JUDGMENT Mitter, J. - This appeal is in a suit instituted by the Respondent in his capacity as trustee and manager of an alleged trust estate called the " family fund." The principal Defendant is the minor son of his deceased brother, Bejay Krishna Khan. One of the material points for decision relates to the real character of the suit, namely, whether it is a suit for account, pure and simple, or a suit for recovery, in the alternative, of specific sums of money from the estate of Bejay Krishna Khan. The parties belong to the Raj family of Narajole, a Hindu family in which succession is regulated by the custom of primogeniture. The relationship between the parties so far as material to the case appears from the following genealogical tree: On the 31st December, 1882, Raja Mohendralal, Upendralal and Rani Bishnupriya executed an instrument (Exhibit 16) called a Niyampatra in respect of a number of properties described in four lists marked ka, kha, ga and gha annexed to the instrument. It is recited therein that the properties in lists ka and gha belonged to Raja Mohendralal and Upendralal, the properties in list kha stood in the name of Rani Bishnupriya and those in list ga belonged exclusively to Raja Mohendralal. The said three persons by that instrument "dedicated" all those properties to the "family fund." The income of the said properties and of another property, called Debutter Harinarainpore, was to be applied to (1) the expenses of the worship of three named idols and of religious and auspicious ceremonies, (2) to the maintenance according to proper scale of their family, and (3) to the purchase of ornaments and things of a like nature for the use of the members of their family. Out of the surplus income that will be left after defraying the aforesaid expenses immovable properties were to be purchased, and those properties were to be included in the "family fund estate." The management of the family fund estate was to remain in the eldest male member of the family. On the death of the executants their heirs belonging to their family were to carry on the work of administering the "family fund." The executants and their heirs will have no power to transfer any of the properties of the "family fund estate" and the same will not be liable for their personal debts . 2. On the death of the executants their heirs belonging to their family were to carry on the work of administering the "family fund." The executants and their heirs will have no power to transfer any of the properties of the "family fund estate" and the same will not be liable for their personal debts . 2. Although Raja Mahendralal became entitled according to the aforesaid rule to manage the "family fund estate," by a further clause in that instrument he made over that responsibility to his brother Upendralal, who continued to manage that estate till his death. 3. Thereafter Raja Narendralal took upon himself the charge of management till his death which occurred on the 14th February. 1921. Shortly after Raja Narendralal's death his two sons Debendralal and Bijoy Krishna executed on the 25th August, 1921, another deed, also called a Niyampatra [Exhibit 16(a)]. Many matters are dealt with in that instrument. For the purpose of this suit, the matters which are relevant are that the Niyampatra of 1882 (Exhibit 16) was confirmed and one property called Mahal Jhakra was added to the family fund estate, and although Debendra had under the terms of Exhibit 16 become entitled to manage the family fund estate, he being then the eldest male member of the family, he relinquished the charge of management to Bejoy. Bidhumukhi, the widow of Upendralal, was then alive but she did not join in this instrument. Bijoy took upon himself the charge of managing the family fund estate including Mahal Jhakra and continued to manage the same till his death, which occurred on the 29th Aughran, 1642, corresponding to December 12th, 1935. The case of the Plaintiff is that the Niyampatras created a trust, that the executants of the first Nayampatra of 1882 and their heirs became trustees and the eldest male member of the family for the time being was to be the managing trustee; that on the death of Raja Narendralal both he and Bejoy became trustees and by reason of the relinquishment of the charge of management in favour of Bijoy by the instrument Exhibit 16 (a), Bijoy became the managing trustee and continued to be so till his death. On Bijay's death he became the managing trustee and was a co-trustee with Upendralal's widow Bidhumukhi. On Bijay's death he became the managing trustee and was a co-trustee with Upendralal's widow Bidhumukhi. His further case is that Bijoy as managing trustee misappropriated trust moneys, which his son and heir, Amiya Krishna, is liable to make good from Bijay's assets. Some of the other principal points accordingly are whether the Niyampatras have created a trust, whether the Plaintiff is a trustee and whether Bijay was a co-trustee and a managing trustee. The position taken up by the Defendant is that the Niyampatras did not create any trust, -- they were simply instruments which provided for the management of the properties included in them, which continued to remain the properties of the executants, that the position of the Plaintiff and Bijay were of managers only, i.e., agents of the owners. Other points, e.g., maintainability of the suit, and the question of limitation have been raised by the Defendant. 4. We will first consider the question of the maintainability of the suit. The learned Advocate for the Defendant Appellant says that assuming a trust was created by the Niyampatras, the suit is not maintainable, because (1) all the trustees are not parties; (2) that the suit is in essence a suit for accounts against the legal representative of a deceased co-trustee. On the assumption that no trust was created but the Niyampatras were simply instruments relating to management the suit is not maintainable because (3) a succeeding manager cannot sue for relief against the legal representative of the last manager or agent. 5. The first point urged proceeds upon a misconception. If a trust was created by Exhibit 16, the trustees would be, as we would indicate hereafter, Debendralal, the Plaintiff, Bidhumukhi and possibly Defendant No. 1, Amiya, the son of Bijoy. The learned Advocate for the Appellant says that though Bidhumukhi has been made a Defendant, the suit is not maintainable as she has not been made a party in her character as trustee. It is a settled principle of law that several trustees form, so to say, one collective trustee and all of them should ordinarily be co-Plaintiffs in a suit in respect of the trust estate, and such of them as are unwilling to join as co-Plaintiffs or have done some act precluding them to be Plaintiffs should be made Defendants [Luke v. South Kensington Hotel Co. L.R. 11 Ch. D. 121 (1879).]. L.R. 11 Ch. D. 121 (1879).]. No doubt that in the cause-title of the plaint Bidhumukhi has not been described as a trustee, but paragraph 15 of the plaint expressly states that she is made a party in her capacity of trustee and beneficiary. She did not express her willingness to become a co-Plaintiff and is now dead, and Upendra's direct line is extinct. We do not accordingly find the first ground to be of any substance. 6. The trend of decisions of this Court is that the legal representative of an agent or trustee is not liable to render account of the estate which was in charge of his predecessor. A suit for account is accordingly not maintainable against such a person. Kumeda Bala v. Ashutosh 17 C.W.N. 5: s.c. 16 C.L.J. 282 (1912) and Maharaja Srish Chandra Nandy v. Supravat Chandra 44 C.W.N. 304 (1940).. A suit for account would lie only if the Defendant is under an obligation to account, and the obligation to account arises in the following circumstances only: (i) the person upon whom such an obligation is sought to be imposed (the Defendant) must have received property of some kind not belonging to himself; (ii) the person seeking to impose the obligation must be the owner or must have such title to that property as would enable him to recover it. That is to say, ownership or such title of the Plaintiff must concur with the possession of the Defendant; (iii) the Defendant must not receive the property as mere bailee; (iv) the Defendant must have received the property in his possession and in his control. Mere custody like that of a servant is not enough; and (v) there must be fiduciary relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 7. As the legal representative of a deceased agent or trustee does not stand in a fiduciary relationship, a suit for account is not maintainable against him. It is equally settled law that a suit for recovery of money misappropriated by a trustee or an agent would lie against his legal representative. In such a suit the decree would be against the assets of the deceased agent or trustee. It is equally settled law that a suit for recovery of money misappropriated by a trustee or an agent would lie against his legal representative. In such a suit the decree would be against the assets of the deceased agent or trustee. A suit for recovery of a specific sum of money, however, does not assume the character of a suit for account merely because in the determination of the questions in controversy accounts may have to be examined. The sole foundation for a suit for account is, as we have already pointed out, the obligation to account, and where that does not exist, the suit for money would not be regarded as a suit for accounts. [Kshetranath Banerjee v. Kalidasi Dassi 27 C.L.J. 96 (1916).]. In the light of these principles the plaint in the case, which we have before us, has to be examined. 8. The plaint consists of sixteen paragraphs and four prayers. The last prayer is the general prayer and prayer No. 3 is for costs. Prayer No. 1 is the prayer for accounts and the second prayer is for the recovery of a specific sum of money. In the first twelve paragraphs the Plaintiff refers to the two Niyampatras and says that they created a trust, that the executants were the trustees and ultimately Bejoy became the managing trustee. Then the plaint charges the mother and natural guardian of Defendant No. 1 (Bejoy's legal representative) with default in not sending to the Plaintiff after Bejoy's death authenticated accounts of income and expenditure during the last period of Bejoy's life. In the last portion of paragraph 12 the Plaintiff states that on account of that default he was not in a position to ascertain exactly how much money of the trust estate was in the hands of Bejoy at the time of his death. Paragraph 13 is very important. There the Plaintiff states that as a result of enquiry he has found that considerable sums of money had been realised by Bejoy from one of the trust properties, namely, Mahal Jhakra, but they were either not credited or lesser amounts had been credited by Bejoy in the accounts and the balance had been misappropriated by him. A detailed statement in respect of the sums of money so misappropriated by Bejoy is given in Schedule ga of the plaint. That total is Rs. 1,891-0-5. A detailed statement in respect of the sums of money so misappropriated by Bejoy is given in Schedule ga of the plaint. That total is Rs. 1,891-0-5. The Plaintiff had not been able to ascertain whether there were similar misappropriations by Bejoy in respect of the income of the other trust properties, but proceeding upon the account papers which had been sent to him the sum of Rs. 7,886-13-3, the details of which are given in Schedule gha, was the surplus which was in the hands of Bejoy at the time of his death. Up to this the frame of the suit was one to recover specific sums of money which according to the Plaintiff Bejoy had either misappropriated or had in his hands at the time of his death and which had not been restored to the trust, and the second prayer in the plaint is a prayer for the recovery of Rs. 9,777-13-8, which is the sum total of the items mentioned in Schedules ga and gha. Then paragraph 14 of the plaint charges the Defendant No. 1 with the liability to account for the management of his father and the first prayer of the plaint is a prayer which is only appropriate to a suit for accounts. Thus the suit is not purely a suit for accounts. It is a suit of a composite nature. In substance it is a suit with alternative claims against the Defendant No. 1, namely a suit for accounts, in the alternative a suit for recovery of a specific sum of money. The prayer for accounts is not maintainable, but we do not see why prayer kha is not maintainable. The learned Subordinate Judge has in fact granted that prayer only. For the purpose of getting relief on that prayer account papers will have to be examined. Defendant No. 1 would, however, be under no obligation to explain any item that may appear in the account papers, and the onus would be entirely upon the Plaintiff to substantiate each and every item appearing in Schedules ga and gha and other items in the account papers on which he may rely or which he may challenge. We accordingly overrule the second ground taken before us by the Appellant. The third ground on which the maintainability of the suit has been challenged by the Appellant depends upon the effect of the Niyampatras. We accordingly overrule the second ground taken before us by the Appellant. The third ground on which the maintainability of the suit has been challenged by the Appellant depends upon the effect of the Niyampatras. For the reasons to be stated hereafter we hold that a trust was created by them and the Plaintiff was a co-trustee and now the managing trustee and Bejoy was not a mere agent or manager but was along with Bidhumukhi his co-trustee and was also the managing trustee. 9. The first Niyampatra of the year 1882 (Exhibit 16) is the most important instrument and this has to be construed. In the first place it is to be observed that the three executants "dedicate" to the "family fund" their respective properties. This in law does not transfer their title, for the dedication is not either to a natural or to a juridical person. The title still remained in them. Later on it is provided that they and their heirs would have no power to sell, give or otherwise transfer or encumber the same. They would have no right to partition the said properties which would not also he liable for their personal debts. These clauses indicate clearly that from the date of the instrument they were not to continue to be beneficial owners. The purpose of the dedication is indicated, namely, the income was to be applied to the worship of the three deities and for religious ceremonies, for the maintenance of their family, i.e., of themselves and other members of their family, and for the purchase of ornaments and things of a like nature for the use of the members of their family. They thus became bare owners after the instrument and to that ownership that still remained with them was annexed the obligation to spend the income on the objects indicated above. In our opinion there was in effect a declaration of trust, the beneficiaries being the deities and the members of their family, the creators of the trust becoming some of the beneficiaries but only in their character as members of the family. The executants themselves became trustees. By the rule that the management of the properties would remain in the eldest male member of the family, Raja Mahendralal was to become the managing trustee but as he relinquished that position in favour of Upendralal the latter became the managing trustee. The executants themselves became trustees. By the rule that the management of the properties would remain in the eldest male member of the family, Raja Mahendralal was to become the managing trustee but as he relinquished that position in favour of Upendralal the latter became the managing trustee. The further clause that on the death of the executants their heirs " will carry on the work" by necessary implication, casts the duty of applying the income to the objects mentioned in the deed on the executants. They are to be the trustees and after their deaths their heirs are to be the succeeding trustees. On the events which happened on the death of Raja Mahendralal and Rani Bishnupriya, two of the first set of trustees, Raja Narendralal and Upendralal became the trustes, the latter being the managing trustee. On the death of Upendralal, Raja Narendralal and Bidhumukhi (Upendralal's widow and heir) became joint trustees, the former being the managing trustee. On the death of Raja Narendralal, his sons and heirs, namely, Debendralal and Bejoy Krishna became joint trustees with Bidhumukhi by the force of the terms of the Niyampatra (Exhibit 16) of the year 1882. By the agreement between Debendralal and Bejoy Krishna as contained in the Niyampatra of the year 1921 [Exhibit 16 (a)] Bejoy became the managing trustee. He was a trustee and he took upon himself the charge of managing the trust properties. In our judgment the only relevant point for consideration, so far as this part of the case is concerned, are two in number, namely, (1) whether Debendralal's position is that of a co-trustee or is he a mere manager, and (2) whether Bejoy was a co-trustee and managing trustee or a mere manager or agent. If Debendra's position is that of a manager he cannot maintain the suit. If Bejoy's position was not that of a trustee the question of limitation will have to be considered from a different point of view. The questions of importance therefore are whether a trust was created and who were the trustees. If a trust was created by the Niyampatras -- and we have held that it was -- the further question as to whether all the objects of the trust are not lawful objects or not is not material having regard to the scope of the suit, which is neither a suit for construction nor for administration. If a trust was created by the Niyampatras -- and we have held that it was -- the further question as to whether all the objects of the trust are not lawful objects or not is not material having regard to the scope of the suit, which is neither a suit for construction nor for administration. If one of the objects is lawful that is enough. Bejoy was a trustee and he having entered upon the management as trustee it would not have been open to him to plead in a suit for account instituted against him as trustee either by his co-trustee or by a beneficiary by way of defence that some of the purposes of the trust are not lawful, and we are of opinion that his son and legal representative is under the same disability in this suit. We will therefore consider if any one of the purposes mentioned in the Niyampatra (Exhibit 16) is lawful. 10. The three objects as mentioned in Exhibit 16 are: (i) worship of the three deities and performance of religious ceremonies, (ii) maintenance of the family according to proper scale, and (iii) purchase of ornaments, etc., for the benefit of the members of the family. 11. The deed contemplates that there would be a surplus after meeting the expenditure on these three objects, and that surplus is not disposed of. It was to be invested in immovable properties which were to become accretions to the trust. In our judgment the first object is lawful. The amount to be spent on that head was not left indefinite. It was to be on the old scale that had already been fixed The question whether the second and the third objects are lawful or not, and the provision regarding the surplus illegal, in view of the provisions of secs. 13 and 14 of the Transfer of Property Act are serious questions in view of the decision in Sukhamoy Chunder Das v. Sm. Manmohini Dasi L.R. 13 I.A. 103 (1885). and the observations made in Kayastha Pathsala, Allahabad v. Mussammat Bhagwati Devi L.R. 64 I.A. 5: s.c. 41 C.W.N. 276 (1936). 13 and 14 of the Transfer of Property Act are serious questions in view of the decision in Sukhamoy Chunder Das v. Sm. Manmohini Dasi L.R. 13 I.A. 103 (1885). and the observations made in Kayastha Pathsala, Allahabad v. Mussammat Bhagwati Devi L.R. 64 I.A. 5: s.c. 41 C.W.N. 276 (1936). But a trust the object of which is the performance of debsheba and religious ceremonies is perfectly valid in Hindu law and if the first object is not dependent upon and is separate from the other two objects the trust to that extent would be valid. The trust created by the Niyampatra would not be wholly null and void. [Kayastha Pathsala, Allahabad v. Musammat Bhagwati Devi L.R. 64 IndAp 5: s.c. 41 C.W.N. 276 (1936).]. In our judgment the trust for the first object is separable from the other two objects. It is not the case where the trustee could have without breach of trust spent according to his pleasure any amount, big or insignificant, for any of three objects. The expenses on the first object were fixed. If in a proper suit it be found that the second and the third objects are not lawful, the Court would be able to set apart sufficient property to meet the requirements of the worship of the three deities and for the performance of the religious ceremonies. We accordingly hold that a trust was created by the Niyampatras, leaving open the question as to whether the second and third objects were lawful or not. We further hold that the Plaintiff is the managing trustee now and Bejoy was the managing trustee and that Defendant No. 1 is liable to make good out of assets of Bejoy inherited by him the amount misappropriated by Bejoy and the surplus income of the trust properties that remained in Bejoy's hand at the time of his death, unless the Plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation. 12. On the question of limitation we do not feel any difficulty. In our judgment sec. 10 of the Limitation Act applies. There was a trust for specific purposes and the trust properties had vested in Bejoy as one of the cotrustees and as managing trustee. The suit, so far as it is maintainable, is in essence a suit to follow trust property, e.g., the income of the trust properties, in the hands of Bejoy's legal representative. There was a trust for specific purposes and the trust properties had vested in Bejoy as one of the cotrustees and as managing trustee. The suit, so far as it is maintainable, is in essence a suit to follow trust property, e.g., the income of the trust properties, in the hands of Bejoy's legal representative. We do not wish to repeat the reasons for the view we are taking. Those reasons appear in the case of Maharaja Srish Chandra Nandy v. Supravat Chandra (3) at p. 314 to which decision one of us was a party. The result is that all the points raised by the Appellant are overruled and this appeal is dismissed with costs. Khundkar, J. I agree.