JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - The same questions arise in both these Rules, which are directed against two orders in two suits whereby the Plaintiffs were allowed to sue as paupers. The Plaintiffs who are Opposite parties to the Rules were discharged employees of the Bengal Nagpur Railway, and brought these suits for damages for wrongful dismissal and for recovery of their Provident Fund monies. It appears that after they filed their pauper applications, the Defendant Company brought into Court the amounts which according to them were due to the Plaintiffs on account of their Provident Fund, and the Plaintiffs accepted the amounts, which they purported to do without prejudice. The applications came to be heard in due course a little over a month later, and the Defendant Company then contended that the Plaintiffs having come by this money could no longer be treated as paupers within the meaning of the Explanation to r. 1 of Or. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not disputed that the Provident Fund money which the Plaintiffs received would have been more than sufficient to pay the court-fees which would have been payable on the plaints. The Defendants admitted receipt of the money, but sought to prove that there was little or nothing of it left in their hands, as they had applied the amount to pay off certain alleged debts which they said they had incurred since their discharge from their employment. In support of their case they wanted to put in a number of vouchers showing payment of these debts, but the learned Subordinate Judge refused to accept the documents on the ground that they were filed too late. As to this, we may say at once that the objection was not justified: the documents were in fact produced by the Plaintiffs on the very first day of hearing after the Provident Fund money had been paid. 2. Be that as it may, the learned Judge disposed of the matter on the ground that under the law he could not take into account any facts which had come into existence since the date of the applications. Relying on the authority of a decision of this Court Provash Chandra Lahiri v. Municipal Commissioners of Howrah ILR 57 Cal. 2. Be that as it may, the learned Judge disposed of the matter on the ground that under the law he could not take into account any facts which had come into existence since the date of the applications. Relying on the authority of a decision of this Court Provash Chandra Lahiri v. Municipal Commissioners of Howrah ILR 57 Cal. 980 (1929) and of a Bombay case cited therein, he held that the relevant date with reference to which the question of pauperism was to be decided was the date on which the application for leave to sue as a pauper was made. In that view he refused to take any notice of the funds which came into the hands of the Plaintiffs during the pendency of the applications. From one point of view, it may be said that the Court attached more importance to form than to substance, for, it is clear that even if the payment of the Provident Fund money could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding the original application, this could still found an application under r. 9 of Or. 33, C.P. Code, to dispauper the Plaintiff after leave to sue as a pauper had been granted. If the Court was satisfied that there were sufficient materials on which the Plaintiff could be dispaupered, there is no reason, therefore, why it could not make such an order in anticipation by straightaway refusing the leave asked for. At the same time, it might be urged on the other side that in that case there should have been at least a formal application under r. 9, asking that in the event of the Court being disposed to grant the leave, the Plaintiff should be dispaupered in view of the subsequent acquisition of property, and that such application was necessary, if for no other reason than to give notice to the Plaintiff of the case he would be called upon to meet at this stage. The present case itself illustrates the prejudice which might otherwise result to the Plaintiff. 3. Dr. Pal on behalf of the Petitioner contended that on a correct interpretation of the relevant provisions in Or. The present case itself illustrates the prejudice which might otherwise result to the Plaintiff. 3. Dr. Pal on behalf of the Petitioner contended that on a correct interpretation of the relevant provisions in Or. 33 it should be held that before the Court could make an order allowing an application for leave to sue as a pauper, it had to find pauperism as at the date the application was heard or the order made, and that it was not enough to find that the applicant was a pauper at the time he had applied. The authority of the case in Provash Chandra Lahiri v. Municipal Commissioners of Howrah (1) is against this view. Dr. Pal cited certain rulings of other High Courts in which a different view appears to have been taken, but we find it difficult to hold that the matter is so plain that if the Court followed the Calcutta decision, it could be said to have acted so clearly without jurisdiction that this Court should be bound to interfere in revision. After all, in a matter like this where a Plaintiff is allowed leave to sue as a pauper, the question is more one between the Plaintiff and the Crown than between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and in our opinion, the High Court should not interfere except in a very clear case. This is certainly not a case of that description. 4. As already pointed out, the fact remains that after the payment of the provident money to the Plaintiffs, the Defendant Company filed no application under r. 9 that the Plaintiffs should be dispaupered in case an order was made declaring them to be paupers. This might at any rate have obviated much of the difficulty that has arisen in the case. 5. There is again no proper finding on which an order could be made dispaupering the Plaintiffs. Dr. Pal urged that there was such a finding in so far as the Court had refused to accept the Plaintiffs' story as to the disbursement of the Provident Fund money for satisfying their debts, but as we have seen, they were not allowed to prove the documents on which they relied in support of their case. The finding such as it is cannot, therefore, be regarded as at all adequate. 6. The finding such as it is cannot, therefore, be regarded as at all adequate. 6. Taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, we do not think, therefore, we ought to interfere. It will be still open to the Defendant Company, it so advised, to make a proper application under r. 9. The Rules are accordingly discharged. There will be no order as to costs.