JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This is a Rule calling upon the Opposite Parties to show cause why an order of the District Judge rejecting an application for pre-emption should not be set aside. The Judge rejected it on two grounds, firstly, because the transfer was a benami one, and secondly, because the case came within the exception to sec. 26F. The Munsif overruled both these contentions and the extraordinary thing is that the vendor, who has no kind of interest in the application, appealed to the District Court. 2. In support of the Rule the first ground pressed was that the question whether the transfer was benami is entirely irrelevant to a proceeding under sec. 26F. 3. A corresponding point came up for my decision under the old Act in the case of Nibaran Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Hem Nalini Debi 61 C.L.J. 310 (1935). Mr. Jana contended that changes made in the section have altered the position. I am bound to say that I can see nothing in the new section to suggest that it is the business of the Court to enquire into matters of this kind. The section provides for the service of a notice upon the transferee: but there is no indication that the transferor is intended to take any part in the proceed-ings at all. The notice calls upon the transferee to state what sums he has paid as a result of his purchase. It does not call upon him to state whether his purchase was a genuine one or not. The Court is required to allow the application provided the necessary deposits are made. In my judgment, it is entirely outside the scope of the section to enquire into and investigate questions of this kind. The objection filed has given the Petitioner due notice that he will be met with the plea of benami, but if in spite of that notice he is willing to spend his money and go on with it, I can see nothing in the law which prevents him from doing so. 4. The second ground depends upon the interpretation of sec. 26F (1) (a). The contention of the Opposite Parties is that the application must fail, because there is no right of pre-emption in the present case. The transfer excepted is one to a co-sharer in the tenancy whose existing interest has accrued otherwise than by purchase. 4. The second ground depends upon the interpretation of sec. 26F (1) (a). The contention of the Opposite Parties is that the application must fail, because there is no right of pre-emption in the present case. The transfer excepted is one to a co-sharer in the tenancy whose existing interest has accrued otherwise than by purchase. The vendees in this case obtained their share in the tenancy by purchase and apparently are excluded by the words used. The learned Judge, as far as I have been able to understand, thought that the word "purchase" meant the actual purchase which had given rise to the claim for pre-emption. His reason for thinking so was that he saw something inconsistent in the provisions of sub-sec. (4). Sub-sec. (4) merely gives the transferee a right to join in the application for pre-emption and no question of its being inconsistent with a provision disallowing preemption altogether could arise. In my opinion, the words ought to be given their plain meaning. 5. Finally, Mr. Jana sought to uphold the order on the ground that the Petitioner is not a co-sharer at all. It appears that the vendor is a priest of the family. It is said that this one particular plot was transferred to him as a gift by some predecessor-in-interest of the tenants and that he has no co-sharers. If that objection were substantiated, then certainly the Petitioner could have no right to pre-emption; but this question raises matters of fact and was never put forward in the Munsif's Court. It is, therefore, quite impossible for me to deal with it under sec. 115 of the Code. It ought to have been raised in the first Court. The Rule is accordingly made absolute. The order of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the Munsif restored with costs in all Courts. I assess the hearing-fee in this Court at one gold mohur.