JUDGMENT Edgley, J. - The Plaintiffs are the Appellants in this case and in the suit cut of which this appeal arises the Plaintiffs sued for a declaration of their title in respect of a share of a certain family house. They also asked for an injunction restraining Defendant No. 1, Sita Kumari, from obtaining possession under a decree of certain huts situated on the land comprised in Schedule II. This lady, Sita Kumari, was not a member of the joint family and it appears that one of her predecessors-in-interest had obtained a mortgage decree in respect of the disputed huts on the 9th of August, 1927. This mortgage decree was put into execution and the huts were purchased at an execution sale by a man named Nanda Mahajan on the 16th of July, 1928. It appears that Nanda Mahajan was unable to obtain possession of the property which he had purchased at the execution sale and he, therefore, instituted a suit to recover possession of this property and he obtained an ex parte decree for khas possession on the 12th of May, 1936. After Nanda Mahajan's death Sita Kumari was substituted as his successor-in-interest. She was resisted when she endeavoured to take possession of the huts. She, therefore, instituted a proceeding under the provisions of Or. 21, r. 97 of the CPC in which she was successful. The Plaintiffs thereafter instituted the suit out of which the present appeal arises. No question arises now with regard to the share of the Plaintiffs in the joint family house, but it is contended on behalf of the Appellants that the Plaintiffs should be granted an injunction against Defendant No. 1 Sita Kumari to restrain her from executing the decree which her predecessor had obtained on the 12th of May, 1936. In this connection, it is argued by the learned Advocate for the Appellants that, as Sita Kumari is not a member of the Plaintiffs' family, his clients are entitled to the injunction by applying the principle of sec. 44 of the Transfer of Property Act. 3. In this connection, the learned Advocate places some reliance upon a decision of this Court in the case of Girija Kanta Chakrabarty v. Mohim Chandra Acharjya 20 C.W.N. 675 (1915). In that case it appears that the Plaintiff was suing to recover possession of certain property which he had bought at an execution sale. 3. In this connection, the learned Advocate places some reliance upon a decision of this Court in the case of Girija Kanta Chakrabarty v. Mohim Chandra Acharjya 20 C.W.N. 675 (1915). In that case it appears that the Plaintiff was suing to recover possession of certain property which he had bought at an execution sale. Although this Court allowed the Plaintiff a decree as regards his title, the learned Judges refused to grant her a decree for joint possession on the ground that the huts which he was seeking to recover were used for residential purposes by the family of the mortgagors. In the judgment in that case no reference was made to the provisions of sec. 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act and the question whether sec. 44 of the Act was applicable to a transfer which had been effected by reason of proceedings in execution of a decree was not considered. In any case, however, even if it be assumed that the principle of sec. 44 of the Transfer of Property Act might be applied in a suitable case for the purpose of preventing a stranger to the family from obtaining joint possession of a family dwelling-house, the proper stage for the members of the joint family to apply for an order of this nature would be at the time when a decree is made in a suit such as was being considered in the case of Girija Kanta Chakrabarty v. Mohim Chandra Acharjya 20 C.W.N. 673 (1915) cited above. 4. As far as the present suit is concerned, this stage was reached on the 12th of May, 1936. On that date, however, the Plaintiffs allowed an ex parte decree for khas possession to be passed in favour of the predecessor of Defendant No. 1 Sita Kumari. Furthermore, this lady subsequently obtained an order in her favour under Or. 21, r. 97 of the CPC and it would not, therefore, be proper in the present suit to restrain her from executing the decree which her predecessor had obtained in 1936 and which the Plaintiffs at that time had an opportunity to contest. Furthermore, this lady subsequently obtained an order in her favour under Or. 21, r. 97 of the CPC and it would not, therefore, be proper in the present suit to restrain her from executing the decree which her predecessor had obtained in 1936 and which the Plaintiffs at that time had an opportunity to contest. As they allowed an ex parte decree to be passed against them in 1936, they must be regarded as estopped in the present suit from asking for an injunction which would prevent Defendant No. 1 Sita Kumari from executing the decree which her predecessor had obtained quite properly. On this ground alone, the decision of the Lower Appellate Court must be affirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs. Biswas, J. I agree.