JUDGMENT Khundkar, J. - There is only one question involved in this suit, and it relates to the sufficiency of what is called a notice to quit which is really a notice to terminate a tenancy. The Plaintiff seeks to eject the Defendant from certain rooms, being room No. 4 on the ground floor, room No. 33 on the first floor, room No. 49 on the second floor and three kitchens on the roof, in premises No. 46, Cross Street in the town of Calcutta, and he claims to recover from the Defendant as mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 189-8 per month. 2. It would appear that originally the Defendant was a lessee of the rooms in question under the Kashimbazar Raj Wards' Estate to which the house No. 46, Cross Street, appertains. The lease expired but the Defendant held over, and was thereafter regarded as a monthly tenant. 3. On the 4th June, 1940, the Defendant received a notice from the Kasimbazar Raj Estate which purported to be a notice terminating his monthly tenancy from the 1st Sravan, 1347 B.S. This date corresponds to the 16th July, 1940. It so happens that some years ago, on the 14th of April, 1937, to be precise, the Plaintiff entered upon occupation of room No. 6 on the ground floor of this house as a month to month sub-tenant of the Defendant. He continued as such until 17th July, 1940, that is the day after that upon which the Plaintiff's tenancy under the Kasimbazar Raj Estate is alleged to have been terminated by the notice to quit. 4. On the 17th July, 1940, the Plaintiff took a lease for five years of all the rooms in question under the Kasimbazar Raj. Actually the lease was executed on the 25th August, 1941, but it was expressed to commence as from the 17th July, 1940, and the document was registered on the 27th August, 1941. 5. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant's tenancy having been terminated by the Kasimbazar Raj as from the 16th July, 1940, the Defendant is in the position of a trespasser, and hence this suit for ejectment and mesne profits. The defence is that the Defendant is still a month to month tenant under the Kasimbazar Raj, as the so-called notice terminating his tenancy was bad and ineffective in law. 6. The defence is that the Defendant is still a month to month tenant under the Kasimbazar Raj, as the so-called notice terminating his tenancy was bad and ineffective in law. 6. It is desirable that the whole of the notice which is in the form of a letter addressed to the Defendant and signed by the Manager of the Kasimbazar Raj Wards Estate should be set out: You are hereby informed that the period of tenancy granted to you as monthly tenant for a term of 5 years commencing from the Bysak 1342 B.S. expired in Chaitra 1346 B.S. and as you are still holding over as a monthly tenant you are hereby requested to make a fresh engagement on new terms by the 31st Ashar 1347 B.S. at the latest, failing which the tenancy will be determined from the 1st Sravan, 1347 B.S. You are in arrear for Rs. 867-8-0 besides the deeretal claim of Rs. 3,204 principal and you must have to clear off all arrears up to date immediately. I may grant you fresh lease for a further period of (?) years subject to Commissioner's sanction, if you agree to pay Selami equivalent to six months' rent minimum and rent fixed in round number according to position of the room. The Selami must be deposited by the end of Ashar, 1317 B.S. failing which you will have to vacate. In case of your agreeing to pay Selami by the date fixed you will have to execute and register an agreement. 7. For the purposes of the argument addressed to me, it is only the first paragraph of this letter that is of importance. This paragraph alleges that the Defendant is a monthly tenant; it requests him to enter into a fresh engagement with the Raj Estate by the 31st Ashar, 1347 B.S. and it states that failing that, the tenancy will be determined from the 1st Sravan, 1347 B.S. 8. Mr. Chatterjee who appears on behalf of the Defendant has contended that this is a bad notice for two reasons. Firstly, it is not a plain and unambiguous statement of an intention to terminate the tenancy but is no more than an invitation to take a fresh settlement, as it is called, of the rooms in question. Secondly, because it does not conform to the requirements of sec. Firstly, it is not a plain and unambiguous statement of an intention to terminate the tenancy but is no more than an invitation to take a fresh settlement, as it is called, of the rooms in question. Secondly, because it does not conform to the requirements of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the relevant portion of which for the purposes of the present argument is in these terms: A lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by 1.3 days' notice expiring with the end of the month of tenancy. 9. The notice says that the tenancy will be determined from the 1st Sravan, 1347 B.S., but the date upon which the month of tenancy was to expire is the previous day, that is the 31st Ashar, 1347 B.S. In support of his first point Mr. Chatterjee has relied upon certain passages at pp. 619-621 of the 7th Edition of Redman on Landlord and Tenant in which that learned author enunciates the principles deducible from a number of English cases. The rule which is stressed by Mr. Chatterjee in his argument is given by the author at p. 621 of this Edition in the following terms: A notice to quit must be positive, plain, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional intimation that a tenancy is to determine and absolutely come to an end as an existing tenancy on a given date. 10. Mr. Chatterjee's contention is that the notice in this case does not answer that description, that it is not a notice primarily intended to terminate a tenancy; it is in fact no more than an invitation to take fresh settlement and that the expression You are hereby requested to make a fresh engagement on new terms by the 31st Ashar 1347 B.S. 11. is the only operative part of this document. An Indian case upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Chatterjee is that of Sakhi Chand v. Ram Chandra Marwari 16. C.L.J. 561 (1912). In that case the landlord served a notice upon his tenant in the following terms: Whereas two almirahs and three shops are in your tenancy and the rent for the same has been paid up to Bhadra 1317, and as in respect of this some persons offer Rs. C.L.J. 561 (1912). In that case the landlord served a notice upon his tenant in the following terms: Whereas two almirahs and three shops are in your tenancy and the rent for the same has been paid up to Bhadra 1317, and as in respect of this some persons offer Rs. 27 a month, you are therefore informed by this notice that if from the 1st Aswin 1318 you want to keep the shops and almirahs in lease, you shall have to pay Bs. 27 a month. 12. It was held that the notice was not sufficient to terminate the tenancy. 13. Mr. Chatterjee further contends, as regards this branch of his argument, that if the letter in question does in fact purport to be a notice to quit, it is a provisional notice, the quitting being made conditional upon the tenant's failure to enter into a fresh engagement by the 31st Ashar, 1347. Mr. Chatterjee would go so far as to urge that a conditional notice to quit can never be a valid no ice. 14. Regarding the second branch of his argument Mr. Chatterjee wishes to stress the words "will" and "1st Sravan, 1347," in the last two lines of the first paragraph of the letter in question which run as follows: Failing which the tenancy will be determined from the 1st Sravan 1347. 15. Mr. Chatterjee contends that when a landlord by a notice says to his tenant--"your tenancy will be determined "--this contemplates the giving of a proper notice at a future time. He also contends that a no ice terminating this tenancy on the 1st of Sravan is necessarily bad because the last date of the month of the monthly tenancy was the previous day, namely, the 31st Ashar, 1347. 16. A number of cases have been relied upon in support of both branches of Mr. Chatterjee's argument to some of which it is necessary to make reference. 17. As regards the case of Sakhi Chand, v. Ram Chandra Marwari 16 C.L.J. 561 (1912) mentioned above, it is clear that the notice which was served upon the tenant in this case, was not a no ice which terminated the tenancy at all, because it did not call upon the tenant to vacate the premises either on the 1st Aswin, 1318, or any other date. 18. In Bradley v. Atkinson ILR 7 All. 18. In Bradley v. Atkinson ILR 7 All. 899 (1885) which was a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, reported in ILR 7 All 899, a person who had taken the tenancy of a room in a dwelling house on a monthly basis as and from the 1st July, 1882, was served by his landlord with a notice dated 11th December, 1882, in the following terms: If the rooms you occupy in the house No. 5, Thornhill Road, are not vacated within a month from this date, I will file a suit against you for ejectment, as well as for recovery of rent due at the enhanced rate. 19. It was held that the notice was bad. The no ice in this case did not state that the contract of tenancy would be regarded as terminated on the last day of the month of the tenancy. The notice was given on the 11th December and it was expressed to expire on the 11th January. 20. In Bijay Chandra Sinha v. Howrah Amta Light Ry. Co., Ltd. 38 O.L.J. 177 (1922) the notice which was a notice by the tenant to the landlord was of longer duration than 15 days, but it did not expire with the end of the month of tenancy. Here also it was held that for that reason the tenancy was not terminated by the notice. A passage from the judgment which appears at p. 182 of the report requires to be set out: "that tenancy could be terminated by a notice to quit as prescribed in sec. 106." (Transfer of Property Act). Under that section a lease of immovable property from month to month is "terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by 15 days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy." In the present case the notice which was served was no doubt a notice of longer duration than 15 days, but it did not expire with the end of a month of the tenancy. The notice was thus inoperative in law and the tenancy had not been legally terminated when the Defendant Company vacated the premises. 21. In Susil Chunder Neogy v. Birendrajit Shaw 38 C.W.N. 782 (1934), a lease for three years of certain premises in Calcutta, commencing from the 1st April, had expired, and the tenant was holding over. The notice was thus inoperative in law and the tenancy had not been legally terminated when the Defendant Company vacated the premises. 21. In Susil Chunder Neogy v. Birendrajit Shaw 38 C.W.N. 782 (1934), a lease for three years of certain premises in Calcutta, commencing from the 1st April, had expired, and the tenant was holding over. On the 24th September, the landlord served on the tenant a notice to quit "by the last day of the month of October." It was held that the notice was bad inasmuch as the lease expired at midnight on the 1st April, and each month of the tenancy by holding over, expired at midnight of the first day of the succeeding month. All I will here say by way of comment with regard to the notice in this case is to point cut that the notice was expressed to expire "by the last day of the month of October," which necessarily implied that as from the beginning of the 1st November the tenancy would no longer be in existence. 22. In Benoy Krishna Das v. Salsiccioni L.R. 59 IndAp 414: s.c. 37 C.W.N. 1 (1932) a lease for residential purposes of property in Calcutta was expressed to be from 1st June, 1921, for the ensuing four years. The tenancy continued after the four years, but on the 1 st February, 1928, the tenants gave notice to terminate it; the notice stated that it was one month's clear notice to take effect from that day and that possession would be given up on the 1st March. It was contended on behalf of the landlord that the notice was invalid because the month of the tenancy by reference to which the notice had to expire ended at midnight on February 29th. It was held that under sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act of 1882 the lease expired at midnight on the 1st June, 1925, that consequently the tenancy commenced at that time and the notice was one expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy and was therefore valid under sec. 106 of the Act. 23. It was held that under sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act of 1882 the lease expired at midnight on the 1st June, 1925, that consequently the tenancy commenced at that time and the notice was one expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy and was therefore valid under sec. 106 of the Act. 23. These cases show that a notice in order to be sufficient to terminate a tenancy must be clearly and precisely expressed so as to bring that termination about on the last day of a month of the tenancy, and that if it fails to do so it does not fulfil the requirements of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 24. One other case relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee may be mentioned. It is the English case of Gardner v. Ingram (6). Here there was an agreement for a lease for five years in which it was provided that the tenancy might be determined after expiration of the terra of three years out of the term of five years by six months' notice in writing expiring at the corresponding quarter day at which the tenancy commenced. 25. The tenant entered into possession on the 29th September, 1885, and on the 23rd March, 1888, gave notice to the landlord in the following terms: Kindly take notice that I intend to surrender to you the tenancy of this house on or before the 29th September, 1838. 26. It was held that this notice was equivocal in its terms and therefore bad. I might state at once that this case hardly applies because the notice with which it deals was a notice of the tenant's intention to surrender and not a notice which purported to put an end to the contract. Reference may be made in this connection to the various modes by which a lease of immovable property may be determined as set out in sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Express surrender described in cl. (e) of that section is an entirely different mode of determining the lease from that which is described in cl. (h). Surrender consists in the yielding up of the lessee's interests under the lease to the lessor by mutual agreement between them. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Express surrender described in cl. (e) of that section is an entirely different mode of determining the lease from that which is described in cl. (h). Surrender consists in the yielding up of the lessee's interests under the lease to the lessor by mutual agreement between them. The matter is made plain by Lord Coleridge, C.J., in a passage which appears at page 730 of the report: Now a notice to quit must be dealt with on its terms. Although no particular form need be followed, there must be plain, unambiguous words claiming to determine the existing tenancy at a certain time. This notice is not of such a character. The tenant merely says that he intends to surrender the lease on or before a particular date. The words mean that he intends to enter into negotiations as to something which cannot be done without his landlord's consent, that he will surrender the lease to the landlord if he will accept it, that is no notice to quit and there is an end of the case. 27. Mr. Ghose who appears for the Plaintiff has conceded in answer to the first branch of Mr. Chatterjee's argument that the notice with which we are concerned contains an option to negotiate for a new tenancy, but he has contended that does not make the notice bad. He has relied upon a number of cases which may briefly be noticed. 28. In Ahearn v. Bellman L.R. 4 Ex. Div. 201 (1879) the Defendant was a tenant to the Plaintiff from year to year of certain premises; the Plaintiff gave the Defendant notice in writing which read as follows: I hereby give you notice to quit and deliver up possession of the shop, premises and show-room now held by you as tenant from me on or before the first day of May next 1878. 29. The notice contained also the following clause: I hereby further give you notice that should you retain possession of the premises after the date before mentioned, the annual rental of the premises now held by you from me will be one hundred and sixty pounds, payable quarterly, in advance. 30. It was held by the majority of the Court that the notice to quit being otherwise sufficient, it was not rendered invalid by this additional clause. 30. It was held by the majority of the Court that the notice to quit being otherwise sufficient, it was not rendered invalid by this additional clause. Eramwell, L.J., after quoting the language of the notice observed as follows: I am not at all sure that that was not meant as a throat that the tenant would have to pay more rent; but I am inclined to think its more reasonable construction, especially when it contains the words 'payable in advance' is that it was an offer, and I think it would have justified the Defendant in treating it as an offer upon certain terms, which he might accept.... I think there would have been no difference if the notice had been given in one letter, and the offer made in another letter at a subsequent time. I cannot understand how it can be said that an offer of a new' tenancy in any way affects the validity of the notice to determine the old one; if anything, it corroborates it, because it supposes that the old tenancy is gone, otherwise there would be no competency to enter into a new one. 31. The notice with which we are concerned appears to me in the light of the decision just referred to, to fall into two distinct parts. There is a request to the tenant to come forward by the 31st of Ashar, 1347, and to make a fresh engagement with the Kasimbazar Raj Estate, and there is an intimation to him that if he does not do so, the tenancy will be determined from the 1st of Sravan, 1347. 32. I am satisfied that the two parts of this notice are sufficiently independent and each stands by itself. 33. In Bury v. Thompson [1895] 1 Q.B. 696 the Plaintiff sued for a declaration that the term of years created by a lease under which he was tenant to the Defendant had been determined by notice. 34. On October 21st, 1893, the Plaintiff wrote to the Defendant: I see that my first seven years will be determined on December 25, 1894.... I understand that the rent is 50 too high, and I shall not be able to stay unless some reduction is made. I give you an early intimation of this, so that you may have ample time to consider what course you would like to adopt. 35. I understand that the rent is 50 too high, and I shall not be able to stay unless some reduction is made. I give you an early intimation of this, so that you may have ample time to consider what course you would like to adopt. 35. Negotiations for a reduction of rent followed, and continued until within six months of the termination of the first seven years of the term, when the Defendant refused any reduction. It was held that the letter of October 21st, 1893, was a good notice to determine the term created by the lease. In the judgment of Lopez, L.J., it was stated that the letter clearly conveyed to the Defendant an intimation that it was not the Plaintiff's desire to stay on beyond the seven years of the terms of his first lease, 36. and that it was impossible to say that it did not convey to a landlord of ordinary capacity notice of the Plaintiff's desire not to continue the tenancy. 37. In Kitabhai Gandabhai v. Kalu Ghela ILR 22 Bom. 241 (1896), the Plaintiff gave the Defendants who held his land as annual tenants a notice in the following terms: Therefore, within two days from the receipt of this notice, meet us, increase the rent and give us a legal right, or in default, on the 31st March, 1892, we shall keep present two good men and take full possession of the said land with all trees, etc., on that day, and no contention of yours in that matter will avail; and if you raise a contention we shall have recourse to a regular suit to obtain possession, and you will be responsible, etc. 38. It was held that the notice was a good fine. 39. In Adolphe Shrager v. Emma Price 12 C.W.N. 1059 (1908), the Plaintiff who had an inter esse termini, gave notice to quit through his attorneys to the Defendant, a tenant in possession in the following terms: We give you notice that our client will require you to vacates and give up possession of the promises on the 29th February, now next, and that should you fail to comply with the request our client will take proceedings against you to eject you from the premises and he will charge you the sum of Rs. 350 per mensem as damages sustained by him during such period as you continue in possession after the 29th proximo. 40. It was held to be a good and clear notice to quit and the addition of the second portion of the notice did not vitiate it. 41. In the case of Sakhi Chand v. Ram Chandra Marwari 16 C.L.J. 561 (1912) already noticed above, Mookerjee, J., delivering the judgment of the Court made the following observation which appears at p. 562 of the report: Thus, it was laid down by the majority of the Court of Appeal in Aherne v. Bellman L.R. 4 Ex. Div. 201 (1879), that although a notice to quit must be clear and certain so as to bind the party who gives it and to enable the party to whom it is given to also act upon it at the time he receives it, it cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule of law that the notice to 'be given must not be optional. 42. It seems to me that the test which I have to apply to the notice in this case is a two-fold one. Firstly, does it show an intention on the part of the landlord to determine the tenancy, and secondly, is it so expressed as to convey that meaning without equivocation to the tenant to whom it is addressed? Now that tenant was admittedly one, a month of whose tenancy would expire on the 31st Asar. To such a tenant the words: failing which (a fresh engagement) the tenancy will be determined from the 1st Sravan 1347 B.S. 43. can, in my judgment, mean only one thing and that is that as from the 1st Sravan, 1347 B.S., he will no longer be a tenant of this landlord. 44. With regard to the first branch of Mr. Chatterji's argument I accordingly hold that this notice is not bad, simply because it contains a clause inviting the tenant to enter into a fresh engagement. 45. In regard to the second branch of Mr. Chatterji's argument which is that the notice is bad because it purports to put an end to the tenancy from the 1st Sraban, 1347 B.S., I do not think much assistance is to be derived from a study of the judicial decisions which have been cited on one side or the other. In regard to the second branch of Mr. Chatterji's argument which is that the notice is bad because it purports to put an end to the tenancy from the 1st Sraban, 1347 B.S., I do not think much assistance is to be derived from a study of the judicial decisions which have been cited on one side or the other. What is of importance is the language used in the notice. The notice says: "The tenancy will be de ermined from the 1st Sraban, 1347 B.S." Be it noted that the word used is not "on," but "from." What is meant by the expression "will be determined"? It means terminated or put an end to and the necessary implication is that when that happens it will no longer be in force. It this is borne in mind, then the meaning of the words: "from the 1st Sraban" becomes plain. These words relate to the implied statement that the tenancy will be no longer in force. Looked at in this way, the words "the tenancy will be determined from the 1st Sraban" can mean but one thing and that is that the tenancy will stand determined from the 1st Sraban. The same thing might also be expressed if the language was: the tenancy will be determined as from the 1st Sraban, which would, I think, mean that it would be terminated at the end of the day, on the 31st Asar. One does not really need to labour an argument based on grammatical analysis in a case like this. The landlord intended to put an end to the tenancy on the last day of Asar and the tenant, when he read this letter, knew that his tenancy would stand determined as and from the 1st Sraban. The letter not only contains, but conveys that intention. 46. I am satisfied that the notice to quit fulfils all the requirements of the law. There must, therefore, be a decree for ejectment. 47. As regards the question of the amount of mesne profits, learned Counsel are agreed that the correct figure would be Rs. 189-8 per month as from the 1st Sraban 1347 B.S., until possession is delivered. 46. There will accordingly be a decree for this amount. 48. The Plaintiff is entitled to his costs; certified for two Counsel. Mesne profits will carry interest at the usual rate of 6 per cent.