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1942 DIGILAW 109 (ALL)

Mathura Prasad v. Emperor

1942-09-01

ALLSOP

body1942
JUDGMENT Allsop, J. - This is a reference by the learned Sessions Judge of Farrukhabad recommending that this Court should set aside a sentence of fine passed u/s 307 of the Municipalities Act against one Mathura Prasad. It appears that a notice was issued to Mathura Prasad to demolish certain projections which had been constructed on property of which he was a trustee and which was said to project over a Municipal drain. This was a notice apparently u/s 211 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act and was issued by the Executive Officer. Mathura Prasad did not appeal against the order either to the whole Board or u/s 318 of the Municipalities Act to the officer appointed to hear such appeals. He was then prosecuted The Courts would not go into the question whether the order issued by the Executive Officer was justified by the facts. The learned Judge seems to have thought that this was a mistake on the part of the Courts below and it is for this reason that he has recommended that this Court should interfere. In my judgment the learned Judge is not right upon this point. u/s 321 of the Municipalities Act no order or direction referred to in Section 318 shall be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided therein. An order or direction u/s 211 is mentioned in Section 318 and therefore it cannot be questioned by any authority other than the officer appointed by the Local Government or failing such appointment by the District Magistrate. It follows that it cannot be questioned in a Court of law. There seems to have been some argument in the Court of the learned Judge that the order or direction issued by an Executive Officer did not come within the provisions of Section 318 because an appeal lay from this order to the whole board. I do not quite understand this argument. The definition of the term 'board' in Section 2(1) of the Municipalities Act includes in any case where a power is expressed as being conferred on aboard...an officer of the board authorised to exercise that power. u/s 211 the power is conferred upon the Board to require by notice the owner or occupier of a building to remove or to alter a projection or a structure in certain circumstances. u/s 211 the power is conferred upon the Board to require by notice the owner or occupier of a building to remove or to alter a projection or a structure in certain circumstances. Under Schedule II of the Act, the Executive Officer is authorised to exercise this power It fellows, therefore, that the Executive Officer is the Board within the meaning of Section 211. It is true that his order is subject to appeal to the whole Board, but if no appeal is made or if the appeal being made is rejected, then the order of the Executive Officer stands and this is an order by the Board. The result is that an appeal lies against that order u/s 313 of the Municipalities Act, but even if no appeal lay, Section 321 says nothing about appeals. All it says is that any order or direction mentioned in Section 318 cannot be questioned in any way other than that laid down in the section and therefore, it cannot be questioned in a Court of law. It seems to me therefore, that the learned Judge was wrong in thinking that the Criminal Court should have gone into the facts as if it had been hearing an appeal against he order of the Executive Officer directing that the projection should be removed. 2. The learned Judge has mentioned certain other points which formed the subject of objections in the application before him. The first is that notice instead of being issued to Mathura Prasad himself who was a trustee of the temple on which the projections existed was issued in the name of the firm Mathura Prasad Manohar Das of which Mathura Prasad was a member. The learned Judge seems to have thought that this was an irregularity, but he has overlooked the point that a firm is not a legal person. It is merely a convenient name for the individuals composing it and therefore the notice as expressed was issued to Mathura Prasad who was a member of the firm and to every other member of the firm. If any of these individuals objected to the order, he could have appealed either to the whole Board or later to the District Magistrate. If any of these individuals objected to the order, he could have appealed either to the whole Board or later to the District Magistrate. Another point is that the notice was served upon the munib of the firm and it was apparently argued that he should not be treated as the servant of Mathura Prasad's. This objection is of no avail to Mathura Prasad for the same reason, namely, that the munib is not the servant of a corporation called Mathura Prasad Manohardas but of the firm which means the individuals composing the firm, that is, he is the servant of Mathura Prasad among others. 3. In my judgment there is no reason for interference with the order of the Court below and I reject the reference.