ORDER Iqbal Ahmad and Verma, JJ. - The facts which are material for our present purpose are these: The applicant, Shri Nath, is a member of a joint Hindu family with his father, Rustam Singh. The family has got ancestral zamindari property, but it is entered in the revenue records in the name of Rustam Singh alone. Shri Nath and his wife, Mt. Harbansi Kuar, borrowed money from Puran Mal on two different occasions and executed promissory notes in Puran Mal's favour on 7th July 1934 and 26th November 1934. On 9th April 1936, that is, after the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (27 of 1934) had come into force, Puran Mal brought a suit against Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi Kuar for the recovery of the money due under the promissory notes mentioned above. The defendants did not appear and an ex parte decree was passed in favour of Puran Mal on 8th July 1936. On 5th October 1936, an application was made on behalf of Mt. Harbansi Kuar and Shri Nath alleging that they were "agriculturists" and praying for reduction of interest in accordance with Ss. 4 and 30 and for the fixing of instalments in accordance with S. 5 of the Act. The application was opposed by the decree-holder Puran Mal. The judgment-debtors applicants did not appear on the date fixed for the hearing of their application and the Court dismissed, it for want of prosecution on 17th July 1937. Thereupon a fresh application for the same reliefs, and couched almost in identical language, was filed by the judgment-debtors on 17th September 1937. This application was also opposed by the decree-holder Puran Mal. The Court below has dismissed that application by its order dated 23rd April 1938, and the present application for revision by Shri Nath is directed against that order. The grounds on which the Court below has decided against the judgment-debtors are these. The Court has held that, as Shri Nath's name does not appear against any zamindari property or tenancy land in the revenue records, he cannot be deemed to be an "agriculturist" within the meaning of the Act. The grounds on which the Court below has decided against the judgment-debtors are these. The Court has held that, as Shri Nath's name does not appear against any zamindari property or tenancy land in the revenue records, he cannot be deemed to be an "agriculturist" within the meaning of the Act. The Court did hold that Shri Nath's father Rustam Singh was an "agriculturist" within the meaning of that expression in the Act and that Shri Nath was a "member of a joint Hindu family with his father, and the correctness of that finding has not been challenged on behalf of the respondent decree-holder before us. The Court, however, was of opinion that that could not entitle Shri Nath to the benefits conferred on "agriculturists" by the Act. The Court further referred to Expln. 2 to S. 2(2) of the Act and held that S. 5 was "excluded" and that consequently Shri Nath could not claim instalments. On the question of reduction of interest, the Court appears to have held that Mt. Harbansi Kuar was an "agriculturist," but that, as she had joined her husband Shri Nath, a non-agriculturist, in the transaction of loan, she also was not entitled to claim any benefit under the Act. The fact that Mt. Harbansi Kuar is an "agriculturist" is also not denied before us on behalf of the respondent decree-holder. 2. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the view taken by the Court below, that Shri Nath, although he is a member of a joint Hindu family with his father, who is an "agriculturist," cannot be deemed to be an "agriculturist," is correct. Learned counsel for the applicant refers to the cases in Kedar Prasad and Others Vs. Suraj Narain Sinha, AIR 1938 All 12 8 , Bangali Mal Vs. Bansidhar and Another, AIR 1939 All 391 Neither of these two cases is exactly in point. Learned counsel for the respondent decree-holder refers to the case in ('38) 25 AIR 1938 All 12 : 172 IC 951 : ILR (1938) All 19 : 1937 ALJ 970, Allahabad Bank Ltd., Meerut v. Prakash Nath. This case does support the view taken by the Court below. It seems to us, however, that the attention of the learned Judges who decided that case was apparently not drawn to proviso 1 to S. 2(2) of the Act. This case does support the view taken by the Court below. It seems to us, however, that the attention of the learned Judges who decided that case was apparently not drawn to proviso 1 to S. 2(2) of the Act. In our opinion, the proviso just mentioned has an important bearing on the interpretation of the words "except Ss. 3, 4, 5 and 8" in Expln. 2. It may be noted that the respondent in the case in Allahabad Bank Ltd. Vs. Prakash Nath, AIR 1938 All 12 did not appear and the case was heard ex parte. The learned single Judge who has referred this case to a Bench has expressed the opinion that there appears to be a conflict between the decisions in Kedar Prasad and Others Vs. Suraj Narain Sinha, AIR 1938 All 12 8 and Allahabad Bank Ltd. Vs. Prakash Nath, AIR 1938 All 12 3. The second question that has arisen is this Learned counsel for the respondent decree-holder argues that, the suit having been brought after the Act had come into force, the defendants should have asked for instalments in the suit itself in accordance with the provisions of S. 3 of the Act, and that, as they did not do so, they were not entitled to present an application under S. 5. It is urged that S. 5 must be confined in its operation to two classes of decrees, viz., (1) decrees passed before the Act came into force, and (2) decrees passed after the Act came into force in suits which were pending on the date when the Act came into force. In other words, the argument is that a judgment-debtor has no right to present an application under S. 5 with respect to decrees passed in suits which were instituted after the Act had come into force. 4. The third point that has arisen is with regard to the prayer of the judgment-debtors for the reduction of interest under S. 30 of the Act. Learned counsel for the decree-holder respondent has argued that relief under sub-S. (2) of S. 30 cannot be claimed with respect to decrees passed after the Act had come into force. 4. The third point that has arisen is with regard to the prayer of the judgment-debtors for the reduction of interest under S. 30 of the Act. Learned counsel for the decree-holder respondent has argued that relief under sub-S. (2) of S. 30 cannot be claimed with respect to decrees passed after the Act had come into force. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on a Full Bench decision of the Chief Court at Luck-now in AIR 1940 251 (Oudh) Learned counsel for the applicant has, on the other hand, relied on the decisions of this Court in Baryar Singh Vs. Ram Dularay, AIR 1937 All 96 , Narain Singh Vs. Banke Behari Lal and Hafiz Abdul Noor Vs. Sahu Brij Mohan Saran The view taken by the Full Bench of the Chief Court at Lucknow is diametrically opposed to the view taken in the decisions of this Court just referred to. The questions mentioned above are of considerable importance and are likely to arise frequently. There is also the conflict of judicial opinion indicated above. We consider it desirable, therefore, that the case should be heard and decided by a larger Bench. We accordingly direct that the papers be laid before the Honourable the Chief Justice for the constitution of a Full Bench. ORDER Iqbal Ahmad, C.J. 5. The answers to the questions of law that arise for decision in the present application in revision depend on the interpretation of certain provisions of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (27 of 1934) and on two out of the three questions that fall to be decided there is divergence of judicial opinion. The facts that give rise to those questions are no longer in controversy and are as follows: Shri Nath, the applicant before us, is a member of joint Hindu family with his father Rustam Singh. The family is possessed of ancestral zamindari property which is entered in the revenue papers in the name of Rustam Singh alone. Shri Nath and his wife Mt. Harbansi borrowed money from Puran Mal, the opposite party in the present revision, on two promissory notes dated 7th July 1934 and 26th November 1934. After the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act had come into force, Puran Mal brought a suit against Shri Nath and Mt. Shri Nath and his wife Mt. Harbansi borrowed money from Puran Mal, the opposite party in the present revision, on two promissory notes dated 7th July 1934 and 26th November 1934. After the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act had come into force, Puran Mal brought a suit against Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi for recovery of the money due on the two promissory notes and obtained ex parte decree on 8th July 1936. Thereafter, on 5th October 1936, Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi filed an application alleging that they were agriculturists and prayed for reduction of interest in accordance with Ss. 4 and 30 and for the fixing of instalments in accordance with S. 5 of the Act. Puran Mal contested the application and the same was dismissed for want of prosecution by the applicants on 17th July 1937. 6. Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi then filed a second application for the same reliefs on 17th September 1937. This application was also opposed by Puran Mal. The Court below dismissed the application. It held that even though Rustam Singh was an "agriculturist" as defined by the Act and Shri Nath was a member of joint Hindu family with him, Shri Nath could not be deemed to be an "agriculturist" as his name was not recorded against any zamindari property or tenancy land in the revenue papers. It therefore concluded that Shri Nath was not entitled to the benefits conferred on "agriculturist" by the Act. It then referred to Explanation 2 of S. 2(2) of the Act and held that as "S. 5 is excluded" Shri Nath could not claim instalments. It found that Mt. Harbansi was an agriculturist' but it held that as she had joined her husband Shri Nath, a non-agriculturist, in the transaction of loan, she also was not entitled to claim the benefits conferred by Ss. 4, 5 and 30 of the Act on 'agriculturists.' 7. The questions that have been argued before us and arise for decision are: (1) Whether the view of the Court below, that Shri Nath, although he is a member of a joint Hindu family with his father, who is an agriculturist cannot be deemed to be an 'agriculturist' is correct? (2) Whether the omission of Shri Nath and Mt. The questions that have been argued before us and arise for decision are: (1) Whether the view of the Court below, that Shri Nath, although he is a member of a joint Hindu family with his father, who is an agriculturist cannot be deemed to be an 'agriculturist' is correct? (2) Whether the omission of Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi to ask for the fixing of instalments in the suit itself, which was filed after the Agriculturists' Relief Act had come into force, in accordance with the provisions of S. 3 of the Act, disentitled them to present an application under S. 5 of the Act? (3) Whether relief by way of reduction of interest under sub-s. (2) of S. 30 can be allowed with respect to decrees passed after the Act had come into force? In the consideration of the questions formulated above the object of and the scheme underlying the Agriculturists' Relief Act must be kept in view. The Act was passed with the object of giving relief to agriculturists from indebtedness and it is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is "preliminary" and consists of interpretation clauses. Chapter 2 makes provision with respect to fixing of instalments, future interest, mode of execution and forum of suits. Chapter 3 deals with mortgages and their redemption. Chapter 4 makes provision about rates of interest and chap. 5 enjoins about the maintenance of accounts by creditors. Chapter 6 incorporates miscellaneous. Now, so far as the first question is concerned, it does not, to my mind, present any difficulty. By cls. (a) to (g) of S. 2(2) 'agriculturist' is defined as a person who "pays" land revenue, local rates or rent or "holds" land not exceeding a certain limit. Then follows the Proviso 1 which runs as follows: Provided that in Ss. 2(10)(a), 3, 4, 5, 8 and Chaps. 4 and 5 an agriculturist means also a person who would belong to a class of persons mentioned in parts (a) to (g) of this sub-section, if the limits of land revenue, local rates, rent and area mentioned in these parts were omitted. 8. It is a well-recognized canon of interpretation of statutes that the Legislature is to be deemed to have used a particular word in an enactment in one and the same sense unless the contrary intention appears from the context. 8. It is a well-recognized canon of interpretation of statutes that the Legislature is to be deemed to have used a particular word in an enactment in one and the same sense unless the contrary intention appears from the context. It cannot, I consider, be doubted that the word "person" in S. 2(2) has been used to denote an individual human being. The same meaning must therefore be attached to the word "person" used in the proviso quoted above. Each male member "of a joint Hindu family, though a competent part of that family, retains his individuality and is therefore a "person" within the meaning of the proviso. It follows that for the purposes of sections and chapters mentioned in the proviso every individual member of a joint Hindu family is to be regarded as an 'agriculturist' within the meaning of the Act irrespective of the amount of land revenue, local rates, rent and area paid or held by the family. In other words, every member of a joint Hindu family is entitled to avail himself of the benefits conferred by the sections and chapters mentioned in the proviso provided that that member belongs "to a class of persons mentioned in" cls. (a) to (g) of S. 2(2). It would however be noted that the proviso embraces only some of the sections and chapters of the Act and makes no provision about the rest of the sections and chapters. It was therefore necessary for the Legislature to elucidate the position of members of a joint Hindu family or joint owners or tenants with reference to the sections and chapters that do not fall within the purview of the proviso. This the Legislature did by enacting Expln. 2. The proviso and Expln. 2 in between themselves exhaust all the provisions contained in chaps. 2 to 6 of the Act. Explanation 2 is as follows: In the case of members of a joint Hindu family or joint owners or joint tenants, each member or owner or tenant shall be considered to be an agriculturist for the purposes of Chaps. 2 (except Ss. 3, 4, 5 and 8) 3 and 6, whose share or interest in revenue, local rate or rent or the rent-free land, as the case may be, does not respectively exceed the aforesaid limits. 9. The net result of the proviso and Expln. 2 (except Ss. 3, 4, 5 and 8) 3 and 6, whose share or interest in revenue, local rate or rent or the rent-free land, as the case may be, does not respectively exceed the aforesaid limits. 9. The net result of the proviso and Expln. 2 is that every member of a joint Hindu family is to be deemed to be an agriculturist for the purposes of the sections and chapters mentioned in the proviso irrespective of the amount of the revenue, rent or local rate paid by him or the family or the area of land held by him or the family. Whereas for the purposes of the rest of the sections and chapters of the Act a member of a joint Hindu family is to be deemed to be an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act only if on apportionment and ascertainment of his individual share of the revenue, local rate, rent or land, the limit provided for by cls. (a) to (g) of S. 2(2) is not exceeded. In short, the proviso and the explanation are independent and exclusive of each other. The explanation is, merely explanatory of cls. (a) to (g) of S. 2(2) and does not in any way control or abridge the scope of the proviso. The view that I take is in consonance with the decisions in Sheo Shanker Das and Another Vs. Mohammad Hasan, AIR 1937 All 633 , Kedar Prasad and Others Vs. Suraj Narain Sinha, AIR 1938 All 12 8 , Bangali Mal Vs. Bansidhar and Another, AIR 1939 All 391 and AIR ('41) 28 AIR 1941 Oudh 124 : 191 IC 784 : 16 Luck 500 : 1940 OWN 1219, Raza Husain v. Shankery Saran. 10. In the case before us, we are concerned with the prayers contained in the application of Shri Nath for the fixing of instalments in accordance with S. 5 and reduction of interest in accordance with Ss. 4 and 30(2) of the Act. These sections come within the purview of proviso 1 to S. 2 and, therefore, Shri Nath must for the purposes of these sections, be deemed to be an agriculturist irrespective of the amount of the revenue, etc., paid by his family or the land held by it. 4 and 30(2) of the Act. These sections come within the purview of proviso 1 to S. 2 and, therefore, Shri Nath must for the purposes of these sections, be deemed to be an agriculturist irrespective of the amount of the revenue, etc., paid by his family or the land held by it. But, as stated before, the Court below, held that, as Shri Nath's name was not recorded in the revenue papers as against any of the zamindari property or the tenancy land belonging to the family, he could not be deemed to be an agriculturist. This view of the Court below is supported by the decision of this Court in Allahabad Bank Ltd. Vs. Prakash Nath, AIR 1938 All 12 . It was held in that case that for the purposes of applications under S. 5 or applications under Chap. 4, the person recorded as owner or the person paying revenue, etc., is the only Person who can apply and that normally such a person in a joint Hindu family would be the karta. I regret I am unable to agree with that decision. I may point out with respect that the learned Judges based their conclusion on the wording of only Explanation 2 and completely overlooked proviso l quoted above. They appear to have held that, as S. 5 and chap. 4 were "expressly excluded in this explanation," a member of a joint Hindu family could not claim the benefit of that section or that chapter. The party against whom the case was decided was not represented by counsel and it appears that the attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to proviso 1. 11. The Act nowhere provides that in order to be an agriculturist a person's name must be recorded in the revenue papers. On the other hand, a person must be deemed to be an agriculturist if he fulfils the requirements of any of the clauses of S. 2(2). The name of Shri Nath is no doubt not recorded in the revenue papers, but he as a member of a joint Hindu family with his father, is entitled to a share in the family property. He is therefore a person who pays revenue or rent and holds land within the meaning of S. 2(2) of the Act. The name of Shri Nath is no doubt not recorded in the revenue papers, but he as a member of a joint Hindu family with his father, is entitled to a share in the family property. He is therefore a person who pays revenue or rent and holds land within the meaning of S. 2(2) of the Act. I therefore hold that he is an "agriculturist." I now proceed to consider the second question formulated above. The answer to that question must, in my view, be in the negative. Section 3 of the Act provides for the fixing of instalments at the time of passing decrees mentioned in the section, whereas S. 5(1) empowers the Court to fix instalments after the passing of such decrees. The relevant portion of S. 5(1) is as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the Court shall, unless for reasons to be recorded it directs otherwise at any time, on the application of the judgment-debtor and after notice to the decree-holder, direct that any decree for money or preliminary decree for sale or foreclosure passed by it or by any Court whose business has been transferred to it against an agriculturist whether before or after this Act comes into force, shall be converted into a decree for payment by instalments drawn up in such terms as it thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of S. 3. 12. The words "at any time" and the sentence "whether before or after this Act comes into force" in the section are important and, in my judgment are decisive of the question under consideration. The power given to the Court by S. 5(1) is not controlled by any limit of time and is exercisable with respect to all decrees for money, etc., whether passed before or after the Act. The power given by the section to fix instalments, far from being controlled by any words in the section, is made unrestricted in its scope by the opening words in the section which are "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." In view of those words, it is, to my mind, impossible to hold that the omission of an 'agriculturist' defendant to ask for instalments at the time of passing of decree bars him from claiming the relief provided for by S. 5(1) on the principle of res judicata. The Legislature in its discretion thought fit to give to an 'agriculturist' double opportunity of claiming instalments in the case of decrees passed after the Act came into force. The first opportunity is at the time of the passing of decree under S. 3 and the second opportunity is afforded to the agriculturist by S. 5 after the decree has been passed. As the words used by the Legislature in S. 5(1) are clear and of unambiguous import, it is not permissible for a Court of law to attempt to abridge the effect of those words by considerations of inconvenience resulting from multiplicity of proceedings in Court. It is the duty of the Court to adhere to the literal meaning of the words used and to give decisions accordingly. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that the omission of Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi to ask for instalments in the suit itself did not disentitle them to pray for the conversion of the decree into an instalment decree in accordance with the provisions of S. 5(1) of the Act. 13. It now remains to answer the third question at the inception of this judgment, viz., whether relief by way of reduction of interest under sub-cl. (2) of s. 30 can be allowed with respect to decrees passed after the Act had come into force? On this point, there is divergence of opinion between this Court and the Lucknow Chief Court. This Court in Baryar Singh Vs. Ram Dularay, AIR 1937 All 96 in Narain Singh Vs. Banke Behari Lal and in Hafiz Abdul Noor Vs. Sahu Brij Mohan Saran held that the words "if a decree has already been passed" in S. 30(2) refer to the date on which the debtor makes his application under s. 30 for reduction of interest and do not relate only to those cases in which decrees have been passed before the Act came into force. The first two cases are single Judge decisions and the last case is a decision by a Bench of two Judges. A Full Bench of the Lucknow Chief Court, on the other hand, in AIR 1940 251 (Oudh) held that the words "if a decree has already been passed" in sub-cl. (2) of S. 30 refer only to decrees passed before that Act came into force. 14. A Full Bench of the Lucknow Chief Court, on the other hand, in AIR 1940 251 (Oudh) held that the words "if a decree has already been passed" in sub-cl. (2) of S. 30 refer only to decrees passed before that Act came into force. 14. Sub-clause (2) of s. 30 is not happily worded, but after considering the relevant sections of the Act, I prefer the view taken by the Lucknow Chief Court. Chapter 4 of the Act deals with the 'rates of interest' and consists of four sections, viz., Ss. 28, 29, 30 and 31. By S. 2S provision is made about the rate of interest on loans secured and unsecured taken after the passing of the Act. By S. 29 certain benefit is conferred on the debtor for prompt payment of an unsecured loan taken after the passing of the Act. Sub-clause (1) of S. 30 makes provisions about the rate of interest on "undecreed" loans secured and unsecured taken before the Act came into force. Sub-clause (2) of S. 30 then deals with a decree that "has already been passed" and remains unsatisfied in whole or in part. Lastly, S. 31 makes provisions about the rate of interest with respect to loans taken after the Act came into force when the aggregate of interest has reached 100 per cent. of the sum borrowed. It would thus appear that three of the four sections, viz., 28, 29 and 31, deal with interest on loans taken after the Act came into force and S. 30 relates to interest on loans taken before the Act came into force. Section 30 is evidently a self-contained section dealing only with loans taken before the Act. Sub-clause (2) of section 30 runs as follows: If a decree has already been passed on the basis of a loan and remains unsatisfied in whole or in part, the Court which passed the decree shall on the application of the judgment-debtor amend it by reducing, in accordance with the provisions of sub-S. (1), the amount decreed on account of interest. 15. As this sub-clause is a part of S. 30 which deals with interest on loans taken before the passing of the Act it should, if possible, be so construed as to refer to only those decrees that were passed on the basis of loans taken before the Act came into force. 15. As this sub-clause is a part of S. 30 which deals with interest on loans taken before the passing of the Act it should, if possible, be so construed as to refer to only those decrees that were passed on the basis of loans taken before the Act came into force. If the view taken by this Court in the cases noted above, that the words "if a decree has already been passed" refer to the date on which the debtor makes his application under S. 30 for reduction of interest, is adopted, sub-cl. (2) would apply not only to decrees passed on the basis of loans incurred before the passing of the Act but will also govern decrees passed on the basis of loans taken after the Act came into force. In other words, in accordance with that view the scope of sub-cl. (2) would be so widened as to bring within its purview even decrees with respect to loans taken after the passing of the Act and this, in my view, would be inconsistent with the scheme of Chap. 4. As stated before, the Legislature by separate sections in the chapter dealt separately with loans taken before and after the Act. If the Legislature had intended the provisions of sub-cl. (2) to embrace decrees of both the descriptions, it would have enacted those provisions in a separate section instead of embodying the same in a sub-clause of S. 30. The scheme of Chap. 4 therefore strongly points to the conclusion that sub-cl. (2) of S. 30 is confined in its operation only to decrees passed on the basis of loans taken before the Act was put into force. In my judgment the word "already" in sub-cl. (2) refers to the date on which the Act came into force and not to the date on which the application of the judgment-debtor for reduction of interest is filed. I am supported in this conclusion by the decision in (1906) 2 Ch D 270 : 75 LJ Ch 595 : 95 LT 129 : 4 LGR 787 : 22 TLR 631, Godden v. Hythe Burial Board. In that case it was held that: The words in S. 9, Burial Act, 1855, 'no ground not already used as or appropriated for a cemetery' mean 'used as or appropriated' at the date of the passing of the Act. 16. In that case it was held that: The words in S. 9, Burial Act, 1855, 'no ground not already used as or appropriated for a cemetery' mean 'used as or appropriated' at the date of the passing of the Act. 16. Kekewich J. in his judgment observed as follows: We are not dealing with a technical word, but with a word in common use in the English language, and it is one which has no technical meaning whatever. The rule in such cases is to construe the word according to its popular and colloquial meaning. What is the meaning of the word 'already' in the popular or colloquial sense? It seems 'at this time, or now'....... That 'now' can only mean, it seems to me, at the date of the passing of the Act. There is No. 'now' with reference to an Act of Parliament except the date when it receives the royal assent. 17. By using the word "already" in sub-cl. (2) the Legislature, to my mind, was making provision about the decrees that had been passed on the date that the Act was put into force and did not contemplate decrees to be passed in future. To adopt the view taken by this Court in the cases mentioned above would be to hold that the Legislature, by enacting sub-cl. (2) completely abrogated the doctrine of res judicata and this, in my view, is not permissible in the absence of express words indicating such an intention. It would be noted in this connexion that S. 30 is conspicuous by absence of the words "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908," which find a place in the opening portion of S. 5 of the Act. By S. 28 and sub-cl. (1) of S. 30 provision is made for reduced rate of interest on loans taken by agriculturists and it is open to an agriculturist debtor to avail himself of that benefit in suits instituted after the passing of the Act by claiming reduction of interest in the suit itself. If he omits to avail himself of that benefit and allows a decree to be passed he cannot, in accordance with the provisions of S. 11, Civil P.C., be allowed to raise the question of interest over again after the passing of the decree. There is nothing in Chap. If he omits to avail himself of that benefit and allows a decree to be passed he cannot, in accordance with the provisions of S. 11, Civil P.C., be allowed to raise the question of interest over again after the passing of the decree. There is nothing in Chap. 4 which in any way abrogates the provision of s. 11 and this is an additional reason for confining the operation of cl. (2) of S. 30 only to decrees passed before the Act came into force. To put the matter in another way. The Legislature by S. 28 and sub-cl. (1) of S. 30 made provision for favourable rate of interest as regards loans for the recovery of which suits may be brought after the passing of the Act. But there may have been decrees passed against agriculturists before the Act came into force and relief was intended to be given to agriculturists with respect to such decrees. It was with a view to make provision for such decrees that clause (2) of S. 30 was enacted as but for that clause the agriculturist debtor would have been barred by the principle of res judicata from claiming reduction of interest. I, therefore, hold that sub-cl. (2) of S. 30 is applicable only to decrees passed on the date that the Act came into force and not to decrees passed thereafter, Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi also claimed the benefit of S. 4 of the Act. Clause (1) of S. 4 runs as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in the CPC 1908, the rate at which future interest may be allowed in any decree for payment of money or for sale in default of payment of money or for foreclosure or in any order for grant of instalments passed against an agriculturist shall not exceed the rate notified by the Local Government in the Gazette under sub-s. (2) as in force at the time when the decree or order, as the case may be, is passed. 18. This clause is mandatory and it is not permissible for a Court to award future interest as against an agriculturist in violation of the provisions of that clause. In the case before us, the Court below had ample jurisdiction to bring its decree in the matter of future interest in conformity with the provisions of that clause. 18. This clause is mandatory and it is not permissible for a Court to award future interest as against an agriculturist in violation of the provisions of that clause. In the case before us, the Court below had ample jurisdiction to bring its decree in the matter of future interest in conformity with the provisions of that clause. This the Court below could do in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to rectify the mistake committed by it at the time of passing the decree. For the reasons given above, I would allow this application in revision, set aside the order of the lower Court, convert the decree dated 8th July 1938, passed against Shri Nath and Harbansi into an instalment decree and modify the original decree only as regards future interest if it offends against the provisions of S. 4 of the Act. I would allow costs of this application to Shri Nath applicant. Braund, J. 19. The facts are sufficiently set out in the reference itself. The only material ones for the present purpose are that the borrowers in this case were father and son, were admittedly members of a joint Hindu family and the father's name alone was entered in the revenue records as the holder of the ancestral land of the family. On these facts the revision has been referred to us on three questions. I state them in my own language: "(1) Whether a member of a joint Hindu family can rank as an agriculturist within the meaning of S. 2(2), United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1934, (hereinafter called the Act), notwithstanding that the land of the family is entered in the revenue records only in the name or names of one or more of the other members of the family; (2) whether an agriculturist debtor can ask for relief under S. 5 of the Act (i.e. for satisfaction by instalments of a decree passed on the debt) in a case in which the suit on the debt has been brought since the date of the coming into force of the Act, that is to say 30th April 1937; and (3) whether an agriculturist debtor can apply for relief under S. 30(2) of the Act (i.e., for reduction of interest) in the case of a decree on the debt passed after the date of the coming into force of the Act." 20. The first of these questions is not altogether free from difficulty. We have no material before us from which we can tell what was the gross land revenue payable in respect of the family land, nor do we know the aliquot shares of the members of the family. But that, in the view I take, is not material. I begin by setting out the relevant sections of the Act itself. An "agriculturist" is defined by S. 2(2) of the Act. Six categories are included in the definition and it has to be noticed that they are all described as "persons" who either "pay" certain maximum amounts of land revenue, rates or rent or who "hold" land of a particular description and of a particular value. The first class is the class of "persons who pay" land revenue: Agriculturist means, in all sections of the Act where the term is used-(a) a person who, in districts not subject to the Benares Permanent Settlement Regulation 1 of 1795, pays land revenue not exceeding Rs. 1000 per annum; or....... 21. There then follow three provisos to the whole definition. The first proviso, in effect, says that in respect of certain provisions of the Act, among which are included the provisions for allowing payment by instalments (Ss. 3 and 5) and the provisions for reducing interest (Ss. 28 and 30 of ch. 4), the limits of land revenue, rates, rent and area shall not apply; in short, that every one who pays land revenue, rates, rent, etc., of, or who holds the land shall be entitled to the benefit of those particular provisions of the Act. Proviso 2 is not material to our present purpose, but the third one is. It provides that: ... if a non-agriculturist joins with an agriculturist in any transaction of loan, save for the purpose of adding his name as security, the agriculturist shall not be considered as such for the purpose of that transaction. 22. Finally, there come a series of explanations the second of which is the relevant one: Explanation 2. - In the case of members of a joint Hindu family or joint owners or joint tenants each member or owner or tenant shall be considered to be an agriculturist for the purposes of Chapters 2 (except Ss. 22. Finally, there come a series of explanations the second of which is the relevant one: Explanation 2. - In the case of members of a joint Hindu family or joint owners or joint tenants each member or owner or tenant shall be considered to be an agriculturist for the purposes of Chapters 2 (except Ss. 3, 4, 5 and 8), 3 and 6, whose share or interest in revenue, local rate, or rent free land, as the case may be, does not respectively exceed the aforesaid limits. 23. The whole question, therefore, reduces itself to my mind to whether, having regard to Expln. 2, a joint Hindu family, which owns land but all the members of which are not individually entered in the revenue records, can be said collectively to be a 'person" who "pays" or "holds" as the case may be. At first sight, I was much inclined to take the view that the noticeable omission from Expln. 2 of Ss. 3 and 5 and chap. 4 of the Act meant that, for the purposes of those omitted sections, individual members of a family and individual joint owners or tenants were not to be treated as "agriculturists," whereas for the purpose of those sections which were not omitted they were to be so treated. That I think was the view taken by a Bench of two Judges of this Court in Allahabad Bank Ltd. Vs. Prakash Nath, AIR 1938 All 12 The late Sir Shah Sulaiman C.J. and Harries J. there seem to express this view in these words: This explanation makes it clear that for certain purposes each member of a joint Hindu family or each joint owner or joint tenant may apply for certain benefits conferred by the Act. But on the other hand, this explanation makes it equally clear that each member of a joint family or joint owner or joint tenant cannot claim the benefits conferred by S. 5 of the Act or by S. 30 which is one of the sections in Chap. 4, because S. 5 and Chap. 4 are expressly excluded in this explanation..... 24. On reflection, however, with respect, I do not think that this view is the right one on the true construction of S. 2(2) of the Act. As I have already said, the whole question turns on whether in the circumstances predicated and in spite of Expln. 4, because S. 5 and Chap. 4 are expressly excluded in this explanation..... 24. On reflection, however, with respect, I do not think that this view is the right one on the true construction of S. 2(2) of the Act. As I have already said, the whole question turns on whether in the circumstances predicated and in spite of Expln. 2, the whole family (i.e., in this case, both the father and the son) can be regarded collectively as a "person," who pays land revenue, or whether only the father whose name is entered in the revenue records be so regarded. If the former alternative is the true one, then no "non-agriculturist" joined in this loan and proviso 3 did not apply. Now, s. 2(2) having defined the eight classes of "persons" who are agriculturists, enlarges that class, for the purposes of certain sections of chap. 2 and of Chaps. 4 and 5 only, by proviso 1 by removing from them the limits of land revenue, rates, rent and area. At that stage, therefore, there are two classes of agriculturists: one, for the purpose of certain sections of chap. 2 and Chaps. 4 and 5, an "unlimited class;" the other for the purpose of the remaining sections, a "limited class." But, in either case, they must still be "persons." 25. Now, it seems to me that so far as the "limited" class and the sections in respect of which they were limited are concerned, even if a collective joint Hindu family was included in the definition of an 'agriculturist,' it would be wholly immaterial what their divided interests were, because the divided interests must necessarily be less than the undivided estate on the principle that part is less than the whole. But, if a collective joint Hindu family is included in the definition of an 'agriculturist,' then so far as such a family is concerned in respect of those parts of chap. 2 which are not included in proviso l and in respect of chaps. 3 and 4 (which are also not included in that proviso) it became highly material to add something to the definition, because, if nothing is added, a case might arise in which a joint Hindu family collectively owned land exceeding the pecuniary limits, or the limits of area as the case may be, but in which the individual aliquot shares came within those limits. In that case it would be necessary to "explain" that the individual members of the family were to be entitled to the benefits of the excluded sections, notwithstanding that the interest of the whole family exceeded the limits. That is, of course, based on the assumption that the word "person" does include a joint Hindu family. And, that to my mind, is exactly what Expln. 2 does. It "explains" that for the purpose of the excluded sections (i.e., the sections excluded from proviso l) the assessment of value or area as the case may be shall, in the case of a joint Hindu family, be upon the individual interests. That, I think, clearly shows that Expln. 2 does recognize in terms that the definition in S. 2(2) includes a joint Hindu family. In the case of the non-excluded sections (i.e., the sections which are included in proviso 1) the question does not arise, because there is no limit either on the family or on anyone else. To put this shortly, I think that Expln. 2 has been introduced into S. 2(2) for the purpose of explaining that individual members of a family who would qualify on their individual interests are not to be excluded from the benefit of the definition in relation to those sections where the limit still remains. And that can only be consistent with the word "person" in S. 2(2), prima facie, including a joint Hindu family. I think that this is" what Bennet J., meant when he said in Kedar Prasad and Others Vs. Suraj Narain Sinha, AIR 1938 All 12 8 ...It is only in the case of a Hindu joint family where the rent paid by the joint family exceeds the Rs. 500 in this sub-s. (f) that recourse is necessary under Expl.2, and if an individual member of a Hindu joint family does not exceed the limit of Rs. 500 for his share of the rent then he would be entitled to the benefit of the various sections of the Act other than those excepted by Expl. 2... 26. I confess that I found it difficult at first to understand the reasoning of that passage. But I think it becomes clear when it is remembered that Expl. 500 for his share of the rent then he would be entitled to the benefit of the various sections of the Act other than those excepted by Expl. 2... 26. I confess that I found it difficult at first to understand the reasoning of that passage. But I think it becomes clear when it is remembered that Expl. 2 is only necessary (a) because of proviso l and in relation to the sections excluded from it and (b) on the footing that, ex hypothesi, a joint Hindu family is included in the definition. The construction in no way strains the word "person" indeed; it is more consistent with it than any other because, under the United Provinces General Clauses Act, a "person" includes an "association...of individuals." A joint Hindu family is an "association of individuals." I should perhaps add that I find no difficulty in treating the land revenue paid as being "paid" by all members of the family, once it is established that the family is a "person" within the definition and notwithstanding that the actual hand which pays it is that of one member only. For these reasons I agree in thinking that the first question before us should be answered in the affirmative. I have not referred in this judgment to the other authorities cited to us Bangali Mal Vs. Bansidhar and Another, AIR 1939 All 391 Nannoo Mal and Others Vs. Hoti Lal and Others, AIR 1937 All 645 Nannoo Mal v. Hoti Lal and ('41) 28 AIR 1941 Oudh 124 : 191 IC 784 : 16 Luck 500 : 1940 OWN 1219, Raza Husain v. Shankery Saran, as they do not, I think, carry the matter any further. 27. The second question does not, I think, present any great difficulty. Sections 3 and 5 of the Act both deal with the power of the Court to order satisfaction of a decree by instalments. Section 3 deals in terms with what the Court may do "at the time of passing the decree." It may of its own motion order payment by instalments and, if the defendant agriculturist so applies, it must so order unless it records reasons to the contrary. Section 5 deals with what the Court is to do, "on the application of the judgment-debtor and after notice to the decree-holder." It must order payment by instalments, unless it records reasons to the contrary. Section 5 deals with what the Court is to do, "on the application of the judgment-debtor and after notice to the decree-holder." It must order payment by instalments, unless it records reasons to the contrary. It is, I think, plain that S. 5 is intended to catch, and does catch, an application in every case where that application is not made under S. 3 "at the time of passing a decree." It applies to every application in relation to a subsisting decree as opposed to one about to be passed. I can see no difference in this respect between an application to modify a decree passed in a suit brought before the passing of the Act and one passed in a suit brought after the passing of the Act. It is true, that in the latter case, a defendant might neglect to apply under S. 3 at the time of the passing of the decree and yet still be entitled to apply under S. 5 later. It is conceivable that in certain circumstances that might provide some "reason" against granting the application but the mere fact that this dual opportunity exists is, in my view, no reason for construing S. 5 otherwise than in accordance with the plain meaning of the words it uses. Nor do I think that any question of the principle of "res judicata" arises, as S. 5 is expressly prefaced by the words "notwithstanding anything contained in the CPC 1908." In my view, this question should be answered in the affirmative. 28. The third and last question arises under S. 30 of the Act. Section 30 is a sequel to S. 28. Section 28 deals with rates of interest on a loan taken by an agriculturist after the Act came into force. Section 30 deals with rates of interest on a loan taken before the Act came into force. Sub-section (1) of each section says that no debtor on such classes of loans respectively shall pay more than the rate specified as apporpriate to it. Section 30 deals with rates of interest on a loan taken before the Act came into force. Sub-section (1) of each section says that no debtor on such classes of loans respectively shall pay more than the rate specified as apporpriate to it. If a loan is taken after the Act comes into force, there is no difficulty because, whatever the contract says when it comes to enforcing it, interests can only be given at the specified rate or less, and any decree on the loan must necessarily so provide; if, however, the loan was taken before the Act came into force, more than one set of circumstances may apply. The rate of interest recoverable can only be the rate, or less than the rate, specified in S. 30(1). If a suit was brought on the loan and a decree passed prior to 30th April 1935, no difficulty occurs, because that case is obviously provided for by sub-S. (2) of section 30: (2) If a decree has already been passed on the basis of a loan and remains unsatisfied in whole or in part, the Court which passed the decree shall on the application of the judgment-debtor amend it by reducing, in accordance with the provisions of sub-S. (1), the amount decreed on account of interest. 29. That sub-section was plainly necessary to bring the case of a decree already passed when the Act came into force into line with the retrospective provisions of the Act. The next case is the one where a suit was started before the Act came into force, but the decree was passed afterwards. And the third case is when both the suit and the decree were started and passed respectively after the Act came into force. Logically I think there should be no difference between these two cases for, in both of them, the Court has an opportunity of giving effect to the retrospective provisions of the Act at the time of the passing of the decree, which ex hypothesi will have been after the Act has come into force. It has to be observed in this connexion that a 'locus penitentia' was provided by the Act itself between the date of the assent of the Governor-General and the date it came into force, such last mentioned date being fixed subsequently by notification. It has to be observed in this connexion that a 'locus penitentia' was provided by the Act itself between the date of the assent of the Governor-General and the date it came into force, such last mentioned date being fixed subsequently by notification. There was therefore no reason why effect should not be given to its provisions in every decree passed after the Act came into force. The question really turns on the words: "If a decree has already been passed..." in sub-s. (2), and, in particular, on the word "already." In this Court the view has been taken in several cases that the word "already" denotes any time before the actual application for reduction of interest is made, whether the decree was passed before or after the Act came into force and irrespective of when the suit was started: see Baryar Singh Vs. Ram Dularay, AIR 1937 All 96 , Narain Singh Vs. Banke Behari Lal and Hafiz Abdul Noor Vs. Sahu Brij Mohan Saran If I may venture to make, with great respect, a comment on these three cases, it is that they all appear to me to proceed a good deal more on the supposed intention of the Legislature than on the language of the statute itself. To take the words of Bennet J. in the first of these cases: ...Another reason which leads me to this view is that the Legislature intended to grant relief to agricultural tenants, and there is no reason why it should refuse relief to persons whose decrees were passed after the Act came into force.... and, again, the late Sir John Thom in the second of these cases observes: It is clear, however, in my judgment that the policy of the Legislature was to give relief to all debtors against whom decrees were passed on the basis of loans either before or after the Act came into operation.... 30. And the same view is taken by Harries and Rachhpal Singh JJ. in Hafiz Abdul Noor Vs. 30. And the same view is taken by Harries and Rachhpal Singh JJ. in Hafiz Abdul Noor Vs. Sahu Brij Mohan Saran With great respect to these learned Judges, I do not think that, on the opposite and in my opinion, more natural construction, the intention of the Legislature will by any means have been defeated or even obstructed for, as I have already pointed out, in every case in which a decree is passed after the Act came into force, the Court itself will have had both the duty and the opportunity to give effect to its provisions. I am not impressed by the argument that it is possible to conceive a case in which "per incuriam" the Court might have omitted to do so, through ignorance of the provisions of the Act: Baryar Singh Vs. Ram Dularay, AIR 1937 All 96 and Shaikh Reyasat and Others Vs. Gopi Nath Missir and Others, AIR 1939 Patna 122 . In my view, the safer way of approaching the question is to take the words: "If a decree has already been passed..." and to ask oneself what in their grammatical sense they mean. Bennet J., in the same case, has answered this question in this way: According to the laws of grammar the interpretation of 'has already been passed' should refer to some point of time indicated in the sub-section itself. 31. I respectfully agree with that, but I find it difficult to go further and to agree that the only "point of time indicated by the subsection" is the point of time at which the application is made. It seems to me that, in relation to an adverb of time such as 'already' or 'now' the obvious point of time prima facie indicated is the time from which the statute speaks. It is, I think, a proper principle of construction that, in the absence of some compelling indication to the contrary, an adverb of time has reference to the present and, in relation to a statute, to the time from which the statute speaks. It is, I think, a proper principle of construction that, in the absence of some compelling indication to the contrary, an adverb of time has reference to the present and, in relation to a statute, to the time from which the statute speaks. In an English case in which an identical point arose as to the construction of the word "already" in a statute, Kekewich J. in a useful passage, took the same view: (1906) 2 Ch D 270 : 75 LJ Ch 595 : 95 LT 129 : 4 LGR 787 : 22 TLR 631, Godden v. Hythe Burial Board. He says: We are not dealing with a 'technical' word but with a word in common use in the English language and it is one which has no technical meaning whatever. The rule in such cases is to construe the word according to its popular and colloquial meaning. What is the meaning of the word 'already' in the popular or colloquial sense? It means' at this time,' or 'now,' Reading the Act through, it reads thus: 'No ground not now used as or appropriated for a cemetery.' That 'now' can only mean, it seems to me, at the date of the passing of the Act. There is no 'now' with reference to an Act of Parliament except the date when it receives the royal assent. There might possibly be an exception where the coming into operation of the Act is deferred: but, as at present advised, I do not think even that would alter it. 'Now' it seems to me, points to the date when the Act in which the word is used becomes an Act, that is, when it receives the royal assent. I see nothing in the authorities which have been cited to make me think that that is otherwise than perfectly correct. The point is not decided but the authorities, I think, point to that conclusion. 32. Adopting the same reasoning, I confess to starting with a strong prejudice in favour of construing the word "already" in S. 30(2) of the Act as referring, in its ordinary grammatical sense, to the date when the Act came into force, and not to any date when an application might happen to be made. I appreciate that this construction might have to yield to any compelling context to the contrary. I appreciate that this construction might have to yield to any compelling context to the contrary. But, notwithstanding the cases in this Court to the contrary, I find none. I do not think that the intention of the Act is defeated by this construction, because as a practical matter, in every case in which a decree has been passed after the Act came into force, the opportunity, and the duty, were present for the Court to give the relief which the Act prescribes. That opportunity was not however present in a case in which the decree was passed prior to the coming into force of the Act. Moreover, the position of sub-S. (2) of S. 30 of the Act as a sub-section of S. 30 only and not as a separate provision applying to both Ss. 28 and 30 is, as the learned Chief Justice has pointed out, a strong indication in favour of the same view. 33. It is possible to suggest that this construction somewhat contradicts our own construction adopted in relation to the second question before us that, in respect of S. 5 of the Act, it is open to a judgment-debtor to apply under that section to reopen a decree whenever passed. But, when considered, there is no contradiction. Sections 3 and 5 of the Act, deal with the right of the Court to grant payment by instalments. Sections 28 and 30 of the Act, deal with the obligation of the Court to reduce interest. There is, to my mind, a world of difference between these two things. In the former case, the decree-holder is deprived of nothing, except that his right to take steps in execution is deferred. In the latter case, the decree-holder suffers a positive diminution of what is due to him under the decree and, it may be a very substantial loss. The former is a matter of procedure, the latter a matter of substance. And it is for this reason that the Legislature may very well, in a matter of actually depriving a decree-holder of what is due to him under his decree, have determined that that should be settled whenever possible by the Court which passed the decree and at the time of passing it, whereas, in a case of merely postponing payment, it might be dealt with at any time. Moreover, it has to be remembered that a judgment-debtor's circumstances may change from time to time and that it might well happen that he was compelled by circumstances to apply for payment by instalments long after the decree is passed. In the case of an application for reduction of interest, on the other hand, it is a matter which can be dealt with once and for all when the decree is passed and is not in any sense discretionary. It is regulated by the Act and the debtor's rights do not vary with his circumstances in the least degree. 34. For these reasons I agree with the decision of the Full Bench of the Chief Court in Oudh in AIR 1940 251 (Oudh) in preference to the authorities of our own Court, with which respectfully I find myself unable to concur. In my judgment, therefore, the answer to the third question propounded to us should be that an agriculturist debtor can apply for relief under S. 30(2), U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1934, only in a case in which the decree was already passed at the date of the coming into force of that Act. I think, therefore, that this revision should be allowed and I concur in the order proposed to be passed by the Court. Dar, J. 35. This is a revision against a judgment dated 23rd April 1938, of the Civil Judge of Etawah by which he rejected an application under Ss. 5 and 30, Agriculturists' Relief Act, for reducing the interest awarded in a decree and for the payment of the said decree by instalments. On 7th July 1934, Shri Nath and his wife Mt. Harbansi Kuer executed a promissory note in favour of Puran Mal for Rs. 100 bearing interest at 2 per cent. Per mensem. On 26th November 1934, the said two persons executed another promissory note in favour of the same creditor for RS. 150 bearing again interest at 2 per cent. per mensem. On 30th April 1935, the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (27 of 1934) came into force and after the Act came into force, on 9th April 1936 Puran Mal raised an action against Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi Kuer for the recovery of Rs. 150 bearing again interest at 2 per cent. per mensem. On 30th April 1935, the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (27 of 1934) came into force and after the Act came into force, on 9th April 1936 Puran Mal raised an action against Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi Kuer for the recovery of Rs. 341-8.0 due on the said promissory notes and on 8th July 1936 an ex parte decree was passed in favour of Puran Mal against Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi Kuer. On 5th October 1936 Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi Kuer made an application under Ss. 5 and 30, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act for converting the ex parte decree of 8th July 1936 into an instalment decree and for reducing the amount of interest awarded in the said decree. It is not clear to me whether the future interest awarded in the ex parte decree is in accordance with the terms of sec. 4, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, or whether the future interest awarded by the decree is also excessive and open to objection under S. 4 of the Act. This application was opposed by the creditor and by a judgment dated 23rd September 1938, the learned Judge rejected this application. The learned Judge has found that Shri Nath one of the applicants before him, was a member of a joint Hindu family with his father Rustam Singh and the joint Hindu family owned zamindari property which paid Government revenue but the property was recorded in the name of Rustam Singh alone and Shri Nath's name did not appear in the khewat. The learned Judge therefore held that Shri Nath although a coparcener in the property, could not be regarded as an "agriculturist.' within the meaning of the Agriculturists' Relief Act, The learned Judge further found that Mt. Harbansi Kuer and Rustam Singh were both agriculturists within the meaning of the Act, and Mt. Harbansi Kuer alone as an agriculturist was entitled to make an application but inasmuch as in the loan transaction which took place in 1934 Mt. Harbansi Kuer's husband Shri Nath who could not be regarded as an agriculturist had joined in the transaction, Mt. Harbansi Kuer also was not entitled to make the application. Harbansi Kuer alone as an agriculturist was entitled to make an application but inasmuch as in the loan transaction which took place in 1934 Mt. Harbansi Kuer's husband Shri Nath who could not be regarded as an agriculturist had joined in the transaction, Mt. Harbansi Kuer also was not entitled to make the application. He accordingly rejected the application of both the applicants and against this judgment this revision has been made and, on account of conflict of authority which exists over a portion of the case, the matter has been referred to this Bench. 36. Three questions arise for consideration in this case. The first is whether a Hindu coparcener who has an interest in a joint Hindu family but whose name is not recorded in the khewat can or cannot be regarded as an "agriculturist" within the meaning of the Agriculturists' Relief Act provided that joint family as a whole or its individual members satisfy the test laid down in the Agriculturists' Relief Act for being regarded as an agriculturist? The second question is whether in a decree passed in a loan taken after the Agriculturists' Relief Act had come into force, if at the time of the passing of the decree instalments were not asked for by the agriculturist, is it open to an agriculturist after the decree had been passed to apply for its being converted into an instalment decree? And the third question is whether in a loan taken after the Act had come into force if an agriculturist allows a decree to be passed against him without raising any question of excessive interest, can he ask after the decree had been passed, for amendment of decree and reduction of interest under S. 30, cl. (2) of the Act? The first matter which falls for consideration is whether Shri Nath can be regarded as an "agriculturist" within the meaning of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. It is admitted that Shri Nath and his father Rustam Singh both are members of a joint Hindu family and that the father and son both own joint family property as coparceners, but it is recorded in the name of Rustam Singh alone in the khewat and the revenue of the family property is also paid in the name of Rustam Singh alone. The question, therefore, arises, can a Hindu coparcener who has got an interest in the family property, though undefined and who pays a proportionate revenue to the Government for his unascertained share but in the name of the karta of the family be regarded as an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act or not? The term "agriculturist" for the purpose of the Agriculturists' Relief Act has been interpreted in S. 2, cl. (2) of the Act and the interpretation, so far as it is relevant for the purpose of this case, is as follows: 'Agriculturist' means, in all sections of the Act where the term is used....(a) a person who, in districts not subject to the Benares Permantent Settlement Regulation 1 of 1795, pays land revenue not exceeding Rs. 1000 per annum or, (b) a person who, in district subject to the Benares Permanent Settlement Regulation 1 of 1795 pays a local rate under S. 109 of the District Boards Act, 10 of 1922, not execeding Rs. 120 per annum or, (c) a person holding land free of revenue who pays a local rate under S. 109, District Boards Act, 10 of 1922, not exceeding Rs. 120 per annum or, (d) in Oudh an under-proprietor holding a sub-settlement of land the revenue of which does not exceed Rs. 1000 per annum or (e) a thekadar who holds a theka of land the revenue of which does not exceed Rs. 1000 per annum or, (f) a person other than a thekadar or an under-proprietor in Oudh holding a sub-settlement who pays rent for agricultural land not exceeding Rs. 500 per annum or (g) a person holding land free of rent, the area of which does not exceed living outside the limits of any municipality who belongs to any of the classes of persons mentioned in Sch. 1. Provided that in Ss. 2(10)(a), 3, 4, 5, 8 and Chaps. 4 and 5 an "agriculturist" means also a person who would belong to a class of persona mentioned in parts (a) to (g) of this sub-section if the limits of land revenue, local rates, rent and area mentioned in these parts were omitted: * * * * * Explanation 2. 2(10)(a), 3, 4, 5, 8 and Chaps. 4 and 5 an "agriculturist" means also a person who would belong to a class of persona mentioned in parts (a) to (g) of this sub-section if the limits of land revenue, local rates, rent and area mentioned in these parts were omitted: * * * * * Explanation 2. In the case of members of a joint Hindu family or joint owners or joint tenants each member or owner or tenant shall be considered to be an agriculturist for the purposes of Chapters 2 (except Ss. 3, 4, 5 and 8), 3 and 6, whose share or interest in revenue, local rate or rent or the rent-free land as the case may be, does not respectively exceed the aforesaid limits. 37. It will be noticed that for the purposes of the interpretation of the word 'agriculturists' the statute draws no distinction between coparcener of a joint Hindu family, or joint owners or joint tenants or even between tenants in common or holders of property whose revenue or rent collectively assessed and between tenants in common and individual owners or holders whose revenue or rent is assessed individually. If therefore all the members of a joint Hindu family happen to be recorded in the khewat or khatauni as owners or if all the joint owners, or joint tenants or tenants in common happen to be recorded in the khewat or in the khatauni the mere fact that revenue or rent is jointly assessed against these coparceners, owners or tenants would not prevent each one of such recorded owner or tenant to be regarded as an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act. If therefore a coparcener or a joint owner or a joint tenant whose name happens to he recorded in the khewat or khatauni can be regarded as an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act, is there any reason for excluding a coparcener or joint owner or joint tenant whose name does not happen to be recorded in the khewat or khatauni, though in fact he has an interest in the property and with reference to his interest he pays rent or revenue, as the case may be, in the name of his cosharer? The statute, no doubt enjoins that "agriculturist" means a person who pays land revenue but in my opinion this condition is satisfied in the case of a joint Hindu family holding property with regard to each member, irrespective of the fact whether the property is recorded in the name of some or in the name of all the members of the family and irrespective of the fact whether it is recorded in the name of the karta alone and the Government revenue is paid in his name. 38. It is now contended that this interpretation of the section is opposed to Expl. 2 to S. 2, cl. 2 of the Act. It becomes therefore necessary to examine the interpretation clause of the statute as I have set out above in its entirety. The primary object of the Agriculturists' Relief Act was to grant relief to small landholders and tenants and to certain class of village community who do not pay land revenue or rent exceeding a fixed limit. The Act therefore provides that this class of agriculturists will have the benefit of the entire Act and they are the persons who are described in S. 2(2), cls. (a) to (h) of the Act. The second object of the statute was also to give relief to large landholders and tenants in certain specified matters, for instance, in granting instalments for the payment of loan and in reducing interest on loans, and for this purpose proviso l was added to S. 2(2) of the Act which enjoins that for Ss. 2(10)(a), 3, 4, 5 and 8 and Chaps. 4 and 5 an "agriculturist" means a person who pays revenue or rent exceeding the limits specified in cls. (a) to (g). The result of this proviso was that large landholders also became entitled to the benefit of certain specified sections of chap. 2 and of Chaps. 4 and 5 and coparceners of a joint Hindu family and joint owners also became entitled to the benefit of this proviso irrespective of the amount of revenue which was paid by the family and irrespective of the fact whether revenue was paid collectively or individually. But with regard to other reliefs granted by the Agriculturists' Relief Act, viz., those contained in chap. 2, Ss. 6 and 7 and in chaps. But with regard to other reliefs granted by the Agriculturists' Relief Act, viz., those contained in chap. 2, Ss. 6 and 7 and in chaps. 3 and 6, the relief was confined to small landholders and tenants who are specified in cls, (a) to (h) of S. 2, sub-s. (2). 39. Now, in a case of a joint Hindu family, or joint owners or joint tenants the collective revenue paid by the entire body may have exceeded the limit prescribed by cls. (a) to (g) but if the revenue or rent was to be apportioned upon coparceners or joint owners or joint tenants according to their share, then the revenue or rent thus apportioned and falling to individual share may have been within the limit prescribed by cls. (a) to (g). In such a case the Legislature thought that the coparceners of a joint Hindu family or joint owners or joint tenants should be given an opportunity to apportion the revenue or rent to the respective share and if by such apportionment the limit provided in cls. (a) to (g) was not exceeded then the coparceners and the joint owners or joint tenants individually should be allowed to take benefit of sections 6 and 7 of chap. 2 and of chap. 3 and of Chap. 6 also of the Act like other small landholders or tenants. In order to enable the coparceners or joint owners or joint tenants to apportion the collective revenue and rent into a separate revenue or rent so as to bring it within the limits of cls. (a) to (g) of S. 2(2), Expl. 2 of the statute was enacted. In my opinion Expl. 2 only applies when a joint owner or a joint tenant or a Hindu coparcener wants to take proceedings under chap. 2, Ss. 6 and 7 or Chap. 3 and chap. 6 of the Act and it has no application whatever when a Hindu coparcener or a joint owner or joint tenant is taking proceedings under chap. 2, Ss. 3, 4, 5 and 8 or under chaps. 4 and 5 of the Act. I am further of opinion that Expl. 2 should not be read as an independent proviso and it should not be read as in any way controlling or modifying proviso 1 of S. 2(2), Agriculturists' Relief Act. In Sheo Shanker Das and Another Vs. 2, Ss. 3, 4, 5 and 8 or under chaps. 4 and 5 of the Act. I am further of opinion that Expl. 2 should not be read as an independent proviso and it should not be read as in any way controlling or modifying proviso 1 of S. 2(2), Agriculturists' Relief Act. In Sheo Shanker Das and Another Vs. Mohammad Hasan, AIR 1937 All 633 Sheo Shanker Das v. Mohammad Hasan Sulaiman C.J. and Bennet J. in speaking of relation of explanation to provisos in S. 2(2) of the Act observed: It follows that applications which are governed by Chaps. 4 and 5 are completely covered by the proviso and not affected by the explanation. 40. In my opinion this is a correct statement of law. If an application is covered by proviso 1 of S. 2(2), Expln. 2 to S. 2(2) has got no application. There has been undoubtedly some conflict of authority as to the interpretation of Expl. 2 to S. 2(2) of the Act. In Allahabad Bank Ltd. Vs. Prakash Nath, AIR 1938 All 12 Allahabad Bank Ltd., Meerut v. Prakash Nath, Sulaiman C.J. and Harries J. interpreted Expl. 2 to S. 2(2) as laying down that members of a joint Hindu family were to be, regarded as agriculturists for purposes of Chap. 2, Ss. 6 and 7 and chaps. 3 and 6 alone and for other provisions in the Act junior members of a joint Hindu family were not to be regarded as agriculturists. In Kedar Prasad and Others Vs. Suraj Narain Sinha, AIR 1938 All 12 8 held that a joint Hindu family was to be regarded as an agriculturist within the meaning of S. 2(f), Agriculturists' Relief Act. That was a case of an occupancy tenancy in which two out of three members of the family were recorded in khatauni as tenants and the question arose whether the third member whose name did not appear in the khatauni could also be regarded as an agriculturist and Bennet J. answered the question in favour of the third member. In ('41) 28 AIR 1941 Oudh 124 : 191 IC 784 : 16 Luck 500 : 1940 OWN 1219, Raza Husain v. Shankery Saran a Hindu son whose name did not appear in the khewat but whose father's name did appear applied for benefit of Ss. In ('41) 28 AIR 1941 Oudh 124 : 191 IC 784 : 16 Luck 500 : 1940 OWN 1219, Raza Husain v. Shankery Saran a Hindu son whose name did not appear in the khewat but whose father's name did appear applied for benefit of Ss. 5 and 30, Agriculturists' Relief Act, and Yorke J. in deciding in his favour held: Section 2(2), Expl. 2 only restricts the benefit of Chap. 2 (except Ss. 3, 4, 5 and 8) and 3 and 6 to such members of a joint Hindu family as fulfil the conditions as to limit of rent, revenue and local rates laid down in cls. (a) to (g), bat it does not lay down that such members, if their rent and revenue exceeds the limits so prescribed, have no right to avail the provisions of the other portion of the Act which right they have been expressly given by proviso 2 to S. 2(2). 41. In Bangali Mal Vs. Bansidhar and Another, AIR 1939 All 391 a father and son had joined in a mortgage and later on both applied under S. 30, Agriculturists' Relief Act; the son's name did not appear in the khewat and it was contended that the son could not be regarded as an agriculturist and by the father joining the son in the loan transaction the entire application had become incompetent. Iqbal Ahmad and Bajpai JJ. did not regard the son as a non-agriculturist and held that father as karta was competent to make the application. On facts, some of these may be distinguished but no useful purpose will be served by discussing them at length. I have given my interpretation of the statute and if there is anything in the above cases which is inconsistent with what I have said above, then, with all respect, I cannot agree. In my opinion therefore Shri Nath has to be regarded as an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act. I now pass on to consider whether the ex parte decree which was passed on 8th July 1936, against Shri Nath and Mt. Harbansi Kuer, can be converted into an instalment decree in spite of the fact that Shri Nath and Mr. Harbansi Kuer had an opportunity to pray for instalments when the ex parte decree was passed but did not do so. Section 5, cl. Harbansi Kuer, can be converted into an instalment decree in spite of the fact that Shri Nath and Mr. Harbansi Kuer had an opportunity to pray for instalments when the ex parte decree was passed but did not do so. Section 5, cl. (1), Agriculturists' Relief Act is as follows: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 5 of 1908, the Court shall, unless for reasons to be recorded it directs otherwise at any time on the application of the judgment-debtor and after notice to the decree-holder, direct that any decree for money or preliminary decree for sale or foreclosure passed by it or by any Court whose business has been transferred to it against an agriculturist, whether before or after this Act comes into force shall be converted into a decree for payment by instalments drawn up in such terms as it thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of S. 3. 42. This section reads that: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court shall....direct that any decree for money...passed by it.....against an agriculturist, whether before or after this Act comes into force, shall be converted into a decree for payment by instalments drawn up in such terms as it thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of S. 3. 43. It will be noticed that the section makes no distinction between a decree passed before the Act and after the Act came into force, it applies to both cases alike. It further enjoins that notwithstanding anything contained in the CPC (5 of 1908) the decree shall be converted into an instalment decree. In my opinion, there is no room for application of the rule of res judicata to a case and the section applies also to decrees passed after the Act came into force and to those cases also where the agriculturists had an opportunity to pray for instalments at the time of the passing of the decree but had neglected to do so. It remains now to consider whether under S. 30 it is open to the Court to amend a decree with regard to interest when the decree was passed after the Act came into force on a loan which was taken after the Act came into force and about which the agriculturist had an opportunity to claim reduction at the time of the passing of the decree but he failed or neglected to do so. Section 30, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, is as follows: (1) Notwithstanding anything in any contract to the contrary no debtor shall be liable to pay interest on a loan taken before this Act comes into force at a rate higher than that specified in Sch. 3 for the period from 1st January 1933 till such date as may be fixed by the Local Government in the Gazette in this behalf. (2) If a decree has already been passed on the basis of a loan and remains unsatisfied in whole or in part, the Court which passed the decree shall on the application of the judgment-debtor amend it by reducing in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (1) the amount decreed on account of interest. (3) A decree amended in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (2) shall he deemed to bear the date of the original decree, and notwithstanding any provision in any law to the contrary no appeal shall lie from any order amending a decree under that sub-section. (4) Any amount already received by the creditor on account of interest in excess of that due under this section shall be credited towards the principal but nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle a debtor to claim refund of any part of the interest already paid by him. 44. It is perfectly plain to me that, "if a decree has already been passed" in S. 30, cl. (2) means a decree which was passed before the Act came into force and this I would shortly put on three grounds. 44. It is perfectly plain to me that, "if a decree has already been passed" in S. 30, cl. (2) means a decree which was passed before the Act came into force and this I would shortly put on three grounds. Firstly, as a matter of construction that if a statute says that if a thing has already been done or if a fact has already taken place and there is nothing to show in the Act as to the point of time to which "already" refers, the presumption should be that a thing should be done and the fact should come into existence before the Act came into force. In England the word "already" has been judicially interpreted in cases arising under debentures and wills and settlements. These cases are noted in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and there is a judgment of a Court of appeal in England, (1906) 2 Ch D 270 : 75 LJ Ch 595 : 95 LT 129 : 4 LGR 787 : 22 TLR 631, Godden v. Hythe Burial Board, in which in interpreting the words in S. 9, Burial Act, 1855, it was held that the words "no ground not already used or appropriated for a cemetery" mean "used or appropriated" at the date of the passing of the Act. Secondly, cl. (2) of S. 30 directs to amend the decree "by reducing in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (1) the amount decreed on account of interest." The amendment therefore under sub-s. (2) has to be in accordance with sub-s. (1), and sub-s. (1) deals with a loan taken before the Act came into force and therefore it follows that a decree which has to be amended also should be on a loan taken before the Act came into force. Thirdly, sub-s. (2) is one of the clauses of S. 30 and the marginal note of S. 30 is "rate of interest on undecreed loans taken before this Act came into force for the period after 1st January 1935." Now it is true the marginal note cannot be taken into account in construing this section, but the section taken as a whole indicates that it is dealing with loans and decrees which came into existence before the Act came into force and the position of cl. (2) in the midst of S. 30, the subject-matter of which is loans taken prior to the Act came into force, is an argument in favour of the view that it is confined to decrees passed before the Act came into force. It is therefore quite clear to life that under S. 30, sub-s. (2) a decree which has been passed on a loan subsequent to the passing of the Act cannot be amended. But this does not dispose of the difficulty in the case. Sections 4(1) and 28(1), U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, are as follows: 4(1). Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 5 of 1908, the rate at which future interest may be allowed in any decree for payment of money or for sale in default of payment of money or for foreclosure or in any order for grant of instalments passed against an agriculturist shall not exceed the rate notified by the Local Government in the Gazette under sub S. (2) as in force at the time when the decree or order, as the case may be, is passed. 28(1). Notwithstanding anything in any contract no loan taken by an agriculturist after this Act came into force shall bear interest at a rate higher than that notified by the Local Government under sub-s. (2) as the prevailing rate of interest for the particular class of loan at the time the loan was-taken. 45. It will be noticed that S. 4 enjoins that future interest in any decree for payment of money against an agriculturist shall not exceed the rate notified by the Local Government and the wording of the section suggests that a duty is cast upon the Court to see that this limit is not exceeded and this notwithstanding anything contained in the CPC of 1908. Again S. 28(1) provides that no loan taken by an agriculturist after this Act came into force shall bear interest at a higher rate than notified' by the Government. The question, therefore, arises that if a decree of the Court contains future interest or past interest which offends against S. 4 or S. 28, Agriculturists' Relief Act, and the agriculturist comes before the Court, asking to amend the decree, so as to bring it in conformity with those sections on what principle you are going to bar the agriculturist? The question, therefore, arises that if a decree of the Court contains future interest or past interest which offends against S. 4 or S. 28, Agriculturists' Relief Act, and the agriculturist comes before the Court, asking to amend the decree, so as to bring it in conformity with those sections on what principle you are going to bar the agriculturist? It is said on the principles of res judicata, the agriculturist's claim should be barred. In Baryar Singh Vs. Ram Dularay, AIR 1937 All 96 and in Narain Singh Vs. Banke Behari Lal and in Hafiz Abdul Noor Vs. Sahu Brij Mohan Saran and Rachhpal Singh JJ. held that the doctrine of res judicata could not apply to a claim of an agriculturist for reduction of interest even in cases when loan and decree came into existence after the passing of the Act. In AIR 1940 251 (Oudh) and Radha Krishna JJ. held that the principle of res judicata should apply to a claim of an agriculturist of this nature. 46. The question is not free from difficulty. The doctrine of res judicata is in this country codified in S. 11, Civil P.C., (Act 5 of 1908); in terms that section cannot apply to proceedings under the Agriculturists' Relief Act. But there is, however, high authority for the view that principles of resjudicata apply in civil litigation to cases where in terms S. 11 does not apply, but we are here dealing with a special jurisdiction under a Special Act enacted for the relief of agriculturists, very often an ignorant and illiterate class. The statute under S. 4, Agriculturists Relief Act, enjoins that notwithstanding anything contained in the CPC (5 of 1908) future interest against an agriculturist shall be at a specified rate and a duty is cast upon the Court impliedly to give future interest at a notified rate" and the agriculturist has no reason to suppose that the Court will not do its duty. If the agriculturist has not appeared in Court to answer a claim of money and the Court by inadvertence passes a decree for a rate of interest exceeding that sanctioned by the statute is the agriculturist precluded from asking for rectification of the mistake in the decree? If the agriculturist has not appeared in Court to answer a claim of money and the Court by inadvertence passes a decree for a rate of interest exceeding that sanctioned by the statute is the agriculturist precluded from asking for rectification of the mistake in the decree? You may say that a judgment and decree, having been signed, cannot be altered except by a review, but I do not see how S. 11 or O. 20, R. 3, Civil P.C., which forbids the alteration of a judgment after it is signed when the whole of the CPC is excluded by S. 4 can bar the agriculturist and I feel also some difficulty in applying the rule of res judicata and the rule about the amendment of judgment and decree on general principles to their full extent in matters arising between a creditor and an agriculturist under the Agriculturists' Relief Act. 47. At the same time it was not contended at the bar and it is not possible to hold that the principle of res judicata can in no case apply between a creditor and an agriculturist with regard to the question of reduction of interest. Suppose an agriculturist appears before the Court and raises the question of interest and the claim is decided against him wholly or partly, then it should not be possible for the agriculturist to have the same matter tried over again by a separate application after the passing of the decree. This much Mr. Baleshwari Prasad concedes, who has appeared for the agriculturist before us, but he submits that this rule should not be extended any further and should not be applied to ex parte decrees for reduction of past interest under S. 28 and should certainly not be applied to applications for reduction of future interest under S. 4 when the decree offends against S. 4. With some hesitation I have come to the conclusion that in cases under S. 28 where the status of the debtor, whether he is an agriculturist or not, itself may be in dispute and where the proper rate of interest may also be in dispute the principle of res judicata should be applied and a decree once passed on a loan taken after the Act should not be reopened unless the bar of res judicata can be got rid of. But different considerations may arise with regard to reduction of future interest under S. 4, Agriculturists' Relief Act, in a decree passed on a loan after the Act came into force where the future rate of interest awarded in a decree offends against S. 4, Agriculturists' Relief Act. 48. I am of opinion that where an application is made by an agriculturist for converting a decree passed after the Act came into force under S. 5 into an instalment decree, if it appears to the Court that the interest awarded under the decree offends against S. 4, it should be open to the Court at the application of an agriculturist to set right the excessive interest in the decree and in a case like this the doctrine of res judicata or the doctrine that once a judgment is signed it cannot be amended cannot and should not apply. I would, therefore, allow this revision, set aside the order of the lower Court, convert the decree dated 8th July 1988 into an instalment decree and correct the future rate of interest if it offends against S. 4 of the Act. ORDER 49. The revision is allowed, the decree of the Civil Judge of Etawah dated 23rd April 1988 is set aside and under O. 41, R. 23 of Sch. 1, Civil P.C., the case is remanded to the Civil Judge of Etawah to pass a decree in accordance with the law declared by this Court, modifying the decree dated 8th July 1938, by converting it into a decree payable by instalments in accordance with S. 5, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, and by correcting the rate of interest, if and to the extent that such rate as decreed offends against S. 4 of the said Act. The applicant is to be entitled to his costs of the proceedings in the High Court.