JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - Appeal No. 1813 has abated and is dismissed without costs. The question raised in the other appeals is whether the rate of rent is Rs. 2-12 a bigha or Rs. 2-4 a bigha. It is not disputed that the original rate was Rs. 2-4: but this was enhanced to Rs. 2-12 by mutual agreement. The contention of the Defendant Appellants is that this agreement contravenes the provisions of sec. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The question depends on the effect of sec. 20 (1A) of the Bengal Tenancy Act which is in these terms: A person shall be deemed, for the purposes of this section, to have continuously held land in a village, notwithstanding that such village was defined, surveyed and recorded as, or declared to constitute a village at a date subsequent to the commencement of the said period of twelve years. 2. The point at issue is whether this amendment explains the law as it is or whether it creates a new right. 3. To my mind the amendment merely explains the law as it is. It is very difficult to find anything in it to suggest that a new right has been created. It refers to and explains the meaning of an expression in sub-sec. (1) which might be interpreted in two different ways. 4. One test however is to see whether, if the amendment had never been made, the present Appellants could succeed. If new rights are created by it, they obviously could not. In my judgment there can be no question that they could succeed. The words used in sub-sec. (1) are capable of either interpretation. The practical difficulty in the way of the Appellants is to be found in certain decisions of this Court. For example, in the case of Janabali Molla v. The Port Canning and Land Improvement Company, Ltd. 40 C.L.J. 167 (1925). Rankin, J., indicated that he might be disposed to decide the point in favour of the view now taken by the Appellants if the matter had still been open. I can see no escape from the conclusion that, if sec. 20 (1A) had never been enacted, the present appeals might have been referred to a Full Bench with a final interpretation that sub-sec. (1) is in favour of the present Appellants. As it would have been possible for them to succeed without sub-sec. I can see no escape from the conclusion that, if sec. 20 (1A) had never been enacted, the present appeals might have been referred to a Full Bench with a final interpretation that sub-sec. (1) is in favour of the present Appellants. As it would have been possible for them to succeed without sub-sec. (1A) at all, the sub-section cannot b said to create a new right. 5. This was the view taken by S.K. Ghose, J., in the case of Kanak Kanti Roy v. Kripa Nath Gain 35 C.W.N.125 (1930); but difficulty has been created by the fact that his decision was reversed in the Letters Patent Appeal which followed. 6. Mr. Banerjee, however, contended firstly that the decision upheld the view of Ghose, J., that the new sub-section was explanatory and secondly that the new sub-section has been given retrospective effect by the decision itself. 7. There is really nothing to be said in support of the former argument. Clearly on such a view the appeal would have been dismissed. It is, however, clear from the judgment itself that the learned Judges have held that new rights were being created. For example, the learned Judges said this: Now it is plain upon a reading of the subsection that it took away such vested rights of the landlord as he might have had on the ground of that person not having been a settled raiyat. Then again: the legislature not having expressed any clear intention that the sub-section was declaratory of the law prior to the date when the sub-section came into force. 8. On the second point I am bound to say that I myself should find considerable difficulty in giving any retrospective effect to the new sub-section from the words actually used. The learned Judges did give it some retrospective effect, though they held that such effect could only be given to the extent that was made absolutely necessary by the words used. In my judgment the effect of the decision is very fairly set out in the head-note dealing with this point. 9. Now, Mr. Banerjee must go a great deal further than that, if he is to succeed. He must maintain that the retrospective effect is such that hundreds of agreements which were perfectly valid when they were made are rendered null and void. 9. Now, Mr. Banerjee must go a great deal further than that, if he is to succeed. He must maintain that the retrospective effect is such that hundreds of agreements which were perfectly valid when they were made are rendered null and void. There is nothing in the judgment which would warrant any such conclusion. 10. I am therefore of opinion that in view of the decision, which is binding on me, the Respondent is entitled to succeed though, if I may say so with great respect, I regret the result. 11. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. 12. I make no order as to costs. Leave to appeal under sec. 15 of the Letters Patent is refused.