Judgement Consolidated Appeals (Nos. 30-34 of 1936) from five decrees of the High Court (May 14, 1936) which modified five decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Meerut (December 22, 1928) by excluding from the decrees passed by the Subordinate Judge in suits for sale under five mortgages certain of the mortgaged properties which were the subject of a private sale agreement in favour of respondent No. Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 130 ( 1941- 1942) Bank of Upper India, Limited V. Robert Hercules Skinner 42 1, R. H. Skinner, on May 30, 1914. The suits were brought by the appellants, the Bank of Upper India, Ld., to enforce simple mortgages executed on various dates between 1904 and 1912 in favour of the appellants by two or more of the respondents vendors. The question in this appeal was whether acknowledgments of the respective mortgage debts made by the mortgagors after the date of the sale agreement of May 30, 1914, operated by virtue of s. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act to extend the time limited by art. 132 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act for the bringing of suits by the appellants to enforce their mortgages against the subjects of the sale agreement in the hands of the respondents. Respondent No. 2, James A. R. Skinner, was the son of respondent No. 1. The following facts are taken substantially from the judgment of the Judicial Committee At various dates between 1904 and 1912 four brothers, cousins of the respondents, executed five mortgages of properties in Meerut, United Provinces, and in Hissar, Punjab. In one the mortgagors were the four brothers, and in four only two of the brothers, disposing of their two-fifth shares in the properties. Two of the mortgages were expressed to be cash credit loans payable after three months notice, the others were for periods of five and two years respectively. The last mortgage was given on November 21, 1912. On May 30, 1914, the four brothers and a sister, who between them at that date possessed the entire property in the lands in question subject to the mortgages, sold to the respondent, R. H. Skinner, certain of the mortgaged lands, on the terms mentioned in the deed of that date. Shortly after the execution of the document R. H. Skinner was given possession of the properties purchased, and obtained mutation into his name. Shortly after the execution of the document R. H. Skinner was given possession of the properties purchased, and obtained mutation into his name. In 1924 the respondent R. H. Skinner bought under a money decree obtained by another banking company against one of the mortgagors a share in some of the mortgaged property situate in the United Provinces. By the terms of the agreement of May 30, 1914, it seemed to have been contemplated that R. H. Skinner would pay the agreed price to the plaintiff bank in reduction of the mortgages. He did not, however, come to any agreement with the bank, and in 1917 the vendors commenced a suit against R. H. Skinner seeking specific performance of the agreement.- That was eventually decreed under a judgment of the Privy Council which gave relief to the defendant if within six months he made the necessary payments to the bank. That he did not do, and the decree accordingly remained unconditionally in force. No interest was paid on the mortgages after May, 1914, but the mortgagors from time to time made written acknowledgments to the bank. The latest was given in 1916, and the present suits were instituted on June 24, 1927. The plaint set out the agreement of sale of May 30, 1914, and that mutation had been made in favour of respondent No. 1, and that he held possession of the properties in question, and reliance was placed on the acknowledgments as saving limitation. The respondents by their written statements alleged, inter alia, that there had been no acknowledgment valid and binding as against them, and that the suits were therefore barred by time. The Subordinate Judge held that the appellants were entitled to decrees for sale on their mortgages, but on appeal the High Court (Harries and Rachhpal Singh JJ.) were of opinion that the acknowledgments subsequent to the date of transfer to respondent No. i could not avail the appellants to extend the time as against the respondents. 1942. May 12, 13, 14. SIR THOMAS STRONGMAN K.C. and Wallach for the appellants. The only question, arising on the construction of s. 19 of the Limitation Act, is does an acknowledgment of a mortgage debt signed by the mortgagor bind a transferee of the mortgagors interest where the acknowledgment is made subsequent to the transfer? There is a considerable body of authority on the Law. Rep. The only question, arising on the construction of s. 19 of the Limitation Act, is does an acknowledgment of a mortgage debt signed by the mortgagor bind a transferee of the mortgagors interest where the acknowledgment is made subsequent to the transfer? There is a considerable body of authority on the Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 130 ( 1941- 1942) Bank of Upper India, Limited V. Robert Hercules Skinner 43 point in India, Calcutta, Madras, Oudh and Lahore being, it is contended, in favour of the mortgagee, and Allahabad in favour of the transferee. At the time the acknowledgments were given the personal remedy against the mortgagors was still alive Lasa Din v. Gulab Kunwar (( 1932) L. R 59 I. A. 376, 382.). As to what interest remained in the mortgagors after the transfer, see Ram Kinkar Banerjee v. Satya Charan Srimani (( 1938) L. R. 66 I. A. 50.) and Jagadamba Loan Co. v. Raja Shiba Prasad Singh (( 1940) L. R. 68 I. A. 67.). The acknowledgments brought each of the suits in question within the periods of limitation; the express words of s. 19, sub-s. 1, are "through whom he derives "title . . . “ Three important decisions in favour of the appellants are Krishna Chandra Saha v. Bhairab Chandra Saha (( 1905) I. L. R 32 C. 1077,1080), Narayana v. Venkataramanna Patnaik (A. I. R. ( 1935) M. 899, 900.), which is directly in point, and Amir Mirza Beg v. Lachmi Narain (( 1931) I. L. R. 7 Luck . 270, 273.). The three leading cases on the other side are Surjiram Marwari v. Barhamdeo Per sad (( 1905) 1 Cal L. J. 337, 343.), Ram Sarup v. Sahu Bhagwati Prasad (( 1936) I. L. R. 58 A; 912, 916.), and Pavayi v. Palanivela (I. L. R. [ 1940] M. 872.). [Reference was also made to Bolding v. Lane (( 1863) 1 De G. J. & S. 122, 127.) and Chinnery v. Evans (( 1864) 11 H. L. Cas. 115.).] A decision adverse to the appellants would mean that no mortgagee would be safe in taking an acknowledgment from his mortgagor; he would have to search te register all the time, and in the Punjab, where the Transfer of Property Act cannot be enforced, he is in a difficulty. 115.).] A decision adverse to the appellants would mean that no mortgagee would be safe in taking an acknowledgment from his mortgagor; he would have to search te register all the time, and in the Punjab, where the Transfer of Property Act cannot be enforced, he is in a difficulty. Cases of hardship there must be, whichever way the decision goes, but it is submitted that on balance the hardship is greater if the High Court judgment here is upheld, because it puts on the mortgagee an intolerable burden. Pringle for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. As regards the suggested hardship imposed on a mortgagee to keep searching the register to safeguard himself, the answer must surely be that if a mortgagee waits for twelve years without receiving interest that is his risk. There are three heads of argument. The first depends on the proposition that an acknowledgment of liability in respect of a property or right only has the legal quality of an acknowledgment when the acknowledgor is not indifferent to or disinterested in the right; here he would have to have some interest in the property. Sect. 19 deals with "an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property "or right/ that is, the property or right in suit. This was a suit under s. 67 of the Transfer of Property Act, a suit for relief by sale of the property mortgaged. The right in suit was a right of the mortgagee to bring that property to sale, that, and nothing else. It was essentially a suit in rend, which is quite distinct from one in personam against the debtor Mullas Transfer of Property Act, 1st ed., s. 68. An acknowledgment of liability is really the same as an admission, and the law as to admissions is that where an admission is made in the case of a person who derives an interest from a previous holder, any statement by the previous holder can only bind the property in the hands of the second person when it is made during the subsistence of the interest of the first holder Maniram v. Seth Rupchand (( 1906) L. R. 33 I. A. 165, 171, 173.) ; Woodroffe on Evidence, 9th ed., p. 255 et seq. ; s. 18 of the Evidence Act (I. of 1872); Amir Mirza Beg v. Lachmi Narain (I. L. R. 7 Luck . 270.). ; s. 18 of the Evidence Act (I. of 1872); Amir Mirza Beg v. Lachmi Narain (I. L. R. 7 Luck . 270.). On its true construction, s. 19 requires that when a property is claimed against a person deriving title or liability from one who has made an acknowledgment in writing of liability in respect thereof, such acknowledgment should have been made before the derivation so as to make the derivation subject to it. The second head of argument is based on the grammar of s. 19. "Where an acknowledgment of liability .... has been "made " is in the past tense, and the suggested inference is that the making of the acknowledgment comes before the derivation of title. The third point, not dealt with below, and which seems to be unanswerable, is that the mortgagees have not established, and cannot establish, that the respondent derived title from the mortgagors. The Transfer of Property Act is not in force in the Punjab, but the Registration Act is. It is well established that where that is the position, that where a disposition of property can be made without writing, if Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 130 ( 1941- 1942) Bank of Upper India, Limited V. Robert Hercules Skinner 44 writing is used, and it is, on its face, an operative document, that passes title provided it is registered. It is not open to anybody to claim outside the document, and if it cannot be looked at for want of registration title cannot be proved Skinner v. Skinner (( 1929) L. R. 56 I. A. 363.) ; Hari Sankar Paul v. Kedar Nath Saha (( 1939) L. R. 66 I. A. 184.). Prima facie, the suit is out of time, and to succeed the appellants must show that they come in under s. 19, and have therefore to establish that the respondent derived title from the acknowledgors ; they cannot do that because they cannot rely on the agreement which purports to give him title because it is a document which should have been registered and has not been. [Reference was also made to Varatha Pillai v. Jeevara-thammal (( 1918) L. R. 46 I. A. 285.).] Sir Thomas Strangman K.C. replied. There was a transfer of possession from which a sale can be inferred. It is rather late in the day to suggest that there was no sale at all. [Reference was also made to Varatha Pillai v. Jeevara-thammal (( 1918) L. R. 46 I. A. 285.).] Sir Thomas Strangman K.C. replied. There was a transfer of possession from which a sale can be inferred. It is rather late in the day to suggest that there was no sale at all. June 15. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ATKIN. The transactions between the appellant bank, now in liquidation, and the relations of the respondents, and between those relations and the respondents, were numerous, and have been the subject of other litigation. But the question to be decided on this appeal, the construction of s. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act, is a simple one, and the point can be discussed on a concise statement of the facts. [His Lordship having stated the facts set out above, continued] These properties are all in the Punjab to which the Transfer of Property Act does not apply. Though some doubt has been expressed on the point by the High Court of Lahore in a similar case also heard on appeal before this Board their Lordships have no difficulty in concluding that the document of May 30, 1914, was intended to affect the transfer of the property and should have been registered. In fact it was not. Some question arose whether all of the acknowledgments were given before the time of limitation had run in favour of the mortgagors, but their Lordships assume for the purposes of this case they were given in time to bind the mortgagors in respect of their personal liability for the debt. Art. 132 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act provides that in a suit to enforce payment of money charged on immovable property the period of limitation is twelve years from the time when the money sued for becomes due. Art. 132 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act provides that in a suit to enforce payment of money charged on immovable property the period of limitation is twelve years from the time when the money sued for becomes due. It is obvious that the period of limitation had expired if it had not been for the acknowledgments, and on that account the appellants relied on s. 19, sub-s. 1, of the Limitation Act "Where, before the expiration of the " period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any " property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect "of such property or right has been made in writing signed by "the party against whom such property or right is claimed, " or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, "a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time "when the acknowledgment was so signed." The question is whether the acknowledgment by a transferor, in order to bind the transferee, can be given after the transfer of title, or whether the section only applies where the acknowledgment has been made before the transferee has derived his title from the acknowledgor. The matter has been frequently discussed in the courts in India with conflicting decisions. Their Lordships have had the advantage of having the principal decisions discussed before them by counsel, and have no doubt that "much can be said on both sides." But it must be remembered that the section is perfectly general, it is not confined to mortgages ; it applies to every form of property, movable and immovable ; and it would appear strange that a man in wrongful possession of property may transfer it to a bona fide purchaser and that the latter is not quieted in his possession by the lapse of time, but may be defeated by acknowledgments made without his knowledge by the person from whom he derived title. This is a doctrine which Lord Westbury L.C. in Bolding v. Lane (( 1863) 1 De G. J. & S. 122.) said leads to very extra ordinary and alarming consequences. This is a doctrine which Lord Westbury L.C. in Bolding v. Lane (( 1863) 1 De G. J. & S. 122.) said leads to very extra ordinary and alarming consequences. He was dealing with a suggestion that under the Real Property Limitations Act of 1843 ah acknowledgment of the mortgagor entitles the first mortgagee to recover all the arrears of the interest out of the land as against the second and subsequent mortgagees who would otherwise be protected by the statute. "The Court" he Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 130 ( 1941- 1942) Bank of Upper India, Limited V. Robert Hercules Skinner 45 says, "is bound by every principle of judicial interpretation "to find, if possible, a construction of the statute which does "not involve consequences so inconsistent with natural "justice " (Ibid. 132.). This principle was applied to this very section by Mookerjee J.—Surjiram Marwari v. Barhamdeo Persad (( 1905) 1 Cal. L. J. 337, 343- 348.)— and their Lordships are prepared to adopt the reasoning of that very learned judge in the present case. In addition to the analogy used by Mookerjee J. of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, there might be adduced the analogy of admissions under the Indian Evidence Act, which are binding if made by persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest, but only if they are made during the continuance of the interest of the person making the statements. The fact that the statute expressly limits the nature of the admission does not detract from the general proposition that any different result would effect serious injustice. On the whole, therefore, their Lordships come to the conclusion that the acknowledgments made in this case by the mortgagors after they had parted with all their interest to the purchaser do not bind the purchaser, and that the High Court came to a correct conclusion on this point. Mr. Pringle, for the respondents, took the further point that the purchaser derived no title from the mortgagors in this case inasmuch as the deed of transfer was not registered, and therefore he could claim by adverse possession. There seems much to be said for this contention, but in view of the opinion expressed on the first point it is unnecessary further to discuss it. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed. There seems much to be said for this contention, but in view of the opinion expressed on the first point it is unnecessary further to discuss it. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed. The appellants must pay the costs of the appeal.