JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is a second appeal by certain persons who were the Plaintiffs in a suit for ejectment and for arrears of rent. This suit related to a shop said by the Plaintiffs of the suit to have been let to the Defendant at Rs. 40 per mensem. It was further said that on the 10th April, 1937, the Plaintiffs gave to the Defendant a notice to quit and also to pay up arrears of rent. As the Defendant did not vacate the shop the Plaintiffs on the 25th May, 1937, filed suit No. 553 of 1937 for ejectment and for arrears of rent. While the suit was pending the Plaintiffs on the 31st May, six days after institution, filed an application u/s 94 read with Order 38, Rule 5, for attachment before judgment of the goods of the Defendant in the shop in dispute. They gave as their ground that the Defendant was removing his goods from the shop, which strictly speaking was not a ground which fell precisely within the terms of Rule 5 of Order 38. The Court however made an order in favour of the Plaintiffs and on the 2nd June, 1937, the amin attached the goods of the Defendant in the shop and thereupon the Defendant paid up a sum of Rs. 100 towards the arrears claimed. On the 6th July, 1937, the Defendant followed up this payment by filing an application in which ha asked for the removal of the attachment on the grounds that the amount owed by him to the Plaintiffs was only Rs. 99 and that he had paid up Rs. 100 and that therefore the attachment was "fazul", by which I understand that he meant that it was unnecessary or superfluous or useless. The objection was not sustained by the Court which on the 9th July, 1937, made an order that if within a certain number of days the Defendant should deposit a sum of Rs. 45, being the balance of the arrears, the attachment would be withdrawn. On the 12th July, the Defendant did deposit in Court this amount and the attachment was thereupon withdrawn. The order of the Court was clearly an order under Rule 9 of Order 38 and it would follow from such an order that upon compliance with the order the attachment would be withdrawn. 2. On the 12th July, the Defendant did deposit in Court this amount and the attachment was thereupon withdrawn. The order of the Court was clearly an order under Rule 9 of Order 38 and it would follow from such an order that upon compliance with the order the attachment would be withdrawn. 2. Subsequent to these proceedings the suit was fought out and contested on various grounds including a ground in regard to the rate of rent. On the 2nd February, 1938, the suit was decreed for Rs. 138-5 0 less sums of Rs. 100 and Re. 1 already paid into Court, that is for Rs. 37-5-0 and also for ejectment. It is said that subsequently the Defendant appealed against that decree but without success. It is not certain when he filed the appeal but it is certain that either before he filed it or while the appeal was pending he made an application to the trial Court on the 23rd February, 1938, u/s 95 CPC claiming Rs. 500 as compensation for the expense or injury caused to him, by the attachment. Actually Rs. 200 was claimed in respect of loss of business and Rs. 250 in respect of damage to his reputation as a business man. The learned Munsif entertained this application and he made an order u/s 95 awarding Rs. 75 as damages for loss of reputation but disallowing the claim for financial loss in the Defendant's business. Against this order an appeal was filed but this was dismissed by the First Civil Judge of Meerut on the 20th March, 1939. 3. A preliminary objection has been put forward by Mr. Jwala Prasad, holding the brief of Mr. Gajadhar Prasad, that this appeal is not maintainable and in view of the provisions of Section 104(2) CPC it is clear that this preliminary objection must be sustained Mr. Mital however asks that the appeal be treated as a revision and it is apparent to me that the appeal was really drafted rather as a revision than an appeal and I think this is a case in which the appeal may properly be converted into a revision and considered upon its merits, since the points raised go very clearly to the question of jurisdiction. Learned Counsel for the opposite-party has referred me to a recent Single Judge decision of this Court in which it was held that not in all cases should an appeal be allowed to be converted into an application in revision. But the case relied upon was rather a special case in which Learned Counsel for the Appellant had pressed his appeal with great force for several hours before as a last hope making the request that it should be treated as a revision and what was even worse was that the points raised did not prima facie fall within the scope of Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure. 4. The main ground upon which Learned Counsel for the Appellant Applicant founds his argument is that it has been held that in such a case as the present one an application u/s 95 is Dot maintainable unless the order of attachment in respect of which the application has been made has been already set aside by the Court as having been made on insufficient grounds. Learned Counsel points out that the original application for setting aside the order of attachment was not even passed upon the contention that the application was made upon insufficient grounds and that in itself should have been a very strong point in the eyes of the trial Court. On the other hand it might by said that that was a paint which went rather to the merits than to the question of jurisdiction and I think that that might be said with some force An application for compensation on the ground that an attachment was asked for upon insufficient grounds must obviously be considered to be very weak when it is found that the application to set aside the attachment itself was not founded upon those grounds, but the point upon which reliance is really placed is the legal aspect of the matter. There is no case in point of this Court and Learned Counsel has had to rely in the main on cases of Calcutta and Madras founded upon certain English cases. I shall take the cases in the order in which they have been put forward by him. In Satish Chandra Banerjee Vs. Munilal and Another, AIR 1932 Cal 821 , a Bench case, the judgment was pronounced by Rankin, C.J. The circumstances were that an order of attachment before judgment was made. I shall take the cases in the order in which they have been put forward by him. In Satish Chandra Banerjee Vs. Munilal and Another, AIR 1932 Cal 821 , a Bench case, the judgment was pronounced by Rankin, C.J. The circumstances were that an order of attachment before judgment was made. An application to vacate that order of attachment was made but was not prosecuted to a conclusion and no order vacating the attachment was obtained. On the contrary under that order for attachment certain monies were recovered which monies were allowed after the decree to go to the Plaintiffs in the case in satisfaction of their decree. It was held that in these circumstances the Tightness or wrongness of the order for attachment before judgment could not be canvassed in a subsequent suit on the question of damages for malicious prosecution and such a suit was not maintainable where in the prior suit the order of attachment was not vacated and the rights of the parties were determined on the basis that it was a right order. A good deal of the argument was based upon the consideration that the Court which had to deal with the suit for compensation was a different Court from that in which the order for attachment before judgment was made, but reliance was placed on a number of cases in which certain principles were laid down. Reference was made to Arjan Biswas and Others Vs. Abdul Biswas and Others, AIR 1921 Cal 774 , where the learned Judges had observed: It may be pointed out that the limitation of one year under Article 29 is to run from the date of the seizure; but so long as the writ is not set aside the seizure cannot be said to be wrongful except in instances such as mentioned above (that is in certain special cases). Further on Rankin, C.J. remarked: That authority is good so far as it affirms the principle in a case exactly like the present that the Plaintiff cannot come and complain of an improper attachment unless the attachment is first set aside. and he went on to say that he considered it important to adhere to this principle, otherwise in every case of attachment before judgment in the guise of a suit for damages the decision of one Court would have to be reviewed by another. and he went on to say that he considered it important to adhere to this principle, otherwise in every case of attachment before judgment in the guise of a suit for damages the decision of one Court would have to be reviewed by another. Certain distinctions certainly do arise from the fact that what was being dealt with was a suit and not an application u/s 95. 5. On the other hand the same view has been taken by an Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Madras High Court in a case u/s 95. That is in the case of Rama Mulali v. Marappa Goundan AIR 1984 Mad. 638, where it was held by Beasley C.J. that where an attachment before judgment is ordered and the property is attached, unless the order of attachment is set aside, an application for compensation cannot be entertained. In this case reliance was placed on the English case of Lees v. Pattetson (1878) 7 Ch.D. 866. Lees v. Patterson (1878) 7 Ch.D. 866 was a case in which a writ of 'ne exeat' against a Defendant was obtained by the Plaintiff immediately after the commencement of an action. The Defendant was arrested, but was discharged upon payment to the sheriff of the sum for which the writ was marked. By this statement of defence the Defendant alleged that the writ had been improperly obtained and claimed damages for his arrest and at the trial he insisted upon this claim. It was held that as the Defendant had net moved to discharge the writ, it must be taken to have been properly issued and consequently that the Defendant was not entitled to any damages. The order in the suit was: There will be judgment for the ordinary partnership accounts, with a declaration that the Defendant Patterson is not to be allowed any set--off by way of damages for the alleged improper issue of the writ of ne exeat. 6. A somewhat similar view of the necessity of getting rid of a prior binding order by having it set aside before a suit could be maintained for damages was expressed in the Metropolitan Bank, Limited and Arthur Cooper, the Liquidator v. Pooley (1885) 10 App. Cases 210. 6. A somewhat similar view of the necessity of getting rid of a prior binding order by having it set aside before a suit could be maintained for damages was expressed in the Metropolitan Bank, Limited and Arthur Cooper, the Liquidator v. Pooley (1885) 10 App. Cases 210. In that case it was held that A bankrupt whose adjudication in bankruptcy has not been set aside cannot maintain an action for maliciously procuring the bankruptcy; and such an action may be summarily dismissed upon summons as frivolous and vexatious. It was in fact held by the Lord Chancellor as follows: Under those circumstances it is perfectly clear and certain that Mr. Pooley, as a bankrupt and as a bankrupt irreversibly found to be so (he had appealed against the order of adjudication without success), has no locus standi come into Court and to say what he does say by his statement of claim that he has suffered damage by the wrongful acts of the Defendants in fraudulently and without reasonable cause procuring him to be adjudicated bankrupt. 7. By a parallel process of reasoning it cannot be open to the Defendant in a suit against whom ac order of attachment has been made and who has complied with that order with the result that it automatically terminated and with the result that the money deposited by him became available to the Plaintiff in satisfaction of his decree, to apply to the Court for compensation upon the ground that the order of attachment, in respect of which the Court is functus officio, was obtained upon insufficient grounds, a fortiori when that was not the basis of the only application he has ever made for the vacation of the order of attachment. In my judgment therefore in the circumstances in which it was made the application of the Defendant u/s 95 Civil Procedure Cede was not maintainable and it is rightly contended in the grounds of appeal that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to take any action against the Plaintiff Appellant u/s 95 of the Code. 8. This application must therefore be allowed. 9. A second point was also taken by Learned Counsel that in the present case there is no injury proved within the meaning of that word as it occurs in Section 95. 8. This application must therefore be allowed. 9. A second point was also taken by Learned Counsel that in the present case there is no injury proved within the meaning of that word as it occurs in Section 95. His suggestion is that injury must be proved in terms of financial damages and that it is not sufficient to hold that the attachment of the property of a business firm must necessarily result in loss of reputation and damage to credit. Some rulings have been cited but in the view 1 take on the first point I do not think it necessary to decide this point and it will be sufficient to say that there certainly are cases which support the view taken by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court, vide for example Palani Kumarasatnia Pillai v. Udayarnadan (1909) 2 I.C. 345 and Nanjappa Chettiar v. Ganapathi Goundan (1911) 12 I.C. 507. 10. Upon the ground which I have stated in dealing with the first line of argument put forward by Learned Counsel for the Applicant this appeal which I am treating as a revision is allowed. The order awarding compensation of the trial Court which was maintained by the lower appellate Court is set aside and the application for compensation of the opposite-party dismissed with costs in all Courts, but in this Court the costs will be as in a revision. If the amount of compensation has been recovered from the present Applicant it shall be refunded to him.