JUDGMENT Nasim Ali, J. - This is an appeal by the Corporation of Calcutta against the decision of the Judge of the Small Cause Court at Sealdah, dated the 27th September, 1940, under sec. 141 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. The facts which are not in dispute in this appeal are these: The partners of the Respondent firm are ten in number. They purchased premises No. 16, Alipore Road, in the year 1919. Thereafter this house was in the occupation of a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 663 up to the year 1924. In 1924 and 1925, there were additions and alterations in the house. After these additions and alterations, the house was occupied by the then junior resident partner of the Respondent firm. During the occupation of the house by this junior partner, the house was assessed, without any objection from the Respondent firm, by the Appellant Corporation under sec. 127 (b) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. Since 1937, the senior resident partner of the Respondent firm is in occupation of this house. In the year 1939, the Chief Executive Officer of the Appellant Corporation assessed the house again under sec. 127 (b) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. Being dissatisfied with this assessment, the Respondent firm appealed to the Court of Small Causes, Sealdah, under sec. 141 of the Calcutta Municipal Act on the ground that the house was "ordinarily let" within the meaning of sec. 127 (a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act and consequently the assessment of the house under sec. 127 (b) of the Act by the Appellant Corporation was illegal. 2. The Small Cause Court Judge has accepted the appeal and has set aside the assessment made by the Appellant Corporation under sec. 127 (b) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. Hence this appeal. 3. The material portion of sec. 127 of the Calcutta Municipal Act is this: For the purpose of assessing land and building to the consolidated rate, -- (a) the annual value of land, and the annual value of any building erected for letting purposes or ordinarily let, shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which the land or building might at the time of assessment reasonably be expected to let from year to year, less, in the ease of a building, an allowance of ten per cent. for the cost of repairs and for all other expenses necessary to maintain the building in a state to command such gross rent; and (b) the annual value of any building not erected for letting purposes and not ordinarily let shall the deemed to foe five per cent. on the sum obtained by adding the estimated present cost of erecting the building, less a reasonable amount to be deducted on account of depreciation (if any) to the estimated present value of the land valued with the building as part of the same premises. 4. For the purpose of assessment buildings are, therefore, classified under two heads: (i) buildings which are erected for letting purposes or ordinarily let and (ii) buildings which are not erected for letting purposes and are not ordinarily let. In other words, for the purpose of assessment the Act lays down two methods for determining the annual value of the land. So far as the first class is concerned the basis is the gross annual rent at which the building might be let from year to year less a certain percentage. In case of buildings of the second class, the rental basis is not to be followed, but the estimated cost of erecting the building, less a certain amount and the estimated present value of the land valued with the building. There is, therefore, a substantial difference between the two methods. 5. There is no evidence in this case to show that the house in question was erected for letting purposes. The word "let" in the section has not been defined in the Calcutta Municipal Act. The dictionary meaning of this word is "to grant use of for rent or hire." The words "the gross annual rent at which the land or building might at the time of assessment reasonably be expected to let from year to year" -- support the dictionary meaning. There is no reason to suppose that the word "let" has been used in different senses in the same section. I am, therefore, of opinion that the word "let" in the section means "granting the use of the land for rent." 6. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent firm is this: 7. The senior resident partner is in occupation of the house. He is not compelled to reside in this house, but is at liberty to reside in any other house. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent firm is this: 7. The senior resident partner is in occupation of the house. He is not compelled to reside in this house, but is at liberty to reside in any other house. He does not do any work in connection with the business of the firm from that house. He is not also bound to receive visitors in that house in connection with the business of the firm. It is also nobody's case that it is for the better performance of services as senior partner that he is required to reside in that house. His occupation, therefore, cannot be considered as that of a servant. His occupation must, therefore, be considered as that of a tenant. 8. There is no evidence in this case to show that the senior resident partner has been granted the use of the house for any cash rent. There is also no evidence in this case to show that he has been allowed to occupy this house in lieu of any services rendered by him to the firm. All that we find from the evidence in this case is that he is alone entitled to reside in this house and no other partner is occupying this house. We do not know under what arrangement with the other partners of the firm he is alone entitled to reside in this house. All that we know is that he is one of the co-owners of the house. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I see no reason why it should not be held that his occupation is that of one of the co-owners of the house and not that of a tenant. This view finds support from the definition of "occupier " in sec. 3, cl. 48 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. The Appellant Corporation was, therefore, right in assessing the building under sec. 127 (6) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. 9. It is not disputed in this case that if the building is liable to be assessed under sec. 127 (6) of the Act, the amount of annual value has been correctly determined. 10. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed. The decision of the Small Cause Court, Sealdah, is set aside and the assessment made by the Appellant Corporation is confirmed. The Appellants will get costs throughout this litigation. 127 (6) of the Act, the amount of annual value has been correctly determined. 10. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed. The decision of the Small Cause Court, Sealdah, is set aside and the assessment made by the Appellant Corporation is confirmed. The Appellants will get costs throughout this litigation. Hearing-fee in this Court is assessed at three gold mohurs. Blagden, J. 11. I should like to express my opinion about this case in my own way out of respect to the able argument addressed to us on behalf of the Respondents, but I regret that I do not think it necessary to explore many of the attractive by-ways which that argument opens out before us. For example, it is often a difficult question whether a servant living in premises of his employer is merely dwelling there as a servant or occupying them as a tenant. But once it is conceded that the occupier in this case is not a servant of the owners, the authorities on this question lose a lot of their relevancy. 12. The point, as points should be, is really very short. Every building in Calcutta, -- and for that matter anywhere else, -- either is "ordinarily let" or it is not". This proposition appears self-evident, but it is satisfactory to think that so far as Calcutta is concerned, we have the authority of the Privy Council for it. 13. Every building in Calcutta, which is "ordinarily let," is, unless exempt, assessable for rates under sec. 127 (a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. When a building is not "ordinarily let," the question arises whether it was "built for the purpose of letting." If so, it is assessable under sec. 127 (a), and if not, under sec. 127 (b), again unless it happens to be an exempt. 14. It is clearly axiomatic that the foregoing categories of buildings are all-embracing, and the only question here is whether No. 16, Alipore Road, is or is not, "let" within the meaning of the section. For if it is "let" at all, it is beyond question that it is "ordinarily " let. Neither side suggests that this edifice was " built for the purpose of letting." It is conceded that it is not exempt from assessment, and, further, it is conceded that if it has been rightly assessed under cl. For if it is "let" at all, it is beyond question that it is "ordinarily " let. Neither side suggests that this edifice was " built for the purpose of letting." It is conceded that it is not exempt from assessment, and, further, it is conceded that if it has been rightly assessed under cl. (b) at all, the amount of the assessment is correct. 15. It is in fact occupied by a Mr. Stokes, the senior partner in the Respondent firm resident in Calcutta. The partners in that firm are its owners. There is no agreement between Mr. Stokes and his co-partners that he shall live there for any fixed or ascertainable time. He makes to the partnership assets no periodical contributions, which, even by analogy, can be termed " rent," in cash or kind. He does employ himself in the partnership business, but not at his residence. I dare say (there is no evidence about it) that he may sometimes take business papers home for perusal, discuss business with a guest, or give telephonic instructions to his office, and so on; but no one suggests that the premises are in any real sense business premises. 16. The learned Judge of the Small Cause Court seems to have inferred that Mr. Stokes gives his services in consideration for his occupancy. But, in the absence of any evidence about this, I should myself have thought that the natural inference was that he worked in the firm's business by virtue of his partnership in the firm. 17. The partners have no present idea of permitting any one outside their own number to live in the building and, if Mr. Stokes were to move out to-morrow, doubtless another partner would probably move in. 18. Can an arrangement of this sort, between partners, be a "letting" within the meaning of sec. 127 of the Calcutta Municipal Act? The word in its ordinary, though not necessary, meaning connotes the relationship of landlord and tenant. See Mayor, Aldermen, and Councilors of the City of Westminister v. Johnson II K.B. p. 737.[1904] This relationship, in my opinion, is flatly inconsistent with that of co-owners. 19. It is clear from Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co. The word in its ordinary, though not necessary, meaning connotes the relationship of landlord and tenant. See Mayor, Aldermen, and Councilors of the City of Westminister v. Johnson II K.B. p. 737.[1904] This relationship, in my opinion, is flatly inconsistent with that of co-owners. 19. It is clear from Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co. I K.B.D. 324.[1905] that a partner cannot be a servant of his own firm, so as to be at once employer and employee, and the learned Counsel wisely did not seek to support the conclusion of the lower Court that he could. 20. Equally, I cannot see how he can be his own landlord. It is true that for many purposes a partner acting as such has two capacities, (see Chapter IV of the Indian Partnership Act, corresponding with sec. 5 and the following sections of the English Act). In relation to the firm's business, he can simultaneously bind by contract his partners as their agent and himself as a principal. It is also perfectly true that, like Henry VIII, he has a private life, and like everybody else "must live somewhere." But it does not follow that he can simultaneously act (a) as a partner and (6) as a stranger to the partnership. 21. However, the Respondents' main contention is that as rating is a highly technical subject, the word "let" should not be given its strict legal meaning but be interpreted in a more loose and popular sense. I think myself that it may well be that " the man in the street" would, or might, regard Mr. Stokes as a person to whom No. 16, Alipore Road had been "let." But I demur to the suggestion that " the man in the street" is the best person to construe a rating Act, or, in any way the final arbiter as to the correct use of language. I am confident that "the man in the street" usually thinks of a partnership as an entity distinct from its members, and, legally speaking, he is wrong in this. 22. Moreover, I cannot see why, because rating is a technical subject, we should make it more technical still by construing a word in an unusual way. Giving words a so-called " popular meaning " never simplifies anything; on the contrary it almost always complicates matters. 22. Moreover, I cannot see why, because rating is a technical subject, we should make it more technical still by construing a word in an unusual way. Giving words a so-called " popular meaning " never simplifies anything; on the contrary it almost always complicates matters. A statute is, after all, a legal document and if a word is used in such a document which has a strict legal meaning, it should, unless so to do makes absolute nonsense, be given that meaning. See as to this the re-(sic) decision of the House of (sic) Van Grutten v. Foxwell [1897] A.C. 658. (sic)eover prim facie a word is used (sic) throughout a statute, and nod here in one sense and there in a different sense. Elsewhere in the very section with which we have to deal, the word "let" is used in what must be (sic) proper and ordinary sense. As no (sic) Convenience whatsoever (beyond a Prone what greater assessment on No. 16, Alipore Road) results from applying this principle in the present case, I can see no reason to depart from it. Indeed, in sec. 3, cl. 48 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, the position of " an " -- not "the" but "an" -- "owner living in or otherwise using his own building" is contrasted with that, on the one hand, of a person liable to pay rent and on the other hand that of a rent-free tenant: and the two conceptions of owner and tenant do seem to me mutually exclusive. Mr. Stokes, in my opinion, exactly fits the description of "an owner living in.... his own building." He is not, in my opinion, a tenant, or, if it be material, a licensee either. For these reasons I agree in thinking that the premises in question are not "let" at all and consequently they cannot be "ordinarily " let: and, consequently, they have been rightly assessed, and I agree that the appeal must be allowed with the result my learned brother stated.