Judgement Appeal (No. 47 of 1940), by special leave, from a decree of the High Court (December 3, 1937) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Deoghar, Santal Parganas (June 28, 1935). The main points involved in this appeal were (1.) Whether, upon the true construction of a scheme for the administration of the affairs and properties of the Baidyanath temple consequent upon a decree of July 4, 1901, made by the Additional District Judge of Burdwan, such properties became vested in trust in the high priest of the temple within the meaning of s. 10 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, with the result that there was no period of limitation for a suit against his legal representatives or assigns for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof. (2.) Whether, alternatively, art. 48 or any other article of the First Schedule to the Act applied to the present suit, which was brought to recover certain temple property. The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee The suit was brought in the name of the Deity of the temple, through the present high priest, against the first respondent, Srm. Urmila Devi (who was the widow and executrix of the late high priest), to recover from her the principal moneys, amounting to Rs. 4200, due on certain war bonds (which formed part of the temple properties, but were retained by the widow as such executrix), together with a sum of interest thereon amounting to Rs. 2577-8-0. The suit was tried by the Subordinate Judge of Deoghar, who ordered and decreed that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the widow Rs. 6777-8-0, with subsequent interest. He decided in favour of the plaintiff on the merits of the case, and on the question whether the suit was barred by limitation (which was issue No. 5), he held that by virtue of a scheme for the temple management settled by a decree made on July 4, 1901 [see the judgment of the Judicial Committee], the late high priest was an express trustee of the war bonds, with the result that, under s. 10 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the action was not barred. The widow appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Wort and Manohar Lall JJ.) who allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit, with costs. The widow appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Wort and Manohar Lall JJ.) who allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit, with costs. While agreeing with the trial judge as to merits, the learned judges of the High Court were of opinion that the late high priest was not a trustee, and that s. 10 did not apply. In those circumstances, they held that art. 48 of the Limitation Act applied, and that the suit had not been commenced within the requisite period of three years. It was therefore barred. The temple Deity, through the high priest, now appealed. By s. 10 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 "Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, no suit against "a person in whom property has become vested in trust for "any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or "assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for "the purpose of following in his or their hands such property "or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property "or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time." By amendment made to s. 10 by s. 2 of the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act (I. of 1929) "For the purposes of "this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be "deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose, "and the manager of any such property shall be deemed to "be the trustee thereof.” 1941. July 14. Charles Bagram for the appellant. Upon its true construction the decree of the Additional District Judge of Burdwan, dated July 4, 1901, created a trust and vested the property of the Baidyanath temple in the Sardar Panda as trustee, and brought the scheme for the management of the temple within the terms of s. 10 of the Indian Limitation Act; there was therefore no limitation for the bringing of the present suit. There was admittedly an infringement of the general law that these charitable endowments cannot be trusts, but it is submitted that this particular case is outside that general principle because the decree governs the matter and has created a trust. If that be so, and the decree gave rise to a trust, and there was a vesting of the property, that is an end of the matter. If that be so, and the decree gave rise to a trust, and there was a vesting of the property, that is an end of the matter. It is possible to have words which would vest the property Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.). [Counsel was stopped.] The respondents did not appear and were not represented. July 30. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Russell of Killowen, who stated the facts above set out, and continued The only question which their Lordships have to determine in this appeal is whether the properties of the Baidyanath temple were vested in trust in the high priest of the temple within the meaning of s. 10 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX. of 1908). If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the appellants suit is not barred by any length of time, and this appeal must succeed. Their Lordships are unable to agree with the High Court; they agree with the view and reasoning of the Subordinate Judge. The decree of July 4, 1901, was made in pursuance of the powers conferred by s. 539 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, which ran thus "539. In case of any alleged breach "of any express or constructive trusts created for public "charitable or religious purposes, or whenever the direction "of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of "any such trust, the Advocate General acting ex officio, or two "or more persons having a direct interest in the trust and "having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate "General, may institute a suit in the High Court or the District "Court within the local limits of whose civil jurisdiction the "whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate, "to obtain a decree—(a) appointing new trustees under the "trust; (b) vesting any property in the trustees under the "trust; (c) declaring the proportions in which its objects "are entitled; (d) authorizing the whole or any part of its " property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged ; (e) settling "a scheme for its management; or granting such further "or other relief as the nature of the case may require. "The powers conferred by this section on the Advocate "General may, outside the Presidency-towns, be, with the "previous sanction of the Local Government, exercised also "by the Collector or by such officer as the Local Government "may appoint in this behalf." Such a suit was brought in 1897, complaining of the conduct of the then high priest of this temple (who was defendant No. 1 to the suit), and praying "that a proper person may "be appointed to be Sardar Panda, and that the debottar "properties may be vested in such a person, and that the "Court may frame rules for the management of the debottar " properties, the said order to be made under s. 539 of the "Code of Civil Procedure." After a lengthy trial a decree was made, which was subsequently amended, but dated back to the date of the original decree, namely, July 4, 1901. The relevant portions of this decree are paragraphs 1 and 2, which run thus " (1.) That in the stead of defendant No. 1 "a new Sardar Panda be elected to hold office for life according "to the second rule given in schedule A annexed hereto, and "that the said defendant No. 1 be removed from the said "office thereon. Defendant No. 2 being the heir entitled to "succeed under the first rule is disqualified on account of his "minority, but shall be entitled to succeed on the death of "the Sardar Panda now to be elected provided he be then "duly qualified under the first rule in the said schedule A. "The said Sardar Panda being duly elected shall be trustee "of all the properties movable and immovable devoted to the "service of the God Mahadeva Vaidya Nath Jiu established in "mauza Deoghar, district Santhal Parganas within the jurisdiction of this Court; and that as such trustee he shall be "bound to observe the conditions of his trust according to "ancient usage and as laid down in schedule B. " (2.) That the whole of the said properties movable and "immovable be vested in the said trustee immediately on his "election subject to the conditions hereinafter set forth." The Sardar Panda who was duly elected pursuant to that decree was the high priest whose widow and executrix is defendant No. 1 to the suit which is the subject of this appeal. The High Court, in coming to their decision, relied on Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar (L. R. 48 I. A. 302.), in which Mr. Ameer Ali, in delivering the judgment of the Board, used the following language in reference to high priests of temples and persons in like positions (Ibid. 311) "Called by whatever name, he "is only the manager and custodian of the idol or the institu tion. In almost every case he is given the right to a part "of the usufruct, the mode of enjoyment and the amount "of the usufruct depending again on usage and custom. In "no case was the property conveyed to or vested in him, nor "is he a trustee in the English sense of the term, although "in view of the obligations and duties resting on him, he is "answerable as a trustee in the general sense for mal-administration." This judgment of the Board is, without doubt, a correct statement of the general law. It was a novel view when propounded, and it was followed by the amendment made to s. 10 by the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act (I. of 1929). But the present case is one which, on its facts, is an exception to the general rule. In the present case the court has exercised the powers conferred on it by the Code, namely, to appoint a trustee and to vest the property in the trustee. The words of s. 539 and the words of the decree are equally plain ; and by virtue of the decree pronounced under the section the late high priest was a "trustee of all the properties movable and immovable "devoted to the service " of the temple God. The war bonds were accordingly in fact vested in him in trust for a specific purpose, and the plaintiffs suit, falling within the words of s. 10 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX. of 1908), cannot be barred by any length of time. The appeal should therefore be allowed, the decree of the High Court should be set aside, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge should be restored. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The first respondent will pay to the appellant his costs of the appeal to the High Court and of the appeal to His Majesty in Council.