JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is an application in revision by one Makhan Lal against whom an order was made by a first class Magistrate of Allahabad u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Applicant had made an application in revision to the Sessions Judge of Allahabad but the latter declined to refer the matter to this Court and dismissed his application. In the present case I think that the learned magistrate in making the order which he has made has transgressed a recognised principle applicable to cases u/s 145. What happened in the present case that in the spring of 1942 there was a dispute about the crops in plot No. 1/2 A of village Palhana Kachar between the Applicant, Makhah Lal and certain persons, Mangal and others who are tenants of the village. The police made a report that there was a danger of the peace and it was open to the magistrate prima facie to take action u/s 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or u/s 145. He elected to take action u/s 145 but he could, of course, have changed his mind and acted under the other section. He took evidence in regard to possession and relied on certain facts as indicating that it was the other parties, Mangal and others, who were in possession and not the Applicant. It was of course, open to him to arrive at this conclusion, although myself I do not think that on the facts the conclusion was sound. But in making the order which he has made he has lost sight of certain facts in the previous history of this matter. Those facts were brought to his notice, so far as I am able to see and were considered but not given, as I think, due weight. Admittedly the plot in dispute was submerged by the river Ganges and it emerged some five or six years ago. It emerged in fact so far as it is possible to make out from the record, in the year 1936, probably at the end of the rains of that year. Admittedly the plot in dispute was submerged by the river Ganges and it emerged some five or six years ago. It emerged in fact so far as it is possible to make out from the record, in the year 1936, probably at the end of the rains of that year. A dispute arose in that year, the Fasli year being 1344 Makhan Lal claimed that he had cultivated the plot but when the time for harvest arrived there was a dispute between him and the tenants, Mangal and others, other co-sharers in the village having executed leases or rent deeds in favour of those persons. This matter remained in dispute during the summer of 1937 and in October 1937 was decided against Makhan Lal, it being held that Mangal and others, tenants, had been in possession in 1344 Fasli. Makhan Lal was not satisfied with that decision which was, of course, not final as between the parties and he instituted a civil suit No. 625 of 1937 in the Court of the Munsif impleading as opposite parties both the tenants and the other co-sharers of the village. He claimed possession by ejectment of the tenants as trespassers in respect of plots Nos. 4 and 1/2 A. The suit was dismissed in respect of plot No. 4 but the learned Munsif held the tenants to be trespassers in respect of plot No. 1/2 A and decreed the suit in favour of Makhan Lal on the 31st July 1939. On the 3rd September 1939 Makhan Lal obtained formal possession in execution of that decree. The tenants Defendants, Mangal and others, took the case in appeal to the District Judge but the appellate Court dismissed the appeal, only modifying the decree of the trial Court so as to order that Makhan Lal should be given a decree for possession not individually but jointly with the other zamindars. The effect of it was that Makhan Lal was given a decree which would not give him any right to claim that he was the sole owner of these plots as against the other zamindars. It is said and there seems to be no reason to think that it is not true, that the other zamindars took no action in respect of this decree and presumably during the winter of 1939-40 Makhan Lal maintained his possession and cultivated the land. It is said and there seems to be no reason to think that it is not true, that the other zamindars took no action in respect of this decree and presumably during the winter of 1939-40 Makhan Lal maintained his possession and cultivated the land. In the next Fasli year on the 6th August 1940 the other zamindars gave fresh leases in respect of 65 bighas out of 77 bighas of plot No. 1/2 A to Mangal and others and on the 3rd January 1941 they sued these tenants for rent of this plot and obtained an order for attachment before judgment in respect of the crop standing on this plot. This attachment was duly made but it was followed by an objection on the part of Makhan Lal which was successful and resulted in an order for the crop to be released. It is stated that the supurdar in possession of the crop under the order of attachment made over the crop to the tenants, the opposite parties and in consequence Makhan Lal again lost the crop of this plot. 2. Makhan Lal took the action which was to be expected of him and instituted a suit for damages against the tenants, zamindars and supurdar and he was succesful in getting a decree for damages against the tenants only, that being upon the finding that the crops were crops which he had cultivated and which had been taken away from him by them. The decree was for the value of the crops of the whole area. 3. Makhan Lal's case is that in the autumn of 1941 again he cultivated this land and again in the spring of 1942 trouble arose in connection with the cutting of the crops, the opposite parties interfering with his harvesting the filed and hence the present proceedings. He has shown that as a result of the magistrate's order the crops were released in favour of the opposite parties. He again instituted a civil suit in respect of the value of the crops of which he was thus, as he says, was deprived and has again on the 11th August, 1942, obtained a decree for damages against the opposite parties. This piece of evidence is, of course, subsequent to the decision of the magistrate. 4. He again instituted a civil suit in respect of the value of the crops of which he was thus, as he says, was deprived and has again on the 11th August, 1942, obtained a decree for damages against the opposite parties. This piece of evidence is, of course, subsequent to the decision of the magistrate. 4. Now, the position, which arises, even if we leave out of account, as is necessary for the purposes of this application, the decree obtained subsequently on the 11th August, 1942, is that as against the contesting opposite parties Makhan Lal in the year 1939 obtained a decree from the Civil Court holding the opposite parties to be trespassers. Again in 1941 when he lost the crops to the opposite parties as a result of the action of the supurdar after his successful objection to the attachment of the standing crops by the other zamindars in their suit for arrears of rent, he got a decree for damages in respect of the whole value of the crops on his field as against the opposite parties on a declaration that he was in cultivatory possession of the plot. Thus the Civil Court has twice in 1939 and in 1941 decided in favour of Makhan Lal that he is the owner entitled to possession of this plot and in these circumstances the question arises whether the magistrate really had jurisdiction to enter into this matter of possession again and thereby force Makhan Lal to keep on ad infinitum filing civil suits for declaration of his rights which have already been declared. 5. On this point I feel no doubt. It has been held in various cases that where there is a decree of a Civil Court for possession in respect of the disputed land the duty of a Criminal Court proceeding under this section is to and which party held such Civil Court decree and then to maintain that party in possession. 6. Again it has been said that it is the duty of the magistrate to maintain any order which has been passed by the Civil Court; and therefore to take proceedings which must necessarily have the effect of modifying or cancelling such order or of interfering with the rights of the parties determined by a Civil Court is to assume a jurisdiction that the law does not contemplate. Similary it has been held that "when the rights of the parties have been determined by a competent Court, the dispute is at an end and it is the duty of the Magistrate to maintain the right of the successful party and the defeated party will not be allowed to invoke the aid of the magistrate and the police to neutralise the effect of the decree of the competent Civil Court. 7. On this ground, I would hold that this was not a case for the application of Section 145 at all. If there was any danger of a breach of the peace, the case was one in which recourse should rather have been had to the provisions of Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. On the merits I would note that the learned magistrate seems to have been impressed by the fact that the decree ultimately passed in favour of Makhan Lal in 1939 was a decree for joint possession. That may be the case but that would not affect the rights of Makhan Lal as against any persons other than the zamindars. He was the person who had cultivated the land when it came out of the river, possibly at considerable expense. If the other zamindars wanted to enforce joint possession, they could seek to do so by taking proper legal action. It looks to me very much as if the other co-sharers, realising the weakness of their position as against a co-sharer who had gone to the expense of re-claiming the land possibly covered to some extent with sand and bringing it under cultivation, were seeking to use the tenants to obtain possession on their behalf by executing leases, which are very likely fictitious, in their favour. It is to be remembered in this connection that in all probability the amount realisable by way of rent from the tenants would be considerably more than the amount which the other co-sharers could get by instituting suits for realisation of profits in respect of excessive khudkasht cultivation of Makhan Lal. Such manoeuvres are by no means uncommon. 9. On the view which I have taken earlier, I allow this revision and set aside the order of the learned magistrate.