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1941 DIGILAW 58 (ALL)

Raghunath Prasad Singh v. Nanghuttu

1941-07-19

body1941
JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan, J. - This revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by the plaintiff-applicant arises out of the dismissal of his suit by the Civil Judge of Partabgarh, exercising the powers of a Small Cause Court. It appears from the allegations in the plaint that the defendant executed a promissory note on the 18th October, 1935, for Rs. 8(sic) in favour of the plaintiff. The claim was for Rs. 110, principal and interest. The defendant in his written statement alleged that three years ago he had put his thumb impression on a blank paper at the instance of the plaintiff under the impression that he was doing so as a witness to a loan advanced to one Bhagwati Prasad. The plaintiff produced he promissory note as well as the receipt, both of which bore his thumb-impressions. Three issues were framed by the Court, namely-- (1) Whether the promissory note in suit is genuine and for consideration? (2) Was the defendant's thumb impression on it obtained by fraud? and (3) Is the suit vexatious and frivolous? 2. The plaintiff produced the scribe of the promissory note and the receipt and an attesting witness. 3. The defendant did not enter into the witness box and produced no evidence in defence. 4. The learned Judge of the Small Cause Court rejected the evidence of the plaintiff's two witnesses on the ground that they lived in different villages at a distance of about a mile or so. In the operative portion of the judgment he observed:-- I consider the evidence insufficient to prove that the defendant executed the promissory note in suit for consideration and dismiss it with costs. 5. It is urged on behalf of the plaintiff-applicant that the first issue framed by the lower Court wrongly places the burden of proof upon the applicant and that the thumb impressions on the promissory note and the receipt having been admitted the lower Court should have drawn a presumption u/s 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in favour of the passing of the consideration. It is suggested that the issue should have been framed in the negative form, namely Is the promissory note in suit not for consideration? 6. I am of opinion that this contention must prevail. It is suggested that the issue should have been framed in the negative form, namely Is the promissory note in suit not for consideration? 6. I am of opinion that this contention must prevail. The thumb impression on the promissory note is admitted by the defendant and it was the clear duty of the defendant in the circumstances to substantiate the plea about fraud and to prove that no consideration passed under the promissory note. Learned Counsel for the applicant relies upon Jagmohan Misir Vs. Mendhai Dube and Another, AIR 1932 All 164 support of his contention. In my opinion the view taken in that decision is applicable with greater force to the present case inasmuch as in that case the defendant after admitting his signature on the promissory note produced himself and a witness to prove that there had been no consideration. The present case, as I have said, stands on firmer ground as there was complete absence of evidence on the side of the defendant and under the circumstances the learned Judge of the Court below was bound u/s 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 to draw a presumption that the promissory note was made or drawn for consideration until the contrary was proved. There being no evidence on the side of the defendant to displace the presumption arising u/s 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the learned Judge misdirected himself in casting the burden of proof upon the plaintiff applicant to prove the passing of the consideration and dismissing his evidence on flimsy grounds. It is difficult to follow what the learned Judge meant by observing that the evidence in his opinion was insufficient to prove the passing of consideration. He did not mention in the judgment that he disbelieved the evidence produced by the plaintiff but thought for some reason or other that it was insufficient. If the evidence being unrebutted was true and reliable, it is difficult to see how it was insufficient to prove a simple fact of the passing of consideration assuming that the plaintiff was required to prove the passing of such consideration. If the evidence being unrebutted was true and reliable, it is difficult to see how it was insufficient to prove a simple fact of the passing of consideration assuming that the plaintiff was required to prove the passing of such consideration. Be that as it may, I am clear in my mind that the plaintiff was under no obligation to produce any evidence in regard to the passing of the consideration in view of the fact that the defendant had admitted his thumb-impression on the promissory note and had set up fraud, which he failed to substantiate by any evidence whatsoever. 7. I am satisfied that the order of the lower Court dismissing the plaintiffs suit is erroneous and has led to substantial injustice. I allow the revision application, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower Court and decree the suit with costs in the lower Court. As the defendant is not present, there will be no order as to costs in this Court.