JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmad, C.J., Bajpai and Dar, JJ. - This is an appeal against a judgment and decree, dated July 16, 1941, of the Civil Judge of Bareilly in an execution matter. 2. On July 1, 1920, Kanhai Lal, a Hindu resident of Anwla in Bareilly district, executed a simple mortgage of certain zamindari property situated in Bareilly district in favour of Bhairon Prasad for Rs. 8,000. The sum secured by this mortgage carried an interest of ten annas per cent, with yearly rests. Soon after the execution of the mortgage both the mortgagor and the mortgagee died. The mortgagor, Kanhai Lal, left two sons--the elder Ram Sarup by his pre-deceased wife and the younger Krishna Murari Lal by his second wife, Mst. Ketki, who survived the mortgagor Bhairon Prasad, the mortgagee, also left two sons--Ram Sarup and Ram Bharose Lal. In the year 1925 a partition took place between the sons and the widow of Kanhai Lal, as a result of which the family property and the family debts were divided and with the consent of the sons of the mortgagee viz. Ram Sarup and Ram Bharose Lal, the liability of the mortgage of 1920 was divided half and half between Ram Sarup and Krishna Murari Lal. On September 21, 1927, Ram Sarup, son of Kanhai Lal, executed a simple mortgage in favour of Ram Sarup and Ram Bharose Lal, the sons of Bhairon Prasad, for a sum of Rs. 9.500 bearing interest at ten annas per cent. By this mortgage half the liability of Ram Sarup on the mortgage of 1920 was satisfied and some other consideration also formed part of the mortgage money. But as we are not directly concerned with this mortgage in this litigation, it is not necessary to particularise it any further. On July 21, 1928, Mst. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal, the widow and the second son of Kanhai Lal, executed a simple mortgage in favour of Ram Sarup and Ram Bharose Lal, sons of Bhairon Prasad, for Rs. (sic),800 bearing interest at thirteen annas and four pies per cent, per annum with yearly rests. Out of this consideration of Rs. 4,800 a sum of Rs. 4,742-1-6 was in satisfaction of half the liability on the mortgage of 1920 and RS. 57-14-6 was a fresh advance. It is alleged that after the partition and before the execution of the mortgage of 1928 Mst. Out of this consideration of Rs. 4,800 a sum of Rs. 4,742-1-6 was in satisfaction of half the liability on the mortgage of 1920 and RS. 57-14-6 was a fresh advance. It is alleged that after the partition and before the execution of the mortgage of 1928 Mst. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal had paid a sum of Rs. 2,400 to Ram Sarup and Ram Bharose Lal towards the payment of mortgage of 1920 and the sum of Rs. 4,742-1-6 which was the consideration of the mortgage of 1928 was the balance which was left after the payment. But this matter again has not been investigated and is not material for the purpose of the controversy which we have to determine in this appeal. In 1937 Ram Sarup and Ram Bharose Lal raised an action No. 19 of 1937 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bareilly for recovery of a sum of Rs 7,980 due on the bond of 1928 against Mst. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal and on January 2, 1938, a preliminary decree was passed in their favour and on April 19, 1940, a final decree was passed in their favour in the said mortgage suit. At the time when the action was raised time had run out for enforcing any personal liability against Mst. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal and the mortgage money could only be recovered from the sale of the property. 3. The mortgage-decree mentioned above remained unsatisfied and on April 5, 1941, (Execution Case No. 32 of 1942) Ram Sarup and Ram Bharose Lal made an application to the execution Court at Bareilly for sale of the mortgaged property and on April 28, 1941, (Miscellaneous Case No. 51 of 1941) Mst. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal made an application u/s 8 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act (XII of 1940) for amendment of the said mortgage decree. In their application, Mst. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal alleged that Kanhai Lal was an agriculturist in the year 1920 when the mortgage mentioned above was executed and Mst. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal were agriculturists in the year 1928 when the mortgage of 1928 was executed and they were and have been agriculturists at all material times and were entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal were agriculturists in the year 1928 when the mortgage of 1928 was executed and they were and have been agriculturists at all material times and were entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. They further alleged that having regard to the rate of interest which the decree-holders were entitled to recover u/s 9 of the Encumbered Estates Act a sum of Rs. 3,216 was all that was left due on the mortgage-decree and they prayed that the decree might be amended by reducing its amount, as stated above. The execution Court found in a well considered judgment that Kanhai Lal could not be regarded as an agriculturist within the meaning of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act as he was paying on the date of the mortgage of 1920 a local rate ten times of which exceeded the sum of Rs. 1,000. It further found that Mst. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal were agriculturists within the meaning of the Act on the date of the mortgage of 1928, but in order to reap the benefit of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act the Applicants must prove that the person who received the original loan was an agriculturist and inasmuch as the person who received the original loan, viz., Kanhai Lal, was not an agriculturist, the Applicants Mst. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal were not entitled to claim benefit of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. On these findings, the application of Mst. Ketki and Krishna Murari Lal was dismissed with costs and against this judgment and decree they have preferred this appeal. 4. At the outset we have to determine the question whether the order of the learned Judge dismissing the application of Mustt. Ketki and Ram Sarup is open to appeal. The U.P. Debt Redemption Act, 1940, does not provide specifically for any appeal or revision with regard to matters which may be determined under the said Act. 4. At the outset we have to determine the question whether the order of the learned Judge dismissing the application of Mustt. Ketki and Ram Sarup is open to appeal. The U.P. Debt Redemption Act, 1940, does not provide specifically for any appeal or revision with regard to matters which may be determined under the said Act. But Section 24 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act provides that "the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, save in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all proceedings under this Act." Now u/s 96 of the CPC an appeal lies "from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appears from the decisions of such Court". The relevant definition of decree as given in Section 2(2) of the Code is as follows: Decree means formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 47 or Section 144.... 5. Section 47, Clause (1) of the CPC provides: All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. 6. It is also settled law that though determination of every question between the decree-holder and judgment-debtor relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree is not a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the CPC yet every determination which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree is a decree within the meaning of the Code. In the case before us Ram Sarup and Ram Bharose Lal, decree-holders, had made an application for execution of the mortgage-decree in which they claimed a sum of Rs. 8,386 by sale of the mortgaged property. In the case before us Ram Sarup and Ram Bharose Lal, decree-holders, had made an application for execution of the mortgage-decree in which they claimed a sum of Rs. 8,386 by sale of the mortgaged property. The judgment-debtors in opposition to this execution made an application praying that under the U.P. Debt Redemption Act the amount due under the decree was only Rs. 3,216 and the decree could not be executed for the amount which the decree-holders claimed and the decree should be amended and reduced to Rs. 3,216. In our opinion, a clear controversy arose between the decree-holders and the judgment-debtors relating to execution, partial discharge or partial satisfaction of the decree and this controversy was finally determined by the execution Court and this determination was clearly a decree within the meaning of the Code and is open to appeal. We are further of opinion that generally speaking an application by an agriculturist debtor u/s 8 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act raises a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree and if the controversy raised by the Applicants is determined by the execution Court the judgment of the Court in the proceedings is a decree and is open to appeal. In Har Narain Lal Bahal v. Mathura Prasad 1940 AWR (HC) 357 a full Bench of this Court held that an order of an execution Court staying the execution of a decree for costs u/s 3 of the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act is a decree and in Nafar Chandra Sardar and Others Vs. Kali Pada Das, AIR 1940 Cal 257 , Nasim Ali and Narsing Rau JJ., held that the combined effect of Section 47 and Section 2(2) is that an order in execution proceedings is a decree, if, so far as regards the Court passing it, it conclusively determines a question relating to the rights and liabilities of the parties with reference to the relief granted by the decree. The decision of the Court that the judgment-debtors are not debtors within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and are not therefore entitled to the benefit of the Act, conclusively determines the question relating to the judgment-debtors' liability with reference to the relief granted by the decree and is a decree. 7. The decision of the Court that the judgment-debtors are not debtors within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and are not therefore entitled to the benefit of the Act, conclusively determines the question relating to the judgment-debtors' liability with reference to the relief granted by the decree and is a decree. 7. The decree-holders further contend that an agriculturist who is entitled to make an application u/s 8 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act for amendment of a decree is a person who is 'liable to pay the amount due under a decree' to which the U.P. Debt Redemption Act applies and the phrase 'an agriculturist liable to pay the amount due under a decree' means personally liable to pay the decree and in case where the agriculturist is not personally liable but only his property is liable the conditions laid down in the statute are not satisfied and such an agriculturist is not entitled to make an application u/s 8. It is contended that the words 'liable to pay the amount due under a decree' have been judicially interpreted and they mean as a matter of law that liability should be personal and not on the property and for this contention reliance is placed on two decisions of this Court, (1) Sheo Shankar and Others Vs. Chunni Lal and Others, AIR 1916 All 290 and (2) Nagesar Ram v. Rajnet Ram 1936 AWR 405 : 58 All. 907. These were the cases in which a question arose whether a mortgage-decree could be set off against a money decree under Order XXI, Rule 18 of the CPC and on the ground that the two decrees were held under different characters the set off was disallowed. These cases are no authority for the proposition that in a mortgage decree where the amount could only be recovered from the property the mortgagor can not be regarded in the eye of law as liable to pay the amount of the decree. In our opinion, the words "liable to pay the amount due under a decree" used in Section 8 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act cannot be restricted to the case where liability is personal and the words are sufficiently wide to include the liability which is on person and property both jointly or on person or property alone singly. In our opinion, the words "liable to pay the amount due under a decree" used in Section 8 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act cannot be restricted to the case where liability is personal and the words are sufficiently wide to include the liability which is on person and property both jointly or on person or property alone singly. There may be decrees against agriculturists who are minors which cannot be personally enforced against them. There may be decrees against agriculturists in which their property is only liable to sale. In both these cases and in all similar cases agriculturists are liable to pay the amount of the decree though the liability is not personal. 8. We now come to the main question whether Musammat Ketki and Ram Sarup cannot be regarded as agriculturists within the meaning of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act 1940 because Kanhai Lal, the husband of Mst. Ketki and father of Ram Sarup, was not an agriculturist in the year 1920 when the original mortgage was made? This raises a question whether a loan under the U.P. Debt Redemption Act has to be a cash advance or a renewed loan can also be regarded as a loan within the meaning of the Act. The word "loan" has been denned in Section 2(9) of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act and it means in substance an advance in cash or kind made to an agriculturist and "includes any transaction which in substance amounts to such advance". "Loan" has also been defined in Section 2(10)(a) of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1934, as "an advance to an agriculturist whether of money or in kind and shall include any transaction which is in substance a loan...." At the time when the execution Court pronounced its judgment in this case the view taken by this Court was that "loan" for the purposes of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act meant a Gash advance and not a renewed loin and relying upon the view of this Court in Dharam Singh v. Bishan Sarup 1937 AWR 892 the execution Judge held that the renewed mortgage of 1929 could not bi regarded as a loan within the meaning of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act and the loan must, therefore, be the mortgage of 1920 when the cash advance was made. Since this judgment was pronounced the majority of Judges in a Full Bench of this Court in Partap Singh v. Gulzari Lal 1942 AWR (HC) 11 has held that "where an earlier transaction of loan is renewed the new transaction itself is a "loan" for the purposes of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1934)." In our opinion, the reasons given by the majority of Judges in Partap Singh v. Gulzari Lal 1942 AWR (HC) 11 for holding a renewed loan as a loan fully apply to the definition of "loan" as given in the United Provinces Debt Redemption Act, Section 2, Clause 9 and a renewed loan is a transaction which in substance amounts to an advance with the meaning of the said Section 2(9) of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. It is true that u/s 9 of the U. P. Debt Redemption Act renewed transactions can be reopened. But this is a matter which stands on a different footing altogether and it furnishes no reason for holding that in the definition of "loan" as given in Section (2)(9), renewed loin is not included. In our opinion, by reason of the fact that Mst. Ketki and Ram Sarup were agriculturists at the time when the mortgage of 1928 was made, they were entitled to make an application for the amendment of the decree u/s 8 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act, 1940 and it was not necessary for them to prove in order to succeed in this application that at the time of the mortgage of 1920 Kanhai Lal was an agriculturist. 9. But there is yet another ground on which Mst. Ketki and Ram Sarup were entitled to succeed. Undoubtedly, on the date when the U.P. Debt Redemption Act came into force and when the application was made by Mst. Ketki and Ram Sarup for amendment of decree u/s 8 of the UP. Debt Redemption Act they were agriculturists. Undoubtedly, the mortgaged property which is zamindari property and 'land' within the meaning of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act was going to be sold. Ketki and Ram Sarup for amendment of decree u/s 8 of the UP. Debt Redemption Act they were agriculturists. Undoubtedly, the mortgaged property which is zamindari property and 'land' within the meaning of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act was going to be sold. Does the U.P. Debt Redemption Act grant relief to an agriculturist or a workman who was an agriculturist or a workman both at the time when the loan was received by him and also when the loan is recoverable or does it grant relief also in cases when the loan is recoverable from the property of the agriculturist or the workman though it was made to a person who was not an agriculturist or a workman at the time when the loan was made? This necessitates the examination of certain relevant provisions of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act, 1940. Section 8 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act gives a right to apply for amendment of a decree to "an agriculturist or a workman liable to pay the amount due under a decree to which this Act applies". u/s 2(6) "'decree to which this Act applies' means a decree passed either before or after the commencement of this Act in a suit to which this Act applies". u/s 2(6) "'decree to which this Act applies' means a decree passed either before or after the commencement of this Act in a suit to which this Act applies". u/s 2(17) "'suit to which this Act applies' means any suit or proceedings relating to a loan." "Loan" has been defined in Section 2(9) as follows: Loan means an advance in cash or kind made before the first day of June 1940, recoverable from an agriculturist or a workman or from any such person and other persons jointly or from the property of an agriculturist or workman and includes any transaction which in substance amounts to such advance, but does not include an advance the liability for the repayment of which has, by a contract with the borrower or his heir or successor or by sale in execution of a decree, been transferred to another person or an advance by the Central or Provincial Government or by a local authority authorized by the Provincial Government to make advances or by a co-operative society or by a scheduled bank: Provided that an advance recoverable from an agriculturist or from an agriculturist and other persons jointly shall not be deemed to be a loan for the purposes of this Act unless such advance was made to an agriculturist or to an agriculturist and other persons jointly. 10. 10. If we leave out the proviso to Section 2(9) for the time being it will be observed that loan as defined in Section 2(9) means an advance in cash or kind made before the first day of June, 1940 (i) recoverable from an agriculturist or a workman, or (ii) from any such person and other persons jointly, or (iii) from the property of an agriculturist or workman and includes any transaction which in substance amounts to such advance, but does not include an advance the liability for the repayment of which has, by a contract with the borrower or his heir or successor or by sale in execution of a decree, been transferred to another person, It will be further observed that if this Clause (9) had stood alone without the proviso then "loan" was an advance recoverable from three classes of persons (1) agriculturist or workman (2) agriculturist or workman jointly with others and (3) from the property of an agriculturist or workman and Clause (9) only laid down that the advance should be recoverable from these persons and it did not lay down that advance should have been made to these persons and if this clause had remained without a proviso then it would not have been possible to maintain that the statute required that the advance to be a "loan" should have been made to an agriculturist and should also be recoverable from an agriculturist. The statute required only One condition, namely, that it should be recoverable from and not that it should have been made to, an agriculturist or workman. 11. We have now to examine the effect of the proviso which is to the effect that an advance recoverable from an agriculturist or from an agriculturist and other persons jointly shall not be deemed to be a loan for the purposes of this Act unless such advance was made to an agriculturist or to an agriculturist and other persons jointly. It will be observed that the proviso applies to two only of the three cases mentioned in the main clause of Section 2(9) viz., advance made to an agriculturist and to an agriculturist and other persons jointly. It does not apply to the case of a workman at all and it does not apply to the third class of advance mentioned above which was recoverable from the property of an agriculturist or workman. It does not apply to the case of a workman at all and it does not apply to the third class of advance mentioned above which was recoverable from the property of an agriculturist or workman. Therefore, the effect of the proviso is that in case where an advance is recoverable from an agriculturist or from an agriculturist and other persons jointly, under the proviso advance must be recoverable from an agriculturist and must have been made also to an agriculturist. But where the advance is recoverable from a workman or recoverable from the property of an agriculturist or workman, the proviso has no application and the case is governed by the main clause of Section 2(9). In the case before us the advance was recoverable from the property of an agriculturist and it is a case within class 3 mentioned above and to a case like this the proviso has no application and the advance which is recoverable from the property of an agriculturist solely and not from his person is a loan within the meaning of Section 2(9) and unaffected by the proviso to Section 2(9). In our opinion, the meaning of Section 2(9) is that in cases where advance is recoverable both from the person and the property of an agriculturist in order to take benefit of Section 8 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act it must be shown that the claimant was an agriculturist both at the time when the advance was recoverable and when the advance was made. But in a case of a workman or in a case where the advance is recoverable only from the property of an agriculturist or workman, it is not necessary that the advance should have been also made to a workman or to an agriculturist. The policy behind the statute seems to be chat in case where the advance is recoverable from property alone and where the property is liable to be sold it is sufficient if the claimant possesses the status of an agriculturist or workman on the date when the advance is recoverable although at the time when the advance was made it was not made to an agriculturist or a workman. 12. We are, therefore, of opinion that Mst. 12. We are, therefore, of opinion that Mst. Ketki and Ram Sarup were entitled to make an application u/s 8 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act on two grounds firstly, because advance was made to them in the year 1928 and they were agriculturists at that time and secondly, because advance is recoverable from their property alone and not from their persons and at the time when the advance is recoverable from their property they are agriculturists. 13. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the execution Court and remand the case back to that Court with direction that it should be restored to its original number and be disposed of according to law. The Appellants will have their costs in this Court and in the Court below in proceedings arising out of an application u/s 8 of the United Provinces Debt Redemption Act. Other costs and future costs will be in the discretion of the Court below.