JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment of some of the tenants of an occupancy holding on the ground that the latter had used the lands in a manner which rendered the same unfit for the purposes of the tenancy. The suit was decreed by the learned Munsif, but on appeal by Defendant No. 1 that judgment was reversed. Hence the present appeal by the Plaintiffs. There was a question raised in the trial Court as to the status of the Defendants. The Plaintiffs' case was that the Defendants were occupancy raiyats, whereas the Defendants claimed the status of mokarari tenants. That question was decided in favour of the Plaintiffs by the trial Court, but in the view which the learned Subordinate Judge took on appeal, he did not express any opinion on this or on some of the other issues in the suit. For the purposes of the present appeal the Defendants might be regarded as occupancy raiyats and hence liable to ejectment on the ground on which ejectment was sought in the suit. The ground is in fact one of the specified grounds mentioned in sec. 25 of the Bengal Tenancy Act on which ejectment will lie as against an occupancy raiyat. 2. The two main questions which were raised in the lower Appellate Court and have been re-agitated before me are those of (1) limitation and (2) maintainability of the suit. 3. As regards the first point, the learned Judge held that the suit was barred under Article 32 of the Limitation Act, as it was brought more than two years from the date when the alleged acts of "perversion" of the tenancy to other purposes from those for which it had been created first became known to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs' case was that the lands had been let out for agricultural purposes and that the Defendants had rendered them unfit for such purposes by placing earth on the lands, erecting certain structures and excavating pits. These were in fact the specific acts of waste, if that expression may be used, mentioned by the Plaintiffs in the notice which they served on the Defendants under sec. 155 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. These were in fact the specific acts of waste, if that expression may be used, mentioned by the Plaintiffs in the notice which they served on the Defendants under sec. 155 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Sec. 155 requires that before a landlord may sue a tenant for ejectment on the ground that the tenant has used the land in a manner which renders it unfit for the purposes of the tenancy, he shall serve in the prescribed manner a notice on the tenant, specifying the particular misuse complained of. Where the misuse is capable of remedy, the landlord is also required to call upon the tenant by the notice to remedy the same, and in any case to pay reasonable compensation for the misuse. It is only where the tenant fails to comply with the landlord's requisition contained in such notice within a reasonable time that the landlord is entitled to bring a suit. It is not disputed before me that a suit for ejectment as well as for compensation such as is contemplated in sec. 155, is governed by Article 32 of the Limitation Act. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider when the "perversion " which constitutes the cause of action in the suit first became known to the Plaintiffs. 4. The suit was instituted on the 19th of November, 1937. The learned Munsif was of opinion that the alleged acts of misuse commenced in Jaistha, 1342 B.S. and continued up to Chaitra, 1342 B.S. Apparently he was not disposed to accept Jaistha, 1342, as the starting point of limitation, which would be more than two years before the institution of the suit. If limitation is supposed to run from Chaitra, 1342, the suit would be admittedly within time. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to think that limitation ought to commence from the 16th of July, 1935, corresponding to the end of Ashara, 1342 B.S., and in support of this he relied on the statement of Plaintiffs' witness No. 1, Jatindra Nath Das, who stated that he had seen the Defendants excavating pits in Ashar, 1342, or the end of Jaistha. 5. In my opinion, the finding of neither of the Courts below is sufficiently definite for the determination of the question of limitation. As already stated, there were several acts alleged by the Plaintiffs, which according to them constituted a misuse of the lands of the tenancy. 5. In my opinion, the finding of neither of the Courts below is sufficiently definite for the determination of the question of limitation. As already stated, there were several acts alleged by the Plaintiffs, which according to them constituted a misuse of the lands of the tenancy. These were (1) the heaping of earth on the land, (2) the erection of some corrugated iron structures, and (3) the digging of pits or trenches. 6. There is evidence of one witness on the side of the Defendants which is accepted by the learned Subordinate Judge to the effect that the structures had been constructed in 1341, and that the Plaintiff No. 4 came to know of the same at the time of the construction. It this evidence is accepted, the suit would, on the face of it, appear to be barred. But still the question would remain as to whether even if it was barred in respect of this particular act of waste or misuse, the Plaintiffs could not still rely on other or subsequent acts for saving the suit from limitation. It is not suggested that the various acts complained of were so connected with each other that they must be treated as constituting one series, and not distinct acts of waste which might be separately taken as having rendered the tenancy unfit for the purposes for which it had been created. Now it is well settled that if there is a misuse by the tenant even of a portion of the land comprised in the tenancy, the landlord's right to eject may and must be exercised in respect of the whole holding, and he cannot bring a suit for ejectment only from the portion which was actually misused. But this does not mean that where the tenants affect only a portion of the land by any acts of waste, the landlord shall be bound to sue at once and that he may not wait till further acts of waste are committed on the rest of the tenancy. Similarly, it does not follow that because a suit for ejectment may be barred, if it is founded on any particular act of waste or misuse, it may not yet be within time as regards other acts of a similar kind which might equally found a fresh cause of action. Similarly, it does not follow that because a suit for ejectment may be barred, if it is founded on any particular act of waste or misuse, it may not yet be within time as regards other acts of a similar kind which might equally found a fresh cause of action. It seems to me, therefore, that in order to decide whether the present suit was barred or not, it was necessary for the Court to come to an express finding as to when the Plaintiffs first came to know of each of the several acts of misuse or waste alleged. In my opinion, it is also necessary to see when the various acts complained of produced the result which would give the Plaintiffs the right to sue. The right to sue does not accrue until and unless the land has been rendered unfit for the purposes of the tenancy. This result is not necessarily reached as soon as the act is commenced. Neither can it be said that it is not reached until the act is finally completed. It is a question of fact, which depends on the evidence forthcoming in the case in hand, as to when and at what stage the land may be regarded as having become unfit by reason of any acts committed by the tenants. 7. It does not appear that the matter was approached from this point of view by either of the Courts below, and I cannot, therefore, accept the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge as sufficient in law for disposing of the question of limitation. 8. In this view of the matter, I think I should direct a remand of the case to the lower Appellate Court for a proper finding on the evidence which will enable it to determine this question. 9. A point was raised before me if the Plaintiffs could claim the exclusion of any period by reason of the notice under sec. 155 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 15 of the Limitation Act provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded. The notice here under sec. 155 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 15 of the Limitation Act provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded. The notice here under sec. 155 gave three months' time to the Defendants to alter the land to its previous condition or to pay compensation, and if, therefore, subsec. (2) of sec. 15 of the Limitation Act applies, the period of limitation will be extended by three months. That is not disputed. It was, however, contended by the learned Advocate for the Defendants that the notice under sec 155 was not notice of a suit within the meaning of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 15. According to the learned Advocate it was merely in the nature of a notification of the landlord's claim to compensation in consequence of the alleged acts of misuse set out therein. I cannot accept that view. Sec. 155 lays down quite clearly that a suit for ejectment will not lie until and unless the notice mentioned in this section has been previously given, and the section further provides that a reasonable time shall be given to the Defendants to comply with the notice. I do not see why in such circumstances the notice should not be regarded as notice of a suit. Notice of a suit does not necessarily mean notice of the plaint or of the substance of the plaint. The suit here is a suit based on the grounds for which the notice is given, and the notice being one required by an express provision of the statute, it will obviously attract the operation of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 15 of the Limitation Act. The learned Advocate for the Respondent drew my attention to a case [Kaviraj Baroda Kanta Sen v. Court of Wards 29 A.L.J.R. 949 at p. 951 (1931).]. But there the notice was one which the law did not require to be given before the suit could be brought. As the learned Judge has pointed out, the notification of the claim in that case was merely an information to the Collector of the particulars of the claim, and it was not necessarily notice of a civil suit on the basis of that claim. As the learned Judge has pointed out, the notification of the claim in that case was merely an information to the Collector of the particulars of the claim, and it was not necessarily notice of a civil suit on the basis of that claim. In fact, under the Act which was under consideration in that case, the institution of the suit was not prohibited without a prior notice. That case is, therefore, clearly of no assistance to the Respondents. 10. The next point which was urged on behalf of the Respondents was that the suit did not comprise the entire lands of the tenancy. If this objection could be substantiated, that would no doubt be fatal. But unfortunately for the Defendants they had not raised this point specifically in their written statement and no issue was raised on this question either. This is a question of fact which they could not, therefore, be allowed to raise afterwards. It is urged that the record-of-rights, as it stands, shows that the tenancy, as it originally stood, included an area which has been left out in the suit and has also been left out in the notice under sec. 155. It appears, however, that since the tenancy was created, a certain portion of it was acquired by Government under the Land Acquisition Act, and it may well be that this accounts for the diminution of the area which was left in the holding after the acquisition. If the question had been pointedly raised, the Plaintiffs might easily have adduced evidence to show that the holding as it now stood consisted merely of the dags which were mentioned in the plaint. I think on this point the learned Munsif had taken a correct view, and not the learned Subordinate Judge. 11. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside, and the case will be sent back to the lower Appellate Court for a further hearing of the appeal on the question of limitation in the light of the observations contained in this judgment and on the further points which had been left undetermined at the previous hearing. So far as the question of the suit not being maintainable on the ground of non-exclusion of a certain area is concerned, that is now concluded by this judgment. So far as the question of the suit not being maintainable on the ground of non-exclusion of a certain area is concerned, that is now concluded by this judgment. The Appellants are entitled to the costs of this appeal; further costs will abide the result.