JUDGMENT Derbyshire, C.J. - This is an appeal from a decision of Edgley, J., dismissing a suit brought by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants for relief in connection with a mortgage. The facts are short and are given in Edgley, J.'s judgment as follows:-- In this suit the Plaintiffs are suing the Defendants for relief under the provisions of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, in respect of a decree obtained against them on the 12th June, 1935, for Rs. 4,58,038-1-9. This was a consent decree which had been obtained by the Maharaja of Darbhanga in respect at the balance due to him on account of a loan of Rs. 6,00,000 advanced to the predecessors of the Plaintiffs, The main reliefs which the Plaintiffs seek are a declaration to the effect that they are not liable to pay to the Defendants any amount in excess of the limits specified in the Bengal Money Lenders Act, and, in any event, in excess of Rs. 12,00,000 for principal and interest. They also ask for the re-opening of the above-mentioned decree and the transactions connected therewith and for release from all further liabilities in respect thereof. 2. Then follows a genealogical table which connects certain of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants and then went on: On May 25, 1914, all persons interested in certain properties which had belonged to Pashupati Nath Bose mortgaged, the same to the Maharaja of Darbhanga as security for the sum of Rs. 45,00,000. This mortgage carried interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum with half-yearly rests. The parties to the mortgage deed were Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandi (as trustee of the estate), Amarnath Bose, Amulya Nath Bose, Manmatha Nath Sen (as guardian of Anath Bose who was at that time a minor), and Sarajubala the wife of Amar. Amar died intestate in 1915 and his wife succeeded to a life-interest in his share of the estate. Thereafter Amulya died on December 31, 1917, after having executed a Will whereby, subject to the payment of his debts, he gave his interest in the family property to the nephews (the present Plaintiffs) for their lives and after their death to their respective sons absolutely. On June 18, 1919, the Maharaja of Darbhanga instituted Suit No. 1618 of 1919 on the mortgage which had been executed in his favour. On June 18, 1919, the Maharaja of Darbhanga instituted Suit No. 1618 of 1919 on the mortgage which had been executed in his favour. Sarajubala died on November 21, 1921, and Anath attained majority in January 1923. The Maharaja of Darbhanga obtained a preliminary decree in his suit on July 3, 1923, which was made final on June 12, 1985, for the sum of Rs. 4,58,058-1-9. Admittedly before June 12, 1935, the mortgagors had paid the Maharaja in cash from time to time an aggregate sum of Rs. 8,57,703-10-0. On September 17, 1930, the Maharaja of Darbhanga assigned to Sm. Renula Bose, the wife of Anath Bose, the decree which he had obtained on June 12, 1935, and the benefit of the securities under the mortgage deed which had been executed in his favour on May 25, 1914. The sum mentioned as consideration for the assignment was Rs. 4,59,364-4-3. On the same date Renula again assigned this decree by way of mortgage to Kumar Promotha Nath Roy in consideration of a sum of Rs. 4,75,000. On February 2, 1937, Renula obtained leave of the Court to execute the decree which had been assigned to her. Admittedly the total sums which have been paid in respect of the mortgage are as follows: To the Maharaja of Darbhanga Rs. 8,57,703-10.0 To Renula Bose as set off Rs. 1,80,000-0.0 Price paid by other purchasers and withdrawn by Ranula Rs. 1,06,195-13.3 Cash paid to Renula Rs. 42,100-0.0 Paid under order dated 24-9-40 Rs. 15,500-0.0 Rs. 12,01,499-7.3 3. The chief contention of the plaintiffs was that in view of the provisions of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, no further sum was payable by them under the final decree in the mortgage suit as the total amount realised by Renula and the Maharaja of Darbhanga already exceeds twice the amount of the principal of the original loan. 4. Edgley, J., decided that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief which they had asked. 5. The suit was filed immediately after the Bengal Money-Lenders Act of 1940 came into operation on September 1st, 1940. The question is--are the Plaintiffs benefited or entitled to benefit under the provisions of that Act? 6. There is no question that the loan is a loan within the meaning of the Act. The original lender transferred his rights under the loan which were a decree of this Court, to Renula Bose. The question is--are the Plaintiffs benefited or entitled to benefit under the provisions of that Act? 6. There is no question that the loan is a loan within the meaning of the Act. The original lender transferred his rights under the loan which were a decree of this Court, to Renula Bose. He transferred it for a consideration of Rs. 4,59,364 on September 17th, 1936, long before this Act came into operation or was even contemplated. The loan carried what was a fair rate of interest, namely, six per cent. The decree carried interest at the same rate. There is nothing to suggest that the transaction was not an honest or bond fide one. 7. Sec. 29 (2) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, enacts: The provisions of this Act shall apply and be deemed always to have applied and shall continue to apply as respects any debt due to a lender or money lender in respect of loans advanced by him before the commencement of this Act or in respect of interest on such loans or of the benefit of any agreement made or security taken in respect of any such debt or interest notwithstanding that the debt or the benefit of the agreement or security may have been assigned to any assignee, and except where the context otherwise requires, reference in this Act to a lender or money-lender shall accordingly be construed as including any such assignee as aforesaid. 8. In short, the assignee of the moneylender is, as far as sec. 29 goes, to be treated in the same way as the moneylender himself. There is another provision in the Act which deals with assignments, i.e., sec. 8. In short, the assignee of the moneylender is, as far as sec. 29 goes, to be treated in the same way as the moneylender himself. There is another provision in the Act which deals with assignments, i.e., sec. 28, the relevant parts of which provide: (1) Where any debt in respect of- (i) a loan advanced by a lender, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, or (ii) interest on any such debt, or (iii) the benefit of any agreement made or security taken, in respect of any such debt or interest, is assigned to any person, the assignor (whether he is the lender by whom the loan was advanced or any person to whom the debt has been previously assigned), shall, before the assignment is made,-- (a) give to the assignee notice in writing that the debt, interest thereon, agreement or security is affected by the operation of this Act, and (b) where the debt is in respect of a loan advanced by a moneylender, supply to the assignee in such form as may be prescribed all information as to the state of the loan together with copies of documents relating thereto. (2) Any person who acts in contravention of any of the provisions of this section shall be liable to indemnify any other person who is prejudiced by the contravention and shall also be punishable, on conviction with imprisonment.... 9. Sec. 28 clearly refers to assignments after the Act came into operation. The assignment of the debt in this case which was before the Act came into operation does not come within the provisions of sec. 28, but it dees come within the provisions of sec. 29. 10. 9. Sec. 28 clearly refers to assignments after the Act came into operation. The assignment of the debt in this case which was before the Act came into operation does not come within the provisions of sec. 28, but it dees come within the provisions of sec. 29. 10. Sec. 30 provides as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time 'being in force, or in any agreement, (1) no borrower shall be liable to pay after the commencement of this Act-- (a) any sum in respect of principal and interest which together with any amount already paid or included in any decree in respect of a loan exceeds twice the principal of the original loan, (b) on account of interest outstanding On the date up to which such liability is computed a sum greater than the principal outstanding on such date, (c) interest at a rate per annum exceeding in the ease of (d) unsecured loans, ten per centum simple, (ii) secured loans, eight per centum simple, whether such loan was advanced or such amount was paid or such decree was passed or such interest accrued before or after the commencement of this. Act. 11. There are other clauses in that section which are not relevant in this case. The only clause which is relevant here is cl. (1) (a). 12. This sub-section, like most of the statute, is unhappily worded, but in my view the meaning of it is that after the commencement of the Act no borrower is liable to pay in respect of principal and interest in respect of any loan, one pice more than twice the principal of the original loan. Payments in respect of the loan may be voluntary payments or payments made under a decree in respect of the loan or payments treated in a decree as being made in respect of the loan as for instance, by way of set-off; but in whatever manner they are made, the sum-total of them is not to exceed twice the principal of the original loan. There is nothing unusual in the limit prescribed as recoverable: the rule of damduput provides that the creditor shall not recover at one time more interest than principal, and in sec. There is nothing unusual in the limit prescribed as recoverable: the rule of damduput provides that the creditor shall not recover at one time more interest than principal, and in sec. 4 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act of 1933 there is a provision that the arrears of interest shall in certain cases be limited to an amount equal to the principal of the loan. Further, there is a provision limiting interest recoverable to principal outstanding in the same section, sec. 30 (1) (6) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940. 13. That being so, what is the position of the debtor in this suit? I cannot see that the debtors have any particular merit in this matter. Before the passing of the Act they were liable to pay interest which their predecessors had promised to pay and were liable to pay, interest which was moderate and in the circumstances reasonable. They are claiming their rights under the law. What are those rights? It appears to me clear that they are not liable to pay more than twice the principal of the loan, namely, twice six lacs, that is, twelve lacs. They and their predecessors have paid slightly more than twelve lacs. The Plaintiffs do not claim repayment of the excess. The Plaintiffs therefore are absolved from liability to pay anything more in respect of this loan. They are absolved from that even though the loan is crystallised into a decree, because the decree is in respect of the principal and interest under the mortgage. That I am of opinion is the position after the passing of this Act. 14. But it is contended on behalf of the Defendants, the Respondents, that there is an exception in their case under sec. 36 of the Act. Sec. 36 is very long and occupies three pages of the official printer's copy of the Act. That I am of opinion is the position after the passing of this Act. 14. But it is contended on behalf of the Defendants, the Respondents, that there is an exception in their case under sec. 36 of the Act. Sec. 36 is very long and occupies three pages of the official printer's copy of the Act. The relevant parts of it are: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if in any suit to which this Act applies or in any suit brought by a borrower for relief under this section, whether heard ex parte or otherwise, the Court has reason to believe that the exercise of one or more of the powers under this section will give relief to the (borrower, it shall exercise all or any of the following powers as it may consider appropriate, namely, shall- (a) re-open any transaction and take an account between the parties; (b) notwithstanding any agreement, purporting to close previous dealings and to create new obligations, re-open any account already taken between the parties; (c) release the borrower of all liability in excess of the limits specified in clauses (1) and (2) of section 30; (d) if anything has been paid or allowed in account on or after the first day of January 1939, in respect of the liability referred to in cl. (e), order the lender to re-pay any sum which the Court considers to be repayable in respect of such payment or allowance in account as aforesaid : Provided that, in the case of a loan to which the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 29 apply, the lender or money-lender and each of his assignees shall be liable to repay the sum which the Court considers to be re-payable in respect of and in proportion to the sum received by such lender or money-lender and such assignee; (e) set aside either wholly or in part or revise or alter any security given or agreement made in respect of any loan and if the lender has parted with the security, order him to indemnify the borrower in such manner and to such extent as it may deem just; 15. Then follows a proviso. 16. Later in the section there follow explanations and certain directions as to what the Court shall do and shall not do when it proceeds to re-open a decree. Then follows a proviso. 16. Later in the section there follow explanations and certain directions as to what the Court shall do and shall not do when it proceeds to re-open a decree. Later follows sub-sec. (5) which is as follows:-- Nothing in this section shall affect of any assignee or holder for value if the Court is satisfied that the assignment to him was fide, and that he had not received the notice referred to in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28. 17. It has been contended on behalf of the Defendants that any relief which may be given to the borrowers, the Plaintiffs in this suit, must be given under sec. 36; that if once sec. 36 is used, the assignee who certainly gave value for the debt bona fide, as he took it long before the Act was even contemplated, never had the notice and could never have had the notice referred to in cl. (a) of sec. 28 (1) and that the rights of such assignee cannot be touched. 18. The purpose of sec. 30 of the Act is to define the limits of a borrower's liability in respect of the interest he shall pay in respect of certain kinds of loans. When once it is clear that the limits laid down in sec. 30 have been exceeded, the Court may, provided the requisite conditions obtain, use the powers given in sec. 36, to give the borrower some relief. Now the opening words of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 are these: If the Court has reason to believe that the exercise of one or more of the powers under this section will give relief to the borrower it shall do certain things. 19. I am not satisfied that it is necessary for the relief of the borrower in this case that the powers under sec. 36 shall be exercised at all. The Act in sec. 30, sub-sec. (1) (a) has said that his liability is limited to twice the principal of the original loan, and it is clear in the present case that that has been paid. 36 shall be exercised at all. The Act in sec. 30, sub-sec. (1) (a) has said that his liability is limited to twice the principal of the original loan, and it is clear in the present case that that has been paid. That being so, the Plaintiffs--the judgment-debtors--are entitled to a declaration that they are not liable to pay any more money under the final mortgage decree (which is of course in respect of the principal and interest of the original loan); the sum legally due under that final mortgage decree is satisfied. 20. Once that position arises, the debtor is entitled as Defendant in the mortgage suit proceedings to take advantage of Or. 34, r. 5 (1) of the CPC and ask the Court which has seisin of those mortgage suit proceedings, to pass an order that the Plaintiff do deliver up the documents referred to in the preliminary decree and that the mortgage property be transferred as directed in the decree and also, if necessary, obtain an order of the Court that the Defendants be put in possession of the property. Those are the rights which the Plaintiffs in this suit, the Defendants in the mortgage suit are entitled to, once the decree is satisfied. I am, therefore, of the opinion that since no claim to repayment is made, it is not necessary to use any of the powers which sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, gives to the Court. 21. A great deal of argument has been raised and a great deal of time occupied in discussing the position of the pre-Act assignee under sec. 36 (5) and I feel that some indication of my view with regard to the matter ought to be given, and for that reason I go a little further into it. 22. The Act, though conceived on a plan, has obviously been altered a good deal in its passage through the Legislature; its wording and phrasing are not always clear and its meaning at times is very difficult to ascertain. Until it has received much more judicial examination, possibly by a higher tribunal, I feel that every Judge must have considerable doubt as to whether his construction of parts of it is correct. The Court has to do the best it can. 23. Until it has received much more judicial examination, possibly by a higher tribunal, I feel that every Judge must have considerable doubt as to whether his construction of parts of it is correct. The Court has to do the best it can. 23. Sec. 36 (5) of the Act, taken in its natural meaning, includes a pre-Act transferee within its protective provisions, since a pre-Act transferee cannot have had the notice prescribed by sec. 28 (2) of the Act. 24. It has been argued that if such is the case, there was no need to provide in sec. 36 (5) that the Court must be satisfied that the assignment to the transferee was bond fide, since (with the exception possibly of a few transfers whilst the Bill was before the Legislature), pre-Act transfers, being before such provisions as are now included in the Act were contemplated, would be made without any intention to defeat the provisions of the Act, and so bond fide. That argument does raise a suspicion that possibly the Legislature was in sec. 36 (5) seeking to protect post-Act transfers only. But in view of the actual words of the sub-section itself the suspicion remains a suspicion and nothing more. 25. Again, there is the proviso to sec. 36 (1) (d) which I have cited above: under this sub-section and proviso a transferee who took an assignment of a debt after January 1st, 1939 (twenty months before the Act came into operation) may be ordered to repay any excess or proportionate part thereof over the limits laid down in sec. 30, sub-secs. (1) and (2), if such excess has been paid or allowed in account after January 1st, 1939. Obviously such a transferee, if he took before the Act, could never have had the notice under sec. 28 (2); yet he may be ordered to repay money paid to him in respect of the loan. It would appear that sec. 36 (5) does not protect him. The case in sec. 36 (1) (d) is however a special one and the liability there laid upon the affected transferee is limited to repayment of the excess paid since January 1st, 1939. 26. It would appear that sec. 36 (5) does not protect him. The case in sec. 36 (1) (d) is however a special one and the liability there laid upon the affected transferee is limited to repayment of the excess paid since January 1st, 1939. 26. I do not think this provision or the suspicion arising from the peculiar wording of the sub-section itself is sufficient to enable a Court to deprive the bond fide transferee for value without the notice referred to in sec. 28 (2) of the right sec. 36 (5) gives him in terms just because the assignment to him was before the Act when he could not possibly get the notice under sec. 28 (2). It was argued that to hold that the pre-Act bond fide transferee for value is within the protection of sec. 36 (5) would defeat one of the chief purposes of the Act. I am not satisfied that such a result will follow from the view I take, especially having regard to the decision in this case. If there is such a prospect, I can only at this stage cite the words of Lord Brougham in the case of Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 4 M.I.A. 179 187 That was an appeal to the Privy Council from a decision of the Bombay High Court: Their Lordships are clearly of opinion, that the judgment of the Court of Bombay cannot stand. The construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the Act. We cannot fish out what possibly may have been the intention of the Legislature; we cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of the statute; we cannot add, and mend, and by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there. The construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the Act. We cannot fish out what possibly may have been the intention of the Legislature; we cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of the statute; we cannot add, and mend, and by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there. If the Legislature did intend that which it has not expressed clearly; much more, if the Legislature intended something very different; if the Legislature intended something pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for Judges to invent something which they do not (sic) within the words of the text (aiding their construction of the text always, of course, by the context); it is not for them so to supply a meaning, for, in reality, it would be supplying it; the true way in these cases is, to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning 'which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered; and, therefore, if any other meaning was intended than that which the words purport plainly to import, then let another Act supply that meaning, and supply the defect in the previous Act. 27. As I have already said, it is not necessary, in giving relief in this case, that sec. 36 (5) should be construed. But in view of the time that has been spent on it and its importance I have given my views. 28. Again, sec. 36 is a procedural section and it is only when the procedure indicated in sec. 36 is used, that the question of the applicability of sec. 36 (5) arises. There is nothing in the procedure laid down by sec. 36 which affects the Code of Civil Procedure. As I read the provisions of sec. 36, they are not in substitution of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are supplemental to them. If the debtors ask that the Court should use the provisions of sec. 36, the Court must ask itself whether it has reason to believe that the exercise of one or more of the powers under the section would give relief to the borrower. If sec. They are supplemental to them. If the debtors ask that the Court should use the provisions of sec. 36, the Court must ask itself whether it has reason to believe that the exercise of one or more of the powers under the section would give relief to the borrower. If sec. 36 (5) protects the rights of the pre-Act assignee of the money-lender, then in this particular case, using the provisions of sec. 36 would not give relief to the borrower, so that the Court would not exercise its powers under sec. 36. 29. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Plaintiffs in this suit are entitled to the declaration that they are not under any obligation to pay any further sum under the mortgage in question, but to no further relief. 30. The result" is that this appeal is allowed and a declaration is made that the Plaintiffs are not liable to pay any further sums in respect of the mortgage decree in question. There will be no order as to costs either here or below. Nasim Ali, J. 31. I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that the Appellants should be released from their liability to pay the amount which is still due from them under the mortgage decree in question. 32. The questions which fall for decision in this appeal are these:-- 1. What is the limit of Appellants' liability under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (1) of sec. 30 of the Bengal Money-Lenders' Act, 1940, on account of principal and interest of the loan, a portion of which was included in the decree in question before the commencement of the Act? 2. Whether the amount which is still due under the decree is in excess of this limit. 3. Whether sec. 30, cl. (1) (a) releases the Appellants from their pre-Act liability to pay this excess. 4. If so, whether cl. (5) of sec. 36 of the Act is a bar to this release. Cl. (1) of sec. 2. Whether the amount which is still due under the decree is in excess of this limit. 3. Whether sec. 30, cl. (1) (a) releases the Appellants from their pre-Act liability to pay this excess. 4. If so, whether cl. (5) of sec. 36 of the Act is a bar to this release. Cl. (1) of sec. 30 provides: (1) no borrower shall be liable to pay after the commencement of this Act-- (a) any sum in respect of principal and interest which together with any amount already paid or included in any decree in respect of a loan exceeds twice the principal of the original loan, (b) on account of interest outstanding on the date up to which such liability is computed, a sum greater than the principal outstanding on such date, (c) interest at a rate per annum exceeding in the case of-- (i) unsecured loans, ten per centum simple, (ii) secured loans, eight per centum simple, Whether such loan was advanced or such amount was paid, or such decree was passed or such interst accrued before or after the commencement of this Act; 33. "Principal" means the amount which was actually advanced to the borrower [cl. (16) of sec. 2]. It does not include any interest on the principal originally advanced which may at any time have been included in the principal. "Interest" includes any sum in excess of the principal, whether paid or payable to a lender in consideration of the loan [cl. (8) of sec. 2]. "Amount already paid or included in any decree " means the amount already paid otherwise than under a decree or the amount of principal and interest which being included in the decree has merged in the decree and is payable under the decree. 34. It is clear from sub-cl. (a) of this clause that the limit is always twice the amount which was actually advanced to the borrower and not "the amount actually paid or included in any decree." The borrower is not liable under any circumstances to pay more than twice the principal of the original loan. The limit in this case, therefore, is Rs. 12 lacs. 35. The amount in excess of the limit is the difference between the amount already paid or payable under the decree and twice the principal of the original loan. The limit in this case, therefore, is Rs. 12 lacs. 35. The amount in excess of the limit is the difference between the amount already paid or payable under the decree and twice the principal of the original loan. The excess in this case is the whole of the amount still payable by the Appellants under the decree in question. 36. Cl. (2) of sec. 30 is in these terms: (2) no borrower shall, after the commencement of this Act, be deemed to have been liable to pay before the Sate of such commencement in respect of interest paid before such date or included in a decree passed before such date, interest at rates per annum exceeding those specified in sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1). 37. This clause does not release the borrower from his pre-Act liability to pay the amount in excess of the limit specified in sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1) which he was liable to pay otherwise than under a decree but did not pay. It, however, releases the borrower from his pre-Act liability to pay interest at rates exceeding those specified in that sub-clause, whether paid or payable under a decree. 38. Cl. (1) declares that no borrower shall be liable to pay after the commencement of the Act on account of principal and interest of a loan any sum in excess of the limits specified in all the 3 sub-clauses of this clause, whether such loan was advanced before or after the Act. 39. It is not disputed by Mr. Ghosh, appearing on behalf of the assignee Respondent (Renula), that these provisions by necessary implication release a borrower from his pre-Act liabilities to pay after the commencement of this Act the excess in cases where no decree was passed before the Act. Cl. (1) makes no distinction between the borrower's pre-Act liability to pay otherwise than under a decree and his pre-Act liability to pay under any decree If inspite of the absence in cl. (1) of words to the effect "no borrower shall after the commencement of this Act be deemed to have been liable to pay before the date of such commencement "which appear in cl. (1) of words to the effect "no borrower shall after the commencement of this Act be deemed to have been liable to pay before the date of such commencement "which appear in cl. (2), the borrower is released after the Act from his pre-Act liability to pay the excess where there was no decree before the Act, there is no reason why he should not be released after the Act from his liability to pay the excess in cases where a decree was passed before the Act as the release from liability after the Act in both cases is his pre-Act liability on account of principal and interest. The Appellants are, therefore, entitled to be released from further liability under the decree in question in view of the provisions of sub-cl. (a) of cl. (1) of sec. 30. 40. Cl. (5) of sec. 36 is: Nothing in this section shall after the rights of any assignee or holder for value if the Court is satisfied that the assignment to him was bona fide, and that he had not received the notice referred to in cl. (a) of sub-sec (1) of sec. 28. 41. The assignee-Respondent relies on the literal construction of this clause and contends that as admittedly she is a bond fide assignee for value and as admittedly she did not receive the notice referred to in sec. 28 (1) (a) of the Act, she is protected by this clause. 42. A literal construction has a prima facie preference, but to arrive at the real meaning it is permissible to consider what was the law before the Act was passed and what was the object of the new Act. Again, every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and the other sections of the Act so far as possible to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute relating to the subject-matter (Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes). 43. The law previous to the Money-Lenders' Act relating to the assignments of loans is contained in the Transfer of Property Act of 1882. This Act does not confer any special right upon bond fide assignees for value without notice. It does not enable such assignees to recover from the borrower any amount which the borrower was not liable to pay to the lender before the Act. 44. This Act does not confer any special right upon bond fide assignees for value without notice. It does not enable such assignees to recover from the borrower any amount which the borrower was not liable to pay to the lender before the Act. 44. The object of the Money-Lenders Act was to make further and better provision for the control of money-lending as the legislature considered that the law relating to money-lending before this Act did not give adequate relief to the borrowers. 45. The relevant portions of this Act are the last three chapters of the Act-- Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 46. Chapter 5 deals with the assignment of loans after the Act. It consists of two sections--28 and 29. Sec. 28 consists of 3 clauses. Cl. (3) has no bearing in the present case; cl. (1) (a) provides for a notice in writing by the assignor to the assignee before assignment of loans advanced before or after the Act that the loan is affected by the Act. Cl. (1) (b) is not material for the purpose of the present case. Cl. (2) lays down that if any person acts in contravention of any of the provisions of this section, he shall be liable to indemnify any other person who is prejudiced by this contravention. Sec. 29 consists of two clauses; the first clause provides: Subject as hereinafter provided, the provisions of this Act shall continue to apply as respects any debt due to a lender or money-lender in respect of loans advanced by him after the commencement of this Act or in respect of interest on such loans or of the benefit of any agreement made or security taken in respect of any such debt or interest, notwithstanding that the debt or the benefit of the agreement or security may have been assigned to any assignee, and except 'where the context otherwise requires, references in this Act to a lender or money-lender shall accordingly be construed as including any such assignee as aforesaid. 47. Proviso (a) to this clause protects a bona fide assignee for value without notice for any defect due to the operation of this Act, but the lender shall be liable to indemnify the borrower. 48. Cl. 47. Proviso (a) to this clause protects a bona fide assignee for value without notice for any defect due to the operation of this Act, but the lender shall be liable to indemnify the borrower. 48. Cl. (2) is in these terms: The provisions of this Act shall apply and be deemed always to have applied and shall continue to apply as respects any debt due to a lender or money-lender in respect of loans advanced by him before the commencement Of this Act or in respect of interest on such loans or of the benefit of any agreement made or security taken in respect of any such debt or interest, notwithstanding that the debt or benefit of the agreement or security may have been assigned to any assignee, and except where the context otherwise requires, references in this Act to a lender or money-lender shall accordingly be construed as including any such assignee as aforesaid. 49. There is no proviso to this clause as in cl. (1). On the other hand this clause extends the definition of lender [a person who advances a loan--sec. 2, cl. (9)] to all classes of assignee of the loan without any distinction. 50. Chapter 5, therefore, is silent on the question as to whether a bond fide assignee for value without notice of any defect due to the operation of the Act of loans advanced before the Act is protected. 51. Chapter 6 deals with interest on loans and charges. It consists of 4 sections--Secs. 30, 31, 32 and 33. Sees. 32 and 33 are not material for the purposes of the present case. Sec. 30 releases the borrower from all liabilities on account of principal and interest in excess of certain limits specified in that section. It gives no protection to bond fide assignees for value before the Act. Sec. 31 deals with interest on decretal amount. This section makes a distinction between loans before the Act and loans after the Act and places loans advanced before the Act in a worse position than loans after the Act. These two sections make no distinction between bond fide assignees for value and other assignees. 52. Chapter 7 contains certain miscellaneous provisions. The material sections of this chapter are secs. 34 and 36. 53. Sec. 34 and sec. 36 deal with powers of the Court under the Act. 54. These two sections make no distinction between bond fide assignees for value and other assignees. 52. Chapter 7 contains certain miscellaneous provisions. The material sections of this chapter are secs. 34 and 36. 53. Sec. 34 and sec. 36 deal with powers of the Court under the Act. 54. Sec. 34 (1) (a) deals with the power of the Court to direct payment by instalments in suits on secured loans. Sec. 34 (!) (b) deals with the power of the Courts to grant instalments in suits in respect of loans advanced before the Act other than those referred to in cl. (a). The other clauses in this section are not material. This section does not protect bond fide assignees for value. 55. Sec. 36 (1) deals with the power of the Court to giant certain reliefs to the borrower under the Act in any suit to which this Act applies or in any suit brought by the borrower for relief under this section. The words "in any suit to which this Act applies" mean "any suit or proceeding instituted or filed on or after the first day of January, 1939 or pending on that date" and includes a proceeding in execution for the recovery of a loan advanced before or after the commencement of this Act. The Proviso to sub-cl. (d) of this clause empowers the Court to direct an assignee to refund money realised by the lender after 1st January, 1939, in excess of the limits specified in cls. (1) and (2) of sec. 30. This proviso is wide enough to make an assignee after the Act liable to refund money which was paid by the borrower to the lender after 1st January, 1939, (the Act came into operation in September, 1939) in excess of the limits specified in cls. (1) and (2) of sec. 30 of the Act, though he had no notice referred to in sec. 28 (1) (a) of the Act. 56. Cl. (2) deals with the re-opening of decrees. Cls. (3) and (4) are not material. Then comes cl. (5) on which the Respondents rely. 57. The words in cl. (5) are "nothing in this section" and not "nothing in this Act." If this clause had not been inserted in sec. 36, sub-cl. (d) of cl. 56. Cl. (2) deals with the re-opening of decrees. Cls. (3) and (4) are not material. Then comes cl. (5) on which the Respondents rely. 57. The words in cl. (5) are "nothing in this section" and not "nothing in this Act." If this clause had not been inserted in sec. 36, sub-cl. (d) of cl. (1) of this section would impose on an assignee after the Act the liability to refund the money which was paid by the borrower to the lender after 1st January, 1939, in excess of the limit specified in cls. (1) and (2) of sec. 30 of the Act, although he did not receive the notice referred to in sec. 28 (1), (a) as Chapter 5 of the Act which deals with assignments after the Act of loans advanced before or after the Act does not protect from such liability an assignee who did not receive such notice. 58. Again, in cl. (5) of sec. 36 we find the words " if the Court is satisfied " and the word "and" (not "or") between the words " that the assignment to him was bond fide " and the words " that he had not received the notice referred to in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28." 59. In an enquiry under this clause, therefore, three issues would arise, namely, (1) whether the assignment was for value; (2) whether the assignment was a bond fide assignment; and (3) whether the assignee received the notice referred to in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28. 60. Cl. (5) requires that the assignee must satisfy the Court on all these points. It, therefore, contemplates cases where those issues would arise. If the assignment before the Act was a sham transaction, there is no assignment at all. If the assignment was to defraud the creditor of the assignor, the borrower cannot question it. 61. The question as to whether the assignee did or did not receive the notice referred to in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28 is a question of fact. In each case, the assignee is to satisfy the Court by placing proper materials that he did not receive the said notice. 61. The question as to whether the assignee did or did not receive the notice referred to in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28 is a question of fact. In each case, the assignee is to satisfy the Court by placing proper materials that he did not receive the said notice. In the case of an assignment of loan before the Act, there cannot be any question of satisfying the Court that the assignee did not receive the said notice as no such notice was necessary before the Act. In view of the law relating to the rights of the assignees before the Act as contained in the Transfer of Property Act, the object of the Bengal Money-Lenders' Act,--the context and the other sections of the said Act, I am of opinion that el. (5) of sec. 36 protects only bond fide assignees for value after the Act who did not receive the notice referred to in sec. 28 (1) (a) of the Act and that this clause is not a bar to the Appellant's release from their liability to pay the amount which is still due under the mortgage decree in question.