Research › Browse › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

1941 DIGILAW 315 (CAL)

Krishnadhon Mondal v. Nalini Chandra Purkait

1941-12-22

body1941
JUDGMENT Roxburgh, J. - This Rule has been issued against an order of the Munsif of the 3rd Court at Diamond Harbour dated the 26th June, 1941, dismissing an application made by the Petitioner under sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. The Opposite Party No. 1 is an assignee of the decree-holder Opposite Party No. 2 and is his brother-in-law. The learned Munsif has held that the assignee is protected by the provisions of sec. 36 (5) of the Act; he has therefor declined to re-open the decree in question. It is not disputed before me that, but for this supposed bar, the Petitioner could obtain relief under sec. 36. The decree was in respect of two mortgage loans, one of Rs. 100 taken on the 9th June, 1931, and another of Rs. 200 taken on the 7th September, 1932. A preliminary decree was obtained ex parte on the 23rd February, 1938, for the amount claimed, Rs. 536 including principal and interest, together with interest pendente lite amounting to Rs. 17-8, and costs Rs. 76-8 in all Rs. 630. A period of grace of one month was allowed, and the decree was made final on the 5th July, 1938. Application for execution was filed on the 12th July, 1940, and the assignment in question was made on the 27th July, 1940, for the full amount of the decree. The Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, appeared in the Calcutta Gazette of the 1st August, 1940, that is to say, four days after the assignment. The Act came into force a month later on the 1st September, 1940. 2. The learned Munsif has found as a fact that the transfer was bond fide, and this Court is bound by the finding. If it was open to this Court to consider the facts I should have great difficulty in accepting the finding. 3. The only question for consideration in this rule is whether a bond fide transferee, in respect of a transfer made before the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, came into force, is protected by the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 36 of the Act. 4. This question has been considered in Manmatha Nath v. Renuda 45 C.W.N. 1090 (1941). 3. The only question for consideration in this rule is whether a bond fide transferee, in respect of a transfer made before the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, came into force, is protected by the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 36 of the Act. 4. This question has been considered in Manmatha Nath v. Renuda 45 C.W.N. 1090 (1941). His Lordship the Chief Justice expressed his view on the question, though, as he stated, a decision on it was net required in that case having regard to his decision on other points. His view is that sub-sec. (5) of sec. 36 operates to protect the pre-Act assignee. Nasim Ali, J., took the opposite view, and a decision on the point was an integral part of his decision on the case as a whole. With great respect I think that the view of Nasim Ali, J., is the correct one. To the reasons given by him, based on an analysis of the Act, I would only add the following:-- In the case of assignments made after the Act the borrower is not deprived of all relief although the bond fide assignee who has not had notice under sec. 28 (1) is protected. In such a case the borrower can obtain indemnity from the assignor if the latter fails to give the notice required by that section. In the case of assignments made before the Act, if sub-sec. (5) of sec. 36 protects the assignee, then the borrower is made the sufferer; benefits which he might have obtained against the original lender are denied to him if there has been a transfer, though the whole law in regard to the matter is made to act retrospectively and for the benefit of the borrower. Had there been any intention to make special provision in respect of assignments made before the Act, one would have expected that the borrower would obtain relief in any case, the special provision, if any, would merely adjust the position as between the assignor and assignee. 5. When we turn to the proviso to sec. 36 (1) (d) we find, I think, a particular instance in which, if pre-Act assignees are not protected, an adjustment is made as to their liabilities between them and their assignors. It will be found, when read with sec. 5. When we turn to the proviso to sec. 36 (1) (d) we find, I think, a particular instance in which, if pre-Act assignees are not protected, an adjustment is made as to their liabilities between them and their assignors. It will be found, when read with sec. 29 (2), to cover (1) the case of an assignment made in the period between the 1st January, 1939, and the commencement of the Act, necessarily in respect of a loan taken before the Act; and (2) it will also cover the case of an assignment made after the Act in respect of a loan taken before the Act. The above follows from a consideration of the terms of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 29. That sub-section deals with assignments, whenever made, of debts and so forth, in respect of loans advanced before the Act. The use of the words " shall... be deemed always to have applied" indicates, I think, that full retrospective effect is to be given to the Act even though an assignment has been made prior to the Act. The effect then of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 29 read with cl. (d) of sec. 36 (1) is that the word " lender " used therein is to be taken to include assignee in respect of loans taken before the commencement of the Act, and whether the assignment is made before or after that commencement. This would make the assignee liable for the whole payment, but the proviso to cl. (d) lays down that in. cases covered by it a pro-rata repayment is to be made by the assignor and the assignee. 6. If we now consider the effect of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 36 in relation to the above two cases to which the proviso to sec. 36 (1) (d) is found to apply, then so far as the second case is concerned there is no difficulty; it is a case of assignment after the Act, and if made bona fide and without the notice required by sec. 28 (1) the assignee will be protected and will not be required to make the payment laid down in cl. (d) read with the proviso. This has been pointed out by Nasim Ali, J., in the judgment cited above. In the first case, however, of assignment between the 1st January, 1939, and the commencement of the Act, then if sub-sec. 28 (1) the assignee will be protected and will not be required to make the payment laid down in cl. (d) read with the proviso. This has been pointed out by Nasim Ali, J., in the judgment cited above. In the first case, however, of assignment between the 1st January, 1939, and the commencement of the Act, then if sub-sec. (5) is applicable, that is to say, if we take what may be called its literal interpretion, then cl. (d) and the proviso, being a provision in the section, cannot be allowed to affect the rights of the assignee, and the adjustment provided for between the assignee and his assignor is purposeless. In the case cited, his Lordship the Chief Justice has stated that it would appear that sub-sec. (5) does not protect the assignee in such a case, but, with respect, if it gives protection in the second case indicated above of assignments after the Act, whatever interpretation is given to it, then it surely must also protect him in the first case if the literal interpretation is adopted. It would appear then that the adjustment laid down in the proviso to this cl. (d) was enacted in order to deal with the case (1) of an assignment, made between the 1st January, 1939, and the commencement of the Act, and on the assumption that such assignments were not protected. This in itself would not be conclusive if the terms of sub-sec. (5) were unambiguous, but the fact that such provision was made lends further support to the other reasons already referred to for holding that sub-sec. (5) does not give protection to an assignee who took his assignment prior to the Act. 7. I think therefore that the learned Munsif Was wrong in rejecting the application on the ground given by him, and the Rule is accordingly made absolute; the order of rejection is set aside, and the learned Munsif will proceed to deal with the application on the merits, and in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.