JUDGMENT Derbyshire, C.J. - This is an appeal from a judgment and order of McNair, J., dated May 5th, 1941. The facts are within a very short compass and are stated in the judgment of the learned Judge. He said: This is an application to set aside an ex parte decree which was passed on May, 24th, 1940. This application was made on April, 3rd, 1941, nearly one year after the passing of the decree. The applicant alleges that he was never served with the writ of summons. The plaint shows that the Defendants reside at Suapur in the district of Dacca. The affidavit of service shows that service was effected toy affixation on March 21st 1940, after three unsuccessful attempts. The place at which the service was effected was No. 111 3, Lake Road, which is said to foe the Defendants' sister's house. The applicants complain that service should have been effected at Lake Road, and they state that there was a suit filed toy the same Plaintiff in the Small Causes Court, Calcutta, on February, 15th, 1940, and that the writ of summons in that suit was served upon them at Suapur in Dacca by registered post on March 5th, 1940. The Respondent admits that, and states that after service was effected at Suapur, the Defendant came down to Calcutta and was staying with his brother Santinidhan Roy at 111 3 Lake Road at Ballygunj. There is, therefore, a reasonable explanation for the service having been effected in Lake Road. The affidavit of service is not satisfactory, but the applicant is out of time in this application. He states that he first heard of the decree on March 5th, 1941. But there is strong evidence on the affidavits that he knew about it in the middle of 1940. The applicant says that he first heard of the decree against him from Rasik Chandra Saha. Rasik Chandra Saha has sworn an affidavit saying that on June 10th, 19-10, he went to the native place of the Defendants at Snapur and there found both the Defendants and asked them for payment of the decretal, amount, and also discussed other claims by the Plaintiff on promissory notes. The applicant denies that Rasik mentioned the decree, tout he does not plead to the statement that other matters were discussed. He says this is irrelevant. The applicant denies that Rasik mentioned the decree, tout he does not plead to the statement that other matters were discussed. He says this is irrelevant. It appears to me by no means irrelevant that there should have been a discussion between Rasik and the Defendants with regard to other promissory notes, tout if that discussion took place, it is only natural that the decree which had been passed in this Court should also have been mentioned. There is the further statement toy Rasik that he again discussed the matter with the Defendants on August 21st, 1940, when the Defendants stated that they were making arrangements to pay all their debts including the decretal amount. I am satisfied that the present applicants knew of the decree long before the alleged date, March 5th, 1941. The application is out of time and is dismissed with costs. The matter has been argued at some length before us I am of the opinion, as was the learned Judge, that whether the affidavit of service is satisfactory or not, the applicant is out of time in this application. I find that the applicant knew of the decree which had been passed ex parte in this matter in June, 1940. The application to set aside the decree was made on April 3rd, 194.1, which was a matter of nine months afterwards. 2. It has been pointed out that the provisions of Or. 9, r. 13 of the CPC do not govern all cases where applications to set aside ex parte decrees are made on the Original Side of this Court [see the judgment of Rankin, C.J., in the case of S.N. Banerjee v. Huseyn Shahied Suhrawardy 32 C.W.N. p. 10 (1927)]. 3. Here the applicants are asking for a decree to be set aside which had been made some eleven months previously and which they had known for at least nine months before they moved in the matter. I see no reason why the matter should not be governed by Art. 164 of the Limitation Act which provides that an application for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte should be made not later than thirty days from the date of the decree, or where the summons was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree. Assuming that the summons was not duly served, the applicant had knowledge of the decree by the end of June, 1940. In my view he should have made his application to set aside the ex parte decree passed within thirty days from that date. 4. It has been suggested that the Court is not bound by the provisions of Art. 164 of the Limitation Act. I would say, with regard to that contention that if it were correct, then there is every reason why the Court, if it is in deed free to decide after what period it may set aside an ex parte decree, should be guided by the provisions of Art. 164. It would be unfortunate if the length of time (after knowledge of the decree) which would be a bar to an application of this kind should be different on one side of the Circular Road from the other. 5. In my opinion the learned Judge was right and this appeal must be dismissed with costs. This is not a fit case for the employment of two Counsel. Nasim Ali, J. I agree.