JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - The Petitioner is a judgment-debtor, and has obtained this Rule against an order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Midnapore, refusing to take action on a notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors' Act. The notice was issued by a Debt Settlement Board on the judgment-debtor filing an application for review before it under sec. 44 of the Act. He had made a similar application before, but it had failed, and an appeal to the Appellate Officer against the order rejecting the application was also dismissed. The learned Subordinate Judge held that no second application for review was maintainable, that at any rate this would be an abuse of the provisions of the Act, and that consequently the notice in question must be deemed to be without jurisdiction and not binding on the Civil Court at all. In our opinion, the matter may be disposed of on a broader, but more certain ground, and it is this, namely, that whether successive applications for review lie to a Debt Settlement Board or not under the Act, the Act does not authorise the issue of a notice for stay of proceedings in a Civil Court on the presentation of an application for review. The authority to stay, rather to issue a notice which will operate as a stay, is contained in sec. 34, and while the section, as now amended, expressly provides for stay in the case of appeals and applications for revision, it makes no such provision for cases of review. These are all distinct proceedings separately dealt with in the Act, sec. 40 dealing with appeals, sec. 40A with revision and sec. 44 with review, and it cannot be argued that the reference to appeal and revision in sec. 34 impliedly involves a reference to review. The omission of review in sec. 34 may indeed have been deliberate, seeing that while there is a specific time-limit of 30 days for an appeal or an application for revision, no such limitation has been prescribed for an application for review. But whether that is so or not, the fact remains that sec. 34 confers no power on a Debt Settlement Board to issue a notice for stay when an application for review is made to it. But whether that is so or not, the fact remains that sec. 34 confers no power on a Debt Settlement Board to issue a notice for stay when an application for review is made to it. It must follow accordingly that if a Board issues a notice under this section in such a case, it will be acting without jurisdiction, and the Civil Court will be competent to ignore it. 2. An application for review under sec. 44 pre-supposes that the proceeding in which the order sought to be reviewed was passed has terminated, and we are unable to accept the argument that as soon as the application is presented or the Board orders the review case to be registered, it automatically revives the original proceeding, so that it could be said that there is now before the Board an application under sec. 8 or a statement under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 which would bring into operation the provisions of sec. 34 under the first part of that section. An application for review no more restores the original proceeding, unless and until the previous decision is set aside or modified, than the filing of an appeal or an application for revision, and that is why it has been considered necessary to make special provision for stay in cases of appeal and revision by an amendment of the section. No such provision, however, as already pointed out, was made in respect of applications for review. 3. The learned Advocate for the Petitioner drew our attention to the fact that in the case of an application for review, the CPC contemplates first, an order granting the same, and then, a re-hearing of the case, but that sec. 44 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors' Act does not provide for such different stages, and from this he sought to argue that there was no question under this Act of the original case being restored and then re-heard. It is true that sec. 44 does not lay down the procedure to be followed in the case of review: that is apparently left to be determined by rules, which, however, have not yet been framed. It is true that sec. 44 does not lay down the procedure to be followed in the case of review: that is apparently left to be determined by rules, which, however, have not yet been framed. All the same, one fails to see how it follows that merely because a re-hearing is not expressly provided for as a result of admitting the application for review, the case will be deemed to be restored ipso facto on the presentation (or registration) of the application, as if this by itself is enough to set the whole matter free, and virtually obliterate the previous decision, though it has not yet been set aside. The argument has no merit in it, and must be rejected. 4. We hold accordingly that the notice under sec. 34 in this case was wholly without jurisdiction, and could not operate as a stay of the proceedings which were pending in the Court below. 5. The result is that the Rule is discharged with costs. We assess the hearing-fee at one gold mohur. Roxburgh, J. I agree.