JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmad, C.J., Braund and Dar, JJ. - This is a case received by this Court in revision from the District Magistrate of Benares and referred to a Full Bench by the late Chief Justice. 2. The facts, to the extent to which they have so far been ascertained, are comparatively simple. The complainant, Mohan Lal, is a resident of Benares. The first accused, who is the Applicant in revision, is the brother-in-law of the complainant and is a resident of Ramgarh, in Jaipur State. The second accused is the Munib of the first accused. 3. It appears that at the end of April, 1937 the complainant wrote to the first accused at Ramgarh to ask him to meet his wife (the sister of the first accused) at Benares and to receive from her a quantity of gold ornaments which he (the complainant) wanted to deposit with the first accused. The complainant has alleged that this deposit of the ornaments was to be a mere bailment for safe custody, while the first accused has asserted that it was really a deposit to secure a loan. However that may be, the first accused acknowledged the letter from Ramgarh on the 30th April and said that he was sending his Munib (the second accused) to Benares on the same day to meet his sister and to receive the ornaments. 4. This arrangement was apparently carried out and there is a letter dated the 5th May, 1937, from the first accused to the complainant informing him that his wife had arrived safely and acknowledging receipt of the gold ornaments. He added that they would be "sent on to you whenever you need them and demand them back." 5. Nothing more seems to have happened until early in 1940 when the complainant did in fact ask for the valuables to be returned. To this demand a letter was returned on the 1st February, 1940, by the Bombay advocate of the first accused repudiating the story of a deposit for safe custody and setting up a claim that the transaction was one of mortgage. On this criminal proceedings were started by the complainant by a complaint dated the 14th February, 1940, against both his brother-in-law and the Munib u/s 406 of the Indian Penal Code. On this criminal proceedings were started by the complainant by a complaint dated the 14th February, 1940, against both his brother-in-law and the Munib u/s 406 of the Indian Penal Code. That is the whole history of the matter, except that the preliminary objection of the first accused that he is not amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of the Courts at Benares has been rejected both by a first class Magistrate and by the District Magistrate. It, therefore, comes before us upon the question of jurisdiction. The only other matter of fact to notice at this stage is that the first accused voluntarily appeared before the Magistrate of Benares and indeed has himself filed a revision application before the District Magistrate and before us and has, in that sense, surrendered to the jurisdiction. 6. There appear to be two sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure with which we are concerned and we shall take the second of them first. Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 188. When a Native Indian Subject of Her Majesty commits an offence at any place without and beyond the limits of British India, or when any British subject commits an offence in the territories of any Native Prince or Chief in India, or when a servant of the Queen (whether a British subject or not) commits an offence in the territories of any Native Prince or Chief in India, he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within British India at which he may be found.... 7. There is nothing before us to show that the first accused is a "Native Indian subject of Her Majesty" or a "British subject" or a "servant of the Queen," and in our view, therefore, upon the facts as they are at present before us, there is no reason to suppose that Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has any application. 8. That brings us to Section 181(2) of the same Code which provides that: The offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained by the accused person or the offence 9. We agree that this section is material to the inquiry which the Criminal Court will be called on to make in this case. It will involve an exact consideration, on the facts of the case as they come out in evidence, of what precisely constituted the act of receiving the goods in question and where and in what circumstances that act took place; whether both accused, or only one of them, took part in that act; where and by whom, the ornaments were retained; where the duty of returning the goods (if they ought to have been returned) ought to have been performed and where the criminal act (if there was one) and its various component parts took place. These and other questions of fact will arise, which at present have not been fully explained and which, in any case, it would not be right for us to assume on the scanty material now before us and in the absence of the evidence which will be taken in the course of the hearing of the case. 10. Mr. Malaviya has referred us to a number of authorities Bapu Daldi v. The Queen (1926) 5 Mad. 23, King-Emperor v. Baldeo (1906) 3 ALJ 146, Mohru Lal v. Emperor 1936 A.W.R. 23 and Fateh Singh v. Emperor 1939 A.W.R. (H.C.) 784 relevant to Section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The view, however, which we take is that it would be premature and improper for us at this stage to entertain this revision any further than to direct that the trial of the Criminal case should now proceed, but without prejudice to all questions both of fact and law and whether as to jurisdiction or otherwise which the accused or either of them may at the trial be advised to take. At the trial which will now take place, every question including those raised on this revision, will remain open and will in the first instance be dealt with by the trial Court on the full facts as they emerge in evidence at the trial. In the meantime, lest any question should arise to the prejudice of the accused in consequence of our having been supposed to have finally disposed of this revision application, we shall in dismissing it reserve liberty to the Applicant to file a fresh application, if he is so advised. 11. In the meantime, lest any question should arise to the prejudice of the accused in consequence of our having been supposed to have finally disposed of this revision application, we shall in dismissing it reserve liberty to the Applicant to file a fresh application, if he is so advised. 11. We may perhaps add that there is, in the anxiety shown to quash proceedings at the earliest possible stage, a tendency to bring revision applications such as this before the Court before the facts have been fully ascertained. We point out that it is not the practice of this Court to take evidence in revision applications and that in many cases, of which class this is one, it is desirable that the trial should proceed and the question of law involved be dealt with in the regular way in the first instance as part of the trial.