JUDGMENT Roxburgh, J. - This is a Reference by the learned Sessions Judge of Bakarganj, recommending that an order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Bhola under sec. 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should be set aside. The first reason given by the learned Judge for his recommendation is that he considers that the proceedings in this case were drawn up on the 12th July, 1940, whereas the last act of exercise of the right in dispute in the case was on or before the 13th March, 1940. The Magistrate himself held that the enquiry in the case had begun with the drawing up of proceedings on the 14th May, 1940. It appears that the first party approached the Magistrate for the first time on the 5th April and he directed that notices should issue on the second party to show cause why proceedings under sec. 147, Cr. P.C, should not be drawn up and fixed the 26th April for hearing the matter. On the 26th April the second party appeared to ask for time. The matter was again adjourned to the 14th May.. 1940, when the second party's prayer for further time was rejected and the following order was passed: Draw up proceedings under sec. 147, Cr. P.C., directing both parties to appear on 3rd June, 1940, and put in written statements in respect of their claims to use the water of the tank and to use the ghat plot No. 1150 north of the Mosque. To 3rd June, 1940. On the same day a formal proceeding under sec. 147 was drawn up and signed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The clerk responsible for drawing up the order adopted in part the form in Form No. 24 of the 5th Schedule of the Code with the result that in stead of calling upon the parties concerned in the dispute to appear and put in written statements of their claims, a final order in the form required in sec. 147 (2) was drawn up and the persons of the second party were ordered not to retain possession of the disputed water and the ghat to the exclusion of the enjoyment of the right of the first party. 147 (2) was drawn up and the persons of the second party were ordered not to retain possession of the disputed water and the ghat to the exclusion of the enjoyment of the right of the first party. The proceedings were duly served on some of the members of the second party and on the 3rd June, the date fixed in the order noted in the order-sheet, a pleader for the second party appeared and offered to supply the addresses of Nos. 1 to 4 of the second party. The second party asked for time and adjournment was made till the 24th June. On that date both parties filed their written statements. The case was then adjourned till the 3rd July when the first party applied to add further persons as parties. This was opposed by the second party but was allowed by the Magistrate. The case was adjourned till the 24th July. Before that date somebody had discovered the error in the order of the 14th May as drawn up and the first party filed a petition drawing attention to this fact. The Magistrate ordered fresh proceedings and fresh notices to issue upon both parties, again fixing the 24th July, 1940. It is noted in the order-sheet that this was objected to by the second party. Thereafter the enquiry proceeded and evidence was heard and the order now under consideration was passed on the 31st January, 1941. 2. It is contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee in support of the Reference that the institution of the enquiry in this case must be taken to date from the 12th July when the amended and corrected version of the proceedings was drawn up. He relies for his contention on the case of Ram Chandra Acharjee v. Aditya Chandra Pal I.L.R 53 Cal. 851: s.c. 30 C.W.N. 863 (1926), where it was held that when a Magistrate had sent to the police for enquiry a petition asking for proceedings under sec. 147 to be drawn up, it could not be said that the enquiry under sec. 147 had been instituted by the order sending the matter to the police but that it was instituted on the date when the formal order under sec. 147 was drawn up. The facts in this case are quite different. 147 to be drawn up, it could not be said that the enquiry under sec. 147 had been instituted by the order sending the matter to the police but that it was instituted on the date when the formal order under sec. 147 was drawn up. The facts in this case are quite different. On the 14th May, 1940, when the Magistrate passed the order in the order-sheet for proceedings to be drawn up, he certainly intended to institute an enquiry, and had that order been correctly followed by a correct formal order, no question could have arisen that the institution of the proceedings had been delayed. It also is evident that everybody understood that proceedings under sec. 147 were being started and that there was no intention on the part of the Magistrate to pass any final order under that section. The error in using the wrong form in the formal order was clearly due entirely to an oversight. In our opinion this was an error that could be corrected at any time and it was duly corrected when brought to the notice of the Magistrate by his order of the 12th July and by the amended correct formal order being drawn up and served. In our opinion, on the facts of this case the enquiry was instituted therefore on the 14th May, 1940, and the first objection raised by the learned Sessions Judge in his Letter of Reference must be overruled. 3. There is a further objection that so far as it concerns the persons who were added by the order of the 3rd July, it cannot be said that any enquiry had been instituted against them before that date. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. Once an enquiry has been instituted the Court has full power and is indeed required to add such persons as seem necessary for the proper decision of the dispute. 4. The learned Judge has further recommended that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate should be set aside on the ground that he has failed to find, as required by the section, that the right claimed by the first party exists. 4. The learned Judge has further recommended that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate should be set aside on the ground that he has failed to find, as required by the section, that the right claimed by the first party exists. The relevant finding of the learned Magistrate is as follows: As a result, I find that the alleged right of user of the ghat in issue for purposes of ablutions as set up by the first party is a bond fide claim of right which, up to this stage, seems to have at least the force of a customary right, if not of a customary easement or an easement proper and as such this claim is also covered by the word 'otherwise' in sec. 147 (1), Cr. P.C. 5. In our opinion, this finding amounts to a finding that the right claimed by the first party exists at least to the extent that it has the force of a customary right and that is a sufficient finding in this case to justify the order that the learned Magistrate has passed. 6. The result is that this Reference is rejected. Lodge, J. I agree.