JUDGMENT Roxburgh, J. - This is an appeal against the decree of Subordinate Judge, First Court, Pabna, dated the 24th day of August, 1939, affirming the decree of the Munsif, Second Court, Pabna, dated the 13th July, 1938, decreeing the Plaintiff's suit, and is by the Commissioners of the Pabna Municipality. The Plaintiff's suit was for a declaration that the assessed tax as shown in the notice dated the 24th September, 1937, was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction, and for injunction restraining the Municipality from taking steps under sec. 156 of the Bengal Municipal Act, and further for recovery of the amount paid under protest as a result of proceedings taken under sec. 525 of that Act. 2. The Plaintiff's case is that he was the putnidar of Taraf Pabna, and owner of two holdings Nos. 408 and 409 of the Municipality wherein certain local markets are held. He has given usufructuary mortgage of the Taraf to certain persons refrred to in the case as Khaikhalasiders who are in present possession of the holdings. His grievance is that the Municipality without giving any notice of assessment and without serving any demand notice or otherwise trying to ascertain the ownership, suddenly issued a notice under sec. 525 of the Municipal Act for sale of the holding on the 22nd October, 1937, and the Plaintiff was compelled, under the circumstances, to deposit under protest the entire amount to save the holding from sale, and thereafter, on the 26th February, 1938, the Municipality served another notice under sec. 156 of the Bengal Municipal Act in respect of the rates for the period 1937-38. The Commissioners contested the suit, denying generally the allegations and contending that the suit was barred by limitation and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 3. All the facts of the case do not appear from the judgments of the Courts below, and it is, therefore, necessary to set out them in some detail in order to analyse and discover what exactly is the Plaintiff's case. It may be noted that it would appear from the judgments of both the Courts below that neither had any very clear idea on this point. The holdings in question are re-adjustments of former holdings shown under Nos. 371 to 379 which are equivalant to holding Nos. It may be noted that it would appear from the judgments of both the Courts below that neither had any very clear idea on this point. The holdings in question are re-adjustments of former holdings shown under Nos. 371 to 379 which are equivalant to holding Nos. 408 and 380 which corresponds to holding No. 409; and it also appears from the assessment list filed, Exhibit D, that the annual valuation of 408 was given as Rs. 1,200 with house tax of Rs. 25,-8 and conservancy tax of Rs. 21, while the annual valuation of 409 was Rs. 660 with taxes of Rs. 12-12 and Rs. 10-8 respectively. The list bears the signature of the assessor and also of the Chairman, R.N. Bose, dated the 7th March, 1935. The main basis of the Plaintiff's case consists in the fact that on the list, as it at present appears, for the annual valuation of the holding No. 408, the figure Rs. 1,320 has been scored through, and the figure Rs. 1,200 has been written above it with the signature of the Chairman. Similarly, the valuation of the holding No. 409 is altered from Rs. 720 to Rs. 660, and the correction is also signed by the Chairman. There are similar corrections signed by the Chairman in respect of the house and conservancy taxes of the two holdings. 4. The assessment list was duly deposited as required under sec. 147 of the Act, and Exhibit E, dated the 2nd March, 1936, is the copy of the public notice given in respect of it. It may be noted that it is one of the Plaintiff's grievances that though his assessment was enhanced, no notice under sec. 147 (2) was given to him, and the Courts below have found as a fact that no such notice was given to the Plaintiff. The Courts below have also found that, as regards the corrections in the list, the procedure laid down in sec. 138 of the Act was not followed, and, in particular, no notice was given under sub-sec. (2) of that section to the Plaintiff. 5. After this, the Municipality made demands to recover the taxes for the two holdings and submitted bills Nos. 1707 and 1708 for the taxes of these holdings to the Plaintiff. 138 of the Act was not followed, and, in particular, no notice was given under sub-sec. (2) of that section to the Plaintiff. 5. After this, the Municipality made demands to recover the taxes for the two holdings and submitted bills Nos. 1707 and 1708 for the taxes of these holdings to the Plaintiff. By the petition, dated the 30th June, 1936, Exhibit G (1), the Plaintiff returned the bills to the Chairman stating that he was neither the owner nor the occupier of the holdings, and that he was returning the bills for service upon the persons with reference to the old register. In passing, it may be noted that in so far as the Plaintiff made endeavours to deny these documents, the Courts below have necessarily found against him. We next have information from Exhibit K, dated the 25th March, 1937, that the tax Daroga called the attention of the Chairman to the difficulty of collecting taxes from these holdings owing to disputes and recommended action under sec. 525 of the Bengal Municipal Act, and the Chairman, on the 26th March, 1937, passed an order to take action. 6. A notification was issued in the Calcutta Gazette in respect of the action under sec. 525 of the Act. Exhibit A has been proved being a copy of the forwarding letter dated the 24th September, 1937, with which the copy of the notification was sent to the Plaintiff (for some reason or other, the actual notification has not been proved in this case.) This is the notice referred to in the plaint, and it was followed on the 4th October, 1937, by the petition Exhibit B (1), from the Plaintiff which was drafted by his pleader Ashutosh Roy, who incidentally, it may be noted happens to be Defendant No. 2, the present Chairman of the Municipality. In this petition, the Plaintiff asked for a reduction of the valuation to Rs. 375, the annual rental of the putni, and requested the Commissioners to consider the matter and give a decision. In the margin, there are notes of various Commissioners indicating that they were willing to stay proceedings as regards sale under the provisions of sec. 525 of the Bengal Municipal Act if the Petitioner deposited the whole amount due, on the understanding that, in the event of the matter being decided in his favour, the excess deposited would be refunded. In the margin, there are notes of various Commissioners indicating that they were willing to stay proceedings as regards sale under the provisions of sec. 525 of the Bengal Municipal Act if the Petitioner deposited the whole amount due, on the understanding that, in the event of the matter being decided in his favour, the excess deposited would be refunded. It is to be noted that in this petition the Plaintiff gave up the contention that he was not the owner and was not therefore liable. He was merely concerned to have the valuation of the assessment reduced. He made no complaint about the corrections or alterations in the list. We find from Exhibit C that on the 7th February, 1938, after the sub-committee had reported, it was declared by a majority of 9 to 2 that the putnidars were the owners and liable to pay the rates; and it was also declared that the amount of the rates assessed was just and reasonable. No evidence has been given to show what proceedings were taken by the sub-committee, and we do not know how this question of whether the putnidars were liable or not arose before it. 7. In the meantime, two days after the filing of Exhibit B (1), the Plaintiff deposited the sum of Rs. 291-12 in respect of the taxes due. Thereafter, the Municipality began to take steps for the realisation of the taxes of 1937-38. Although it is difficult to discover it from the judgments, in fact, all that was done was that a notice was published by beat of drum that it was proposed to realise the taxes of this period by distress in the bazar. The contention of the Plaintiff is that no notice of demand as required by sec. 156 (2) for the taxes of this period has been served on him, and, therefore, no distress could be made upon him under secs. 156 and 157 of the Act. No attempt has been made to give any evidence of the service of notice of demand for the taxes of this period. 8. 156 (2) for the taxes of this period has been served on him, and, therefore, no distress could be made upon him under secs. 156 and 157 of the Act. No attempt has been made to give any evidence of the service of notice of demand for the taxes of this period. 8. The Courts below, apparently, rather oblivious of what they were considering, did not go into the question as to whether any notice of demand has been served for the taxes of the later period, found as a fact that bills, Exhibits F and F (1), were presented on the 25th May, 1936: No notice of demand was proved to have been served along with them or at any time. The Plaintiff's grievance with regard to this distress for terms of the period 1937-38 has nothing to do whatever with the bills, Exhibits F and F (1) or any notice of demand which might have been served in connection with them. There is, therefore, actually no finding by the Lower Courts as regards the question whether there was any service of the notice of demand in regard to the taxes for the period 1937-38. 9. It would appear, therefore, that the Plaintiff has four main grievances which would seem to arise out of four possible causes of action. They are as follows : (1) That the correction made in the assessment list was of such a character and made in such a way, in particular, by neglecting the provisions of sec. 138 (2), in failing to give him' notice of the proposed correction, that the assessment itself is ultra vires, null and void. (2) That since after the assessment list was deposited and published, notice was given under sec. 147 (1) of the Act, no particular notice was given to him under sub-sec. (2) although his assessment had been enhanced and this failure rendered subsequent action to recover any taxes clue according to the assessment ultra vires and void. (3) That the action of the Municipality in proceeding under sec. 525 of the Act was ultra vires on the ground that they, in fact, knew that there was an owner of the property, and that, therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of the money deposited by him as a result of their action. (3) That the action of the Municipality in proceeding under sec. 525 of the Act was ultra vires on the ground that they, in fact, knew that there was an owner of the property, and that, therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of the money deposited by him as a result of their action. (4) That the Municipality having given notice that they intended to realise the taxes due on the holding for 1937-38 by distress, and, at the time when they gave notice, they not having previously served any notice of demand under sec. 525 (2) of these taxes, if they carry out their intention as expressed in the notice published by beat of drums and distress the property, they would act illegally and he is entitled to a declaration to this effect and injunction. 10. The Plaintiff gave notice of the suit on the 8th March, 1938, and filed his suit on the 11th April, 1938. It will be noted, therefore, that he gave notice of the suit within a fortnight of the Municipality having published their intention of making a distress, and before any other action was taken by them. If the Plaintiff succeeds on the first point, the other points are of little importance, as then the whole assessment alleged to have been made by the Municipality would be void, and that would be sufficient to vitiate all subsequent actions,--otherwise regular or irregular. 11. One of the difficulties in dealing with the points of law which arise in this case is that the findings of fact by the lower Appellate Court are of a curious nature. There is no oral evidence as to how the corrections to the assessment list were in fact made. I may say that, for my part, though I tried to discover it, I can find no evidence on the subject at all; it is sufficient for the purpose of this appeal however to accept the findings as they are. 12. The lower Appellate Court has said on this subject: It is open to the Municipality to direct alteration or amendment of the assessment list. Sec. 138 provides the procedure to be followed in malting alteration or amendment. 12. The lower Appellate Court has said on this subject: It is open to the Municipality to direct alteration or amendment of the assessment list. Sec. 138 provides the procedure to be followed in malting alteration or amendment. It provides that the Commissioners at a meeting may at any time direct alterations or amendment of the assessment list and that the Commissioners shall give at least one month's notice to any person interested of any alteration which the Commissioners propose to make. 13. We may pause here and point out a serious fallacy. Under sec. 138 (1) (g), the Commissioners may correct any clerical or arithmetical error. Notice under sub-sec. (2) is only required to be given to the assessee in respect of alterations made under sub-cls. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-sec. (1) and not when any correction is made under sub-cl. (g). There is not a scrap of evidence here to show whether the correction made was or was not the correction of a clerical or arithmetical error. The Courts below have assumed further that it was a correction coming under cl. (c). 14. The learned Subordinate Judge then continues: The amendment was not made by the Municipal Commissioners at a meeting and there is nothing to show that the Chairman was authorised by the Commissioners to do so. The fact that the alterations were initialled by the Chairman clearly indicates that they were done after the assessment list was filed by the assessor. It is quite true that the Chairman when he made the alterations had no mala fide intention. It is not the question of intention. The point is whether the Chairman had any authority to do so. The Act has not given any such power to the Chairman. There is also nothing to show that these alterations were made after service of notice to the Plaintiff as provided in cl. 2 of sec. 138. The assessment so far as the Respondent is concerned is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. 15. The reasoning of this is wholly fallacious. We may, however, accept that there is a finding of fact that the alteration was made by the Chairman, but the lower Appellate Court has not applied its mind to the question when the alteration was made. 15. The reasoning of this is wholly fallacious. We may, however, accept that there is a finding of fact that the alteration was made by the Chairman, but the lower Appellate Court has not applied its mind to the question when the alteration was made. This alteration, however, although it is to be noted that it is in favour of the Plaintiff, is said to form the foundation on which it can be held that the whole assessment can be set aside by the Civil Court. This seems to me to be an extraordinary proposition. The Chairman has all the powers of the Commissioners under sec. 51 of the Act except such as must be exercised by them at a meeting, or as may be in contravention of any direction made by the Commissioners at a meeting. Within the scheme of the Act itself, the assessee is given complete remedy for objection to any valuation and assessment, by the procedure laid down in secs. 148 and 151, and, in fact, in this case, as we have seen, the Petitioner himself made full use of his rights under these sections although he did not succeed. 16. It is not suggested that the alteration was made by the Chairman after the 7th February, 1938, when the Commissioners, at a meeting, finally adjudicated on his petition of objection, Exhibit B. If there was any irregularity prior to that in the correction, as has been apparently found by the Courts below, it seems to me that it was fully cured by the action taken under sec. 148 and the following sections which indeed give the procedure provided by the Act for such correction of any errors made in the course of assessment. It would seem fantastic that the Plaintiff after submitting to the jurisdiction of the Commissioners given under these sections and attempting to get his assessment reduced, should turn round and say that it was quite immaterial what they decided and that the assessment itself was wholly illegal. It would seem fantastic that the Plaintiff after submitting to the jurisdiction of the Commissioners given under these sections and attempting to get his assessment reduced, should turn round and say that it was quite immaterial what they decided and that the assessment itself was wholly illegal. Of course, it has been found as a fact that some figures have been scratched out and initialled by the Chairman in circumstances as to which we have no proof, but as to what is to be the effect of the finding there is no doubt, in my opinion, that the intention of the provisions of the Act is that the assessment as shown in the assessment list is to be conclusive proof of the amount leviable in respect of the holding, (vide sec. 139), and that the determination of any objection by the committee appointed under sec. 149 shall be final, as laid down in sub-sec. (3) of that section. Under sec. 150 it is provided that no objection shall be taken to any assessment or valuation in any other manner than in the Act is provided. No other method of objection is available to the assessee, and he cannot go to the Civil Court for relief : he may possibly have a remedy by an application to the local Government to exercise its powers under sec. 548 (1) of the Act. 17. The lower Courts have relied on certain decisions of this Court, and these have been referred to me in argument: Ambika Churn Mazumdar v. Satish Chandra Sen 2 C.W.N. 689 (1898)., Navadwip Chandra Pal v. Purnananda Saha 3 C.W.N. 73 (1898). and Chairman of Giridih Municipality v. Suresh Chandra Mozumdar 12 C.W.N. 709 (1908). and other cases. The first and the third cases relate to assessability, the question in issue being liability of the persons concerned to be assessed; and in the other case it was found that the Municipality, in purporting to correct the assessment, had, in fact, done some thing outside the powers given under sec. 93 of the Act of 1884 corresponding to sec. 138 of the present Act. 18. 93 of the Act of 1884 corresponding to sec. 138 of the present Act. 18. In the present case, there is no question of assessability or want of powers, the objection is to a matter of procedure in one of the stages of assessment, and, as I have already emphasised, to an error of procedure which could be corrected by the procedure laid down under the Act, and of which procedure the Plaintiff made full use in attempting to get the assessment corrected by a reduction to the amount of Rs. 375 which he contended was the correct assessment. 19. This case is similar to the case of Manessur Dass v. Collector and Municipal Commissioners of Chapra ILR 1 Cal. 409 (1876). There Garth, C.J., observed: Now, in this case, the Plaintiff is attempting by means of a civil suit, to re-open the question of assessment of his house, which has been heard on appeal, and decided by the Municipal Commissioners. It is said that the Commissioners have tried the appeal in an improper way, and that they have exceeded their powers and acted contrary to the provisions of the Act. But even supposing that they had, the Civil Court has no right to interfere. Some actions may, no doubt, be brought against the Commissioners for a great variety of acts which they may do under color of their statutory powers and under a mistaken view of their duties, but not an action of this kind. Their decision upon an appeal against a rate of assessment is absolutely final. 20. I respectfully agree with those remarks and am of opinion that they apply in full to the present case. This disposes of the first and main ground of the Plaintiff's objection. 21. The second ground is based on the absence of notice under sec. 147 (2). Here again there is some inconsistency in the findings of the lower Courts. The trial Court found that the Municipality were justified in taking the Plaintiff at his word when he denied ownership, and, therefore, held that they were entitled to proceed under sec. 525 of the Act on the basis that the ownership of the holding was not known. He, however, found against them under sec. 147 (2), although there is a provision that a notice required therein is only to be served if, the owner is known. 525 of the Act on the basis that the ownership of the holding was not known. He, however, found against them under sec. 147 (2), although there is a provision that a notice required therein is only to be served if, the owner is known. However that may be, all that has been said above with regard to the alleged errors under sec. 138 apply with greater force in respect of the alleged error of procedure under sec. 147 (2). It would seem that the provisions for notice under sec. 147 are merely to draw attention of persons concerned to the assessments and to invite objections; and anybody who subsequently comes to the Commissioners with his petition under sec. 148 seems to me to be entirely out of Court in contending that the assessment and action taken thereunder must be void because he did not receive this particular intimation. 22. It is to be noted that curiously enough that there are three starting points for the period of limitation for an application under sec. 148: (1) the date of the publication of notice under sec. 147 (1); (2) date of service of notice required under sec. 147 (2); and (3) the date of service of the notice of demand. The operative date is the date of expiry of the period which shall last expire. No assessee can be really prejudiced if he is given an opportunity to file an objection after he receives the first notice of demand for payment. The provision of the Act relating to the two periods of limitation dating from the dates of service of notices under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 147 is practically superfluous : it may serve to hasten possible objectors to file their objections before the actual demand for payment of the tax is made. 23. In the present case, the Petitioner came with his petition of objection after his attempt to avoid payment by denying himself and his ownership had failed and when he saw that the Municipality meant business, he then got his friend, that is to say, his lawyer and the present Chairman, to intercede for him, and his case was fairly and sympathetically considered. The contention, therefore, that failure to give him notice under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 147 could give him a right to institute and succeed in a suit in a Civil Court must fail. The contention, therefore, that failure to give him notice under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 147 could give him a right to institute and succeed in a suit in a Civil Court must fail. 24. Before passing to the next point, I should note that in the course of the argument, it has been urged for the Plaintiff, somewhat on the lines on which his case was presented in the trial Court, that it has not been proved that all the formalities required by sec. 149, particularly, the inquiry and taking of evidence, were duly carried out Admittedly, the only evidence is found in Exhibits B and C. It may be also noted in passing that the Vice-Chairman at the time of these proceedings was examined as a defence witness, but not a word was put to him on the subject of any of these proceedings. Neither of the lower Courts comments on this fact. Had it been necessary to consider the question whether the findings of the lower Courts could be supported at all, I do not think that it would have been difficult to say that they are based on no evidence whatsoever. However that may be, I am definitely not bound by the findings of the lower Court on this question as to whether or not the proceedings under sec. 149 and other related sections were duly carried out or not. On this I am perfectly clear. It is for the Plaintiff to show that the proceedings were not duly carried out if he wishes the Civil Court to interfere on the ground that the proceedings were void for any illegality. On the state of the record as it is, it is obviously useless for the Respondent now to contend that there was any thing wrong in these proceedings. We next come to the question that even if the assessment is good and the Respondent is liable to pay taxes, he can yet get a refund of the amount of Rs. 291-12 deposited by him after he had decided to give up the bluff that he was not the owner of the properties. The contention seems to us to be unsustainable. On this point there is a difference between the two Courts in their findings of fact. The trial Court found that the Municipality were entitled to succeed under sec. 525. 291-12 deposited by him after he had decided to give up the bluff that he was not the owner of the properties. The contention seems to us to be unsustainable. On this point there is a difference between the two Courts in their findings of fact. The trial Court found that the Municipality were entitled to succeed under sec. 525. The Plaintiff denied ownership and returned the bills, but ultimately he realised that he might manage to get relief and have his assessment reduced, and then he came with his petition, Exhibit B, on the 4th October, 1937, came to terms with regard to further action in regard to sale, and he was heard. The matter went against him, the amount deposited was due from him, and there is no reason why he should get a refund. The lower Appellate Court, however, has managed to find that the Municipality had no right to proceed with the sale under sec. 525. In the circumstances, the finding is one of no importance. If the Municipality had proceeded to sell, then it might be contended that the proceedings could be challenged on the basis of such a finding. In this case, it is quite clear that the Plaintiff deposited the money to have his petition favourably heard, and as the amount is due from him and payable on presentation of the bills, he is entitled to no refund. 25. The last case made by the Plaintiff has almost been disposed of by the manner in which it was necessary to set it out. The case has only to be discovered to be rejected. It is certainly true that if the Commissioners proceed to realise the taxes by distress without previously making a demand, their conduct might be defective, and might or might not be the subject-matter of proceedings in a Civil Court. It is certainly no part of the Court's functions formally by injunction to tell the Commissioners to read the sections of the Act before they move otherwise they may get into trouble, and I am not going to do so. 26. This is enough to dispose of the case, but I may refer briefly to some points that were discussed before me as preliminary points; it was argued that the suit should fail for want of notice. 26. This is enough to dispose of the case, but I may refer briefly to some points that were discussed before me as preliminary points; it was argued that the suit should fail for want of notice. In my opinion, the contention is sound, and, as in so many other aspects of the case, the onus has been placed upside down. It is for the Plaintiff to prove that the proper notice was served. It is quite clear that he failed to do so. The trial Court considered the point and held that the notice was in possession of the Defendant and it was for them to produce and show that it was not proper. I do not think that this is correct. 27. The question of limitation was also raised. The discussions of the trial Courts on this point are vitiated by the fact that they never analysed and separated the different cases made by the Plaintiff. In my opinion, so far as concerns the first cause of action analysed above, it arose when the corrections in the list were made, if the corrections were made illegally so as to render the assessment ultra vires, null and void. There is no finding when such corrections were made, and if the point of limitation had to be disposed of, it might be necessary to remand the case for a finding on this point. 28. As regards the other three causes of action analysed above, it would appear that they would arise on or after the date the Respondent deposited the sum of Rs. 291-12, namely, the 6th October, 1937. The determination of the question as to whether the suit was within time as regards these would depend on the question whether the period of notice is to be excluded or not in calculating the period of limitation. Under sec. 535 (1) one month's notice is to be given to, the Commissioners, though under sub-sec. (2) of the same section, the action is to be brought within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action and not afterwards. The question is whether this latter provision is absolute, that is to say, whether it overrides the provision of sec. 15 of the Limitation Act, read in the light of sec. 29 of that Act and whether the terms of sec. The question is whether this latter provision is absolute, that is to say, whether it overrides the provision of sec. 15 of the Limitation Act, read in the light of sec. 29 of that Act and whether the terms of sec. 535 (2) amount to an express exclusion of the provisions of sec. 15 of the Limitation Act in respect of the notice required to be given under the Bengal Municipal Act. In the view I have taken it is not necessary for me to decide this point, and I prefer to leave it open. 29. Before concluding I may add that though it has been possible to dispose of the case on the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below, it is clear that both Courts entirely failed to appreciate the fact that the onus was entirely on the Plaintiff to establish facts justifying the interference of the Court in a case of this nature, and secondly, that if the evidence were looked into, there was no basis whatever for the findings. 30. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed with costs to the Municipality throughout, the Plaintiff's suit is dismissed and the injunction dissolved. The prayer made on behalf of the Plaintiff Respondent for leave to appeal under cl. (15) of the Letters Patent is refused.