JUDGMENT Derbyshire, C.J. - The Plaintiff in this suit started the proceedings on June 30th, 1939, for recovery of a sum of money on a hundi. The Defendants entered appearance on July 27th, 1939, and filed their written statement in August, 1939. The Plaintiff then did nothing in the matter till August 21st, 1940, when he applied for discovery. On September 2nd, 1940, the Defendants affirmed their affidavit of documents. Thereafter the Plaintiff took no steps in the proceedings. Consequently, the suit appeared in the special list on July 31st, 1941. The learned Judge thought that no sufficient cause had been shown to enable him to do otherwise than dismiss the suit. I am not sure that the learned Judge had regard to the last sentence of the rule or otherwise dealt with as the Judge may think proper. The Plaintiff certainly has been dilatory and the Defendants have put in a defence which may give the Plaintiff some cause for misgiving. On the other hand the Defendants have not been anxious to bring the matter on to trial, or they would have taken steps under r. 7 of Chap. 10. It was the Court which put the matter into the special list to prevent accumulation of what have been described as "waterlogged cases." It is very necessary that the Court should clear its list of cases which are "water-logged." At the same time it is a most serious matter in a country which is governed by the rule of law to deny to one of His Majesty's subjects the right of prosecuting his claim according to law, and that is what a dismissal in this case means. 2. I have read the case of Kumar Srinivas Prosad Singh v. Kashava Prasad Singh L. R. 63 I. A. 12: s. c. 40 C. W. N. 321 (1935) in which a similar case, which had been dismissed by a Judge under the same rule and on appeal to an Appellate Bench had been upheld, was taken to the Privy Council. The Privy Council were guarded in their comments as to the reasons which would justify a dismissal, and they did not attempt to lay down any rule for the exercise of the Court's powers one way or the other. The Privy Council were guarded in their comments as to the reasons which would justify a dismissal, and they did not attempt to lay down any rule for the exercise of the Court's powers one way or the other. I hesitate to lay down any rule and I doubt whether any rule can be laid down except perhaps this that before a Court under this rule, deprives a litigant of his right to prosecute his claim, the Court should be satisfied that to do otherwise would be to permit an abuse of the process of the Court. But I do not say that that is exhaustive. One test as to whether there is an abuse of the process of the Court is to challenge the hesitating or laggard Plaintiff to set down his case at once and proceed according to the rules. Here the Plaintiff offered to do so, but only of course when summoned by the Court. I think the proper course to pursue here would have been to direct the Plaintiff to put down his case at once and proceed to trial without delay. The length of time to be allowed before the hearing of a case must depend on the circumstances. 3. In my opinion the justice of the case will be met if the appeal is allowed and the case is entered into the warning list forthwith with this proviso for the benefit of the Defendants, that the hearing will not take place before February 2nd, 1942. If the Plaintiff fails to obey that direction the Court will have no difficulty in dealing with the case. The case will go into the list of Gentle, J. 4. I am not at all sure that the Defendants were not equally disinclined to proceed to trial, or they would have done so. 5. I therefore think that this appeal should be allowed. But there will be no order as to costs either here or in the Court below. 6. Exchange of affidavits of documents by noon on Wednesday, January 14th, 1942. Inspection forthwith. Nasim Ali, J. I agree.