JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against an order passed by the Additional District Judge, Alipore, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 401 of 1940 reversing that of the Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court of that place made in a proceeding under sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. The material facts are not in controversy and may be shortly stated as follows: The decree-holder who is the Appellant before us obtained a preliminary mortgage decree against the Respondent on 27th February, 1939. The decree was made final on 11th December, 1939. It was put into execution in T. Ex. Case No. 37 of 1940, and thereupon the judgment-debtor made an application for reopening the decree under sec. 36 (6) (a) (i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. The executing Court rejected the application on the ground that as the decree was not in existence prior to 1st of January, 1939, the Court was incapable of giving any relief under sec. 36 of the Money-Lenders Act. An appeal was taken against this decision to the Court of the District Judge, 24-Parganas. The learned Additional District Judge who heard the appeal was of opinion that the decision of the trial Court was wrong, and that it was not necessary to attract the operation of sec. 36 (6) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act that the decree should have been in existence prior to 1st January, 1939. The Appellate Court therefore sent the case back on remand to the trial Judge for disposal on its merits. It is against this order of remand that the decree-holder has come up on appeal to this Court. We may say at the outset that we agree with the learned Advocate for the Appellant, that the appeal to the Court of appeal below was incompetent. As the application under sec. 36 (6) (a,) (i) of the Money-Lenders Act was dismissed by the trial Court the remedy of the judgment-debtor was to come up to this Court for revision of that order under sec. 115 of the Civil procedure Code, the order of dismissal not being appealable under any provision of law [vide Promode Nath v. Raseswari 45 C.W.N. 776 (1941).]. However as the whole matter is now before this Court, it is open to us to make proper orders, in exercise of our powers of revision under sec. 115, Civil Procedure Code. 2. Now sec. However as the whole matter is now before this Court, it is open to us to make proper orders, in exercise of our powers of revision under sec. 115, Civil Procedure Code. 2. Now sec. 36 (6) (a) of the Money-Lenders Act lays down that the Court which passed a decree can exercise any of the powers conferred by sub-secs. (1) and (2) of the section, provided that "the decree is passed in a suit to which the Act applies, which was not fully satisfied by the 1st of January, 1939." In the present case the first condition has been admittedly fulfilled. The decree itself was passed on 27th February, 1939, and the suit was certainly pending both on and after the first day of January, 1939. The question is how far the decree can be said to fulfill the other condition, viz., that it was not fully satisfied by the 1st of January, 1939. As the decree was not in existence prior to first of January, 1939, it could not possibly be satisfied before that date. What is argued on behalf of the Appellant is that as this condition cannot be complied with unless the decree was made prior to first of January, 1939, sec. 36 (6) (a) has got no application to a decree which is passed after first of January, 1939. There is undoubtedly some force in this argument, for it is seemingly inappropriate to speak of any decree passed after first of January, 1939, that it was fully satisfied before that date. The language is certainly not very happy; but we think that having regard to the scheme of the Act, we should construe the words liberally and hold that it is only when the decree is before first of January, 1939, that evidence has got to be adduced of its non-satisfaction before that date, but when it is posterior to first of January, 1939, the second condition is ex hypothesis ful- filled, there being no possibility of the decree being satisfied before that date. 3. It will appear from the different sections of the Money-Lenders Act, that the legislature intended to give retrospective operation to the substantive provisions of law contained in them to a considerable extent. 3. It will appear from the different sections of the Money-Lenders Act, that the legislature intended to give retrospective operation to the substantive provisions of law contained in them to a considerable extent. A debtor can have relief under the Act, whether or not, the loan advanced, the agreement entered into or the security taken were before or after the commencement of the Act. With regard to suits or proceedings commenced before the Act, it is made retrospective up to a certain limit. The material date in this respect is the first of January, 1939, and all suits or proceedings instituted or filed on or after that date or pending on that date will be regarded as suits to which the Act applies [sec. 2 (22)]. First of January, 1939, is thus the starting point or terminus a quo of a suit to which the Act applies, and but for the fact that under sec. 2 (22) an execution proceeding is also included, it would normally refer to a suit which is instituted on or after the first of January, 1939, and the decree in such a suit could not but be made subsequent to that date. If the contention of the Appellant is accepted the result will be that all suits instituted after first of January, 1939, will be outside the scope of the Act, whereas suits instituted before the date will come within its purview. We do not think that such a result was at all contemplated by the legislature. When there is a defect or lacuna in the wording of the statute itself, the Courts have certainly got to abide by that wording and cannot seek to improve it according to the supposed intention of the legislature. But where, as in the present case, it is possible to interpret the words in a way consistent with the other provisions of the Act, that interpretation must be preferred. In our opinion the most reasonable view to take is, that as by reason of inclusion of execution proceedings, a "suit to which the Act applies " as defined in sec. 2 (22) of the Act, might cover a case, where the suit was instituted and the decree obtained prior to first of January, 1939, sec. In our opinion the most reasonable view to take is, that as by reason of inclusion of execution proceedings, a "suit to which the Act applies " as defined in sec. 2 (22) of the Act, might cover a case, where the suit was instituted and the decree obtained prior to first of January, 1939, sec. 36 laid down an additional requirement which has got to be complied with in such cases, viz., the decree must not have been fully satisfied by the first of January, 1939. The words " the Court which in a suit to which this Act applies passed a decree "occurring in sec. 36 (6') (a) do not suggest that the Court must have passed the decree after first of January, 1939. This clause specifies the Court which can grant relief and refers to the point of time at which the Court considers exercising its powers under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 36. In our opinion the view taken by the trial Court is wrong and must be set aside. The result therefore is that we reverse the decision of the Sub-Judge, and make the same order as was made by the Additional District Judge. The case will go back to the trial Court, for being disposed of on its merits. We make no order as to costs. The application is not pressed and is dismissed.