JUDGMENT Braund, J. - This is an appeal from an order of the Additional Civil Judge of Jaunpur, remanding a case to the Additional Munsif of the same place. 2. The facts are short. The Plaintiffs brought the suit for the purpose of obtaining a declaration that they were the proprietors of a certain grove numbered 139. The Defendants are the zamindars. The facts are scarcely in dispute. It is admitted that the Defendants are the zamindars. It has been found by the Munsif and is not in issue before me that the Plaintiffs, or their predecessors, have been in actual possession of the grove without paying any rent and without giving any acknowledgment since, at the latest, the year 1899 which is the date of Ex. 3. The only real issue has been whether the Plaintiffs' possession has been adverse or not and whether it is open to the Plaintiffs in the circumstances to set up a title by adverse possession. 3. There were certain other defences taken before the Munsif, namely a defence as to jurisdiction, another as to joinder of parties and a third as to whether the proceedings were 'res judicata' in consequence of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. All these three issues were decided by the Munsif in favour of the Plaintiffs. There is one further fact which I must at this point relate. In 1934 the Plaintiffs' names, which up to that time had stood in the revenue records as tenants, were expunged and in 1937 they made an application in the Revenue Court to have their names restored to the record as "grove-holders". It must be conceded that in their pleadings before the Revenue Court they alleged themselves to be grove-holders. That claim was resisted by the present Defendants and was eventually determined by the Revenue Court in the sense that the Plaintiffs were not grove-holders of this grove. 4. Reverting now to what transpired before the Munsif, he, having found in favour of the Plaintiffs on the three issues which I have already mentioned, went on to determine that the Plaintiffs had established actual possession. But, on considering the question of whether their possession had been adverse, he came to the conclusion that it had not. He appears to have had two main reasons for this. But, on considering the question of whether their possession had been adverse, he came to the conclusion that it had not. He appears to have had two main reasons for this. The first was that in every year in which the names of the Plaintiffs, or their predecessor in title, could be traced in the revenue records, there was also an entry of the Defendants' title as zamindars. From this he drew the inference that there could have been no intentional assertion on the part of the Plaintiffs of any title intended to oust the title of the zamindars. If I may comment on that, I doubt whether that really is the effect of the revenue record in that form. What one has to look at is not so much the form of the record as the actual fact of continued possession over a number of years without any payment of rent and without any acknowledgment. Notwithstanding that the record was in that form, it appears to me to be possible to say that the mention of the zamindars in the revenue record is as much in favour of the Plaintiffs as against them, because it may well tend to show that the Plaintiffs' possession was an open challenge to the zamindars title. 5. The other main ground on which the Munsif reached the conclusion that the Plaintiffs had not established their adverse possession was because of their claim in the revenue proceedings in 1937 to be only grove-holders. The Munsif argued from this that they could not now be heard to set up a title as proprietors by adverse possession. He decided this, not on the ground of res judicata, but on the ground, presumably, that, having claimed to be grove-holders in 1937, they could not now establish that they had been in possession for 12 years, not as grove-holders, but as proprietors That as I understand it, was the ground of his decision. In the result, he dismissed the suit. 6. It then went before the Additional Civil Judge of Jaunpur. The learned Judge accepted the fact of possession and indeed, there is no dispute about that. But he disagreed with the Munsif upon the question whether it was adverse or not, The learned Judge says: The Plaintiffs have no been proved to be tenants of this land or holding any other permissive relation in it. The learned Judge accepted the fact of possession and indeed, there is no dispute about that. But he disagreed with the Munsif upon the question whether it was adverse or not, The learned Judge says: The Plaintiffs have no been proved to be tenants of this land or holding any other permissive relation in it. They were quite stranger to that land and as such their possession over it would be deemed in the eye of law to be that of a rank trespasser. 7. He then considered the question of the effect of 1937 claim to be grove-holders and came to the conclusion that it did not prejudice the Plaintiffs' present claim to be proprietors by adverse possession. The learned Judge, therefore, disagreed with the Munsif and remanded the case to him to hear the other issues. But, in doing so, he gave a direction to the Munsif that he need not reopen those preliminary points as to jurisdiction, nonjoinder of parties and res judicata which he had already decided. The result is that the case was sent back to the Munsif to be tried upon the footing of the Civil Judge's decision that the Plaintiffs had established their title by adverse possession and upon the footing of the decision of the other three issues already come to by the Munsif. 8. The point which has been taken before me is the same one as was considered in both the Courts below, namely, whether by claiming to have been grove-holders in 1937 in the revenue proceedings, the Plaintiffs have either precluded themselves from establishing as a fact possession in any larger capacity or have estopped themselves from setting up a claim to be entitled by adverse possession to any thing more than a mere interest as grove-holders. It has to be observed that there are really two ways of putting it, first that their claim as grove-holders in 1937 prevents them from proving as a fact that their possession was adverse at all and secondly--which is quite a different case--that, by having claimed to be grove-holders in 1937, they are now estopped from raising any larger claim. 9. Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, sets out what the position is at the end of the period prescribed for limitation. 9. Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, sets out what the position is at the end of the period prescribed for limitation. It says: At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property his right to such property shall be extinguished. 10. Section 28 does not in terms say what is to happen to the extinguished right. It does not say where it is to go to. But it has always been held that 12 years' adverse possession of land by a wrong doer, not only bars the remedy of the real owner and extinguishes his title, but confers a title on the person in possession. That goes to the length that the title of the real owner who had been dispossessed cannot even revive if, at a later date he, re-acquires possession We arrive, therefore, at the point at which Section 28 not only deprives the owner of his right in the property but transfer it to the person who his successfully set up his adverse possession under the statute. 11. There is, however, a further limitation to this. It has to be considered to what extent the right is transferred; in other words what is the quality and extent of the right acquired by the person who has establised his adverse possession The answer to that question appears to have determined by a long line of authorities in India in sense that it depends upon the claim which as accompanied the adverse possession. It depends upon the intention of the person whose possession has ousted the true owner. In short, it (seems) to me to be little less than a species of prescription One has to look and see with what intention the person setting up the statute has been in possession--whether with the intention of wholly ousting the real owner or with the intent on of ousting him to some limited extent only. 12. I have been referred to a number of cases. In the case Lajwanti v. Safa Chand (1924) 22 A.L.J. 304 (P.C.) : AIR 1924 (P.C.) 121 the Judicial Committee considered the position of a Hindu widow who was wrongly left in possession during her life time as against the rest of the family. 12. I have been referred to a number of cases. In the case Lajwanti v. Safa Chand (1924) 22 A.L.J. 304 (P.C.) : AIR 1924 (P.C.) 121 the Judicial Committee considered the position of a Hindu widow who was wrongly left in possession during her life time as against the rest of the family. Lord Dunedin, having first decided that the possession of the two widows in the particular circumstances of the case was wrongful in the sense that they had no legal title, went on to consider the effect of that in these words It was then argued that the widows could only possess for themselves; that the last widow Devi would then acquire a personal title; and that the Respondents and not the Plaintiff were the heirs of Devi. This is quite to misunderstand the nature of the widow's possession. The Hindu widow as often pointed out, is not a life renter but has a widow's estate that is to say, a widow estate in her deceased husband's estate. If possessing as widow she possesses adversely to any one as to certain parcels she does not acquire the parcels as stri dhan but she makes them good to her husband's estate.... 13. In effect that appears to me to say that, in the case of a Hindu widow who remains in possession of property without a title, the only intention, or capacity, to prescribe for an interest by adverse possession which can be attributed to her is one to prescribe for a Hindu widow's interest and for nothing more. But u has always to be remembered that, in dealing with the case of a Hindu widow, one is dealing with a special and exceptional case. There is only one capacity in which a Hindu widow could possibly in the circumstances have had any interest in the property and that was in her capacity as a Hindu widow. It is unlike the case of a stranger who is found in possession of property, because in that case the whole range of the various interests which can exist in property are open to him. It is otherwise in the case of some special class of persons like a Hindu widow who only purports to take possession, in the first place, in that limited capacity. It is otherwise in the case of some special class of persons like a Hindu widow who only purports to take possession, in the first place, in that limited capacity. I venture to think that, broadly speaking, there is a great deal of difference between a case in which a stranger prescribes under the statute and one in which a person, having only particular rights, claims to have been in possession adversely to the ture owner. 14. The next case to which I have been referred is Budesah v. Hanmanta (1896) 21 Bom 509. In that case in the Bombay High Court it was established that Section 28 of the Limitation Act not only destroys the title of the real owner but creates a title by negation in the occupant which he can actively assert. It also establishes that, if there has, in fact, been prescription merely for a limited interest, then it is only to the extent of that limited interest that the statute creates a title by negation in the occupant. It takes the matter, I think, in principle no further. 15. I lastly come to a decision by the learned present Chief Justice of this Court in 1929 in the case of Mohammad Kamil and Others Vs. Muhammad Salim and Others, AIR 1929 All 875 , In that case certain mortgagees under a usufructuary mortgage applied in pursuance of their mortgage for mutation of names. By mistake they were entered as mortgagees not only in respect of the mortgaged land but in respect of a piece of land which was not mortgaged at all. Their names remained so entered for over 12 years and to put the matter shortly, at the end of 12 years they claimed to be entitled by adverse possession, not merely to a mortgage interest in the piece of land which was not included in the mortgage, but to a full prorietary interest. It was held by the learned Judge that they had only prescribed for a mortgage interest and therefore, Section 28 of the Limitation Act could not possibly operate to give them more than they had prescribed for. If I may say so, that was obvious, because there never could have been the slightest doubt from the moment that they went into possession that their only excuse for being there must have been that they were mortgagees. If I may say so, that was obvious, because there never could have been the slightest doubt from the moment that they went into possession that their only excuse for being there must have been that they were mortgagees. It was obvious on the facts that they never pretended and never could have pretended, to be any thing else but mortgagees from the very beginning. That, again, in a case of a person going into possession, in the first place, in a special capacity, as in the case with a Hindu widow. When there does exist such a special capacity the possession must necessarily be attributed to that special capacity, unless there is the strongest evidence to the contrary. I think that is the right principle to apply. 16. Now I come back to the present case. Here the Plaintiffs were first found in possession as strangers as early as 1899. From that date until 1934, a period of 35 years, they remained in uninterrupted and unexplained possession. There is not a trace of any indication of the capacity in which they were in such possession. It has to be remembered that, unlike the case of a mortgagee or of a Hindu widow the Plaintiffs were strangers to the Defendants and in this case, I do not think that one can attribute to them any such special capacity as I have tried to describe above. It seems to me to be a simple case of A being found in adverse possession against B. When a person is in adverse possession to another without I any explanation it seems to me that, prima facie, that possession must be presumed to be possession with an intention to claim the full rights of a proprietor. 17. Then came the interlude in 1937. It is quite true that the Plaintiffs then claimed to be grove-holders only and in that claim they failed. Now what I am asked to do is to say that, because on that occasion in 1937 the Plaintiffs put forward a claim to be entitled to the property as ancestral grove property, it completely negatives the possibility that at any time since 1899 they could have intended to hold as proprietors. My view is, although it is not altogether any easy question, that that goes altogether too far. My view is, although it is not altogether any easy question, that that goes altogether too far. Had there been any evidence at all which could support the view that the Plaintiffs had ever been in possession otherwise than as persons purporting to enjoy the rights of full owners, then what they did in 1937 would, of course, have been strong evidence in support. But there is no such evidence. On the other hand there are a number of reasons why the Plaintiffs might have put forward a claim in 1937 which was not correct. It might have been a mistaken claim. It might have been a dishonest claim. They may have overstated their rights. It has to be remembered that in 1937 they were not claiming by adverse possession at all but were claiming an actual title to the property as ancestral property. On the dismissal of the claim, it seems to be that the question still remained to be ascertained what the true facts were. And I do not myself see how the Plaintiffs can have prejudiced a search, for the true facts by that they did in 1937, The effect of their claim may Lave been that they themselves believed they were grove-holders. But even if it went as far as that, I have great difficulty in seeing why it should now prevent them from roving that, in fact, they were in possession adversely in the fullest sense. 18. At the beginning of this judgment, I endeavoured to draw a distinction between the case by adverse possession and the case by estoppel. I have been considering it so far purely as a question of adverse possession. But a suggestion has been made throughout that the Plaintiffs are also precluded by estoppel from raising the claim which they are now putting forward. I have great difficulty in seeing how this can succeed. When they claimed in 1937, to be grove-holders, that challenge was immediately accepted by the Defendants. Indeed, it was successfully challenged. Nothing in the nature of fraud on the part of the Plaintiffs has been alleged and still less proved. Nor has it been alleged or proved that the Defendants were induced to alter their positions adversely by virtue of the Plaintiffs assertion that they were grove-holders. On the contrary they successfully challenged and resisted it. Indeed, it was successfully challenged. Nothing in the nature of fraud on the part of the Plaintiffs has been alleged and still less proved. Nor has it been alleged or proved that the Defendants were induced to alter their positions adversely by virtue of the Plaintiffs assertion that they were grove-holders. On the contrary they successfully challenged and resisted it. As far as I can see, no question of estoppel arises. Had they acquiesced in it, the position might now be very different. 19. For all these reasons, in my view, the learned Civil Judge was right in dismissing the appeal and I also feel obliged to dismiss this appeal with costs. 20. I have only to add that I have not, in any way, considered or been asked to consider the three issues which have already been decided by the Munsif and if the decisions on those issues are challenged, they will remain open in the appeal which no doubt will eventually be filed against the Munsif's ultimate decision.