JUDGMENT Allsop, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the Plaintiff in order to obtain a declaration that a mortgage executed by his father and a decree subsequently obtained against the father on the basis of the deed were not binding upon the Plaintiff and that the debt secured by the mortgage could not be recovered by sale of the properties mentioned in the plaint. These properties consisted of eight houses or shops and one item of zaminderi property. After instituting the suit and after the mortgagee and decree-holder had put in his written statement the Plaintiff amended his plaint and asked for a further declaration that the property in suit was not liable to sale in execution of a simple money decree No. 57 of 1928 obtained by Lachhmi Narain against the father Raghubar Dayal. It is conceded that the eight shops in suit were sold in execution of this decree and purchased by Mst. Gopi, the wife of Raghubar Dayal and the step-mother of the Plaintiff. It is also conceded that she is in possession and Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff Appellant has been unable to point to any evidence to show that the debt incurred by Raghubar Dayal to Lachhmi Narain was incurred for any immoral purpose. It follows therefore that the transfer of the shops and houses to Mst. Gopi cannot be questioned by the Plaintiff Appellant and he is no longer interested in the equity of redemption in these eight shops or houses. He is interested therefore only in the ninth item of property mentioned in the plaint, that is a zamindari share in some property in the town or village of Dibai. The question is how far the mortgage and the decree on the basis of it are binding on this property. The mortgage deed was executed by Raghubar Dayal on the 22nd of January, 1925, in order to secure a debt of Rs. 25,000. This sum of Rs. 25.000 consisted of four items, namely a sum of Rs. 12,690 which was to be paid by the mortgagee in order to redeem a previous mortgage of the year 1917, a sum of Rs. 5,537 which was to be paid by the mortgagee to discharge Raghubar Dayal's liability for a debt originally amounting to Rs. 25,000. This sum of Rs. 25.000 consisted of four items, namely a sum of Rs. 12,690 which was to be paid by the mortgagee in order to redeem a previous mortgage of the year 1917, a sum of Rs. 5,537 which was to be paid by the mortgagee to discharge Raghubar Dayal's liability for a debt originally amounting to Rs. 5,000 due to Seth Shib Charan Das who was the son of the mortgagee, a sum of Rs. 1530, which was to be paid, by the mortgagee to one Banarsi Das on the basis of a decree and finally, a sum of Rs. 5,243, which was paid over in cash by the mortgagee to the mortgagor at the time of the registration of the bond. 2. It is admitted that the Plaintiff who is the son of Raghubar Dayal cannot question his liability for the payment of the first item because the money was due upon a mortgage which was executed by Raghubar Dayal before the Plaintiff was born and at a time when there was no joint family. It has been argued that the Plaintiff was not liable to pay the second item because the mortgagee had not paid the sum due to Seth Shib Charan Das, It was argued that Seth Shib Charan Das and the mortgagee were really members of a joint family and there was no question of payment of one to the other. There can be no doubt however that Raghubar Dayal did borrow a sum of Rs. 5,000 from Shib Charan Das and that this constituted an antecedent debt at the time when the mortgage was executed. Any money borrowed for the payment of this antecedent debt could be recovered from the property of the joint family. 3. There is no point in going into the question whether Seth Shib Charan Das and the mortgagee were members of a joint family or not. The point is that the promissory note executed by Raghubar Dayal in favour of Shib Charan Das has been produced with an endorsement upon it that the liability has been discharged. There is no doubt that there was a liability from Raghubar Dayal to Shib Charan Das and the liability was discharged as a result of the deed of mortgage. It is clear therefore that this sum of Rs. There is no doubt that there was a liability from Raghubar Dayal to Shib Charan Das and the liability was discharged as a result of the deed of mortgage. It is clear therefore that this sum of Rs. 5,537, can be recovered from the joint family property and that the father was justified in alienating the property to pay this debt. The item of Rs. 1,530, is established to have been due under a decree and the money was paid. There is no doubt that the son was liable for this sum and that the mortgage of the property in order to secure a debt incurred for the discharge of the liability was justified. 4. There remains the cash item of Rs. 5,243. The learned Judge of the lower Court has held that a part of this sum has been established as having been borrowed for legal necessity. There was a flour mill which was established by Raghubar Dayal before his son was born and he is alleged to have borrowed part of this money for the purposes of this mill. It seems to me even if the money was borrowed for this reason that the father had no right to alienate the joint family property in order to obtain money for the purposes of the mill. It has been argued before us on behalf of the Respondent No. 1 that is Amba Prasad the mortgagee that this mill was really joint family property and consequently that the father was entitled to alienate other property in order to obtain money for the purposes of the mill. It has been urged that the mill was established by Raghubar Dayal out of money which he had inherited from his father. Learned Counsel that argued that any property which is acquired by a Hindu out of money obtained from his father becomes ancestral property when that Hindu has a son Learned Counsel has referred us to the case of Ayyangouda Basangouda Ayyangoudar Vs. Gadigeppagouda Huchangouda Ayyangoudar, AIR 1940 Bom 200 . The learned Judges in that case said that profits made from a business started with the proceeds of the sale of ancestral property would form part of the ancestral co-parcenary property. I must not be understood either to agree or disagree with this proposition. Gadigeppagouda Huchangouda Ayyangoudar, AIR 1940 Bom 200 . The learned Judges in that case said that profits made from a business started with the proceeds of the sale of ancestral property would form part of the ancestral co-parcenary property. I must not be understood either to agree or disagree with this proposition. I think, on the whole that it is not advantageous to increase the possibilities of litigation over a matter of this kind, but it may be in some instances, if ancestral property in one form is converted definitely into property of another form that there may be force in the arguments on which the learned Judges in that case based their decision. The question does not really arise in the case before us because it was not pleaded that this flour mill was established out of the proceeds of property acquired by Raghubar Dayal from his father and there was no evidence to prove that this was so. On the facts before us there is nothing to establish that this mill was ancestral property and consequently there is no force in the contention that Raghubar Dayal was justified in alienating ancestral property to obtain funds for the purposes of the mill. There is no other evidence to prove that the sum of Rs. 5,243, was borrowed for any purpose which would make the son liable for paying this money. It was never denied that the zamindari property which is mentioned in the plaint was ancestral property in which the Plaintiff Appellant acquired a share when he was born. The position then is that the Plaintiff Appellant has an interest only in this one property and that his suit in respect of the remainder, viz. the house and shops was rightly dismissed by the learned Judge of the Court below and also that the Plaintiff is liable only for the payment of a sum of Rs. 19,757 by way of principal out of the sum of Rs. 25,000 secured by the mortgage. The learned Judge of the lower Court dismissed the Plaintiff's suit because he argued that the Plaintiff had valued the whole property in the plaint at a sum of Rs. 10,000 arid the Plaintiff's liability was for a much larger sum. It seems to ma that this was not quite a right decision. 25,000 secured by the mortgage. The learned Judge of the lower Court dismissed the Plaintiff's suit because he argued that the Plaintiff had valued the whole property in the plaint at a sum of Rs. 10,000 arid the Plaintiff's liability was for a much larger sum. It seems to ma that this was not quite a right decision. It is impossible in this Court to work out the full equities because we do not know the history of the property during the time when this suit and this appeal have been pending, but the fact undoubtedly remains that the Plaintiff's property No. 9 in the plaint, that is, the zamindari property is liable only for a sum of Rs. 19.757 out of the sum of Rs. 25,000, the principal sum secured by the mortgage and I think that the Plaintiff is entitled to a declaration to this effect in respect of this item of property. Whether this declaration will ultimately be of any benefit to the Plaintiff Appellant when the equities are worked out I am unable to say and I must be understood not to express any opinion upon the point. 5. I would give the Plaintiff Appellant a declaration that property No. 9 mentioned in the plaint, that is, the zamindari property, is liable to the extent of only Rs. 19,757 out of the principal sum of Rs. 25,000 secured by the mortgage and that the liability for the interest will be apportioned accordingly. In the circumstances, I would direct that the Plaintiff should get 1/5th of his costs throughout from Defendant Respondent No. 1 Shib Charan Das and Gopi Nath the representative in interest of the Defendant Respondent Amba Prasad and that these Respondents should get 4/5th of their costs throughout from the Plaintiff Appellant. The other parties> should beat their own costs. Verma, J. 6. I agree with the order proposed. I also are that there is no evidence worth the name to show that the flour mill was started by Raghubar Dayal with the assistance of ancestral funds. That being so, the question of law raised by Mr. Panna Lal does not arise and I do not therefore consider it necessary to express any opinion upon it. 7. By the Court.--A decree shall be drawn up giving the Plaintiff a declaration as mentioned above and directing the payment of costs stated above.