JUDGMENT Gentle, J. - The Plaintiff is the Receiver appointed in Suit No. 258 of 1886 in respect of a debutter estate, the Plaintiff being appointed in the year 1924. The claim is for possession of No. 4314, Baghbazar Street, Calcutta, the tenancy in the Defendant's favour being a monthly one created on the 17th August, 1933, and was determined by a notice to quit given on the 16th July, 1940, which expired on the 16th August following; also a claim for three months' arrears of rent at Rs. 101 per month, together with mesne profits. There is no doubt that a letter, purporting to be a notice to quit, was sent to the Defendant dated 16th July, 1940, the effect of it is in contest. It also is not disputed that Rs. 303 were due for rent at the date when this suit was instituted. All the rent and the sum of Rs. 101 in respect of each month's subsequent occupation have been paid into Court by the Defendant up to April, 1941. 2. In the written statement the defences which are raised and which have given rise to the issues are that the Plaintiff let the premises to the Defendant permanently, that there was no question of the tenure being monthly, and that the Plaintiff has assisted and encouraged the Defendant to expend a large sum of money in erecting, upon the land which was the subject of the letting, a large building. 3. The issues which were settled are as follows: 1. Is the notice of ejectment valid and legally terminates the tenancy 2. Is the Plaintiff estopped by his own conduct from evicting the Defendant or In the alternative is the Plaintiff bound to pay the value of the structures standing on the land as compensation to the (Defendant as a condition precedent to an order of eviction? 3. To what relief or reliefs the Plaintiff is entitled? 4. It is convenient, firstly, to refer to the oral evidence. The Plaintiff Subodh Chunder Mitter spoke to his appointment as Receiver of the debutter estate and that it included the plot of land the subject-matter of the suit. This was known formerly as 124, Cornwallis Street and is so mentioned in some documents which have been filed. 4. It is convenient, firstly, to refer to the oral evidence. The Plaintiff Subodh Chunder Mitter spoke to his appointment as Receiver of the debutter estate and that it included the plot of land the subject-matter of the suit. This was known formerly as 124, Cornwallis Street and is so mentioned in some documents which have been filed. It was formerly let to a tenant who had erected some huts upon it, these huts were sold at a sale held in some proceeding in the Court of Small Causes and the Defendant was the purchaser for about Rs. 1,100. The Plaintiff went on to say that on the 17th August, 1937, he let the plot of land to the Defendant at a rent of Rs. 101 per mensem and also was paid a sum of Rs. 125 as fee to register the Defendant as a tenant of the estate. The Defendant demolished the huts a few months after the commencement of the tenancy, he informed the Defendant that he had purchased some cheap scrap iron and he intended to erect a two-storied hut with this material. The Plaintiff said the Defendant came to him with tears in his eyes and asked the Plaintiff to sign a plan of the proposed construction and added that if the Plaintiff did not do so the Defendant would be put to great loss. Thereafter he added his signature to two other plans and to three applications which were to be accompanied by the plans for submission to the Corporation of Calcutta for sanction being given to erect the construction. The Corporation's sanction was sought in September, November, 1933 and in February, 1934, the two earlier applications were refused and the last granted. The construction which the Defendant erected the Plaintiff described as a two-storied matkhota consisting of corrugated iron and tile. The Plaintiff explained that he signed the plans and the applications sent to the Corporation because he was in the position of owner of the land by whom such applications must be made. The Plaintiff admitted that he still had two of the rejected plans in his possession. The Plaintiff explained that he signed the plans and the applications sent to the Corporation because he was in the position of owner of the land by whom such applications must be made. The Plaintiff admitted that he still had two of the rejected plans in his possession. He denied that he had ever informed the Defendant that he would never be ejected or evicted, on the contrary, he said he told him on more than one occasion that he might have to leave the premises let to him at any time as he (the Plaintiff) was only a Receiver and he denied being paid Rs. 500 or any sum in addition to what he had previously mentioned. He agreed the Defendant is now a blind man but said this affliction occurred to him two or three years ago. He did admit after being recalled that the correspondence which passed in regard to the sanction of the Corporation for the new construction took place between himself and the Corporation, although as previously mentioned at one time he said his sole connection in the matter was merely signing some plans and some applications for sanction to erect. 5. The Defendant gave evidence. He said he had been blind for 12 or 13 years and he referred to his purchase of the huts at the sale held in the Court of Small Causes. He said his original intention was to repair these huts and to live in them himself. Some few days after he had become the purchaser, at the Plaintiff's request he went to see him. The Plaintiff asked him to make arrangements to become his permanent tenant and was told to do so the rental amount payable would be Rs. 101 together with a salami or premium of Rs. 1,000. Later the Plaintiff told the Defendant that the latter should erect a new house in which he could live permanently and let parts of it out to others, and the Plaintiff would himself obtain for the Defendant the necessary sanction from the authorities in regard to the plans and that being done the Defendant could become a permanent tenant of the Plaintiff. The Defendant said he agreed to this and paid Rs. 500 by way of salami. The Plaintiff had all the plans prepared and he paid him Rs. The Defendant said he agreed to this and paid Rs. 500 by way of salami. The Plaintiff had all the plans prepared and he paid him Rs. 100 for this, and eventually the Corporation's sanction was obtained and over a period of some months the building was constructed at a total cost of Rs. 15,000 or Rs. 16,000 which the Defendant said included the original purchase price of Rs. 1,100 for the old huts. The Defendant denied that he was told by the Plaintiff that he might have to vacate the premises at any time, he said that he would never have spent the money which he did had he been so informed, that he only incurred the expenditure because the Plaintiff told him that he would remain a permanent tenant and would not be ejected or evicted. Throughout the Plaintiff told him that he was the owner and he did not refer to himself as a Receiver appointed by the Court in respect of the estate of which this plot of land formed part. The Plaintiff told him there was no need for any formal document but if one was required in the future it would be given. The Defendant said that after he received the letter of the 16th July, 1940, which purports to be a notice to quit, he went to see the Plaintiff who told him that he had nothing to fear and he should wait quietly and matters would be alright. The Defendant said the building was a substantial one, all the walls are of brick, the roof of tiles and the floor, ceilings and verandahs surrounding the property are built of concrete or concrete on wood. Two photographs have been produced and proved by the photographer who took them a few days ago, and it is apparent that the description which the Plaintiff gave of the construction is incorrect. The building is a substantial one and is in accordance with the description which the Defendant gave of it. An account book was produced by the Defendant in which he said his clerk recorded the expenses of the construction, this book has not been translated. The allegation in the written statement is that the building cost about Rs. 14,250. Whatever the exact amount may be, it is quite obvious that many thousands of rupees were spent. The Plaintiff obtains a rent of Rs. The allegation in the written statement is that the building cost about Rs. 14,250. Whatever the exact amount may be, it is quite obvious that many thousands of rupees were spent. The Plaintiff obtains a rent of Rs. 101 and the Defendant lives there himself and sublets the remainder which comprises three shops and dwelling tenements for a total sum of Rs. 150 per mensem. If the construction were as the Plaintiff described, it is quite obvious that the building could not be a two-storied one and it is unlikely it would be let out at the rent which the Defendant receives. 6. Dhanraj Sha gave evidence. He said he is a connection by marriage of the Defendant and he accompanied the Defendant on each of the occasions when interviews took place with the Plaintiff and in his evidence in substance, he bore out what the Defendant said transpired at those meetings. This witness said the Defendant had been a blind man ever since he had known him which was a period of 12 or 13 years. This witness also identified the account books which the Defendant produced as being in the handwriting of a clerk employed by him and who is now dead. 7. It is now convenient to express my findings of fact and my views in regard to the evidence which has been given. The Plaintiff describing the building as he did I am sure wished to convey what an inferior place it was and how little money had been spent on it. It is an entire misdescription as I have already indicated. The unlikelihood is manifest of the Defendant expending a large sum of money upon a building erected on a plot of land which he might have to vacate at any time upon short notice. According to the Plaintiff's evidence although he was warned that his occupation of the land might end at any time nevertheless the Defendant with his mind apprised of the position expended a large sum of money upon erecting this building. The Plaintiff did not commend himself to me to be either a reliable man or a truthful witness, he contradicted himself on more than one occasion, his intentional misdescription of the premises was lacking in frankness. The Plaintiff did not commend himself to me to be either a reliable man or a truthful witness, he contradicted himself on more than one occasion, his intentional misdescription of the premises was lacking in frankness. At first he said his only connection with the negotiations with the Corporation was merely adding his signature to plans and application forms, subsequently he admitted that all the correspondence took place with him and the Corporation. The Corporation's file has been produced and contains a letter dated 9th June, 1936, signed by the Plaintiff. He was reluctant to admit his signature. The letter deals with some matter in regard to the building which had been erected the year previously. In the letter itself the handwriting is very similar to the signature and the ink and pen used must have been the same, the Plaintiff denied the letter was written by him. But quite apart from this letter I am quite satisfied that the person who negotiated with and transacted all business with the Corporation in regard to sanction being obtained for the purpose of erection was the Plaintiff and nobody else. It is quite incorrect, as the Plaintiff said, that the Plaintiff's signature was required to the plans and documents because he was the owner of the property. The application for sanction for the new building was made under rr. 52 and 53 of Schedule 17 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. These rules together with r. 54 make it quite clear that the signature to plans and applications is required by the owner of the building to be erected and not by the owner of the land upon which the building is to be erected. 8. I am satisfied that the Defendant was a blind man at the time the transactions took place with the Plaintiff in 1933 and may be that is one of the reasons why the Plaintiff himself undertook the negotiations with the Calcutta Corporation. 9. In substance I accept the evidence which the Defendant gave and I do not believe the testimony of the Plaintiff, save where it is in accordance with the other accepted evidence, or is an admission against himself. 10. Having expressed my opinion in regard to the acceptance of the evidence, then the following facts are established. 11. 9. In substance I accept the evidence which the Defendant gave and I do not believe the testimony of the Plaintiff, save where it is in accordance with the other accepted evidence, or is an admission against himself. 10. Having expressed my opinion in regard to the acceptance of the evidence, then the following facts are established. 11. The Defendant purchased the old huts at the sale in the Small Causes Court for the purpose of repair and to live there. The Plaintiff himself suggested that the Defendant should demolish the huts, erect a substantial and good building upon the land which the Plaintiff was in a position to let to him and in the event of the Defendant doing this, he would never be evicted nor ejected by the Plaintiff from the land. There was also the oral promise that the Defendant would become a permanent tenant. The Plaintiff himself carried out the negotiations to obtain the sanction of the Corporation and was paid by the Defendant for so doing, a sum of not less than Rs. 100. In addition, I find also that a sum of Rs. 500 and not Rs. 125 was paid by the Defendant as salami, but the Plaintiff entered in the estate account books that a sum of Rs. 125 had been received as a fee to register him as a tenant of the estate. 12. Upon those findings of fact, what is the position? Learned Counsel for the Defendant relies principally upon an estoppel which arises in this way: By reason of the statements and the conduct of the Plaintiff, the Defendant has been made to change his position to his detriment, in that he has spent a large sum of money upon erecting a building and if he is ejected from the land, he must either pull down the superstructure as he is entitled to, in which event he will obtain practically nothing for it, or try to sell the superstructure to a willing buyer. I am quite satisfied that there is no one, apart from the Plaintiff or the estate, who will buy the superstructure, but in the light of what learned Counsel for the Plaintiff told me, there would be no purchaser. I am quite satisfied that there is no one, apart from the Plaintiff or the estate, who will buy the superstructure, but in the light of what learned Counsel for the Plaintiff told me, there would be no purchaser. I was informed, although there was no evidence, that the estate requires the plot of land upon which the building is erected, to carry out some building development together with another adjacent plot. 13. The Defendant, relying upon the statements and promises and also being encouraged by the Plaintiff assisting in obtaining sanction from the Corporation, is a large sum out of pocket at the present time. Learned Counsel for the Defendant relied upon the provisions of sec. 115 of the Indian Evidence Act and contended that even when a person has acted upon innocent statements by another, an estoppel arises against the one making the statement and referred to Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha L.R. 19 I.A. 203 at p. 215: s.c. ILR 20 Cal. 206 (1892), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee say: In regard to the first of these points, the section of the Evidence Act by which the question must be determined dices not make it a condition of estoppel resulting that the person who by his declaration or act has induced the belief on which another has acted was either committing or seeking to commit a fraud, or that he was acting with a full knowledge of the circumstances, and under no mistake or misapprehension.' 14. A little later it is pointed out that the principle upon which the Indian Statute rests is that it would be most inequitable and unjust to a person who acted upon the representations of another or on conduct amounting to representation which induced him to act as otherwise he would not do, that the other should be allowed to deny or refute the effect of the statement. 15. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff has cited Ariff v. Jadunath Majumdar L.R. 58 I.A. 91 : s.c. 35 C.W.N. 550 (1931). In that case the Respondent entered into an oral agreement with the Appellant by which the latter granted him a lease of some land for a period of five years with an option to continue during each succeeding period of five years. In that case the Respondent entered into an oral agreement with the Appellant by which the latter granted him a lease of some land for a period of five years with an option to continue during each succeeding period of five years. The agreement was made in 1913 in which year the Respondent entered into possession and spent some ten or twelve thousand rupees upon erecting a building. No formal lease or any other document ever came into existence and eight years later the Appellant gave Respondent one month's notice to quit. The Respondent, in three Courts in India, successfully relied upon a plea of part performance to overcome the provisions of sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, requiring a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, to be made by a registered instrument. The matter was carried to the Judicial Committee in which it was pointed out that the plea of part performance could not prevail, and at p. 102 reference is made to the doctrine of equitable estoppel which was held also not to be applicable. It was pointed out that the Respondent for many years after the making of the agreement in 1913 had available to aim a remedy to sue for specific performance and to obtain the enforcement of the lease in writing being granted to him, and as he had failed to do so, he had lost such remedy some years before he commenced his suit which eventuated in the appeal to the Judicial Committee and he had no interest or title in the land which he could in any way enforce. In the course of the judgment it is pointed out at p. 99 that the matter then before the Judicial Committee was not the question of money being expended by the Respondent in any mistaken belief as to his legal rights, or of the Appellant knowing of the existence of any such (mistaken belief, or encouraging the Respondent by abstaining from asserting a right inconsistent with the acts of the Respondent', and a little later that the structures were erected on the land.....not in any mistaken belief by the Respondent of his rights in regard to the land, but an assertion of rights which he correctly believed to be his, not by reason of any encouragement or abstention on the part of the Appellant, but by reason of the agreement which ho was then entitled to enforce against the Appellant. 16. It is quite clear that in the above case there was no conduct by the Appellant (who was the landlord and in the same position as the Plaintiff in the present suit) which encouraged or caused the tenant to expend money on the property. On the above authority, the spending of money by the tenant was entirely referable to and in pursuance of a grant. 17. In the case before me that is not the position. The Plaintiff expressly informed the Defendant that if he built a new structure, he would not be evicted nor ejected, and further he not only encouraged him, but he participated in the structure being built by undertaking for reward which he received, all the negotiations with the municipal authorities to obtain the necessary sanction for the building to be erected. In those circumstances the present suit is distinguishable from Ariff v. Jadunath Majumdar L.R. 58 I.A. 91 : s.c. 33 C.W.N. 550 (1931). 18. I hold that the Plaintiff is estopped from recovering possession of this property from the Defendant. In arriving at this conclusion which I have expressed, I do not decide the nature or extent of the interest which the Defendant may have in this land. I merely hold that by reason of his conduct, the Plaintiff is estopped from obtaining against the Defendant an order for eviction or ejectment. 19. In arriving at this conclusion which I have expressed, I do not decide the nature or extent of the interest which the Defendant may have in this land. I merely hold that by reason of his conduct, the Plaintiff is estopped from obtaining against the Defendant an order for eviction or ejectment. 19. The rent for three months in arrear when the suit was filed, has been paid into Court together with the monthly amount of rent up to the month of April this year. There is no doubt that the balance will be paid. 20. Before I close, reference to one matter is necessary. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff contended that as his client is a Receiver and had not authority to let the land for longer than two years, even if he might have let the land with all requirements of law, nevertheless as he had not authority, he is entitled to recover possession. In support of this proposition Nawab of Murshidabad v. Bilasroy Chowdhury ILR 56 Cal. 252 (1928). was cited. In that case the Plaintiff was forbidden by statute to grant leases. He granted leases and sued subsequently for possession, and succeeded on the ground that by statutory law the Plaintiff could not grant a lease. 21. The Receiver in this suit, as well as other Receivers, can be authorised to grant leases for longer periods than two years and he is not in the position in which the Plaintiff was in the above authority, not being under the disability of being prevented from granting a lease of any sort, and therefore the contention that the Receiver cannot be estopped, whatever his conduct may have been, is not supported by authority and I cannot entertain it. The result will be that there will be a decree dismissing the suit with costs; certified for one Counsel.