JUDGMENT Pal, J. - These seven appeals are by the Plaintiffs and arise out of seven suits for arrears of rent against seven sets of tenant Defendants in respect of seven different tenancies. It is an admitted fact that the Plaintiffs instituted the title suit No. 485 of 1915 in respect of the mehal in which the suit lands are situated against the Defendants or some of their predecessors. That suit ended in a compromise by the terms of which the Plaintiffs' title to the suit lands was declared and it was agreed that the Defendants would continue in possession of the same as tenants under the Plaintiffs. The present suits for rents are based on that compromise decree. The Plaintiffs' claims in these suits are contested by the Defendants on the ground inter alia that the said solenama required registration under sec. 17(1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act and as it was not so registered it was inadmissible in evidence and failed to create the relationship of landlord and tenant between the Plaintiffs on the one hand and the seven sets of Defendants on the other. 2. The certified copy of the solenama was filed in each suit and the same was admitted in evidence in each suit. It appears that no objection to their admissibility was taken in the Court of first instance. The first Court relying on the solenama decreed the Plaintiffs' suits. On appeal by the Defendants, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that the solenama not having been registered was not admissible in evidence and that excluding the solenama from the evidence there was no other evidence to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. He accordingly arrived at the conclusion that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in these suits. Consequently all the suits were dismissed. 3. The only point that arises for consideration in these seven appeals is whether the solenama required registration under the Indian Registration Act and whether having been left unregistered, it was admissible in evidence for the purpose of establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant. The relevant provisions of the compromise are contained in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the solenama. In para. The relevant provisions of the compromise are contained in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the solenama. In para. 4 it was agreed that the Plaintiffs' title to the extent of 5 annas 8 gandas in the relevant properties would be declared and he would get a decree for possession in respect thereof. Paras. 5 and 6 then proceeded as follows: It having been settled that the Plaintiff would get a decree declaring his title in 5 annas 8 gandas to the lands of schedule 1 excluding the lands off schedules 2 and 3, out of the said remaining lands of schedule 1, the area (measuring 3-4-11/4 and described in schedule 4 below are in the khas possession of the compromising Defendants. The Defendants will execute a kabuliyat in favour of the Plaintiffs within six months from the date of the decree for taking settlement of a jote under the Plaintiff within annual rental at the rate of Rs. 1-4-0 per Kedar for the bhiti lands and 10 annas per Kedar for paddy lands for a term of seven years in respect of the Plaintiff's 5 annas 8 gandas share of the lands in schedule 4. If the kabuliyat foe not given within the six months as aforesaid, the Plaintiffs will foe entitled to take khas possession of the lands in their 5 annas 8 gandas share toy executing this decree." 6. "In the lands of schedule one in respect of which it is settled that the Plaintiffs will get a decree for their 5 annas 8 gandas share, the Defendants are the owners of the remaining 10 annas 12 gandas share. The Plaintiff will institute a suit for partition of the same within a year from the date of the decree. In that partition suit, the lands of schedule one that are in the possession of the compromising Defendants would as far as possible be included in their respective sahams. The compromising Defendants will foe considered' to be tenants having jote under the Plaintiffs in respect of these lands in excess of their own share therein and will execute kabuliyat in favour of the Plaintiffs agreeing to pay rent at the above rates in respect of those lands. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge construed this solenama as constituting a lease for a term exceeding one year and consequently held that it required registration under sec. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge construed this solenama as constituting a lease for a term exceeding one year and consequently held that it required registration under sec. 17(1) (d): of the Indian Registration Act. The learned Subordinate Judge observed as follows: It has been contended on behalf of the Defendants Appellants in these appeals that the terms of each of these solenamas constitute a lease for a term exceeding one year and that accordingly each of them is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. It seems to me that this contention is well-founded and will prevail in the circumstances of the present case. A mere perusal of the terms embodied in para. 5 of each of these solenamas clearly indicates that there was the present demise in favour of the Defendants in these suits. They clearly go to show that the, tenancy was to take effect at once and the rental was reserved at a certain rate per year for the same. The term was for 7 years. In these circumstances, I am of opinion that each of these solenamas constituted a lease for a term exceeding one year and reserving a yearly rental within the (meaning of sec. 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act. That toeing so, it cannot be received in evidence as it has not been registered. The mere fact that each of the solenamas was incorporated in the decree or formed part of it does not make any difference inasmuch as being a lease under cl. (d) sub-sec. 1 of sec. 17 of the Registration Act, it does not come within the purview of the exception in the case of a decree under cl. (vi) of sub-sec. 2 of sec. 17 of that Act. Para. 5 of these solenamas cannot be construed as an agreement to lease. The kabuliat referred to therein was to be executed as evidence of the lease itself. Thus, upon a construction of each of these solenamas (Ex. 2 series) I have come to the conclusion that each of them operates as a lease for a term exceeding one year and reserving an yearly rental and it is not admissible in evidence for want of registration though it is incorporated in the decree. 5. Dr. Basak appearing for the Appellants in these appeals contends as follows: 1. 2 series) I have come to the conclusion that each of them operates as a lease for a term exceeding one year and reserving an yearly rental and it is not admissible in evidence for want of registration though it is incorporated in the decree. 5. Dr. Basak appearing for the Appellants in these appeals contends as follows: 1. On a proper construction of the solenama it did not constitute any lease but only amounted to an agreement to lease on the happening of a certain contingency. According to him the terms contained in para. 5 of the solenama show that the Defendants were to hold the lands as tenants only if they executed the kabuliyat within" six months from the date of the decree. The Plaintiffs were given a decree for khas possession in respect of these lands under the terms contained in para. 4 of the solenama. This decree was reiterated in para. 5 also and the Plaintiffs' right to get khas possession in execution of that decree was excluded only if the contingency contemplated by the terms of this paragraph happened, namely, if the Defendants executed the kabuliyat within six months from the date of the decree. If they did execute such a kabuliyat then it was agreed that the Plaintiffs' right to take khas possession in execution of the decree would be gone and in lieu thereof the Defendants' right as lessees under the Plaintiff would come into existence from the date of the happening of the contingency. According to him para. 6 also indicates the same thing and here the contingency contemplated is the institution of a partition suit within one year from the date of the decree. According to Dr. Basak, therefore, the terms of the solenama did not amount to any present demise and consequently were not a lease within the meaning of sec. 17 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act. 6. His next contention is that even assuming that the solenama constituted a present demise of the lands and thus required registration under sec. 17 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act, it would be excluded from evidence of any transaction affecting the property. But even then it can be taken in evidence for the collateral purpose of explaining the character of possession of the Defendants. 17 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act, it would be excluded from evidence of any transaction affecting the property. But even then it can be taken in evidence for the collateral purpose of explaining the character of possession of the Defendants. If admitted in evidence for this limited purpose, it would show that the Defendants have been in possession of the Plaintiffs' share in the lands since the date of the decree, asserting only a tenancy right under the Plaintiffs and therefore the Plaintiffs would be entitled to claim an assessment of fair and equitable rent in respect of these tenancies. 7. After carefully reading the solenama as a whole, I am unable to accept the contention of Dr. Basak that it did not amount to any present demise of the lands in favour of the Defendants. The Defendants were already in possession of the suit lands. The Plaintiffs' title thereto was no doubt admitted by the solenama but at the same time it was agreed that the Defendants would not have to part with their possession but would continue in enjoyment of the lands as before, only they would have to hold the same as tenants under the Plaintiffs. The condition contained in para. 5 that if the kabuliyat be not executed within six months from the date of the decree the Plaintiffs would be entitled to take khas possession by executing the decree was really a defeasance clause. In my opinion, it was settled by this solenama that the Defendants' tenancy would commence immediately from the date of the solenama and this tenancy would be defeated if they failed to execute the kabuliyat within six months. It appears from the plaints in the present suits that the Plaintiffs also understood the solenama in that way. In fact, in their plaints, the Plaintiffs based their claim for rent on the terms of the solenama asserting that by the solenama the tenancies were created. In my judgment, therefore, the construction put on the solenama by the learned Subordinate Judge is correct and the document required registration under sec. 17(1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act. 8. The next question is to what extent this document would be excluded from evidence and whether it can be taken in evidence for the purpose of showing the character of the Defendants' possession. The relevant provision is contained in sec. 17(1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act. 8. The next question is to what extent this document would be excluded from evidence and whether it can be taken in evidence for the purpose of showing the character of the Defendants' possession. The relevant provision is contained in sec. 49 of the Indian Registration Act. That section runs as follows: No document required toy sec. 17....to toe registered shall......(c) be received as evidence of any transaction to affect such property....unless it has been registered: provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act.....to be registered may be received.... as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.' 9. This is how the section stands after amendment by sec. 10 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929. Before this amendment, the section stood as follows: No instrument required by see. 17 to be registered shall be received in evidence in any civil proceedings in any Court....or shall affect any property comprised therein unless it shall have; been registered in accordance with the provision of this Act. 10. The section did not contain any proviso. In the case of Varatha Pillai v. Jeevarathammal L.R. 46 I.A. 285: S.C. 24 C.W.N. 346 (1910), the Judicial Committee held on a construction of this old section that a document which required registration but which had not been registered could be used for the collateral purpose of ascertaining the origin and nature of the possession of a party to a suit. Applying the principle underlying this decision, a document might be used to show that a party was in possession as a lessee. It could not however be used for the purpose of showing that the lease was a permanent one. The reason was that a permanent tenancy could not be created by adverse possession. [See Sree Satya Dhyanatirtha v. Raghunath 28 Bom. L.R. 743: S.C. AIR [1926] Bom. 384 (1925).]. In the case before the Judicial Committee A executed a deed of gift of immovable property to B and delivered possession of the property to him. The deed was not registered. [See Sree Satya Dhyanatirtha v. Raghunath 28 Bom. L.R. 743: S.C. AIR [1926] Bom. 384 (1925).]. In the case before the Judicial Committee A executed a deed of gift of immovable property to B and delivered possession of the property to him. The deed was not registered. More than 12 years after the date of the deed, C claiming to be A's heir sued B for possession, alleging that B held the property as a trustee or manager for A. B denied that he held the property as a manager or trustee for A and alleged that he had been in possession of the property as a donee from A. It is clear that as the deed of gift was not registered B could not claim title to the property as a donee. He, therefore, claimed the property by adverse possession and tendered the document to prove the nature of his possession; that is to show that he held the property in assertion of his own ownership as a donee. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the document was admissible in evidence for such a purpose. 11. It is contended on behalf of the Respondents that the amendment of the section has changed the law in this respect and that after the amendment an unregistered document affecting immovable property can be taken in evidence not for any collateral purposes but only for the purpose specified in the proviso added to the section. The relevant provision contained in the proviso is that an unregistered document may be received as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. Mr. Das Gupta appearing for the Respondents contends that the proviso thus avoids the expression "collateral purpose" and in its place uses the words "collateral transaction" and his contention is that as the solenama required registration, being a lease, the possession as a lessee is not the result of any collateral transaction but is the result of the very same transaction for which the document was executed but was left unregistered. 12. In my judgment, the amendment does not affect the principle underlying the decision of the Judicial Committee in the above case in the least. The proviso by specifying the cases in which an unregistered document may be received as evidence does not exclude its admissibility for a collateral purpose. 12. In my judgment, the amendment does not affect the principle underlying the decision of the Judicial Committee in the above case in the least. The proviso by specifying the cases in which an unregistered document may be received as evidence does not exclude its admissibility for a collateral purpose. It cannot be received as evidence of any transaction affecting immovable property. But as was held by the Judicial Committee in the above case its use for the purpose of establishing the character of possession does not amount to using it as evidence of any transaction affecting immovable property within the meaning of sec. 49. In my opinion, therefore, the document in question is admissible in evidence to show that though before the compromise decree the Defendants might have been in possession without any title and by assertion of a right of ownership in respect of the suit lands, after the said compromise decree the character of their possession became changed and they began to hold the lands only as tenants under the Plaintiffs. It is not the case of the Defendants that there was any subsequent change of "animus" on their part in this respect and there is no evidence of any such change of animus. Consequently, it must be held that the Defendants possessed these suit lands claiming to hold the same as tenants, though no legal tenancy was created by reason of the non-registration of the solenama. On completion of 12 years from the date of the decree, they completed their title as tenants under the Plaintiffs by adverse possession. The Plaintiffs thereafter would not be entitled to claim khas possession but would certainly be entitled to have fair and equitable rents assessed in respect of these lands. 13. In the facts and circumstances of this case I feel that for the sake of justice the Plaintiffs should be given an opportunity of amending their plaints converting the suits into those for assessment of fair and equitable rent and claiming arrears on the basis of the rents that will thus be assessed. In the result, I allow these appeals. The judgment and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the suits are remanded to the Court of first instance. In the result, I allow these appeals. The judgment and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the suits are remanded to the Court of first instance. The Plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their plaints claiming assessment of fair and equitable rent and modifying their claim for arrears on the basis of the rents that may thus be assessed. The Plaintiffs however must pay the costs of the Defendants hitherto incurred by them up to the Court of appeal below. Costs of these appeals will be borne by the respective parties. Further costs will be at the discretion of the Court below.