JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is a second appeal in a suit for removal of obstructions to a lane or street in the town of Gorakhpur. The Plaintiff came to Court alleging that the Defendants had in 1923 obtained an order from the Municipal Board for the closing of the southern end of this lane and had closed it and that eleven years later when the Plaintiff wanted to reconstruct his houses which stood on the east side of the lane and had even obtained permission from the Municipal Board the Defendants unlawfully closed the northern and of the lane also and built walls in front of the plain iff's two doors which opened on the lane. They had also opened new doors in their own house towards the disputed lane and interfered with the Plaintiff's right to pass over this lane. Hence the Plaintiff sought demolition of the walls erected at the north and south end of the lane and of the latrine constructed by the: Defendants in the lane, and an injunction restraining the Defendants from parsing over the lane through the doors which they had opened and from interfering with the Plaintiff's right of passage over the lane. The suit which was filed on the 7th August, 1934, was originally dismissed by the Munsif on the 29th August, 1935. It was remanded by the lower appellate Court on the 21st December. 1935 and again dismissed by the trial Court on the 25th May, 1937. On appeal the lower appellate Court on the 5th May, 1939, decreed the suit in part. The trial Court had he'd that this lane in dispute was a public street, but the lower appellate Court for reasons which are clearly correct in the light of the definition of "public street" in S. 2 (19) (a) and (b) of the U.P. Municipalities Act has held that the lane in suit is not a public street. It follows from this that when the Municipal Board in the year 1923 transferred the land of this lane to the Defendants treating it as a public street the grant was ineffective and the lane in question retained its character of a public lane, that is a lane over which the public had a right of way. It follows from this that when the Municipal Board in the year 1923 transferred the land of this lane to the Defendants treating it as a public street the grant was ineffective and the lane in question retained its character of a public lane, that is a lane over which the public had a right of way. The lower appellate Court has accordingly found that this land lying between the houses of the Plaintiff and the Defendants was a lane over which the public had a right a passage. It took the view that this was a case in which a lost grant should be presumed, and I can see no reason to differ from that finding. Following from this finding it took the view that the Plaintiff and the Defendants had equal rights of passage over this lane and therefore the Plaintiff was entitled to the relief claimed by him for the removal of the walls and gate at the north and south ends of the lane and for removal of the latrine and of a wall built by the Defendants in front of the doors, be they new or old, opened by the Plaintiff on the east side of the lane. 2. In this second appeal Learned Counsel for the Appellants had at first sought to argue a question of estoppel but he was unable to show that estoppel was seriously pleaded by the Defendants, nor has he been able to quote the passage in the pleadings upon which he would found any plea of estoppel. He was inclined to suggest that it might be a case of estoppel by acquiescence but the case dees not seem to fall within the scope of estoppel by acquiescence as set forth in the well-known case of this Court Jai Narain v. Jafar Beg (1926)24 A.L.J. 355. 3. In the course of argument however a fresh question arose, namely the question as to whether this suit was really filed within limitation. At first sight it appears that the suit is one to which Article 120 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and therefore the period of limitation for the suit would be six years only. 3. In the course of argument however a fresh question arose, namely the question as to whether this suit was really filed within limitation. At first sight it appears that the suit is one to which Article 120 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and therefore the period of limitation for the suit would be six years only. Had that been the case the suit so far as the southern gate is concerned would certainly fail, as also probably the suit in regard to the northern gate, although there might possibly be some little doubt on this point. But it is contended on behalf of Learned Counsel for the Respondents that obstruction of a public lane that is of a public right of way, constituted a continuing wrong and brings into operation S. 23 of the Limitation Act and not Article 120. So far as Article 120 is concerned there are a large number of cases quoted in Chitaley's Commentary, but so far as I can see none of these cases is realiy analogous to the case of obstruction of a 'public right of way. Among the cases referred to I find a suit for injunction directing Defendants to remove certain constructions erected by the latter on common land, a suit for removal of an encroachment on reserve land, a suit by a zamindar for removal of a structure put up by a mortgagee of occupancy holding without the zamindar's consent, a suit to remove buildings erected on a graveyard, and so on, but all of these are cases of the nature of trespass in which someone's possession of land is affected and not the exercise of a right. On the other hand there is no room for doubt and Appellant's Learned Counsel does not dispute that obstruction to a water-course and to the flow of water is a continuing wrong as to which the cause of action is renewed de die in diem so long as the obstruction causing such interference is allowed to continue--of., Rajrup Koer v. Abdul Hossein (1880) 6 Cal. 394 It has been remarked with regard to obstruction with reference to a right of way that there is no distinction in principle between the obstruction to a water-course and obstruction to a right of way so far as the applicability of this section (S. 23 of the Limitation Act) is concerned. 394 It has been remarked with regard to obstruction with reference to a right of way that there is no distinction in principle between the obstruction to a water-course and obstruction to a right of way so far as the applicability of this section (S. 23 of the Limitation Act) is concerned. An obstruction to a right of way is therefore a continuing nuisance is to which a cause of action will be renewed de die in diem so long as the obstruction continues. It has been suggested by Learned Counsel for the Appellants that where an obstruction is caused by an act which results in complete cessation of the ability to exercise a right, as for instance by building a high wall or wire fencing or something which clearly prevents passage, there can be no question of a continuing wrong as the wrong has been completed once and for all by a single act. It does not seem to me that this is really the conclusive point The real crux of the matter in regard to a right of way is that the public has a right at all times or at any time to exercise that right and the right to redress arises on every occasion when an attempt is made to exercise that right and owing to the act of the opposite party the exercise of the right is found impossible. In this connection I do not consider that cases in which, for example, damage has been caused to a wall by digging a hole or a trench close beside it with the result that it cracks and thereafter continues to crack a little more and a little more are in point. Those are cases in which the injury is complete as soon as the act complained of results in damage The same reasoning applies to cases in which by reason of a wrongful act a man's arm for example is broken. It may be that the pain of the broken arm may continue for a long time but the cause of action arises on the date when the damage is caused, and it is not a case in which a recurring cause of action arises on every occasion when the owner of the arm wants for instance to raise it or to use it. The English case of Earl of Harrington v. Corporation Derby (1905) 1 Ch, D 205 (226), appears to be a case of this kind. 4. Learned Counsel for the Respondents has referred to a series of cases with reference to the obstruction of rights of way. In Sreemati Soojan Bibi v. Shamed Ali (1897) 1 Cal. W.N. 96, a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that any interruption of the easement (in this case a right of way over the Defendant's land) gave the Plaintiff a recurring cause of action de die in diem under S. 23 of the Indian Limitation Act, and that the two years' rule as prescribed by S. 26 was not applicable. Similarly in Nerode Kanta Chakravarti v. Bharat Chandra Chakravarti (1909) 2 I.C 410, (a Calcutta case of the year 1909) it was held with reference to the obstruction of a path which had been set apart on joint lands, that the Plaintiff had an absolute and indefeasible right acquired many more than 20 years ago and had enjoyed it without interruption upto quite recent times, and that the obstruction was in the nature of a continuing nuisance and under S. 23 of the Limitation Act gave a fresh starting point for limitation de die in diem, A similar view was taken by a single Judge of the Lahore High Court in AIR 1937 94 (Lahore) , where the access by the Plaintiff to a public street was obstructed by the Defendant. The learned Judge remarked: In my opinion the lower Courts were wrong in holding that the suit was barred by limitation : the wrong to the Plaintiff is a continuing wrong : his access to the highway from his property and from the highway to his property is prevented during every moment of the time while the erection stands. 5. The view taken in all these cases is clear that a right of way or a right of passage is not a right in the nature of a title or of possession from which there can be an ouster and to which the articles which enforce a limitation of either 12 years or 6 years can apply. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellants sought to rely Erst upon the Madras case of The Municipal Commissioners for the City of Madras v. Sarangapani Mudaliar (1895) 19 Mad. 154. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellants sought to rely Erst upon the Madras case of The Municipal Commissioners for the City of Madras v. Sarangapani Mudaliar (1895) 19 Mad. 154. In that case the Municipality of Madras sued to recover as forming part of a highway a strip of laud adjoining the house of the Defendant on which a pial had been erected more than 45 years before the suit. 7. Held, "assuming that the land in question was originally included in the street, that the Defendant had acquired a title by adverse possession against the Municipality, which was not entitled to call in aid the provisions of the Limitation Act, Sch. II, Article 194". 8. Bat in this case the ratio of the decision was that the Municipality was really suing to recover possession of a portion of their property from which they had been ousted. It was not a suit in any sense to enforce a right of way which had been obstructed. Lastly Learned Counsel has referred to a Full Bench case of the Lahore High Court, Khair Mohd. Khan v. Jannat, AIR 1910 Lah. 359 in which the question arising in the present case has been discussed at some length and has been referred to in the judgments of all three Judges who were members of the Bench. The judgments bring out very clearly the distinction between an ouster from possession and interference with such a right as a right of passage, and to my mind this decision so far from supporting the proposition put forward by Learned Counsel rather supports the other side. In my view there can be no doubt that the obstruction which prevents someone from exercising a right of way does fall within the scope of the term "continuing wrong" and a fresh period of limitation begins to run under S. 23, Limitation Act, at every moment of the time during which the wrong continues. 9. On this view it is clear that the present suit was instituted within time. 9. On this view it is clear that the present suit was instituted within time. The Plaintiff's claim in so far as it was a claim for the removal of the obstructions to the right of way, that is by removal of the two walls at the north and south and of the lane, of the latrine and of the wall built by the Defendants in front of the Plaintiff's doorways, was rightly decreed by the lower appellate Court. I find no force in this appeal and dismiss it accordingly with costs The cross-objection has not been pressed and is dismissed. Leave for L.P. A. is refused.