintiff came to know of it in October, 1932. This suit was instituted on the 17th May, 1937, against Chaudhri Mumtaz Husain and Tir Singh Bahadur Singh for the amount embezzled. 2. Both the Courts have dismissed the suit on the ground that since the plaintiff allowed his remedy against the principal debtor Chaudhri Mumtaz Husain to become barred by time, the surety, that is Tir Singh Bahadur Singh was discharged. There is a divergence of opinion between the Allahabad High Court on the one side and the Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Lahore High Courts on the other as to the interpretation of Sections 134 and 137 of the Contract Act. Section 134 provides that the surety is discharged by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor, by which the principal debtor, is released, or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor. Section 137 of the Contract Act runs thus-- Mere forbearance on the part of the creditor to sue the principal debtor or to enforce another remedy against him does not, in the absence of any provision in the guarantee to the contrary, discharge the surely. 3. The Allahabad view is that the surety is discharged where the creditor has allowed the claim against a principal debtor to become barred by time. The other High Courts are of the opinion that the surety was not discharged when the legal remedy become barred by time. This point has been discussed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1939 110 (Privy Council) : AIR 1939 110 (Privy Council) , AIR 1939 110 (Privy Council) Their Lordships referred to a case of the Allahabad High Court in Ranjit Singh and Another Vs.
This point has been discussed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1939 110 (Privy Council) : AIR 1939 110 (Privy Council) , AIR 1939 110 (Privy Council) Their Lordships referred to a case of the Allahabad High Court in Ranjit Singh and Another Vs. Naubat and Others, (1902) ILR (All) 504 and certain decisions of the Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Lahore High Courts and observed that they preferred to follow the reasoning of the majority of the High Courts in India and that the law in England was also the same. The Allahabad view taken in Ranjit Singh and Another Vs. Naubat and Others, (1902) ILR (All) 504 has been followed in subsequent cases by the same Court. The observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council show that the view taken by the other High Courts is correct. It is true as argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that the point before their Lordships of the Privy Council was not exactly the same because in that case the plaintiff had withdrawn the suit against the principal debtors without liberty to bring a fresh suit and was thus precluded from bringing another suit against them but the observations of their Lordships are entitled to great weight and the view of the majority of the High Courts in India also is the same. There is no decision of this Court. I therefore prefer to follow the view of the Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Lahore Courts in preference to that of the Allahabad High Court. I accordingly hold that the plaintiff has not lost his remedy against the surety by reason of the fact that he did not prefer his claim within time against the principal. I therefore allow the appeal and remand the case to the trial Court for decision on other issues according to law. Costs will abide the result.