JUDGMENT Allsop, J. - This is an application in revision against an order of Magistrate of Mirzapur refusing to take cognizance of a complaint of an offence of criminal breach of trust. The complainant said, that he and the accused were members of a body of trustees who were in charge of certain money left by a lady for certain charitable and religious purposes. Part of the money left by this lady consisted of promissory notes to the value of Rs. 15,000. These were handed over to the accused who was living in Bombay. That was in the year 1925. More recently the accused was authorised to convert the promissory notes into cash which he did. The complaint is that he sent sufficient money from Bombay for a certain time to meet the expenses of the trust but that some time before the complaint was filed he had ceased to send any money. The complainant referred to a letter from the solicitors of the accused and said that they showed that the accused had misappropriated the money of the trust in his hands. The letter was to the effect that the accused had told the promissory notes under the authority of all the trustees and having received no further instructions, had deposited the proceeds in his own concern. He seems to carry on a business of the banker and the solicitors said that he had opened an account in the name of the trust, They went on to say that he had been sending money from time to time to Mirzapur for the purposes of the trust and that he was willing to return the whole capital provided he was allowed to do so within a reasonable time by instalments. The complainant filed this complaint in Mirzapur. The Court held that the breach of trust, if any, was committed in Bombay and that the Court at Mirzapur had no jurisdiction. The decision was based on the case of Kashi Ram Mehta v. Emperor (1934) 3 AWR 506. Learned Counsel for the Applicant who has come here in revision has relied upon the case of Mohru Lal v. Emperor 1936 AWR 23. The two cases are not intended to lay down contradictory principles. The learned Chief Justice of the time, Sir Shah Sulaiman, was a party to both of them. They are intended between them to clarify the law. The two cases are not intended to lay down contradictory principles. The learned Chief Justice of the time, Sir Shah Sulaiman, was a party to both of them. They are intended between them to clarify the law. It was laid down in the first of the two cases that an offence of criminal breach of trust should be tried in the place where the breach took place, that is, at the place where the money was misappropriated or converted to the use of the accused. In the course of the judgment the learned Judges mentioned O'Brien's case which was decided by Sir John Edge, C.J. That was a case where a man was sent to collect money and eventually failed to produce it at the place where it should have been produced. The learned Judges agreed that in those circumstances it might be perhaps assumed that the misappropriation occurred at that place because it was not possible to say at what other place there had been a misappropriation. The later case to which Learned Counsel for the Applicant has referred is really a case similar to that of Queen Empress v. O'Brien. The learned Judges distinguished between offences described in the first part of Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code and offences described in the second part. They said, The first part of Section 405 will apply where it is known that the accused had dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his own use certain property at a particular place and the jurisdiction to try the accused will be at the place where that dishonest misappropriation or conversion has taken place. But where it is alleged that the accused has failed to account of the property, then the second part of Section 405, I.P.C. will apply and jurisdiction exists at the place where the property should have been delivered by the accused. 2. They had already distinguished between the first part of the section which they described as a positive part dealing with dishonest misappropriation or conversion of property and the second part which they described as a negative part, that is, a failure to prove that the property entrusted to the accused h td been used by him in accordance with any direction of law or any legal contract by which he was bound. In the case before me the charge obviously is that the accused had misappropriated the property by depositing the money in his own firm. Whether that amounts to a criminal offence is not the question before me. That is the charge and in accordance with the judgment in the case of Mohru Lal 1936 AWR 23, the offence was committed under the first part of Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. The second part is to be invoked only when the first part cannot. It was clearly held in the decision in the earlier case of this Court that the fact that there are consequences of an offence does not give any Court jurisdiction in the place where those consequences occur unless those consequences are necessary ingredients to the offence itself. 3. I am satisfied that there is no reason for holding that the learned Magistrate was wrong in his decision and I, therefore, reject the application.