JUDGMENT Bennett and Ghulam Hasan, JJ. - This Second Civil Appeal raises the question whether sons who separated from their father many years before his death but who received no property from him on separation are entitled on his death to share in his property equally with other sons who did not separate from him. The property in the case was the self acquired property of the father and some of it was acquired before separation and some afterwards. The two sons who separated from their father are dead and are represented by their sons, the latter being the plaintiffs in the suit. The appeal is against the judgment and decree dated the 8th December, 1937, passed by the learned District Judge of Rae Bareli upholding the decree dated the 20th April, 1937, passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge of Partabgarh. Both the Courts below answered the question stated in the affirmative. 2. The suit was brought by Jamuna Prasad and Jagannath grandsons of a man named Thakur Din, against two sons of Thakur Din, named Ambika and Debi Sahai. The plaintiffs asked for a declaration that they were entitled to a half share in their grand-fathers' property and for joint possession thereof. 3. The defence was that Thakur Din, who died in 1924 had two wives, that the defendants were sons of the second wife, and that Kamta and Jagat, the fathers of the two plaintiffs respectively, separated from Thakur Din in or about the year 1904, when he gave them a moiety share of his property. 4. The issues framed in the case were:-- 1. Did the plaintiffs separate and the defendants remain joint with Thakur Din as alleged by the defendants? If so, what is its effect? 2. Have the plaintiffs got not share in the properties in suit as alleged by the defendants? 3. Was the defendant No. 2 born after the separation of the plaintiffs' fathers from Thakur Din? If so, what is its effect? 4. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 5. The trial Court held that the plaintiffs' fathers separated from Thakur Din, while the defendants remained joint with him, but there was no actual partition of the property. The second issue was found against the defendants. If so, what is its effect? 4. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 5. The trial Court held that the plaintiffs' fathers separated from Thakur Din, while the defendants remained joint with him, but there was no actual partition of the property. The second issue was found against the defendants. On the third issue it was found that defendant No. 2, that is Debi Sahai, was born after the separation of the plaintiffs' fathers from Thakur Din, but that this fact was immaterial. The plaintiffs were found on the fourth issue to be entitled to the relief prayed. 6. These findings were upheld by the learned District Judge in first appeal. We may mention that he has incorrectly shown the pedigree put forward by the defendants. As hat pedigree is given in his judgment, it would appear that defendant No. 1, Ambika, was the son of the first wife: actually it was the defendants' case that he was the son of the second wife Counsel are agreed that this was the defendants' case and that it represents the facts. 7. The lower appellate Court particularly considered the question whether there had been a partition of the property and agreed with the trial Court that there had been no partition. The District Judge referred to the fact that some exhibits showed that the plaintiffs were recorded as holding certain shares, but held that this specification of shares did not prove that there had been a partition. 8. Both the Courts below relied on the case of Badri Nath v. Hardeo (1930) 5 Luck. 649 where a Bench of this Court held that sons who separated from their father in the latter's lifetime have an equal right with the sons who remain joint with their father to inherit the property of their father on his death. 9. This second appeal has been brought by Ambika alone: Debi Sahai being made a respondent with the plaintiffs. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued first of all that the Courts below were not justified in finding that there had not been an actual partition as no issue was framed on this point. 9. This second appeal has been brought by Ambika alone: Debi Sahai being made a respondent with the plaintiffs. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued first of all that the Courts below were not justified in finding that there had not been an actual partition as no issue was framed on this point. It is said that an issue should have been framed on the point in view of the specific plea taken by the defendants that the fathers of the plaintiffs had received on separation a moiety share in Thakur Din's property. 11. It is true that there is no express issue on this point, but it is admitted that no objection to the issues was taken by the defendants. It seems to us that the question, which is undoubtedly one of importance, is implicit in the first two issues. It is clear that the trial Court considered that these issues covered the question whether there had been an actual partition, because a clear finding on this question was recorded. We see no reason to think, therefore, that it was not fully understood by the parties and their Counsel that this question was implicit in these issues. As there is a concurrent finding by both the lower Courts on this question of fact we cannot reconsider it in second appeal. 12. Learned Counsel for the appellant also contended, however, that the ruling of this Court referred to in Badri Nath v. Hardeo (1930) 5 Luck. 649 should not be followed and he referred us to other authorities on the point, in particular to Viravan Chettiar, represented by Ramasami Chettiar Vs. Srinivasachariar, AIR 1921 Mad 168 and Chintapenta Narasimha Rao Vs. Chintapenta Narasimham and Others, (1932) ILR (Mad) 577 13. In Viravan Chettiar, represented by Ramasami Chettiar Vs. Srinivasachariar, AIR 1921 Mad 168 the precise question now before us was not under consideration, the principal question considered in that case being whether an undivided Hindu son acquires the self-acquired properties of his deceased father by inheritance or by survivorship. Reference was made to the previous Madras case of Nana Tawker Vs. Srinivasachariar, AIR 1921 Mad 168 the precise question now before us was not under consideration, the principal question considered in that case being whether an undivided Hindu son acquires the self-acquired properties of his deceased father by inheritance or by survivorship. Reference was made to the previous Madras case of Nana Tawker Vs. Ramachandra Tawker and Another, (1909) ILR (Mad) 377 in which it had been held that the self-acquired property of a father is taken by his undivided sons to the exclusion of a divided son, and that the succession is by survivorship rather than by inheritance, and the latter view was dissented from. 14. In Chintapenta Narasimha Rao Vs. Chintapenta Narasimham and Others, (1932) ILR (Mad) 577 the Madras High Court followed the decision in Nana Tawker Vs. Ramachandra Tawker and Another, (1909) ILR (Mad) 377 on the first point, but dissented from it on the second point, agreeing with the decision in Viravan Chettiar, represented by Ramasami Chettiar Vs. Srinivasachariar, AIR 1921 Mad 168 . They pointed out that the case of Viravan Chettiar, represented by Ramasami Chettiar Vs. Srinivasachariar, AIR 1921 Mad 168 had dissented from Nana Tawker Vs. Ramachandra Tawker and Another, (1909) ILR (Mad) 377 on one point, but not on the point of exclusion from inheritance to the father of divided by undivided sons. They said that the Oudh case of Badri Nath v. Hardeo (1930) 5 Luck. 649 was the only decision to the contrary. It purported to follow Kunwar Bahadur and Others Vs. Madho Prasad and Others, AIR 1919 All 223(1) but the Madras High Court did not understand how this latter case could be treated as an authority on the question at issue. They said:-- There was, no doubt, a dispute as to the right to succeed to a father's self-acquired property, but it was conceded that the sons, who were living apart from the father, had not partitioned the joint property and severed themselves from him and the sons who continued to live with him. That being so, it is obvious that the family remained joint and that the question now at issue could not have arisen. That being so, it is obvious that the family remained joint and that the question now at issue could not have arisen. All that the Judges then said was this:-- If however we accept the finding of the Court below that the property was the self-acquired property of Asharfi upon his death all his sons including the defendants would be entitled and the mere fact that some of those sons continued to live in his house joint in food with him would not deprive the sons who were living away from him of their share in his estate. In other words, the mere fact of separate living did not operate as a division and naturally the latter were equally entitled with the rest to succeed. It is a legitimate inference from the emphasis laid on the fact that there had been no partition that had there been a partition, the decision would have been in the opposite sense. 15. It is clear therefore that on the facts as found in the present case, namely that the fathers of the plaintiffs had merely separated in living from Thakur Din and that there had been no partition of the property, the Madras case of Chintapenta Narasimha Rao Vs. Chintapenta Narasimham and Others, (1932) ILR (Mad) 577 is against the appellant and does not support him, these sons of Thakur Din not being "divided" in the technical sense from their father. 16. On this view it is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on the question whether "divided" sons are entitled to inherit equally with undivided sons. It has no doubt been considered that in Badri Nath v. Hardeo (1930) 5 Luck. 649 the question was answered by this Court in the affirmative, but in that case too the finding was that while the plaintiff had separated from his father in mess and residence, there had been no partition of any property between him and his father, his father not being possessed of any property at that time. No distinction was, however, drawn in Badri Nath v. Hardeo (1930) 5 Luck. No distinction was, however, drawn in Badri Nath v. Hardeo (1930) 5 Luck. 649 between the case of a son who had merely separated in mess and living from his father without a partition and the case of a son who had separated and taken a share in the property, and it would seem from the judgment that no distinction was intended, although the learned Judges laid stress on the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Kunwar Bahadur and Others Vs. Madho Prasad and Others, AIR 1919 All 223(1) that sons who are living separate from their father will be entitled to share along with the Sons who may be living jointly with him. 17. However that may be, it is not necessary for us in the present case to go further than the decision in Kunwar Bahadur and Others Vs. Madho Prasad and Others, AIR 1919 All 223(1) with which, as we have mentioned, the Madras High Court in Chintapenta Narasimha Rao Vs. Chintapenta Narasimham and Others, (1932) ILR (Mad) 577 expressed concurrence. We see no reason to dissent from the view taken in these cases. We are of opinion, therefore, that the Courts below were justified in the view that the plaintiffs were entitled to inherit on the death of their grandfather Thakur Din equally with the sons of Thakur Din, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs' fathers had separated from Thakur Din thirty two years before. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.