JUDGMENT Hamilton, J. - This case has been filed as a second appeal. Counsel admits that a second appeal does not lie and it must be considered as an application in revision. The application is by one Bala Prasad, a judgment-debtor, who applied to have a sale set aside under Order 21, Rule 89 because he had deposited in Court what was due to the decree-holder. An objection was made which was apparently based on parts of a tender form and the objection was that the deposit had not been made by the judgment-debtor. The Court below came to the conclusion that the tender had not been made by the judgment-debtor although the application under Order 21, Rule 89 had been made by the judgment-debtor and, therefore, the sale could not be set aside. A preliminary objection was raised that no revision was maintainable because there was no failure on the part of the Courts to exercise jurisdiction and there was not either material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. Learned Counsel for the Applicant first urged that the dismissal of the application to set aside the sale was failure to exercise jurisdiction and he relied largely on Mst. Dhanwanti Kuer v. Sheo Shankar Lall (1919) 4 Pat. L.J. 340: 51 IC 873. Although this decision found favour with one of the members of a Full Bench whose decision is reported in Yad Ram Vs. Sunder Singh, AIR 1923 All 392 it did not do so with the other two members of the Ben:h and this Full Bench decision, in my opinion, lays down that if a Court considers on the merits an application under Order 21, Rule 89 there is no failure to exercise jurisdiction even if the prayer is rejected. The exercise of jurisdiction would then be a consideration of the application made and the decision on it whether the relief claimed, if I can use that expression, was granted or not. In-the present case relying on that Full Bench decision I am satisfied that there was no failure to exercise jurisdiction and the next point that would have to be decided is whether there was material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction and in order to decide whether there was or was not, one must look into the facts of the case, that is to say into what took place in the Courts below. The Applicant alleged that he had made an application and he had deposited the money through one Bhika Ram. To prove this he produced two papers which according to him formed part of the tender form drawn up and used when the payment was made. A tender in these circumstances is in three parts. One part which is called the original is to be filed with the record, the middle part which is called the duplicate is kept by the payer and the third part which is called the triplicate is to be retained in the treasury. In this case the money was paid in two amounts, one being the amount due under the decree and the other damages. Both the papers filed are the parts which are known as the triplicate, that is to say, the part that was to be retained in the treasury. It bears no signature of the presiding Judge nor does it bear any signature of the treasury Officer though it should have both. As this triplicate part is exactly like the duplicate part except that in the triplicate at the bottom there is a note that it is to be retained in the treasury while in the duplicate there is a note that it should be given to the payer, I thought that some error might have been made in the treasury so that they kept the duplicate and handed over the triplicate instead of the reverse. Both the duplicate and triplicate should, however, have the signature of the presiding officer and the signature of the treasury officer while these two triplicates (even if we consider them as duplicate) which are on the record, have no signature of the treasury officer or of the presiding Judge. An examination of the record does not show that the 'original' part is there. We find on two triplicates before the Court the signature of the Munsarim which apparently, if one examines Chapter XI, rule 12 and following of the General Rules (Civil), is made at the very beginning when the tender is produced whether with or without the application. An examination of the record does not show that the 'original' part is there. We find on two triplicates before the Court the signature of the Munsarim which apparently, if one examines Chapter XI, rule 12 and following of the General Rules (Civil), is made at the very beginning when the tender is produced whether with or without the application. The Munsarim on receiving such a paper should call upon the official in charge of the record of the case for a report, have corrections made in the tender form if necessary, and sign it and it is after this stage that the presiding officer of the Court should affix his signature below that part of the duplicate or triplicate which is an order to the treasury officer to receive the amount which the bearer of the tender form is to pay in. This documentary evidence only show, therefore, that the tender form got as far as the Munsarim, but it does show that it got as far as the Judge much less as far as the treasury officer. The presiding officer of the Court might through some error in the office not have affixed his signature but it seems to me highly improbable, if not impossible, that the treasury officer should not have affixed his signature and that the pen on who received the duplicate should not like to see whether it did bear the signature of the treasury officer, for that is the part which the payer receives as a proof of his payment. The Courts below have considered the case from the point of view whether the tender not being signed by the judgment-debtor is a valid tender so that it may be held under Order 21, Rule 89 that there was a deposit by the judgment-debtor. I do not say that I agree with all that has been said by the Courts below. For instance the trial Court started by saying that the tender was presented by one Bhika Ram on behalf of Bala Prasad, the judgment-debtor, and there is no evidence whatsoever on the record to show that Bhika Ram did present the tender. I do not say that I agree with all that has been said by the Courts below. For instance the trial Court started by saying that the tender was presented by one Bhika Ram on behalf of Bala Prasad, the judgment-debtor, and there is no evidence whatsoever on the record to show that Bhika Ram did present the tender. In so far as there is evidence it is against this, for there is an affidavit by Bala Prasad which is to the effect that the tender was presented by him on the 26th and the payment in the treasury was made by Bhika Ram on the 27th. The evidence, such as it is, may not deal with every step of the transaction but in so far as there is evidence it is to the effect that Bala Prasad actually presented that tender form on the 26th, though the money was paid into treasury on the 27th by Bhika Ram. As regards the point made by the Courts below that there was no signature on the tender either of the judgment-debtor or of his counsel or of his attorney, this is immaterial and indeed irrelevant for there is no place where the judgment-debtor as such should sign and no reason why he should affix his signature. The one person whose signature has to appear there apart, of course, from the signature of the presiding officer and of the treasury officer, is that of the man who has actually paid the money. From the past tense used it would appear that this signature should be made at the time the money is paid or after it but even if made before, this signature could only be that of the judgment-debtor if the judgment-debtor himself pays the money into the treasury. There are reasons which might make me inclined to disagree with the Courts below as to whether the money was deposited by the judgment-debtor or not had the facts been as the Courts below took them to be, that is to say, had the application been made by the judgment-debtor through his counsel and the money actually been deposited into the treasury by a person who was not a counsel or the mukhtar-i-am of the judgment-debtor. Had these facts been proved I would have had to consider whether the Courts below in reaching the conclusion which they had arrived at had committed material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction so as to justify my interference. Although the case was argued at length on these points it has just come out now that this application must fail on a very simple and almost preliminary point. The Applicant had to prove that he had deposited money either personally or, as he alleges, through Bhika Ram. If we take depositing the money in the sense of actually paying at the treasury, the question of which of the two methods had been adopted would only arise when it was proved that money was deposited in the treasury by some one The documentary evidence produced by the Applicant to prove this consists in those two triplicate parts of the tender and as I have said the absence of the signature of the presiding officer and of the treasury officer take us no further than the very early stage when the tender form is produced before the Munsarim. For all that we know when the Munsarim had attached his signature this form might have been taken over by the judgment-debtor or Bhika Ram who is alleged to have paid the money and nothing more done. This application for revision must, therefore, fail because this Court may interfere in revision but need not always do so and when it is met at the very beginning with the fact that there is no proof of any payment having been made it cannot disagree with the decision of the Court below that there was no valid deposit. Whatever view one might hold as to the deposit being valid or not had it in fact been made by some one, when it is not proved there was any deposit there can obviously have been no valid deposit. This application is, therefore, dismissed with costs.