JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - The question raised in this Rule is whether the appeal should be re-heard. In opposing the Rule, Mr. Sanyal has conceded that the judgment of the learned Judge is not satisfactory but has contended that no useful purpose will be served by a remand. The Petitioners' application is one of the usual character under sec. 174, sub-sec. (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The fraud alleged was the usual fraud of suppression of processes in connection with the sale. The application was prima facie barred by limitation and it is not disputed by Mr. Bhattacharjee that it must fail unless limitation is saved under sec. 18 of the Limitation Act. 2. I do not think there is any real difficulty as to the way in which the learned Judge ought to have proceeded. He ought to have, first of all, considered whether the Petitioners' case of fraud has been established or not. Although he has written an extremely lengthy judgment, he has refused to decide that question at all. If he was satisfied that the fraud alleged is established, he should then have proceeded to consider whether the case comes within sec. 18 of the Limitation Act, that is to say, whether the auction-purchasers were parties to the fraud; if they were not, the application would be barred by limitation. Thirdly, if the auction-purchasers were parties to the fraud, the effect of that fraud would go on until knowledge of the sale was obtained by the Petitioners. If the auction-purchasers wished to show that, in fact, the Petitioners had knowledge of the sale at some earlier date than that alleged in the petition, the burden of proving it lies upon them. 3. I have already pointed out that the learned Judge refused to decide the first question. It therefore cannot be disputed that a remand is inevitable if a finding on that point is necessary. 4. The next point is whether the case comes within sec. 18 of the Limitation Act. The learned Judge refers to the decision of my learned brother Edgley in the case of Abdul Jamil Samsul Hamid Chaudhury v. Arabia Khatun 43 C.W.N. 862 (1939). I have had occasion to notice that this decision is sometimes misunderstood by learned Judges in the Mofussil. 18 of the Limitation Act. The learned Judge refers to the decision of my learned brother Edgley in the case of Abdul Jamil Samsul Hamid Chaudhury v. Arabia Khatun 43 C.W.N. 862 (1939). I have had occasion to notice that this decision is sometimes misunderstood by learned Judges in the Mofussil. I have seen it interpreted to mean that, even though the auction-purchaser himself has suppressed the processes, he is quite safe unless he commits some other fraud after the sale. I need hardly say that, if the auction-purchaser himself is a party to the fraud, his conduct in connection with it obviously keeps from the applicant the knowledge of his right to make an application. 5. In the present case, there was certainly an allegation in paragraph 6 of the petition to the effect that the auction-purchasers were colluding with the decree-holders and other persons in the suppression of the processes. The part attributed to them was that they were really not auction-purchasers at all but mere benamdars of the Opposite Party No. 8 in the petition. In order to succeed, the Petitioners must show that the auction-purchasers were the benamdars of this man. 6. The auction-purchasers were mortgagees and had therefore the strongest possible motive for making a bid in order to save their mortgages. There is nothing suspicious in their conduct at all. The learned Munsif took as evidence of their collusion the fact that 'they did not deposit the decretal dues. I cannot conceive why it should be regarded as suspicious that the auction-purchasers did not pay somebody else's debts. There is no reason why they should make a deposit and their action in bidding was perfectly natural. The learned Munsif was really thinking of a case where the sale had already taken place and the mortgagee has to make a deposit in order to get it set aside. Now, it would be quite useless for me to remand this case unless there was some evidence to justify a finding that the auction-purchasers were the benamdars of the Opposite Party No. 8. Mr. Bhattacharjee was kind enough to go through the evidence and frankly had to concede that there is none. 7. Finally, there is a finding that a previous application was made some years ago by the present Petitioners. Mr. Bhattacharjee was kind enough to go through the evidence and frankly had to concede that there is none. 7. Finally, there is a finding that a previous application was made some years ago by the present Petitioners. On that finding of course, there can be no doubt that the present application, apart from any other consideration, was barred by limitation. The Rule is accordingly discharged. The Petitioners Nos. 5 and 6 will pay the costs of the Opposite Parties Nos. 1 and 2. Hearing-fee is assessed at two gold mohurs.