Judgement Appeal (No. 50 of 1939), by special leave, from a judgment and decree of the Additional Judicial Commissioner in Baluchistan (November 6 and 19, 1936, respectively). In 1880 one Mir Dur Mohammad Khan, the predecessor in title of the present respondents, obtained from the then Khan of Kalat a grant (sanad) of a large tract of waste land situated in the Nasirabad Tahsil of his State. The land was declared to have been "given" to the grantee for Rs. 40,000, and the grant was made in contemplation of the excavation by the grantee of an extension of the Desert Canal. The grantee duly paid the price, and he and his heirs were in possession of the land when, on February 17, 1903, the then Khan executed an agreement, called a "Treaty," whereby he made over and ceded in perpetuity to the British Government the entire management of the Nasirabad Niabat absolutely, and with all the rights and privileges, state or personal, as well as full and exclusive revenue, civil and criminal jurisdiction and all other powers of administration, including all rights to levy dues and tolls. The British Government took early steps to arrange for the revenue administration, and a record of rights was prepared by the responsible executive officer, Mr. W. W. Smart, of the territory in question, and entirely waste lands were entered therein as "Government unoccupied lands." Those lands in fact comprised lands covered by the sanad of 1880, and the respondents, thirteen in number, thereupon instituted on September 14-15, 1936, in the Court of the District Judge, Sibi, the proceedings out of which this appeal arose, claiming a declaration of their title, and possession, an injunction restraining the defendant (appellant), the Secretary of State for India in Council, from encroaching on their land, and correction of the record of rights. The appellant pleaded (inter alia) that, by the treaty of 1903, Nasirabad was ceded to the British Government by the Khan of Kalat, a Sovereign State ; that the acquisition of territory was an act of state ; that any pre-existing rights which the respondents might have derived from the Khan were irrelevant, and the British Government was not bound to recognize them ; and that the municipal courts had no jurisdiction to try or determine the matter. The terms of the Treaty of 1903 are set out fully in the judgment of the Judicial Committee. On June 22, 1936, the Judicial Commissioner in Baluchistan transferred the case from the file of the District Judge, Sibi, to his own file, and directed that it should be disposed of by the Additional Judicial Commissioner. The Additional Judicial Commissioner (Mr. Rangi Lal) held (inter alia) that the treaty was nothing more than a lease pure and simple, and could not by any means be said to be an act of state on the part of the British Government; that if the position of the British Government was that of a lessee, its rejection of the respondents claims could not be an act of state. He was of opinion that the case was of a simple nature, and that the respondents were suing as vendees to enforce their rights under a sale, against the representative of their vendor (the Khan). He held that under the sanad the respondents had acquired indefeasible rights in the land in suit, and could enforce them in the Kalat courts, and, after the Treaty of 1903, in the British courts. In the result, he decreed the suit, with costs. The Secretary of State for India in Council appealed. 1941. Mar. 18, 19. J. M. Tucker K.C. and J. M. Pringle for the appellant. The case raises a question of some importance as to the rights of the British Indian Government under the Treaty of 1903. The land in suit is still in a Native State, outside British India, and the sovereignty of that State is in the Khan of Kalat, but, by virtue of the treaty, full jurisdiction is exercised over the territory in question by the British Government. The appellants contention is that the grant to Mir Pur Mohammad Khan in 1880 by the then Khan was a mere lease, and not a transfer of complete ownership. The Judicial Commissioner appears to have held that the ownership in the land passed to the predecessors in title of the present respondents. Assuming, however, that the grant did convey the full ownership, the treaty, when entered into, gave to the British Government the same rights over this State as it would have had had it been acquired by conquest Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. Assuming, however, that the grant did convey the full ownership, the treaty, when entered into, gave to the British Government the same rights over this State as it would have had had it been acquired by conquest Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. After the treaty the British Government took full control of the territory, and then settled it. The question for this Board is whether the act of the British Government in deciding to take no notice of any titles which existed before the date of the treaty, except in so far as it chose to act upon them, was not just as if it was an ordinary act of state on conquest. The British Government was under no obligation to recognize any private rights in land in that territory which had been created before the treaty, and it was thereafter at liberty to create or recognize such new private rights in those lands as it might think fit; its decision in each of those respects is not a matter which can be questioned in any municipal court. The first question for decision is as to the effect of the treaty—whether it is a treaty, or a mere agreement between two Governments which would not interfere with existing titles granted by the ceding Government before the treaty. There was by the treaty a passing, in substance, of every sovereign right—it was saying, as nearly as possible, "complete " cession of sovereignty." Assuming that it had been a complete cession of sovereignty, then the British Government could not have been bound by any municipal court as to their treatment of then existing rights. A new title began with the treaty. What was ceded was every right and power that the Khan had as a sovereign, and acts done under the treaty are in the same position as ordinary acts of state done under a treaty of complete cession. The position in this case is not very different from what it was in Dattatraya Krishna Rao Kane v. Secretary of State for India (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 318, 323-24.). [Reference was also made to Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba (( 1859) 7 Moo. The position in this case is not very different from what it was in Dattatraya Krishna Rao Kane v. Secretary of State for India (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 318, 323-24.). [Reference was also made to Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba (( 1859) 7 Moo. I. A. 476, 530-31.) and Cook v. Sprigg ([ 1899] A. C. 572, 574.).] The present is the first case of its kind, and although here there is not a parting with actual sovereignty, there is a parting with everything but the show of sovereignty, and the legal result would be the same as in a case of cession by conquest. By the terms of the treaty, as well as by the terms of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, the British Government was free to elect to recognize or not to recognize such pre-treaty rights in the suit lands as the respondentsmight have acquired under the sanad of 1880, or otherwise. Gibson K.C., Sir Hari Singh Gour, and S. P. Khambatta for the respondents. For the purpose of the argument for the appellant it was assumed that there is no question about the title of the respondents to the suit lands. The law on the subject of cession rights is explained in Sobhuza II. v. Miller ([ 1926] A. C. 518.) [the whole judgment in that case was read]. It was also submitted for the appellant that what was done was done as an act of state. All the authorities are clear that that is a matter of intention, and, accordingly, the respondents are entitled to ask whether it was the intention that what was done by Mr. Smart, the executive officer, when he entered the suit lands in the record of rights as "Government "unoccupied lands," and so deprived the respondents of their title, was an act of state. The answer must be that it was not so intended. The quality of that act on that date was no different from its quality now. The facts and circumstances of the matter at the time show that it was not the intention of the Government to confiscate at all. The appropriate Revenue Official said that the matter was one to be decided in the courts, and that alone is destructive of the argument that what was done was an act of state. The facts and circumstances of the matter at the time show that it was not the intention of the Government to confiscate at all. The appropriate Revenue Official said that the matter was one to be decided in the courts, and that alone is destructive of the argument that what was done was an act of state. The next question is whether there was warrant in the agreement of 1903 for depriving the respondents of their ownership of the lands. The agreement must be considered in the light of the circumstances at the time. There is not one clause in it which gives one square inch of territory to the British Government. There is no warrant whatsoever in this agreement for depriving the Khans subjects of their goods and chattels, and no warrant at all for depriving them of their lands. It was said in Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria ([ 1921] 2 A.C. 399.) that "a mere change in sovereignty is not to be "presumed as meant to disturb rights of private owners; "and the general terms of a cession are prima facie to be "construed accordingly " (Ibid. 407.). That is very strong indeed. The present case is a fortiori; here there is not a change of sovereignty ; the title to the land remains in the Khan, and the respondents are the Khans subjects. [Reference was also made to Diceys Conflict of Laws, 5th ed,, p. 212, re act of state.] This agreement must be subjected to a strict con struction. The Ruler of the State was, and remains, a Sovereign Prince, and everything is left except what was taken away. This is a matter of revenue, and it was to enable the revenue to be got in that the management was handed over to the British Crown. Further, in West Rand Central Gold Mining Company v. Regent ([ 1905] 2 K. B. 391.) it was said "It must not be "forgotten that the obligations of conquering states with "regard to private property of private individuals, particularly "land as to which the title had already been perfected before "the conquest or annexation, are altogether different from the "obligations which arise in respect of personal rights by "contract " (Ibid 411.). . . The full intendment of the law is against forfeiture Colquhoun v. Society of Contributors to Widows Fund of Faculty of Procurators in Glasgow ( 1908 S. C. (H. L.) 10.) ; in that case it was said that forfeitures "are not favoured in the law " (Ibid. 19.), and that applies in the present case. Finally, if it is sought to deprive the respondents of their proprietary rights, then a wrong has been committed Johnstone v. Pedlar ([ 1921] 2 A. C. 262, 268, 279.). There is no warrant here for interfering with the title of the respondents which, ex hypothesi, was a good and valid one. It was not the intention of the Government of India to sanction the deprivation of the respondents of their ownership in the suit lands. The transaction was a purely commercial one between the Khan and the Governor-General of India, and, as such, it was subject to the ordinary law, and, in the absence of such law, to the rule of justice, equity and good conscience, The Governor-General is an officer of the Crown, created by law, and his powers, as such, are statutory and limited. Even as successor to the late East India Company his powers are commercial and administrative, and as such there is no room for the application of the doctrine of act of state to a case subject to the ordinary law of contracts. Sir Hari Singh Gour followed, and referred to Ansons Law and Custom of the Constitution, Pt. II., p. 336 ; to P. & 0. S.N. Co. v. Secretary of State for India (( 1861) 5 Bom. H. C. R. (Appdx. A.).), and ss. 29 and 32 of the Government of India Act, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 61). Any contract which is made by the Secretary of State in Council must conform to the provision of s. 29 of the Act of 1915. It is clear from the terms of the document of 1903 that it was intended to be a commercial agreement. The civil and criminal jurisdiction is necessary for the collection of revenue. Whether the agreement was a commercial one or a treaty, the Governor-General is not authorized to make such a treaty on behalf of His Majesty. [Reference was made to Forester v. Secretary of State for India in Council (( 1871-2) L. R., I. A. Supplmt. The civil and criminal jurisdiction is necessary for the collection of revenue. Whether the agreement was a commercial one or a treaty, the Governor-General is not authorized to make such a treaty on behalf of His Majesty. [Reference was made to Forester v. Secretary of State for India in Council (( 1871-2) L. R., I. A. Supplmt. 10, 17 .] J. M. Tucker K.C. replied, and referred to Ilberts Government of India, 2nd ed., p. 176, and to Sobhuza II. v. Miller ([ 1926] A. C. 518.), Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India (( 1924) L. R. 51 I. A. 357, 360.), and Secretary of State for India v. Bai Rajbai (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 229, 238.). Apr. 28. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Atkin. This is an appeal, by special leave, from the judgment of the Additional Judicial Commissioner in Baluchistan, in which in the respondents suit he made a decree declaring their title to, and granting them possession of, the lands in suit. The appeal raises an important question as to the powers of the British Government over the sub-division of Nasirabad, part of the territory of the Khan of Kalat, under a document dated February 17, 1903, purporting to be an agreement made between the Khan of Kalat and Colonel Yate, Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan. The agreement was expressed to be subject to the confirmation of the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, and was duly confirmed on May 14, 1903. The circumstances in which the agreement was made appear to be that for many years part of this district had been irrigated by canals flowing from the Indus, and that arrangements had been made between the Khan and the British Government by which occupiers of land benefited were made subject to a water tax assessed by British officials, collected by Kalat officials, of which the proceeds were divided equally between the two Governments. This species of dual control naturally proved irksome, and the remedy was found in the agreement in question, styled, without prejudice to its accurate description in law, the Treaty of 1903. This species of dual control naturally proved irksome, and the remedy was found in the agreement in question, styled, without prejudice to its accurate description in law, the Treaty of 1903. It is in the following terms " Agreement entered "into by His Highness the Khan of Kalat, Mir Mahmud Khan, "G.C.I.E., on the one part, and by the Honble Colonel "C. E. Yate, C.S.I., C.M.G., Agent to the Governor General in "Baluchistan, on the other part, subject to the confirmation " of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council. "Executed at Sibi on the seventeenth day of February, one "thousand nine hundred and three. "I. Whereas it has been found by experience to be to the "advantage of both the British Government and His Highness "Beglar Begi Mir Mahmud Khan, G.C.I.E., Khan of Kalat, "that the Niabat of Nasirabad should be exclusively managed " by the officers of the British Government, it is hereby declared "and agreed as follows— " His Highness Mir Mahmud Khan, Khan of Kalat, on behalf "of himself and his heirs and successors, hereby makes over "and cedes in perpetuity to the British Government the "entire management of the Nasirabad Niabat absolutely and "with all the rights and privileges, state or personal, as well "as full and exclusive revenue, civil and criminal jurisdiction "and all other powers of administration, including all rights "to levy dues and tolls on the following conditions— "(i.) That the said Niabat shall be administered, on behalf "of the British Government, by or through such officer or "officers as the Governor General in Council may appoint for " the purpose with effect from the 1st day of April, one thousand "nine hundred and three, or such subsequent date as the "Government of India may take it over. " (2.) That the British Government shall pay to His Highness "on the first day of April, one thousand nine hundred and "four and thereafter, annually, on the first day of April each "year, fixed annual rent of Rs. 1,15,000 (one hundred and "fifteen thousand). "(3.) That the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1,15,000 (one hundred "and fifteen thousand), shall be paid to His Highness without "any deduction of cost of administration. "II. 1,15,000 (one hundred and "fifteen thousand). "(3.) That the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1,15,000 (one hundred "and fifteen thousand), shall be paid to His Highness without "any deduction of cost of administration. "II. The boundary of the Nasirabad Niabat as described "by His Highness the Khan of Kalats Naib, Ghaus Bakhsh, "in July, 1902, is as follows — "On the South the Sind Border, on the North, commencing "eastwards at the Leni Burj, it runs North-Eastwards along "the Mazari border of the Bugti Hills. It follows the foot "of these Hills running in a westerly direction to their nearest "point to the Shahpur Road near the Manak Garhi Nulla. "It then follows this Nulla as far as the Shahpur Road, then "follows the Shahpur Road South as far as the Deh Chattan "lands (generally known as Dodaika) and then turns West "following the boundary of Dodaika to the Nurwah Channel "above the point to where the water reaches. It then follows "the Nurwah as far as the junction of the latter with the Dur "Mohammad Wah, which is shown on most maps as the "Shahiwah, a continuation of the main desert canal. From "this point it follows the Dur Mohammad Wah right along "its course to the West and South-West crossing the railway "at mile 368, five miles North of Jhatpat Station, until it "meets the line of pillars erected about 4 years ago by the "Magassis and Jamalis as their mutual boundary. It then "follows this line of pillars Southwards to the Sind border, "passing about 500 yards to the West of the point where the "Sonwah has been closed. It then "follows this line of pillars Southwards to the Sind border, "passing about 500 yards to the West of the point where the "Sonwah has been closed. III Whereas it is possible that the lower portion of the "Manjuti lands enclosed by a straight line drawn from the "place where the Dur Mohammad Wah crosses the railway, "near mile 368, to a point on the Jacobabad-Shahpur Road, "8 miles to the North of where the Dur Mohammad Wah "crosses that road may hereafter be brought under irrigation, "His Highness the Khan of Kalat hereby agrees, on behalf "of himself, his heirs and successors, to make over and cede "to the British Government in perpetuity that portion of the "Manjuti land in the same manner as the Nasirabad Niabat "above referred to, and it is hereby agreed that the British " Government shall pay to His Highness annually an additional "rent of rupees two thousand five hunded, making a total "quit-rent of Rs. i,17,500 to be paid on the first day of "April one thousand nine hundred and four and subsequent "years. "IV. And whereas it is advisable that any further Kalat "State lands outside the present boundary of the Nasirabad "Niabat, which may hereafter possibly be brought under "irrigation by branches and extensions from existing British "Canals, should also come under British administration in "the same manner as the Nasirabad Niabat above referred to, "His Highness the Khan agrees to make over on lease in "perpetuity any lands in the Lehri Bhag and Gandawa Niabats "that may hereafter be found to be irrigable from existing "British Canals at a fair quit-rent which can be determined "when the surveys have been completed." "MIR MAHMUD KHAN "CHAS. E. YATE, Colonel, "Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan. "CURZON "Viceroy and Governor General of India. "This agreement was ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy "and Governor General of India at Simla on Thursday, this "14th day of May, 1903. "LOUIS W. DANE, "Secretary to the Government of India in the "Foreign Department." Over part of the land comprised in the agreement the predecessors of the plaintiffs held proprietarily rights granted to them by the then Khan of Kalat. For the purposes of this case it may be assumed that the grants continued to be of full force up to the date of the agreement. For the purposes of this case it may be assumed that the grants continued to be of full force up to the date of the agreement. After it had been made, the Government of India decided that there should be a settlement of the territory on the lines of the settlement in Sind. A civil servant with experience of Sind, Mr. Smart, was appointed, and began work in October, 1905, which he completed in April, 1907. The principles to be adopted in determining what existing titles, if any, were to be recognized in the settlement were decided from time to time in the course of the work. The district was treated as divided into two sections, the eastern and the western, the former being better irrigated and more cultivated than the western, in which the lands in suit are situate. This section has an area of about 372,000 acres, of which a large part was waste and uncultivated. In October, 1906, there was a conference between the Agent to the Governor-General and the Revenue Commissioners in Baluchistan and Mr. Smart, in which decisions were made which were carried out in the settlement record, and in respect of which the present dispute arises. It will be convenient to set out in the words of Mr. Smart in his settlement report the principles upon which the settlement proceeded. "3. The method of inquiry pursued in the preparation of the " settlement records has been the same for the eastern and "western sections with one exception. In the eastern section "it was considered necessary to make detailed inquiries into "all cases where possession of land had been acquired by a "doubtful title. "The principle which was adopted was as follows — "Wherever figures of cultivation for the last 12 years showed "that an occupant had cultivated one-third of the holdings "he claimed, no inquiry into title was to be made. Inquiries "into title were made wherever this condition was not fulfilled, "provided the claim of the occupant had not been established "by some previous decisions of competent authority. The "principle followed involved a great deal of trouble, and the "nature of evidence to be collected was often extremely "complicated. Inquiries "into title were made wherever this condition was not fulfilled, "provided the claim of the occupant had not been established "by some previous decisions of competent authority. The "principle followed involved a great deal of trouble, and the "nature of evidence to be collected was often extremely "complicated. "In the western section, owing to the existence of old "Sanads from His Highness, the Khan of Kalat, it was decided "in a note of the conference held on 5th October, 1906, between "the Honble the Agent to the Governor-General, Revenue "Commissioner, and myself, that the following principles "should be employed. The total irrigable lands were to be "divided in three classes. A lands already irrigated and "cultivated (allowing for fallow years) were to be entered in "the names of present occupants, provided they showed "reasonable title e.g., continued possession for 12 years. " B lands commanded by existing canals or Zemindari "water-courses therefrom, which are in use but not irrigated "owing to scarcity of water, were to be entered in the name "of claimants showing the best title, on condition that the " Sind Fallow Rules will apply to them from the Kharif Season "of 1907; a notice was to be served on such claimants "informing them that they would be liable to pay assessment "in the fifth year, whether they had cultivated the land or "not, provided they had not paid assessment once in the "past four years. "’C’ land, which is entirely waste or Pat,’” was to be "entered as Government unoccupied lands. "These principles have been followed in the settlement of "the western section. The method employed in the work of "settlement is otherwise the same for both sections." The area of the "C" lands thus entered as Government unoccupied lands extended to about 141,000 acres. The present suit is concerned with all the lands over which the plaintiffs held rights granted by the Khan of Kalat; but the controversy was particularly directed to "C " lands, the plaintiffs claiming that as they were comprised in their grant from the Khan the Government have no title to them. The present suit is concerned with all the lands over which the plaintiffs held rights granted by the Khan of Kalat; but the controversy was particularly directed to "C " lands, the plaintiffs claiming that as they were comprised in their grant from the Khan the Government have no title to them. The answer of the Government is that the treaty of 1903 gave them full sovereign rights over the territory; that if they decided to ignore the rights of previous holders, and to substitute as owners either themselves or anyone else, no one had a right to complain in a municipal court ; that the acts of the Government in making the treaty, and in exercising its powers under it, were acts of state for which the Government could not be impleaded. It is necessary, therefore, to refer to the treaty to see what its juristic effect was. According to the plaintiffs, it was merely what their counsel styled "a commercial contract,” intended only to effect a more convenient method of collecting revenue, and granting powers only for that object. Their Lordships cannot take this view. It is opposed to the plain wording of the document, and to the obvious construction when the treaty is regarded as a whole. "Cedes in perpetuity ". . . . the entire management of the Nasirabad Niabat "absolutely and with all the rights and privileges, state or "personal, as well as full and exclusive revenue, civil and " criminal jurisdiction and all other powers of administration " are words creating rights between two sovereign States which were never yet found in any mere commercial agreement. It is true that the right ceded is the entire "management,” and the consideration is an annual rent ; and, as is made clearer in para. 4 of the treaty, the transaction is in fact a perpetual lease of the territory at a quit rent. Nevertheless, the Sovereign of Kalat made over to the British State the whole of his sovereign rights, though as the cession takes the form of a lease the territory does not pass so as to become part of the British Dominions, but still remains Kalat territory. Nevertheless, the Sovereign of Kalat made over to the British State the whole of his sovereign rights, though as the cession takes the form of a lease the territory does not pass so as to become part of the British Dominions, but still remains Kalat territory. The Government therefore are entitled to rely, if necessary, upon the provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, s. 1 "It is and shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen "to hold, exercise, and enjoy any jurisdiction which Her "Majesty now has or may at any time hereafter have within "a foreign country in the same and as ample a manner as if "Her Majesty had acquired that jurisdiction by the cession "or conquest of territory." By s. 16, "In this Act foreign country means any country "or place out of His Majestys dominions. The expression "jurisdiction1 includes power.” It is perhaps unnecessary to say that the statute does not increase the powers given to His Majesty in the foreign country. It is the power given, and no other, which may be exercised as if acquired by conquest or cession. In the present case the powers given are "all the "rights and privileges, state or personal." It is plain that these rights and privileges are to be exercised in as ample a manner as if acquired by conquest or cession. On the legal position that arises in such circumstances there is a wealth of weighty authority. In Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boyc Sahaba (( 1859) 7 Moo. I. A. 476.) the East India Company, who had in 1855 entered into treaties with the Rajah of Tanjore not dissimilar from the treaty in the present case, had seized the whole Raj of Tanjore on the death of the last Rajah without leaving issue male. It was held that the East India Company were possessed of sovereign powers ; that they had exercised those powers not under colour of law but as acts of state, and that they and their successors could not be impleaded in any municipal court for what was so done. In the judgment of the Judicial Committee, delivered by Lord Kingsdown, occur the following words (Ibid. In the judgment of the Judicial Committee, delivered by Lord Kingsdown, occur the following words (Ibid. 540.) "The result, in their Lordships’ "opinion, is, that the property now claimed by the respondent "has been seized by the British Government, acting as a "Sovereign power, through its delegate the East India Company ; and that the act so done, with its consequences, is an "act of state over which the Supreme Court of Madras has "no jurisdiction. Of the propriety or justice of that act, "neither the court below nor the Judicial Committee have the "means of forming, or the right of expressing, if they had "formed, any opinion. It may have been just or unjust, "politic or impolitic, beneficial or injurious, taken as a whole, "to those whose interests are affected. These are considerations into which their Lordships cannot enter. It is sufficient "to say that, even if a wrong has been done, it is a wrong "for which no municipal court of justice can afford a remedy.” In Cook v. Sprigg ([ 1899] A. C. 572)) the plaintiffs claimed to be grantees of concessions made to them by the paramount chief of Podoland before annexation of Pondoland by the British Government. Lord Halsbury L.C., giving the judgment of the Judicial Committee, said ([ 1899] A. C. 578.) "It is a well-established principle "of law that the transactions of independent States between "each other are governed by other laws than those which "municipal courts administer. It is no answer to say that "by the ordinary principles of international law private "property is respected by the sovereign which accepts the "cession and assumes the duties and legal obligations of the "former sovereign with respect to such private property "within the ceded territory. All that can be properly meant "by such a proposition is that, according to the well understood "rules of international law, a change of sovereignty by cession "ought not to affect private property, but no municipal "tribunal has authority to enforce such an obligation." In Secretary of State for India v. Bat Rajbai (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 229.) the circumstances were that in 1817 the Gaekwar had ceded the district of Ahmedabad to the British Government. In 1898 claims were made by the plaintiffs against the Government asserting permanent rights to lands within the district existing before the cession. In 1898 claims were made by the plaintiffs against the Government asserting permanent rights to lands within the district existing before the cession. The Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that the question entirely depended upon the extent to which the British Government had recognized pre-cession rights (L. R. 42 I. A. 237.) "The relation in which they stood to their native sovereigns "before this cession, and the legal rights they enjoyed under "them, are, save in one respect, entirely irrelevant matters. "They could not carry on under the new regime the legal "rights, if any, which they might have enjoyed under the old. "The only legal enforceable rights they could have as against "their new sovereign were those, and only those, which that "new sovereign, by agreement express or implied, or by "legislation, chose to confer upon them." Their Lordships will conclude this review of authorities with the words of Lord Dunedin, in giving the judgment of the Board in Vayjesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India (( 1924) L. R. 51 I. A. 357.) In that case territory in Gwalior had been ceded to the British Government by the Maharajah Scindia by a treaty which expressly provided that each Government should respect the conditions of existing leases. The appellants had brought a suit for a declaration that they were pre-cession proprietors of the lands in question. It was stated in the judgment (( 1924) L. R. 51 I. A 360.) " A summary of the matter is this when a " territory is acquired by a sovereign state for the first time, "that is an act of state. It matters not how the acquisition "has been brought about. It may be by conquest, it may be "by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation of "territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognised ruler. In all "cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of the territory "can make good in the municipal courts established by the "new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through "his officers, recognised. Such rights as he had under the "rule of predecessors avail him nothing. Nay, more, even "if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants "should enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to " those inhabitants to enforce these stipulations in the municipal "courts. Such rights as he had under the "rule of predecessors avail him nothing. Nay, more, even "if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants "should enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to " those inhabitants to enforce these stipulations in the municipal "courts. The right to enforce remains only with the high "contracting parties." These decisions were again adopted by the Board in Dattatraya Krishna Rao Kane v. Secretary of State for India (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 318.), where they were applied to a claim to enforce pre-cession rights in territory leased in perpetuity by H.H. the Nizam to the British Government in 1902. It follows, therefore, that in this case the Government of India had the right to recognize or not recognize the existing titles to land. In the case of the lands in suit they decided not to recognize them, and it follows that the plaintiffs have no recourse against the Government in the municipal courts. An explanation for Government action was at one time given that the plaintiffs were in breach of their conditions of tenure to the Khan of Kalat. Whether this be true or not is clearly irrelevant in view of the established law regulating the position of the Government as against former proprietors. Neither it nor any action of government officials indicates any intention on the part of the Government to recognize this existing title in these lands. On the contrary, the decision made in October, 1906, by the high officials, together with Mr. Smart, that the plaintiffs were only to be given inalienable occupancy rights over some of the lands, while the "C" lands were to be entered as government lands, indicates conclusively what the intention of the Government was; and it only needed the confirmation of the report by the Government of India, which was signified on April 1, 1908, to conclude the matter. In accordance with these authorities their Lordships have not considered whether the decision was just or unjust, politic or impolitic ; and it must not be considered that they have had any material placed before them to indicate that it was, in the circumstances, either unjust or impolitic. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, and the respondents suit dismissed, with costs. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal.