JUDGMENT Mukherjea, J. - This is a Rule issued by this Court in exercise of its powers under sec. 12 of the Legal Practitioners' Act calling upon the pleader Mr. Bepin Chandra Medhi to show cause why he should not he dismissed or suspended on the ground of his being convicted under the Defence of India Rules. Mr. Holiram Deka has appeared on behalf of the pleader to show cause and we also had the advantage of hearing Mr. Ramaprosad Mukherjee, Assistant Government Pleader, on behalf of the Crown. The factum of conviction cannot be disputed by this Court and we cannot go into the propriety of the conviction and the sentence passed upon the pleader. The sole point for our consideration is whether in the circumstances of this case the conviction of the pleader under the Defence of India Rules implies such a defect of character as to render him unfit to be a member of the legal profession. The facts appear to be these: The pleader ordinarily practises in the Mangaldai Sub-Divisional Courts and is a respectable man and a member of the Assam Legislative Assembly. He gave the Sub-Divisional Officer of Mangaldai a notice on the 15th of December, 1940, to the effect that he intended to offer Satyagraha at Tangla on the 18th of December, 1940. He was present at Tangla at about 1 p.m. on the 18th of December, 1940, and there he uttered an anti-war slogan which, literally translated, would stand as follows: It is improper to assist the war efforts of the British with men and money. It is the sole duty to resist all wars by non-violent means. 3. He was arrested on the spot by the Divisional Inspector of Police and taken to a jail and tried on the same day by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Mangaldai and convicted under r. 38 (5) of the Defence of India Rules read with sec. 21 of the Act and sentenced to nine months' simple imprisonment. 4. I agree with Mr. Ramaprosad Mukherjee that the expression " defect of character" is not the same thing as moral turpitude and it is not necessary in every case to show that what the pleader did, subjected him to anything like general infamy or imputation of bad character [vide In the Matter of Sashi Bhusan Ray 38 C.W.N. 278 (1933)]. I agree with Mr. Ramaprosad Mukherjee that the expression " defect of character" is not the same thing as moral turpitude and it is not necessary in every case to show that what the pleader did, subjected him to anything like general infamy or imputation of bad character [vide In the Matter of Sashi Bhusan Ray 38 C.W.N. 278 (1933)]. As was observed by Sir Lancelot Sanderson, C.J., the pleaders are a privileged body who have duties not only to their clients but also to the Courts of which they are officers to co-operate with them in the orderly administration of justice, [vide In the matter of Tar in I Mohan Barari 26 C.W.N. 580 (1922) and Emperor v. Rajani Kanta Bose 35 C.L.J. 356 (1922)]. These were cases where certain members of the legal profession joined in an organised attempt to boycott the Courts because of certain grievances either of a political character or relating to the affairs of the Court itself and it was held that they could be dealt with by the Court under sec. 12 of the Legal Practitioners Act. The present case, however, is of a different complexion altogether. There was nothing wrong in the conduct of the pleader either in his dealings with his clients or in his relations with the Court as an officer of the latter. I do not think also that he comes within the purview of the rule enunciated by the learned Judges in the case of In the matter of Sashi Bhusan Roy 38 C.W.N. 278 (1933), referred to above. He did not incite any people to violate a law or to defy any established authority. He did not at all make a speech or say anything against the British Government. The slogan he uttered was rather the slogan of a pacifist and he gave expression to his own opinion that none should assist the British Government in their war efforts as it is the duty of everybody to resist all wars by nonviolent means. This expression of opinion may be wrongful and may bring him within the mischief of the Defence of India Rules but it is surely not a case where the pleader abuses his position as such or acts prejudicially against the machinery of law of which he is himself a member. 5. This expression of opinion may be wrongful and may bring him within the mischief of the Defence of India Rules but it is surely not a case where the pleader abuses his position as such or acts prejudicially against the machinery of law of which he is himself a member. 5. In the circumstances of the present case, therefore, we do not think that it calls for the exercise of our disciplinary jurisdiction under sec. 12 of the Legal Practitioners Act. It may be also noted that this is the solitary occasion when the pleader was convicted under the Defence of India Rules. We do not mean to say that a conviction under the Defence of India Rules would not make a pleader amenable to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court; but the Legislature has given a wide discretion to the Court in regard to such matters and we must judge every ease by its own circumstances. 6. The result therefore is that we discharge the Rule. Sen, J. I agree.