ORDER Braund, J. - This is an application made by the Voluntary Liquidator of the Public Benefit Insurance Society Ltd., under S. 186(1), Companies Act, in circumstances which I shall describe in a moment. The petition was filed on 5th March exactly six months ago-and I have already had occasion to comment on the dilatory way in which the matter has proceeded. It has however now come before the Court for the fourth or fifth time and fortunately I am at least in a position to dispose of it as against most of the respondents. The petition raises a point which is not altogether uninteresting as it seems to be one which has not been raised before. The company was incorporated in December 1929 with a capital of a lac of rupees divided into a thousand shares of a nominal value of Rs. 100 each. The company was incorporated for the purpose of carrying on an insurance business and it may be taken for granted that it is a "Provident Society" within the meaning of S. 65, Insurance Act (Act 4 of 1938). On 25th October 1939, the company went into voluntary liquidation and on 10th April 1940, Mr. J.C. Chandiok, the present applicant, was appointed liquidator. At that stage, I desire to refer to S. 90, Insurance Act, which provides that where a provident society is wound up whether under the Companies Act, 1913, or under the Insurance Act, a report has to be made within seven days from the passing of the winding up resolution to the Superintendent of Insurance and, except where the winding up is done by an order of the Court, the Superintendent of Insurance then appoints a liquidator. There is no doubt in this case that the company fell within that section and, accordingly, Mr. Chandiok was the nominee of the Superintendent of Insurance under S. 90 of the Act. 2. At that point it is necessary to say that, prior to its going into liquidation, the Directors of the company had made four calls in pursuance of Arts. 12 to 17 of table A, which applied to the company. Rs. 10 had been originally payable on allotment and by a resolution passed in August 1930 a further call of Rs. 10 was made. By another resolution passed in April 1931 a further sum of Rs. 12 to 17 of table A, which applied to the company. Rs. 10 had been originally payable on allotment and by a resolution passed in August 1930 a further call of Rs. 10 was made. By another resolution passed in April 1931 a further sum of Rs. 5 was called up, while by resolutions of June 1931 and July 1938 sums of Rs. 12-8-0 and Rs. 6-4-0 respectively were called. All that happened before the liquidation, with the result that, in addition to the Rs. 10 payable on allotment, a further Rs. 33-12-0 had been called altogether. That left Rs. 56-4-0 to represent the outstanding liability which had not been called at the date of the liquidation. The list of contributories was settled by the liquidator on 5th June 1940 and it may be taken that all the present respondents are on the list of contributories. The liquidator had power to settle the list of contributories himself by virtue of S. 91(2) read with the company winding-up rules of this Court, Rs. 56 to 58. At that stage, the liquidator was minded to call up the whole of the outstanding liability of Rupees 56-4-0 per share. At the same time there were some comparatively small sums due from share-holders which still remained unpaid from the previous four calls which had been made. The liquidator in making his call of the remaining Rs. 56-4-0 per share did not come to the Court, but assumed that he had jurisdiction to make the call without the Court's assistance. Having done so, and having failed to obtain payment from a number of contributories, he launched the present petition. The present petition may therefore be divided into two parts-the first to enforce the call of Rs. 56-4-0 per share made by the liquidator since the liquidation and the other to enforce those comparatively small amounts which at the date of the liquidation were still outstanding and represented previous calls made by the Directors. I propose to deal with the liquidator's call-that is the one made since the date of the liquidation-first, as it represents far the larger sum of money and affects every one of the respondents. I have already described how the liquidator came to be appointed. His powers are to be found in S. 91, Insurance Act. I propose to deal with the liquidator's call-that is the one made since the date of the liquidation-first, as it represents far the larger sum of money and affects every one of the respondents. I have already described how the liquidator came to be appointed. His powers are to be found in S. 91, Insurance Act. By that section: (1) A liquidator appointed to wind up a society shall have power-.....(b) to determine the contribution to be made by the members of the society respectively to the assets of the society...... (2) The liquidator shall, for settling the list of contributories and realising the amount of contributions, have the same powers as an official liquidator appointed by the Court for the winding up of a company under the Companies Act, 1913. 3. Then follows S. 92 which indicates the procedure that the liquidator has to adopt. After dealing with a number of specific matters with none of which we are at present concerned, the section goes on by sub-S. (12) to provide: So far as is not otherwise provided herein or is not otherwise prescribed under this Act, the liquidator shall so far as practicable follow the procedure to be followed by an official liquidator appointed by the Court for the winding up of a company under the Companies Act, 1913. 4. Now, the question which obviously presents itself, is whether the voluntary liquidator, in the peculiar position in which this liquidator stood, had any power to make a call himself without the intervention of the Court. We may concede at once that, had he been just an ordinary voluntary liquidator, Mr. Chandiok could probably have made this call. He was not however in that position. It is true that this provident society was in voluntary liquidation and that Mr. Chandiok became by virtue of his appointment by the Superintendent of Insurance the Voluntary Liquidator. But in that liquidation he was, I think, bound by the special provisions applied by the Insurance Act to liquidators appointed to wind up a society. It is to my mind as plain as it can possibly be that by S. 91(2) of the Act the liquidator has no powers of "realising the amount of contributions," except such powers as an official liquidator has in a winding up order by the Court. It is to my mind as plain as it can possibly be that by S. 91(2) of the Act the liquidator has no powers of "realising the amount of contributions," except such powers as an official liquidator has in a winding up order by the Court. Moreover, by S. 92(12) he is bound, as far as practicable and so far as the Act itself does not otherwise expressly provide, to follow the same procedure as that which is prescribed by the Companies Act for an official liquidator. 5. It has been argued that what this liquidator has done in making the call is not within the description of "realizing the amount of contributions." The contributions there deferred to must mean, I think, what is due from the contributories in their capacity as contributories or, in other words, what is due from them in respect of their shares. It seems to me that the making of a call is an integral part of the process of "realizing" the contributions. The liquidator, when he is appointed, finds that the contributories v, horn he has settled on the list are liable for certain sums in certain contingencies. What does he do as the first step to get those sums? He is, of course, to make a call, in other words, he has to tell the contributories that he needs the money and that they have got to pay. An official liquidator can only do that by having resort to S. 187, Companies Act, which gives the power, not to him, but to the Court to make calls and to order payment of them. It seems to me that the making of the call is a first and inseparable part of the process of the "realization" of the monies due from the contributories and for that reason. I think, it clearly falls within S. 91(2), Insurance Act, and is one of those things that the liquidator of a provident society can only do by exercising the same powers as an official liquidator would exercise under the Companies Act. Moreover, under S. 92(12) not only can he exercise those powers as the official liquidator but he should follow the same procedure which applies to an official liquidator. An official liquidator could have only realized what was due from the contributories by coming to the Court and asking the Court to make a tall. Moreover, under S. 92(12) not only can he exercise those powers as the official liquidator but he should follow the same procedure which applies to an official liquidator. An official liquidator could have only realized what was due from the contributories by coming to the Court and asking the Court to make a tall. Hence, in my opinion, the present Liquidator has no greater power. I do not think it can be argued successfully that the making of a call is merely the determination of the contribution to be made by the members" within the meaning of S. 91(1)(b) of the Act. 6. For these reasons, I have been compelled to come to the conclusion that no call has been validly made by the present liquidator in respect of any of those sums which represent the calls made since the date of the winding up and, accordingly, I am not able to give him any order in respect of those sums. I desire to say that in respect of those sums. I am not dismissing his claim upon the ground that ultimately and after the right procedure has been taken they may not become due, All I say is that, for technical reasons and as matters stand" at present, they are not due because no valid call has been made. I do not wholly blame the Liquidator for having omitted to notice this point as it is not altogether an obvious one. There remain to be dealt with the claims against various respondents in respect of the other sums, that is to say the balances of the calls made prior to the liquidation. In order to simplify the matter, I may say at once that one of respondents (No. 21) has died and that no order is now sought as against him. Five other respondents (Nos. 3, 6, 17, 22 and 23) have not vet been served and I cannot accordingly deal with the petition as against them to-day. That leaves respondents 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25 and 26 against whom the petition can be effective to-day. 7. Respondents 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 have all appeared by Mr. B.N. Misra and have admitted that the sums stated to be due from them are actually due. 7. Respondents 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 have all appeared by Mr. B.N. Misra and have admitted that the sums stated to be due from them are actually due. The last mentioned, however, Anurudh Kumar has by para 20 of his affidavit in reply taken a point that, even though the sum of Rs. 156-4-0 is due from him in respect of the calls made prior to the liquidation, he is entitled to liquidate that sum by setting it off against a sum of Rs. 720 which he claims the company owes him on a loan account. I understand that the liquidator does not admit that that sum is due from the company. Apart, however, from that there is another reason why that claim to a set-off cannot succeed. The present application by the Liquidator is clearly one under S. 186(1), Companies Act. He seeks to recover payment of money due from a contributory exclusive of money due from him by virtue of a call in pursuance of the Act. Obviously, the call made by the Directors was not one made "in pursuance of the Companies Act." By virtue of sub-s. (2) of S. 186, it is wholly discretionary in a Court whether any set-off can be allowed and it is now clear beyond any doubt and as a fixed judicial principle that the Court never allows a person to whom the company is indebted to set off that indebtedness against what is due from him as a contributory in respect of calls. It is otherwise where the two debts are of a purely commercial nature. But where the debt to the company is in respect of calls the set-off is never available to a contributory. That was finally settled, so far as this Court is concerned in the Full Bench case in ('40) 27 AIR 1940 All. 544 : 192 I.C. 357 : ILR (1941) All. 153 : 1940 A.L.J. 826, Shri Nath Sah v. Official Liquidator. I ought perhaps to have mentioned that all these seven respondents challenge the validity of the liquidation upon other grounds; but on this application 1 am not prepared to go into that question. That can be raised in proper proceedings at their instance, if they are minded to. 153 : 1940 A.L.J. 826, Shri Nath Sah v. Official Liquidator. I ought perhaps to have mentioned that all these seven respondents challenge the validity of the liquidation upon other grounds; but on this application 1 am not prepared to go into that question. That can be raised in proper proceedings at their instance, if they are minded to. For these reasons, so far as the respondents 1, 2, 4, 5 and 10 are concerned, I shall make orders for payment by them to the liquidator on or before 15th October of this year of the respective sums of Rs. 156-4-0, Rs. 233-2-9, Rs. 174-14-6, Rs. 156-4-0 and Rs. 156-4-0. As regards respondents 7 and 8, nothing is due from them in respect of calls made prior to the liquidation and I shall, accordingly, dismiss the petition as against them. 8. I now come to respondents 11, 14, 15, 18 and 9. They all raise the same point, which I understand to be this. They say that, if the matter be inquired into, it will be found that the Liquidator has no occasion to levy these sums from them because, to put it shortly, he has over-estimated the liabilities of the company. To my mind, that is a wholly irrelevant argument as far as this application is concerned. A call, once it has been validly made by the Directors prior to liquidation and once the date for its payment has passed, becomes a debt due from the share-holder to the company and is indistinguishable from any other debt. When subsequently the company goes into liquidation, that debt, or those debts, become assets of the company which have to be realised by the liquidator. They have lost their character as calls and have become debts and, as such, are realisable by the liquidator just as any other debt or asset is realised. This Court is not in the least concerned with what he wants it for and, in my view, this Court has not even any jurisdiction to ask the liquidator what he wants it for and still less to withhold the payment of it from him. When, of course, a liquidator comes to the Court under S. 187 and asks for leave to make a call after the liquidation has intervened, the position is quite different. When, of course, a liquidator comes to the Court under S. 187 and asks for leave to make a call after the liquidation has intervened, the position is quite different. There the Court has jurisdiction and indeed it is the very object of its being brought to the Court at all to consider whether the liquidator really needs the money he says he needs it or not. In that case the liquidator is making a call himself and that is a step in the liquidation over which the Court has control. I think, therefore, that I have no jurisdiction at all to question the propriety of a liquidator seeking to get in a debt due to the company prior to the liquidation under S 186. For these reasons I shall make orders as against respondents 11, 14, 15, 18 and 9 respectively for payment of the sums of Rs. 31-4-0, Rs. 337-8-0, Rs. 18-12-0, Rs. 212-8-0 and Rs. 118-12-0. 9. As regards respondent 16, nothing is due from him beyond such sum, if any, as may be payable in respect of any call ultimately validly made by the liquidation. The petition will have to be dismissed as against him As regards respondent 26, there has been a slight clerical error and only Rs. 6-4-0 is in reality due from him There will be an order for payment against him for that small sum All these sums will be made payable by 15th October 1941. As regards respondents 12, 13, 19, 20, 24 and 25, they have not appeared, nor have they filed any affidavits and I shall, accordingly make an order for payment as against them by 15th October 1941 of the following sums respectively, Rupees 31-4-0, Rs. 6-4-0, Rs. 12-8-0, Rs. 793-12-0, Rs. 32-8-0 and Rs. 33-12-0. As regards the remaining respondents (No. 3, 6, 17, 22 and 23), the petition will stand over to be heard as soon as they can be served As regards respondent 21, there will be no order. As regards those respondents against whom the petition has wholly failed, namely Nos. 7, 8 and 16, I think that they are entitled to their costs and the petition will be dismissed with costs As regards all the other respondents, except those against whom it has been stood over, I shall make no order as to costs.