JUDGMENT Bajpai and Dar, JJ. - This is an appeal against a judgment and decree dated February 21, 1936, by which the Plaintiff's claim for possession of immovable property with mesne profits was dismissed. Azanindari share in 'taluka' Akhtha Mawaiya and the appended villages of Mawaiya, Bsnipura and Nawa-pura in the Benares District and a pakka bait house situated in Piari Kalan, Benares city, which is the property in suit, at one time formed part of the estate of a Hindu named Sheo Pragash Lal, who died in the year 1869. On the death of Sheo Pragash Lal his estate, which included the above property, devolved by right of inheritance upon his widow, Jasoda Kuer, who died on November 4, 1929. On June 26, 1881 she executed a simple mortgage of the said house in favour of Kamta Nath for Rs. 1,000. The purpose for which the money was borrowed is not recited in the deed. On August 25, 1884, she borrowed another sum of Rs. 2,300 from Gobind Das by mortgaging another house, not in dispute in this case. It is recited in the deed that Rs. 2,330 was raised for the payment of Government revenue and the rest was brought by the lady to her own use. In 1884 Kamta Nath raised an action in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Beneres (No. 76 of 1884) for recovery of money due on the bond of 1881 and on December 18, 1884, Kamta Nath obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 1,464-11. In 1885 Gobind Das raided an action (No. 82 of 1885) in the Court of the Subordinate Judge Benares against Mst. Jasoda Kuer for recoyery of money due on the bond of 1884, and on September 10, 1885 Gobind Das obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 3,163-14-6. 2. On January 7, 1886, Mst. Jasoda Kuer executed a mortgage deed in favour of Gobardhan Das for a sum of Rs. 6,000. It is recited in the bond that the money was raised for payment of the two decrees mentioned obove and for other necessary expanses of the lady. The property mortgaged was the house in the city of Benares which had been previously mortgaged to Kamta Nath and Taluka Akhtha Mawaiya, the property which is now in suit, and one other village Kundhai. The property mortgaged was the house in the city of Benares which had been previously mortgaged to Kamta Nath and Taluka Akhtha Mawaiya, the property which is now in suit, and one other village Kundhai. In 1888 Gobardhan Das raised an action (suit No. 85 of 1886) against Mst. Jasoda Kuer for recovery of money due on the bond of 1886 and on August 2,1888 a decree was passed for Rs. 10, 521/6. In execution of Gobardhan Das's decree taluqa Akhtha Mawaiya was sold on May, 20, 1890, by a Court auction and was purchased by Gobardhan himself for Rs. 8,00). In further execution of Gobardhan Das's decree the house at piari Kalan in the city of Benares was sold by public auction on August 23, 1895, and was purchased by Ishwar Sahai for Rs. 1,600 Gobardhan Das, after his purchase, entered into possession of Taluqa Akhtha Mawaiya, and on his death his two sons and three grandsons succeeded to the property and they are in possession of it at present and have been made Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 in the present action. Ishwar Sahai the purchaser of the house, by a conveyance dated August 12,1915, sold the house to Ganga Prasad for Rs. 1,900 and Ganga Prasad, by virtue of that purchase entered into possession of the house and on his death the house came into possession of Ganga Prasad's son and grandson, who are Defendants Nos. 12 and 13 in the action, and Ishwar Sahai, the purchaser of the house in the year 1896, being dead, his sons are joined in this action as Defendants Nos. 6 to 10. Mst. Jasoda Kuer had a brother Mathura Prasad who died leaving a son Shyam Bahadur Lal and he has been made Defendant No. 11 in the action. 3. The Plaintiffs, Ramanand Lal and Shyama Nand Lal are two brothers, sons of Ramesbwar Dial who died in 1895. The Plaintiffs, alleging that they as reversionary heirs of Sheo Pragash lal being entitled to Sheo Pragash Lal's estate on the death of his widow, Jasoda Kuer, which took place on November 4, 1929, raised an action on January 3, 1934, in the Court of the Civil Judge, Benares for recovery of possession of Taluqa Akhtha Mawaiya and the house in the city of Benares against Defendants Nos. 1 to 13 and for mesne profits which accrued due since the death of the lady, and their case, shortly stated is that Sheo Pragash Lal had died leaving a considerable estate which came into possession of his widow Jasoda Kuer, that Jasoda Kuer, without any legal necessity created the mortgages of 1881, 1884 and 1886 and in enforcement of the said mortgages allowed the property to be sold in execution sales and that the house was purchased ' benami ' by her brother Mathura Prasad in the name of Ishwar Sahai and the village was purchased by Gobardhan Das the decree-holder but the mortgage being without legal necessity the execution sales which followed were not binding upon the Plaintiffs the reversionary heirs and they were entitled to recover possession of the estate with mesne profits from the purchasers. The suit was contested by the purchasers. They denied the Plaintiffs' relation with Sheo Pragash Lal and the Plaintiffs' reversionary title. They pleaded that the mortgages were made for legal necessity and the auction sales which followed the mortgages were binding upon the Plaintiffs as reversionary heirs, and they further pleaded that they had made additions and improvements to the property in their respective possession and they were not liable to be evicted without receiving proper compensation for them. 4. The trial Judge found regarding the mortgage of 1886 in favour of Gobardhan Das of Rs. 6,000- that legal necessity was proved except for a sum of Rs. 1,230, and the learned Judge held that the failure of proof of necessity with regard to the sum of Rs. 1,230 might be disregarded and the mortgage was binding upon the reversioners. The trial Judge further found that the purchasers had made certain additions and improvements to the property subsequent to their purchase and these would have to be compensated for; but on the finding that the mortgages and the auction sales were justified by legal necessity the learned Judge has dismissed the claim, and against that dismissal the Plaintiffs have made this appeal. 5. 5. This is an action by Hindu reversioners for recovery of possession of immoveable property transferred by a Hindu female on the death of the said female, The transfers which require consideration were made in 1881, 1884 and 1886, and the auction sales took place in 1890 and 1896 and the action was raised in 1934, 51 years after the first transaction in dispute and 48 years after the third transaction in dispute. In the mortgage of 1881 there is no recital as to the purpose for which money was borrowed. In the mortgage of 1884 it is recited that the money was borrowed for payment of Government revenue which could not be paid from collections and income of the property, and in the mortgage of 1886 it is recited that the money was being raised in order to pay off the decrees which had been passed on two previous mortgages and for a further sum of money for household expenses. 6. There has been a great deal of discussion at the Bar as to the law which applies to this case. Sir Tej, on behalf of the purchasers has contended that it is sufficient in an old transaction for the transferees of a Hindu widow to show that money was required for a purpose for which Hindu law allows widows to make a transfer of the property and that it is not necessary for the transferees to show that the widow had no other means of meeting, that purpose except by borrowing. Sir Tej has further contended that, whatever may be the burden upon the original alienee of a Hindu widow, the burden is not the same upon the transferee of an alienee who was no party to the original transaction. And in an old transaction the factum of necessity as well as representation of necessity and bona fide enquiry on the part of the transferee may both be presumed, even when recitals of legal necessity in the deed of transfer are absent or silent by reason of obliteration of evidence which may have takan place on account of lapse of time. And that a mortgage made by a widow for legal necessity is binding on the reversioner, even when a portion of the consideration was not proved to be for legal necessity and that the same consideration applies to an auction sale which is based on the mortgage. And that a mortgage made by a widow for legal necessity is binding on the reversioner, even when a portion of the consideration was not proved to be for legal necessity and that the same consideration applies to an auction sale which is based on the mortgage. 7. We think that up to a certain stage the law which is applicable to this case is well settled. Payment of Government revenue and borrowing money for maintenance are egitimate purposes for which a Hindu widow is entitled to alienate the husband's estate, provided the maintenance and the revenue could not be met out of the income of the estate or out of the available funds of the estate; but it is not the law that while keeping the income to herself where income exists and, keeping husband's funds to herself where husband's funds exist, which might enable her to pay off the Government revenue it is open to a Hindu widow to pay Government revenue by borrowing. In Mulla's Hindu law, 9th Edition, at page 181 the law in this matter is stated as follows : Payment of arrears of Government revenue and of decrees for rent accrued due after the death of the deceased owner, provided she had no funds when she mortgaged or sold the property to pay the revenue or the decrees and the mortgage or sale was absolutely necessary in order to discharge the debt, which if not discharged would have resulted in a forcible sale of the property. If there is an actual existing necessity, the circumstances that the necessity was brought about by the mismanagement of the widow does not vitiate the mortgage or sale, unless it is shown that the mortgagee or purchaser himself constributed to the mismanagement. 8. In Mayne's Hindu law and usage, 10th edition at page 787 the law is stated as follows : -- One very common case of necessity is that of a loan of money, or a mortgage or sale of part of the property to pay off arrears of Government revenue provided there is no other available source. 9. This in our opinion, is a correct statement of law and is amply supported by authority. 10. With regard to the burden of proof which rests upon the alienee of a Hindu widow, there also cannot be much dispute. 9. This in our opinion, is a correct statement of law and is amply supported by authority. 10. With regard to the burden of proof which rests upon the alienee of a Hindu widow, there also cannot be much dispute. The alienee, in order to justify a transaction by a Hindu widow has to prove a legal necessity in fact for the transaction, or a representation of legal necessity which the transferee after bona fide enquiry believed and he advanced money on its basis. Here again in Mulla's Hindu Law, 9th edition the law is correctly stated at page 184 as follows: If the sale or mortgage is impeached the burden lies on him to prove (a) either that there was legal necessity in fact ; or (6) that he made proper and bona fide inquiry as to the existence of the necessity and did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity. If he proves that there was a necessity in fact, the alienation will be upheld even, though the necessity was brought about by the mismanagement of the limited heir, unless it be shown that he himself contributed to the mismanagement Even if he fails to prove that there was a necessity in fact, the alienation will be upheld if he proves that he made such inquiry as aforesaid and that the facts represented to him were such as if true, would have justified the transaction. In no case, however, is he bound to see that the money paid by him is applied to meet the necessity. The reason is that he can rarely have the means of controlling the actual application unless he himself enters on the management. The same rule applies to a transferee from an alienee. 11. In our own opinion the alienee from a Hindu widow and a transferee from alienee stand in the same position in the matter of burden of proof and both have to discharge the same burden as against a reversioner though presumptions of facts may arise in either case when by lapse of time evidence has disappeared. 12. When a Hindu widow transfers in moveable property of her husband and part of consideration of the transfer is for necessity and part of it is not, is the transaction binding upon the reversioner ? 13. 12. When a Hindu widow transfers in moveable property of her husband and part of consideration of the transfer is for necessity and part of it is not, is the transaction binding upon the reversioner ? 13. Sir Tej's contention is that if a substantial portion of the consideration is for legal necessity, then the transfer is binding and a presumotion should be made that the remaining portion also was for legal necessity and in support of this contention Sir Tej relies upon the well know pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1927 37 (Privy Council) which has subsequently been applied and affirmed by Their Lordships in Niamat Rai v. Din Dayal (1927) 8 Lah 597 : AIR 1927 P.C. 1212, Gauri Shankar v. Jiawan Singh (1931) 29 A. L J. 967 (P.C ) aid Ram Sandar v. Lachhmi Narain, (1929) 51 ALL. 430 (P.C.): A I R 1929 P C. 143. and on the head note of Sri Krishn Das v. Nathu Ram4 in 25 A. L J. 80 which is as follows : Where it is established that the sale or a mortgage by a Hindu widow or a Hindu father or manager of a joint Hindu family was one justified for legal necessity, the fact that the vendee or the mortgagee is unable to prove that a small portion of the consideration was applied far the purposes of legal necessity, is no ground for setting aside the alienation, nor can the vendee or the mortgagee be held liable to pay to those challenging the alienation that portion of the consideration for which legal necessity is not positively established. 14. A great deal of controversy exists as to whether the rule hid down in Sri Krishn Das v. Nathu Ram (1929) 61 All. 430 (P. C): AIR 1929 P.C. 143 applies to cases of sales or whether it applies to mortgages also and further whetner it applies to a case of partial necessity or whether it applies only to a case of total necessity. In Thakur jai Indra Bahadur Singh v. Lala Khairati Lal (1928) 4 Luck. 107 : AIR 1928 Old. 465, and in Durga Prasad Singh Vs. Lachmi Narain, AIR 1934 All 789 , the rule laid down in Sri Krishn DAS v. Nathu Ram (1929) 61 All. 430 (P. C): AIR 1929 P.C. 143 , was not applied to mortgages. In Thakur jai Indra Bahadur Singh v. Lala Khairati Lal (1928) 4 Luck. 107 : AIR 1928 Old. 465, and in Durga Prasad Singh Vs. Lachmi Narain, AIR 1934 All 789 , the rule laid down in Sri Krishn DAS v. Nathu Ram (1929) 61 All. 430 (P. C): AIR 1929 P.C. 143 , was not applied to mortgages. In Hitendra Narayan Singh and Others Vs. Sukhdeb Prasad Jha and Others, AIR 1929 Patna 360 , the rule was applied to mortgages also ; while in Dwarka Ram v. Bakshi Parnaw Prasad Singh (1935) 14 Pat. 595 : AIR l935 Pat 178, the rule was confined to sales and was not extended to mortgages. In Purna Chandra Bagchi, Nabadwip Municipality Vs. Satish Chandra Modak and Others, AIR 1935 Cal 116 , the question whether the rule applies to sales and mortgages was left undecided, but it was held that the Privy Council decision referred to above was a case in which a representation of necessity was made to transferee which on bona fide inquiry was believed by him and two conditions viz the existence of a bona fide enquiry and the existence of evidence to show that the sale itself was justified by legal necessity must co-exist in order to attract the application of this rule to a particular case. 15. We do not think that the rule enunciated in Krishn Das v. Nathu Ram (1929) 61 All. 430 (P. C): AIR 1929 P.C. 143 , ani in other cases which follow it applies to a case of partial necessity. They were all cases in which either legal necessity was proved in fact for the transfer and for the entire consideration of transfer or there was a representation of the legal necessity for transfer and for the entire consideration and the transferee after bon fide inquiry believed and acted upon it ; and the Privy Council only emphasized that in such cases the transferee was not bound to account for the application of the money. The Privy Council did not hold-- and the point did not arise in those cases--that where a part of the transfer or a part of the consideration of the transfer is not justified by legal necessity or by a representation of necessity which the transferee had believed the unjustified consideration or transfer in such a case would be binding upon the reversioner. 16. 16. In Mulla's Hindu Law, 9th Edition at page 196, the law on this part of the subject is stated as follows : Cases frequently arise in which property Inherited by a widow from her husband is sold by her for legal necessity but the whole of the price is not proved to have been applied to purpose of necessity and the sale is challenged by the reversioners on that ground. In such cases, if the sale itself is justified by legal necessity and the purchaser pays a fair price for the property sold and acts in good faith and after due inquiry as to the necessity for the sale, the mere fact that part of the price is not proved to have been applied for purposes of necessity, would not invalidate the sale, the purchaser not being bound to see to the application of the price If the above conditions are satisfied, the sale must be upheld unconditionally, whether the part not proved to have been applied to purposes of legal necessity is considerable or small. 17. This, in our opinion, is a correct statement of law and Sri Krishn Das v. Nathu Ram 4 and that type of cases only apply when it is proved that there was legal necessity in fact for tire consideration of transfer or there was a representation of necessity for entire consideration which on bona fide inquiry was believed and found correct and in case of sales there was also legal necessity for sale of property and an adequate price was paid for the same, but the transferee is not able to prove that a small portion of sale consideration was applied for purposes of legal necessity. Those cases do not apply when these elements wholly or in part are wanting or, in other words, where the transfer is tor partial necessity either with regard to its consideration or with regard to the property transferred. 18. Those cases do not apply when these elements wholly or in part are wanting or, in other words, where the transfer is tor partial necessity either with regard to its consideration or with regard to the property transferred. 18. It follows from this that if a mortgage is made by a Hindu widow for a consideration part of which is not justified by legal necessity, that portion of the mortgage is not binding upon the reversioner; and if a decree has been passed on such a mortgage, a part of the decree will be binding on the reversioner, and a part will not be binding on the reversioner and if in execution of such a decree property is sold, the sale is liable to be set aside at the instance of the reversioner on payment of the consideration which was binding on the reversioner, as was done in Santi Kumar Pal v. Mukanda Lal Mondal (1934) 62 Cal, 204: A, I. 1935 Cal. 20, and in Deputy Commissioner of Kheri v. Khanjan Singh (1907) 29 All. 331. Cases may, however, arise where the portion of the consideration not binding on the reversioner is negligible or unsubstantial in a mortgage which has resulted in an execution sale and such cases may have to be considered on their own special equities. But as a general rule, if a part of a mortgage made by a widow is not binding on the reversioners, the decree made upon such a mortgage is also not binding upon them and an auction sale made in execution of the decree is also not binding upon the reversioners and they are entitled to recover the property on payment of the consideration which is binding upon the estate. 19. It was contended at the Bar that in the case of an old transaction which is challenged 50 years after it took place if there was a recital in the deed to the effect that the transfer was being made for payment of Government revenue, a presumption should be made in fact that there were no other means of paying revenue and that it could not be paid out of the income and borrowing was necessary. On the other side, it was contended that, if the deed by which transfer is made is silent as to its necessity, no presumption can be made about necessity and presumptions are only permissible in cases where there is a recital in the deed about the necessity. It was further contended that, if there were recitals in the deed to show that money was required for a necessary purpose, presumptions may be made that a representation of necessity was made to the transferee and the latter on bona fide enquiry, found it to be true, but no presumption can be made as to the existence of necessity in fact. In Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishora Achariya Chowdhuri (1917) 44 Cal. 86 (P.C.), Lord Chancellor observed as follows: But in such a case as the present their Lordships do not think that these recitals can be disregarded, nor, on the other hand, can any fixed and inflexible rule be laid down as to the proper weight which they are entitled to receive. If the deeds were challenged at the time of near the date of their execution, so that independent evidence would be available, the recitals would deserve but slight consideration, and certainly should not be accepted as proof of the facts. But, as time goes by, and all the original parties to the transaction and all those who could have given evidence on the relevant points have grown old or passed away, a recital consistent with the probability and circumstances of the case, assumes greater importance, and cannot lightly be set aside, for it should be remembered that the actual proof of the necessity which justified the deed is not essential to establish its validity. Its only necessary that a representation should have been made to the purchaser that such necessity existed and that he should have acted honestly and made proper enquiry to satisfy himself of its truth The recital is clear evidence of the representation, and, if the circumstances are such as to justify a reasonable belief that an enquiry would have confirmed its truth, then when proof of actual enquiry has become impossible, the recital, coupled with such circumstances would be sufficient evidence to support the deed. To hold otherwise would result in deciding that a title becomes weaker as it grows older, so that a transaction perfectly honest and legitimate when it took place would ultimately be incapable of justification merely owing to the passage of time. 20. In Chintamanibhatka Venhata Reddi Pantulu Garu v. Rani Saheba of Wadhwan (1919) 43 Mad. 641 : AIR 1920 P.C. 64 , which was a case in which a transfer by a widow was challenged 82 years after it took place, Lord Shaw approved and adopted the statement of law on he subject by the Madras High Court which was to the following effect: It is not disputed that the onus lay upon the Defendant to prove the necessity for the sale but having regard to the great lapse of time since the transaction took place, that is about 82 years, perhaps the highest on record, it will not be reasonable to expect such full and detailed evidence as to the state of things which gave rise to the sale in question as in the case of alienation made at more or less recent dates In such circumstances, presumptions are permissible to fill in the details which have been obliterated by time. 21. On the other hand, in Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh (1915) 43 Cal. 417 : A I. 1915 P C. 57 the Calcutta High Court has remarked as follows: It is for the Appellant to establish either that there was legal necessity in fact for these large borrowings or that from sufficient enquiries made he honestly believed that there was such necessity It has been argued that the onus upon the Appellant is lightened by reason of the lapse of time. But lapse of time does not affect such a matter except in so far as it might give rise to a presumption of acquiescence or save the Appellant from adverse inferences arising from the scanty proof offered. In the present case there was admittedly no acquiescence. Then it is said that the expenses were incurred in the course of the litigations which took place between Durga Kumari and Durga Prasad. That there were such litigations is a fact, and expenses must have been incurred. But it is not sufficient to establish these two facts. In the present case there was admittedly no acquiescence. Then it is said that the expenses were incurred in the course of the litigations which took place between Durga Kumari and Durga Prasad. That there were such litigations is a fact, and expenses must have been incurred. But it is not sufficient to establish these two facts. It must be shown that the expenses could not have been made from the income of the estate, that they were reasonable and what they were........... 22. And this decision was upheld by the Judicial Committee in Bhojraj v. Sita Ram. 1936 A.W. 37 (P. C) Lord Roche, in delivering the judgment of the Board, observed as follows: It was contended on behalf of the Defendants that owing to the lapse of time, as a matter of law, necessity should be presumed and in support of the ontention the case of Chintamanibhatka Vinkata Reddi v. Rani of Wadhwan,13 was relied upon. The judgment in that case does not in the opinion of their Lordships support the contention of the Respondent. Here, as in the case cited, regard must be had to the amount of evidence likely to be available after the lapse of a long time and presumptions should be all>.ved to till in gaps disclosed in the evidence, but in this case there is evidence justifying the couclusins of the Courts below. Presumptions lot to supplement but to contradict the evidence would be out of place 23. We think that in transfers made by the Hindu widow which are being challenged after a long delay there is no hard and fast rule about presumptions which are to be made either with regard to recitals in the deed of transfer or with regard to the question whether necessity existed in fact or whether a representation of necessity was made and on bona fide enquiry was believed. Each case will have to be considered on its merits and presumptions may be made which are consistent with the evidence, the probabilities and the surrounding circumstances in the case. If the evidence, the probabilities and the circumstances warrant, the Court may find that necessity for the transfer existed in fact or the Court may find that a representation of necessity was made and it was believed and, for that reason, the transferee is protected, though the factum of necessity is not proved. 24. If the evidence, the probabilities and the circumstances warrant, the Court may find that necessity for the transfer existed in fact or the Court may find that a representation of necessity was made and it was believed and, for that reason, the transferee is protected, though the factum of necessity is not proved. 24. A more difficult question then arises, when a deed is silent as to necessity in an old transaction ; can a presumption be made that representation of necessity was made and was believed by the transferee on an enquiry ? In Kuntarasami Muda-liar v. Narayansami A I. 1932 Mad. 762 and in Thimmanna Bhatta and Others Vs. Rama Bhatta and, AIR 1938 Mad 300 it has been held that the rule that presumptions may be made to fill in the gaps is not only confined to a case where the alienee can point to recitals in the deed under which he claims, but the Court can presume on probabiities and evidence, even when the deed is silent, that there was necessity in fact. In our opinion, when the recital in the deed is silent as to the necessity, in a proper case, having regard to probabilities, circumstances and evidence in the case, a presumption may be raised either with regard to the factum of the necessity or with regard to representation of the necessity which the circumstances of the case warrant. 25. It is now necessary to consider the facts of this case. Sheo Pragash Lal died in the year 1869. At the time of his death, according to the evidence he was about 40 years old. His wife, Jasoda Kuer, was about 15 years old. He left no child and he left a real estate, most of it permanently settled, which was assessed to a Government revenue of Rs. 15,735-4-8. A chart was supplied to us at the hearing by Mr. Banerji which was prepared from khewats and other exhibits on the record which shows the quantum of the estate as it was between the years 1880-86, when the disputed transactions took place; and according to this chart, the estate consisted of 45 villages, whole or in part and it was assessed for revenue at the figure which we have given above. Sheo Pragash Lal left no child, and there is no evidence that the widow had any dependants to support. Sheo Pragash Lal left no child, and there is no evidence that the widow had any dependants to support. Mst Jasoda Kuer was the daughter of a man named Mahesh Prasad and she had a brother by the name of Mathura Prasad. After the death of Sheo Pragash Lal the lady's father and brother acted as her attorneys and managers. There is no evidence to show what was the actual income of the estate, but from the fact that the estate was assessed to a revenue of over fifteen thousand rupees and was permanently settled a presumption arises that the income of the estate should be considerable. In the year 1868 there was a famine in the Benares District, where the estate mainly lies, and in 1869, when Sheo Pragash Lal died, he left a debt of Rs. 3,000. For what purpose this money was borrowed does not appear from the record but it is not improbable that the money might have been borrowed for payment of Government revenue on account of famine, and, if so, it shows that there was some demand upon the income of the estate which left the proprietor in this difficulty that when he was faced with the demand of revenue in a famine year, he had no funds to fall back upon and he had to raise money by borrowing. It also appears that at the time of his death a sum of Rs. 6,000 was due to Sheo Pragash Lal from other people for which a succession certificate was taken by his widow, but there is no evidence to show what the nature of these dues was for which succession certificate was taken and whether any money was in fact realised or not with regard to them. 26. Soon after her husband's death on June 15, 1871, Jasoda Kuer raised a sum of Rs. 3,000 by making a mortgage in favour of Thakur Singh. The whole of this money was borrowed for payment of debts left by her husband, Sheo Pragash Lal, six years later, on August 30, 1877, Jasoda Kuer made a usufructuary mortgage of portion of her property in favour of Jalal Uddin for Rs. 2200 and on February 1, 1878, she made a simple mortgage of her property in favour of Thakur Singh for Rs. 1,240. 2200 and on February 1, 1878, she made a simple mortgage of her property in favour of Thakur Singh for Rs. 1,240. As a result of this usufructuary mortgage and simple mortgage, the first mortgage of 1871 which was for payment of her husband's debt was paid off. It will thus appear that, for some reason or other, the husband died leaving a debt of Rs. 3,000 and the widow could not manage to pay that amount by the income of the property or by her husband's funds and she borrowed the money for its payment, and that her inability to discharge this liability continued up to 1878 when she executed the usufructuary mortgage and the simple mortgage mentioned above. In 1878 there was another famine in the District of Benares She again borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,500 in August 1878 from a lady named Rani Maknandi Kuer by mortgaging her property. In this mortgage deed it was recited that the money was borrowed for payment of Government revenue. 27. This is the previous history of the family before the transactions in dispute took place. On June 22, 1881, Jasoda Kuer borrowed Rs 1,000 from Kamta Nath by mortgaging the house and as we have said before, it is not recited in the deed for what necessity this money was borrowed; but there is evidence to show that proceedings for realisation of revenue were pending against her at that time and those proceedings terminated on July 19, 1881, when she paid a sum of Rs 1,003-8-0 as arrears of revenue. On June 20, 1882 Jasoda Kuer executed a simple mortgage in favour of Bhola bingh for Rs. 10,000 out of which a sum of Rs. 1,100 was for payment of the instalment of Government revenue of May 1882. The rest of the consideration was for payment of some of the earlier debts mentioned above and some other debts. On August 25, 1881, Jasoda Kuer made a simple mortgage in favour of Gobind Das for Rs. 2500. Out of this consideration a sum of Rs 2,300 was for payment of Government revenue of May 1884. And lastly on January 7, 1886, Jasoda Kuer made a mortgage in favour of Gobardhan Das for a sum of Rs. On August 25, 1881, Jasoda Kuer made a simple mortgage in favour of Gobind Das for Rs. 2500. Out of this consideration a sum of Rs 2,300 was for payment of Government revenue of May 1884. And lastly on January 7, 1886, Jasoda Kuer made a mortgage in favour of Gobardhan Das for a sum of Rs. 6,000 the consideration of which was as follows:-- Rs, a.p. (1) For payment of Gobind Das' decree 3,194 5 0 (2) For payment of Kamta Nath's decree 1,536 8 0 (3) Set off agamst the prior debt of Gobardhan Das 300 0 0 (4) Taken for stamp and registration costs 40 0 0 (5) Taken for household expenditure 929 3 0 Total Rs. 6,000 0 0 28. As the auction sales which are challenged in this case took place in execution of a decree which was passed on the mortgage of 1886, in order to make the auction sales binding it is necessary for the transferees to establish that the mortgage of 1886 was binding upon the reversioners; and as out of the consideration of the mortgage of 1886 a portion was for the satisfaction of the two mortgages of 1881 and 1884 in favour of Kamta Nath and Gobind Das respectively on which decrees had been obtained, it becomes necessary for the transferees to establish necessity for these two mortgages of 1881 and 1884. 29. Mr. Banerji's contention is that in the mortgage of 1881 there is no recital of any necessity and therefore it cannot be presumed that the mortgage was for the payment of Government revenue and from the mere fact that near about that time Rs. 1,000 odd was paid for Government revenue or that proceedings.,with regard to realisation of Government revenue were pending against Jasoda Kuer an inference cannot be drawn that money was borrowed in fact for payment of Government revenue or on a representation made to Kamta Nath that money was required for the payment of Government revenue. Mr. Banerji contends that in 1878 three years earlier, when money was borrowed for payment of Government revenue that necessity was recited in the bond of Thakur Singh. Mr. Banerji contends that in 1878 three years earlier, when money was borrowed for payment of Government revenue that necessity was recited in the bond of Thakur Singh. Again, a year later, in 1882 when money was borrowed for payment of Government revenue- in the bond of Bhola Singh that necessity was recited and again, in 1884, when money was borrowed from Gobind Das for payment of Government revenue, that necessity was recited. The fact that the necessity for payment of Government revenue was not recited in the bond of Kamta Nath and that the bond was silent as to all necessity shows that the money was not required for that purpose and that the transaction with Kamta Nath was without reference to a legal necessity and on the footing of a personal borrowing by the widow on her own personal credit and the creditor looked to payment from Jasoda Kuer and not from reversioners. The creditor was advancing a small sum of Rs. 1,000 on a short term credit and he expected to realise it from the usufruct of the estate in the hands of Jasoda Kuer and he did not care to bind the estate. Mr. Banerji further contends that the lady had an estate which was assessed to revenue of about Rs 1,500 and it must be presumed that her income from the permanently settled estate might well be taken to be about Rs. 32,000 a year. She had no children and no dependants to support. There is no evidence as to what she did with the income, and the transferees have failed to prove that there was any necessity for her to borrow Rs. 2,300 for payment of Government revenue from Gobind Das or to borrow a sum of Rs. 929-3 for household expenditure from Gobardhan Das and a further sum of Rs. 300 of which no particulars are given in the deed. Mr. Banerji further contends that the trial Judge has disbelieved the evidence led by the defence to prove legal necessity for Rs. 929 and Rs. 300, in other words for Rs. 1,229 out of the total consideration of Rs. 6,000 in the bond of Gobardhan Das, and has held that the legal necessity to the extent of Rs. Mr. Banerji further contends that the trial Judge has disbelieved the evidence led by the defence to prove legal necessity for Rs. 929 and Rs. 300, in other words for Rs. 1,229 out of the total consideration of Rs. 6,000 in the bond of Gobardhan Das, and has held that the legal necessity to the extent of Rs. 1 229 out of the consideration of Rs, 6,000 in the bond of Gobardhan Das has not been proved but the learned Judge has wrongly applied the rule laid down in Sri Krishn Das v. Nathu Ram 4 to the mortgage of Gobardhan Das on the findings which he has arrived at. If the consideration of the mortgage of Gobardhan Das for Rs. 6,000. was justified by legal necessity to the extent of Rs. 4,771 and was not justified to the extent of Rs. 1,229 then Mr. Banerji contends, to the extent to which the mortgage was not justified it is not binding upon the reversioners and consequently the decree which has been passed on the basis of that mortgage and the sale which took place in execution of the decree are also not binding upon the reversioners and they are entitled to get possession of the property on payment of that portion of the consideration which is binding upon them. 30. These are serious contentions and we have given them our anxious consideration. The transactions which are being challenged took place about 50 years ago. The scribes, the attesting witnesses and the parties who took part in the transactions are all dead. The reversioners to the estate lived at Benares close by, and they never challenged these transactions soon after they took place or at a time when they were fresh and when evidence justifying them could be available. This is not a case in which it is proved that the Hindu widow was extravagant or wasteful or improvedent or was surrounded by unscrupulous persons. It is not shown to us that the transferees in any way acted unfairly or unscrupulously or did not pay full consideration. There is no evidence that the property was not sold for full price. It is not shown to us that the transferees in any way acted unfairly or unscrupulously or did not pay full consideration. There is no evidence that the property was not sold for full price. Very different considerations would have arisen if all or any of these things had been established or if there had been any reason to suspect the bona fides of the transferees or to suspect that the widow was over reached or was a tool in the hands of unscrupulous persons. It appears that the lady was being assisted by her father and brother, and nothing has been proved to show that the father and the brother were out to serve their own interests and were not serving the interest of the lady. In the transactions of Gobardhan Das a leading lawyer of Benares, who is now dead, took part in attesting the deed. This lawyer belonged to the same community as the lady and there is every reason to think that he would know all the affairs of the lady and would not vouch for recitals which were incorrect or false or would take part in a transaction which was not justified. 31. It is true that there is no direct evidence to show as to what happened to the income which the lady had from the estate, but it is clear that the husband of the lady himself left a debt of Rs. 3000 and that the year before he died there was a famine. It is also a fact that in 1878 there was another famine and the lady borrowed the money from Rani Makhandi Kuer to pay Government revenue. The after-effects of a famine continue for sometime and difficulties continue in making collections from tenants. In 1884 money was borrowed from Gobind Das. It was recited in the bond that on account of the arrears due by the tenants and other expenses it is not possible to pay the revenue without taking a loan, and this would mean a great loss to me, the executant. 32. In the bond of 1881 in favour of Katnta Nath it is true that there is no recital, but it is a fact that money- was due for Government revenue at that time and the sum of Rs. 1,003 was actually paid in Governimnt revenue soon after the sum of Rs. 32. In the bond of 1881 in favour of Katnta Nath it is true that there is no recital, but it is a fact that money- was due for Government revenue at that time and the sum of Rs. 1,003 was actually paid in Governimnt revenue soon after the sum of Rs. 1,000 was borrowed from Kamta Nath. It is also a fact that in 1882 a sum of Rs. 1,100 was borrowed from Bhola Singh for payment of revenue for the instalment of May 1882. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to find as a fact that legal necessity existed, or in other words that the lady was not in a position to pay Government revenue or to maintain herself without borrowing money. It is sufficient if it can be found I that a representation was made to the transferee that money was required for payment of Government revenue and for her maintenance which the transferee, after reasonable enquiry, in good faith believed and he advanced money on that basis. We think that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, a presumption might well be raised that, when Rs. 1,000 was borrowed from Kamta Nath, a representation was made that the money was required for payment of revenue and that there was no other way for its payment except by borrowing and Kamta Nath believed in good faith all this and after reasonable enquiry that necessity existed he advanced money on that basis. We may also presume that, when representation was made to Gobind Das that Rs. 2,330 was required for payment of revenue, which could not be paid in any other way except by borrowing, Gobind Das, after due enquiry believed in that representation and advanced the money; and we may further presume that a representation was made to Gobardhan Das that money was due to Kamta Nath and to Gobind Das on their decrees, which could not be paid in any other way except by borrowing, and the lady required a further sum of Rs. 900 odd and Rs. 300 for maintenance and other necessary expenses and Gobardhan, after due enquiry and in good faith, acted on the representation and found it justified. 33. 900 odd and Rs. 300 for maintenance and other necessary expenses and Gobardhan, after due enquiry and in good faith, acted on the representation and found it justified. 33. The case is not free from difficulty and in all transactions of Hindu widows which are challenged by reversioners after a great lapse of time and in which presumptions are raised to fill in the gaps of evidence, there is some risk of speculation; but in the absence of evidence of waste and extravagance on the part of the widow and unfairness on the part of the transferees and inadequacy of the price of sale consideration and, having regard to the fact that the rsversioners have allowed transactions to stand so long and the transferees have made improvements upon property transferred in good faith, we have come to the conclusion that the transfers need not be disturbed. 34. The result is that the appeal is dismissed, but as the Defendants falsely denied the Plaintiffs' pedigree and reversionary title and the decree of the trial Court is being affirmed upon other grounds than those adopted by the trial Court, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.